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ABSTRACT	  	  	  In	  November	  2003	  the	  Massachusetts	  Supreme	  Judicial	  Court	  sent	  issued	  a	  controversial	  ruling	  in	  favour	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  Goodridge	  v.	  
Massachusetts	  Department	  of	  Public	  Health.	  	  	  In	  the	  decade	  preceding	  the	  
Goodridge	  decision,	  the	  majority	  of	  US	  states	  had	  passed	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act	  statutes,	  barring	  recognition	  of	  same	  sex	  marriage,	  and	  in	  the	  years	  following	  Goodridge	  many	  states	  passed	  constitutional	  amendments	  to	  define	  marriage	  between	  one	  man	  and	  one	  woman.	  	  What	  sets	  Massachusetts	  apart	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  United	  States	  on	  this	  issue?	  Through	  the	  analysis	  of	  Massachusetts	  newspaper	  reports,	  archival	  material,	  and	  interviews	  with	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  movement	  leaders,	  this	  dissertation	  explores	  the	  social	  and	  political	  factors	  in	  Massachusetts	  that	  enabled	  this	  state	  to	  emerge	  without	  a	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act	  in	  place,	  to	  win	  a	  legal	  battle	  to	  establish	  legal	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  and	  to	  fight	  off	  attempts	  to	  establish	  an	  amendment	  that	  would	  have	  overturned	  the	  Goodridge	  decision.	  	  Evidence	  indicates	  that	  1)	  cultural	  and	  demographic	  factors	  facilitated	  the	  early	  emergence	  of	  a	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  movement	  in	  Massachusetts,	  2)	  throughout	  the	  1970’s	  and	  1980’s	  activists	  gained	  strategic	  capacity	  and	  cultivated	  elite	  and	  grassroots	  allies,	  3)	  by	  the	  1990’s	  the	  victories	  of	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  movement	  established	  policy	  legacies	  and	  contributed	  to	  cultural	  change	  in	  favour	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  and	  families,	  and	  4)	  during	  the	  struggle	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  the	  2000’s	  activists	  successfully	  drew	  on	  the	  accumulated	  strategic	  skills,	  allies,	  and	  resources	  amassed	  over	  decades	  of	  movement	  activity	  to	  not	  only	  win	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  rights	  but	  to	  defeat	  several	  attempts	  by	  opponents	  to	  overturn	  legal	  recognition	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  	  This	  study	  illuminates	  the	  interaction	  between	  culture,	  structure,	  and	  agency	  and	  underscores	  the	  critical	  importance	  of	  engaging	  political	  structures,	  employing	  broad-­‐based	  cultural	  tropes,	  and	  making	  informed	  strategic	  decisions	  to	  advance	  movement	  success.	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  anyone	  whom	  I’ve	  forgotten,	  and	  I’m	  sure	  there	  are	  a	  few,	  thank	  you	  and	  please	  forgive	  my	  oversight.	  	  And	  to	  Lisa,	  you’re	  the	  best.	  	  Above	  all	  else,	  this	  is	  a	  love	  story.	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CHAPTER	  1:	  BACKGROUND	  	  Introduction	  	   The	  United	  States	  boasts	  one	  of	  the	  oldest,	  largest,	  and	  most	  heavily	  funded	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  movements	  in	  the	  world	  (Rimmerman	  2002,	  Rayside	  2008,	  Smith	  2009).	  	  Yet	  securing	  even	  basic	  rights	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  in	  America,	  such	  as	  protection	  against	  employment	  discrimination,	  has	  proceeded	  at	  an	  uneven	  pace.	  	  Establishment	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  varies	  greatly	  across	  the	  US,	  by	  region,	  by	  state,	  and	  within	  states.	  	  In	  addition,	  when	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists	  win	  battles	  to	  establish	  rights,	  these	  movement	  successes	  are	  often	  challenged	  by	  an	  equally	  well-­‐organized	  and	  well-­‐funded	  opposition	  movement	  (Fetner	  2008,	  Rayside	  2008,	  Rimmerman	  2020,	  Smith	  2009).	  	  	  This	  now-­‐familiar	  pattern	  creates	  a	  patchwork	  system	  of	  rights	  and	  benefits	  for	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  people	  where	  moving	  from	  one	  state,	  city,	  or	  municipality	  to	  another	  may	  leave	  a	  lesbian	  or	  gay	  person	  with	  more,	  less,	  or	  in	  many	  cases,	  no	  rights	  or	  protections	  under	  the	  law.	  	  Such	  is	  the	  case	  for	  everything	  from	  anti-­‐discrimination	  measures	  for	  lesbian,	  gay,	  bisexual	  or	  transgender	  (LGBT)	  persons,	  domestic	  partner	  benefits,	  adoption	  and	  parenting	  rights,	  and,	  most	  recently,	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  	  	  When	  the	  first	  court	  case	  concerning	  gay	  marriage	  was	  filed	  in	  Minnesota	  in	  1972	  by	  Jack	  Baker	  and	  James	  Michael	  McConnell,	  gay	  rights	  were	  not	  advanced	  enough	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  to	  emerge	  as	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a	  “threat”	  to	  the	  established	  order.	  The	  couple	  appealed	  the	  court	  decisions	  against	  them	  to	  the	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court,	  which	  dismissed	  the	  case	  without	  fanfare	  “for	  want	  of	  a	  substantial	  federal	  question”	  (Case	  2005).	  	  After	  this	  the	  issue	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  mostly	  lay	  dormant	  until	  1993	  when	  the	  Hawai’i	  Supreme	  Court	  ruled	  in	  favour	  of	  extending	  marriage	  rights	  to	  same	  sex	  couples	  in	  Baehr	  v.	  
Lewin.	  	  	  After	  decades	  of	  advances	  in	  LGBT	  rights,	  	  this	  ruling	  	  did	  indeed	  signal	  a	  real	  challenge	  to	  established	  gender	  and	  family	  order	  and	  gay	  marriage	  emerged	  at	  this	  time	  as	  a	  lightning	  rod	  of	  cultural	  and	  political	  contention.	  	  	  	  The	  Baehr	  ruling	  caused	  a	  flurry	  of	  legislative	  activity	  around	  the	  country,	  resulting	  in	  “Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act”	  (DOMA)	  statutes	  eventually	  being	  passed	  in	  41	  US	  states	  and	  at	  the	  federal	  level.	  	  	  These	  statutes	  restrict	  marriage	  exclusively	  to	  one	  man	  and	  one	  woman	  and	  assert	  that	  states	  holding	  DOMA	  statutes	  (as	  well	  as	  the	  federal	  government)	  will	  refuse	  to	  recognize	  a	  marriage	  between	  people	  of	  the	  same	  sex	  from	  any	  other	  state	  (http://www.domawatch.org/stateissues/index.html).	  	  The	  establishment	  of	  DOMA	  statutes	  and	  constitutional	  amendments	  banning	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  continued	  throughout	  the	  1990’s	  even	  though	  in	  Hawai’i	  the	  Baehr	  decision	  was	  overturned	  by	  popular	  referendum	  and	  subsequent	  approval	  of	  a	  	  state	  constitutional	  amendment	  against	  same	  sex	  marriage.	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The	  topic	  of	  gay	  marriage	  simmered	  through	  the	  late	  1990’s	  and	  into	  the	  early	  2000’s.	  	  By	  2003	  most	  states	  had	  passed	  DOMA	  statutes	  and	  those	  that	  had	  not	  could	  rely	  on	  the	  federal	  level	  DOMA	  (although	  Hawai’i,	  Alaska,	  and	  Nevada	  went	  a	  step	  further	  in	  amending	  their	  state	  constitutions)	  and	  this	  seemed	  to	  settle	  the	  issue	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  for	  most	  Americans.	  	  	  There	  was	  considerable	  controversy	  when	  Vermont	  passed	  a	  civil	  unions	  bill	  in	  2000,	  but	  nothing	  like	  the	  fury	  unleashed	  in	  November	  2003	  when	  the	  Massachusetts	  Supreme	  Judicial	  Court	  ruled	  in	  favour	  of	  plaintiffs’	  right	  to	  marry	  their	  same-­‐sex	  partners	  in	  Goodridge	  v.	  Department	  of	  
Public	  Health	  (Rayside	  2008,	  Smith	  2009).	  	  Like	  Baehr	  before	  it,	  the	  
Goodridge	  decision	  whipped	  up	  a	  national	  fervour	  against	  legal	  recognition	  of	  same-­‐sex	  relationships,	  and	  in	  a	  critical	  election	  cycle	  the	  “threat”	  of	  gay	  marriage	  earned	  special	  mention	  by	  President	  G.	  W.	  Bush	  in	  his	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  Address	  as	  well	  as	  a	  prominent	  place	  in	  the	  campaign	  rhetoric	  of	  politicians	  across	  the	  country.	  	  By	  election	  day	  2004,	  thirteen	  states	  had	  amended	  their	  constitutions	  to	  limit	  marriage	  to	  one	  man	  and	  one	  woman.	  	  According	  to	  the	  National	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Task	  Force,	  as	  of	  January	  2012	  there	  are	  thirty	  eight	  states	  that	  have	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act	  statutes	  prohibiting	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  twenty	  nine	  states	  with	  constitutional	  amendments	  that	  ban	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  six	  states	  where	  legally	  recognized	  marriages	  may	  be	  performed	  for	  same-­‐sex	  partners	  (plus	  the	  District	  of	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Columbia),	  four	  states	  that	  will	  recognize	  same-­‐sex	  marriages	  performed	  in	  other	  states,	  and	  thirteen	  states	  that	  offer	  some	  limited	  rights	  and/benefits	  to	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  (The	  National	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Task	  Force	  2011).	  Because	  there	  are	  some	  states	  that	  have	  DOMA	  and/or	  a	  constitutional	  amendment	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  offer	  limited	  benefits	  to	  same-­‐sex	  couples,	  the	  numbers	  listed	  above	  are	  greater	  than	  the	  number	  of	  US	  states.	  	  In	  this	  complicated	  and	  messy	  picture	  Massachusetts	  emerges	  as	  a	  special	  case.	  	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  Baehr,	  one	  or	  more	  pieces	  of	  anti-­‐gay-­‐marriage	  legislation	  were	  passed	  in	  the	  United	  States	  nearly	  every	  year	  	  from	  1993-­‐2002	  (The	  National	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Task	  Force	  2011).	  	  	  Massachusetts	  not	  only	  fought	  off	  several	  attempts	  at	  establishing	  DOMA	  starting	  in	  the	  late	  1990’s,	  but	  later	  emerged	  as	  the	  first	  (and	  for	  several	  years	  the	  only)	  state	  to	  recognize	  full	  and	  equal	  marriage	  rights	  for	  its	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  citizens	  in	  November	  2003.	  	  Most	  importantly,	  Massachusetts	  activists	  successfully	  defended	  marriage	  equality	  against	  forces	  seeking	  to	  dismantle	  this	  new	  and	  hard-­‐won	  right.	  When	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  was	  moving	  to	  restrict	  the	  marriage	  rights	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people,	  how	  did	  Massachusetts	  buck	  this	  trend?	  	  Answering	  this	  question	  requires	  attention	  to	  several	  areas	  of	  inquiry:	  	  1) What	  unique	  array	  of	  social	  and	  cultural	  forces	  shape	  the	  field	  of	  play	  for	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage	  in	  this	  state?	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2) What	  particular	  set	  of	  institutional	  and	  political	  structures,	  opportunities,	  and/or	  constraints	  must	  social	  actors	  contend	  with,	  	  whether	  for	  or	  against	  same	  sex	  marriage?	  	  3) How	  did	  supporters	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  develop	  successful	  
strategies	  to	  win	  their	  protracted	  battle	  for	  marriage	  equality?	  	  	  	  To	  answer	  these	  questions	  I	  use	  historical	  data	  gathered	  from	  both	  mainstream	  and	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  newspapers,	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  archival	  material,	  and	  interviews	  with	  marriage	  equality	  proponents	  active	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  	  	  	  Many	  scholars	  have	  sought	  to	  analyze	  the	  exceptional	  resistance	  to	  gay	  marriage	  in	  the	  US	  (Adam	  2003,	  Cahill	  2007,	  McVeigh	  and	  Diaz	  2009,	  Rayside	  2008,	  Rimmerman	  2007,	  Schwartz	  and	  Tatalovich	  2009,	  Smith	  2009).	  	  They	  have	  developed	  an	  array	  of	  variables	  that	  explain	  why	  such	  fierce	  opposition	  to	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  exists.	  	  Few	  scholars	  have	  questioned	  how	  battles	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  are	  won	  (in	  the	  cases	  where	  such	  battles	  have	  been	  won).	  	  	  By	  first	  mapping	  these	  patterns	  of	  resistance,	  we	  can	  later	  explore	  how	  Massachusetts	  marriage	  proponents	  successfully	  rearranged	  these	  patterns	  to	  achieve	  marriage	  equality.	  Same	  Sex	  Marriage	  in	  the	  US	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  looking	  at	  why	  the	  United	  States	  seems	  particularly	  resistant	  to	  establishing	  legal	  rights	  for	  same	  sex	  couples,	  there	  are	  several	  explanations.	  	  These	  explanations	  generally	  focus	  on	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political,	  religious,	  and	  cultural	  factors	  and	  how	  these	  variables	  exert	  pressure	  on	  political	  institutions.	  	  Based	  on	  previous	  research,	  a	  profile	  emerges	  of	  regions	  where	  opposition	  to	  gay	  marriage	  is	  strongest.	  	  Instructive	  here	  is	  Bayliss	  Camp’s	  (2006)	  county	  level	  analysis	  of	  anti-­‐gay	  marriage	  referenda	  passed	  during	  the	  2004	  election;	  such	  referenda	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  pass	  in	  counties	  with	  higher	  percentages	  of	  evangelical	  Protestants	  and	  Republican	  voters,	  lower	  levels	  of	  education	  and	  income,	  and	  fewer	  residents	  in	  urban	  areas.	  	  	  	  These	  patterns	  are	  corroborated	  by	  other	  studies	  and	  polls.	  	  Variables	  like	  age,	  race,	  religious	  beliefs,	  education,	  income,	  and	  political	  party	  affiliation	  have	  all	  been	  connected	  one	  way	  or	  another	  to	  support	  or	  resistance	  to	  gay	  marriage	  (Pew	  Forum	  on	  Religion	  and	  Public	  Life	  2009).	  	  	  	  These	  identifiers	  are	  more	  than	  mere	  demographics;	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  particular	  religious	  groups,	  for	  example,	  exerts	  an	  influence	  on	  culture	  that	  may	  very	  well	  impact	  the	  policy	  implication	  for	  LGBT	  rights	  initiatives,	  including	  marriage.	  	  Religious	  beliefs	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  American	  politics	  and	  are	  consistently	  correlated	  with	  gay	  marriage,	  as	  well	  (Fetner	  2008,	  Rayside	  2008,	  Smith	  2009).	  	  The	  influence	  of	  conservative	  religious	  denominations	  in	  American	  politics	  has	  been	  described	  as	  “unusual”	  in	  terms	  of	  “the	  resources	  marshalled	  for	  Christian	  advocacy,	  in	  the	  strength	  of	  religious	  conservatism	  and	  its	  
	  	   7	  
organizational	  presence,	  and	  in	  the	  persistence	  of	  raucous	  debate	  over	  the	  role	  of	  religion	  in	  the	  public	  arena”	  (Rayside	  and	  Wilcox	  2011:	  5).	  Evangelical	  Protestants	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  oppose	  same	  sex	  marriage	  and	  Unitarian	  Universalists	  and	  Reform	  Jews	  are	  among	  the	  most	  likely	  to	  support	  it,	  while	  groups	  like	  mainline	  Protestants	  and	  Catholics	  are	  more	  closely	  divided	  over	  the	  issue	  (Hull	  2006,	  Pew	  Research	  Center	  2009).	  	  The	  relatively	  large	  percentage	  of	  evangelical	  Christians	  in	  the	  United	  States	  has	  long	  been	  used	  as	  a	  an	  explanatory	  variable	  in	  discussions	  of	  prominent	  American	  cultural	  values	  and	  beliefs	  (Lipset	  1996),	  including	  beliefs	  about	  homosexuality	  and	  gay	  marriage	  (Adam	  2003,	  Rayside	  2008,	  Schwartz	  and	  Tatalovich	  2009,	  Smith	  2009).	  	  	  Evangelical	  believers	  comprise	  26%	  of	  the	  population	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  making	  it	  the	  largest	  religious	  group	  in	  the	  country	  	  (Pew	  Forum	  on	  Religion	  and	  Public	  Life	  2009).	  	  	  Perhaps	  more	  important	  than	  numbers	  alone	  is	  the	  power	  this	  group	  wields	  in	  the	  political	  arena,	  particularly	  on	  issues	  of	  social	  policy	  like	  abortion	  and	  gay	  rights.	  	  These	  two	  issues	  have	  emerged	  as	  arguably	  the	  most	  divisive	  issues	  in	  American	  politics.	  	  In	  turn,	  these	  issues	  energized	  a	  formerly	  sectarian	  group	  of	  believers,	  evangelical	  Christians,	  into	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  voting	  blocks	  in	  American	  politics	  (Fetner	  2008,	  Schwartz	  and	  Tatalovich	  2009).	  	  	  The	  political	  power	  of	  evangelical	  Christians	  is	  unique	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  	  In	  Canada,	  for	  example,	  religious	  conservatives	  are	  much	  less	  influential.	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Even	  the	  current	  Prime	  Minister	  Stephan	  Harper,	  an	  evangelical	  Christian	  himself,	  “has	  remained	  largely	  silent	  on	  his	  religious	  beliefs”	  (Rayside	  and	  Wilcox	  2011:	  4).	  	  	  American	  evangelicals	  are	  often	  strident	  proponents	  of	  “traditional	  family	  values”.	  This	  translates	  to	  a	  political	  platform	  advocating	  the	  use	  of	  government	  policy	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  	  patriarchal,	  nuclear	  family	  as	  the	  primary	  family	  form.	  	  For	  those	  who	  espouse	  the	  family	  values	  platform,	  gay	  marriage	  is	  just	  the	  most	  recent	  in	  a	  long	  line	  of	  perceived	  threats	  to	  the	  nuclear	  family	  including,	  but	  not	  limited	  to,	  the	  sexual	  revolution,	  feminism,	  abortion	  rights,	  gay	  rights,	  single	  parenting,	  and	  divorce	  (Hull	  2006,	  Fetner	  2008,	  Rimmerman	  2002).	  	  	  While	  many	  evangelical	  Christians	  advocate	  the	  “family	  values”	  	  platform,	  one	  need	  not	  be	  evangelical	  to	  support	  such	  policies	  at	  the	  ballot	  box.	  Though	  evangelicals	  may	  lead	  the	  charge	  against	  gay	  rights	  in	  general	  and	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  particular,	  they	  clearly	  understand	  how	  to	  frame	  their	  arguments	  in	  ways	  that	  foster	  broad	  support.	  This	  way	  their	  claims	  will	  resonate	  with	  “individuals	  leery	  of	  imposing	  one	  set	  of	  religious	  values	  on	  all	  citizens”	  (McVeigh	  and	  Diaz	  2009).	  	  A	  so-­‐called	  “values	  voter”	  may	  come	  from	  any	  religious	  group	  or	  race	  or	  social	  class	  or	  other	  demographic	  category,	  and	  gay	  marriage	  	  as	  a	  moral	  issue	  certainly	  has	  cross-­‐over	  demographic	  appeal.	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Many	  Americans,	  not	  just	  Christian	  and	  not	  just	  conservative,	  are	  unsettled	  by	  living	  in	  a	  rapidly	  changing	  society	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  this	  can	  cause	  people	  to	  imagine	  a	  mythic	  past	  when	  things	  seemed	  simpler,	  purer,	  the	  future	  more	  certain,	  and	  communities	  more	  stable.	  	  This	  mythic	  past	  often	  involves	  beliefs	  about	  a	  time	  when	  gender,	  family,	  community,	  and	  race	  relations	  were	  clear	  cut-­‐-­‐	  even	  if	  imperfect.	  	  Those	  most	  likely	  to	  feel	  the	  pinch	  of	  shifting	  economic	  structures	  and	  to	  feel	  threatened	  by	  changing	  family	  norms	  tend	  to	  have	  less	  education	  and	  fewer	  employment	  opportunities.	  	  This	  fuels	  the	  desire	  to	  reach	  back	  to	  a	  time	  when	  the	  nation	  and	  its	  families	  were	  strong,	  and	  supported	  by	  “traditional	  family	  values”.	  Indeed,	  this	  is	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  conclusions	  of	  Arlene	  Stein’s	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  	  the	  controversy	  over	  a	  gay	  rights	  bill	  in	  small	  town	  Oregon	  (a	  place	  she	  calls	  “Timbertown”).	  	  	  	  Stein	  (2001)	  characterizes	  most	  residents	  of	  “Timbertown”	  as	  decent,	  hard	  working	  people,	  	  many	  of	  them	  displaced	  workers	  who	  have	  lost	  jobs	  and	  livelihoods	  as	  part	  of	  larger	  economic	  shifts	  over	  which	  they	  have	  no	  control.	  	  There	  was	  a	  time	  when	  the	  men	  in	  this	  community	  could	  count	  on	  walking	  out	  of	  high	  school	  and	  into	  a	  job	  in	  the	  logging	  industry,	  a	  good	  paying	  job	  with	  health	  care	  benefits	  and	  a	  pension	  plan,	  a	  job	  where	  a	  man	  could	  put	  in	  an	  ‘honest	  day’s	  work’	  and	  get	  an	  ‘honest	  day’s	  pay’,	  and	  earn	  enough	  to	  support	  a	  family	  so	  his	  wife	  could	  ‘stay	  home	  with	  the	  kids’.	  	  Now	  this	  way	  of	  life	  is	  under	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threat	  by	  those	  perceived	  to	  be	  outsiders:	  environmentalists	  who	  would	  rather	  protect	  owls	  than	  jobs,	  yuppies	  who	  move	  to	  the	  country	  for	  small	  town	  life	  only	  to	  replace	  the	  local	  hardware	  store	  with	  a	  yoga	  studio,	  and	  feminists	  and	  minority	  group	  members	  challenging	  the	  traditional	  male-­‐breadwinner	  family	  structure	  and	  taking	  jobs	  from	  deserving	  white	  men	  with	  their	  affirmative	  action	  programs.	  	  And	  now	  the	  gays	  want	  rights,	  too?	  	  Enough	  is	  enough,	  many	  Timbertowners	  say.	  	  	  	  For	  the	  men	  and	  women	  of	  Timbertown	  perhaps	  their	  anger	  is	  misplaced,	  but	  their	  problems	  are	  viscerally	  real.	  	  The	  people	  of	  Timbertown	  felt	  they	  had	  listened…to	  blacks,	  women,	  lesbians,	  and	  gays	  whine	  about	  their	  problems.	  	  But	  who	  was	  talking	  about	  their	  pain?	  Who	  was	  talking	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  couldn’t	  support	  their	  families,	  that	  their	  wives	  had	  to	  go	  to	  work,	  that	  their	  houses	  and	  cars	  were	  being	  repossessed,	  that	  they	  were	  forced	  to	  abandon	  their	  families,	  their	  communities	  in	  search	  of	  work,	  and	  that	  the	  jobs	  they	  could	  get	  paid	  pitifully	  low	  wages,	  and	  offered	  few	  benefits	  or	  guarantees?	  (Stein	  2001:	  116)	  	  Because	  of	  this,	  even	  Timbertown	  residents	  who	  did	  not	  strongly	  identify	  with	  Christian	  themes	  could	  identify	  with	  the	  anti-­‐gay	  rights	  rhetoric	  of	  “special	  rights”.	  Those	  who	  opposed	  the	  gay	  rights	  measure	  in	  Oregon	  were	  successful	  in	  portraying	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  as	  “strangers”	  and	  “others”	  unfairly	  demanding	  superior	  power	  through	  minority	  group	  status,	  and	  threatening	  the	  foundations	  of	  hard	  work	  and	  traditional	  family	  values	  	  subscribed	  to	  by	  the	  townspeople.	  In	  many	  ways,	  Stein’s	  observations	  characterize	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the	  struggle	  for	  gay	  rights	  in	  communities	  across	  the	  United	  States,	  including	  the	  struggle	  for	  marriage	  equality.	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Similarly,	  other	  scholars	  have	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  general	  attitudes	  about	  race,	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  in	  general	  are	  often	  connected	  to	  beliefs	  about	  same	  sex	  marriage	  in	  particular.	  	  	  Taking	  a	  macro-­‐level	  view,	  Barry	  Adam	  (2003:	  795)	  asserts	  that	  in	  America,	  “national	  identity	  and	  pride	  are	  caught	  up	  with	  masculinist	  ideologies	  of	  strength	  and	  belligerence…lesbians	  and	  gay	  men	  are	  cast	  as	  transgressors	  upon	  the	  sacred	  space	  of	  gender	  and	  national	  identity”.	  	  Evidence	  for	  this	  view	  can	  be	  found	  in	  resistance	  to	  allowing	  gays	  to	  serve	  openly	  in	  the	  military	  and	  the	  habitual	  linking	  of	  homosexuality	  to	  national	  security	  crises,	  notably	  during	  Cold	  War	  McCarthyism,	  when	  gays	  were	  expunged	  from	  public	  service	  and	  blacklisted	  in	  many	  other	  industries.	  	  Gays	  were	  scapegoated	  again	  during	  the	  gay	  marriage	  debate	  in	  the	  2004	  election	  cycle.	  	  At	  a	  time	  where	  national	  security	  and	  the	  war	  in	  Iraq	  were	  primary	  voter	  concerns,	  President	  Bush	  made	  the	  link	  between	  traditional	  gender	  roles	  and	  national	  security	  explicit	  in	  his	  2004	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  Address	  when	  he	  said,	  “A	  strong	  America	  must	  value	  the	  institution	  of	  marriage”,	  and,	  “Our	  nation	  must	  defend	  the	  sanctity	  of	  marriage.”	  	  Here	  Bush’s	  defensive	  stance	  characterized	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  as	  a	  threat	  not	  just	  to	  individual	  family	  units	  but	  to	  the	  nation	  itself	  .	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More	  recently,	  McVeigh	  and	  Diaz	  (2009:	  895)	  find	  evidence	  that	  “traditional	  sex	  and	  gender	  roles	  within	  a	  community	  can	  promote	  opposition	  to	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  a	  way	  that	  leads	  many	  to	  see	  a	  breakdown	  in	  social	  organization	  as	  both	  a	  cause	  and	  consequence	  of	  non-­‐traditional	  values,	  including	  values	  that	  promote	  tolerance	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage”.	  	  	  These	  findings	  illustrate	  how	  claims	  made	  by	  opponents	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  (positioning	  gay	  marriage	  as	  a	  “threat	  to	  the	  family”,	  exhorting	  voters	  to	  “protect	  the	  children”	  from	  gay	  marriage)	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  resonate	  with	  people	  embedded	  in	  cultures	  and	  communities	  where	  support	  for	  traditional	  gender	  roles	  is	  very	  strong.	  	  When	  this	  	  type	  of	  logic	  is	  applied	  to	  establishing	  LGBT	  rights,	  from	  anti-­‐discrimination	  policies	  to	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  to	  marriage,	  gays	  and	  lesbians	  are	  frequently	  positioned	  as	  one	  more	  undeserving	  ‘other’	  demanding	  unearned	  benefits	  and	  privileges	  from	  society	  because	  of	  an	  “immoral”	  lifestyle	  choice	  (Adam	  2003,	  Cahill	  2007,	  Stein	  2001).	  	  	   A	  picture	  emerges	  	  from	  these	  demographic	  and	  cultural	  characteristics	  that	  illuminates	  the	  seat	  of	  resistance	  to	  same	  sex	  marriage	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Yet,	  while	  the	  gay	  marriage	  panic	  influenced	  opinion	  and	  policy	  on	  same	  sex	  relationships	  throughout	  the	  1990’s,	  Massachusetts	  emerged	  in	  2003	  with	  the	  first	  legal	  recognition	  of	  same	  sex	  couples	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  The	  question	  then	  becomes	  whether	  a	  different	  set	  of	  variables	  was	  at	  play	  in	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Massachusetts	  that	  enabled	  activists	  there	  to	  successfully	  turn	  the	  tide	  against	  the	  resistance	  to	  gay	  marriage	  seen	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Explanations	  for	  Social	  Movement	  Success	  	   There	  is	  a	  range	  of	  theories	  explaining	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  social	  movements,	  including	  the	  movement	  for	  advancement	  of	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  same	  sex	  marriage.	  	  	  Many	  of	  these	  social	  movement	  theories	  focus	  on	  political,	  structural,	  or	  institutional	  factors	  and	  their	  influence	  on	  movement	  outcomes.	  	  	  	  These	  explanations	  analyse	  social	  actors’	  ability	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  political	  opportunities	  and/or	  openings	  in	  political	  systems	  to	  explain	  the	  success	  of	  social	  movements,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  movement’s	  quest	  for	  legal	  marriage	  (Buechler	  2000,	  McAdam,	  McCarthy	  and	  Zald	  1996,	  Tarrow	  1998).	  	  	  Also,	  Miriam	  Smith	  (2008:	  ix)	  analyses	  the	  gay	  marriage	  movement	  in	  the	  US	  using	  historical	  institutionalism,	  a	  method	  of	  	  “focusing	  on	  the	  role	  of	  political	  institutions	  and	  structures	  and	  the	  legacies	  of	  previous	  polities	  in	  shaping	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  movement	  over	  time”.	  	  Here	  I’ll	  look	  at	  how	  political	  structures	  and	  opportunities	  shape	  LGBT	  activism	  and	  the	  gay	  marriage	  movement,	  and	  how	  marriage	  proponents	  make	  strategic	  choices	  within	  particular	  cultures	  and	  structures	  to	  advance	  their	  cause.	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   Explanations	  for	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  social	  movements	  have	  been	  dominated	  by	  theories	  focusing	  on	  factors	  like	  political	  processes	  and	  opportunities,	  mobilising	  structures,	  resource	  mobilization,	  and	  framing	  (McAdam,	  McCarthy,	  and	  Zald	  1996,	  Tarrow	  1998).	  	  	  While	  these	  theories	  privilege	  structural	  explanations	  for	  movement	  success,	  more	  recent	  strands	  of	  social	  movement	  theory	  have	  sought	  to	  build	  more	  comprehensive	  theoretical	  positions	  which	  include	  analysis	  of	  broader	  cultural	  factors	  that	  movements	  must	  contend	  with,	  as	  well	  as	  emphasizing	  the	  agency	  and	  strategic	  choices	  made	  by	  social	  movement	  actors	  themselves	  (see	  Goodwin	  and	  Jasper	  2004,	  Mansbridge	  and	  Morris	  2001).	  	  	  	  Most	  scholars	  agree	  that	  a	  “synthetic”	  approach	  is	  needed	  to	  fully	  explain	  the	  emergence,	  rise,	  and	  fall	  of	  social	  movements	  within	  the	  particular	  structural,	  cultural,	  and	  historical	  locations	  in	  which	  such	  movements	  are	  inevitably	  embedded	  (McAdam	  1996,	  Poletta	  2004,	  Smith	  2009).	  	  	  This	  is	  indeed	  the	  case	  for	  gay	  marriage	  activism	  as	  each	  theoretical	  tradition	  offers	  insight	  into	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  gay	  marriage	  movement,	  but	  in	  reality	  the	  paradigmatic	  foci	  of	  each	  theory	  (opportunity,	  structure,	  culture,	  etc.)	  act	  together	  to	  define	  an	  overall	  climate	  that	  LGBT	  movements	  must	  engage	  in	  order	  to	  wage	  successful	  rights	  campaigns.	  	  	  	  	  	   Political	  opportunity	  and	  political	  process	  models	  of	  social	  movement	  activity	  generally	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  factors	  such	  as	  acquiring	  resources	  (especially	  financial	  and/or	  political	  support	  from	  elites),	  taking	  advantage	  of	  openings	  or	  vulnerabilities	  in	  political	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institutions	  or	  structures,	  and	  the	  interpretive	  processes	  by	  which	  movements	  become	  “framed”	  in	  a	  particular	  way.	  	  For	  example,	  Sidney	  Tarrow	  (1998:	  7)	  argues	  “changes	  in	  political	  opportunities	  and	  constraints	  create	  the	  most	  important	  incentives	  for	  initiating	  new	  phases	  of	  contention”	  and	  that	  the	  “outcomes	  of	  such	  contention	  depend	  not	  on	  the	  justice	  of	  the	  cause	  or	  the	  persuasive	  power	  of	  any	  single	  movement,	  but	  on	  their	  breadth	  and	  on	  the	  reactions	  of	  elites	  and	  other	  groups.”	  	  Importantly,	  the	  very	  structure	  of	  the	  political	  system	  itself	  influences	  how	  social	  movement	  actors	  think	  about	  politics,	  and	  informs	  the	  strategies	  and	  approaches	  available	  to	  movement	  actors	  (Meyer	  1996:	  279).	  	  	  Therefore,	  when	  activists	  perceive	  some	  “dramatization	  of	  a	  system’s	  vulnerability	  or	  illegitimacy”	  or	  “a	  glaring	  contradiction	  between	  a	  highly	  salient	  cultural	  value	  and	  conventional	  social	  practices”,	  movement	  activity	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  occur	  (McAdam	  1996:	  25).	  	  	  	  	   In	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  gay	  marriage	  movement	  in	  the	  US,	  David	  Rayside	  (2008:	  29)	  asserts	  that	  political	  structures	  and	  processes	  are	  important,	  “The	  unusual	  fragmentation	  of	  authority	  within	  all	  levels	  of	  American	  government	  impedes	  radical	  change,	  but	  creates	  entry	  points	  through	  which	  gains	  can	  be	  secured	  in	  particular	  locations	  and	  times”.	  The	  “entry	  points”	  that	  Rayside	  refers	  to	  are	  available	  for	  movement	  supporters	  to	  engage,	  but	  counter-­‐movements	  may	  also	  use	  these	  structural	  openings	  to	  their	  own	  advantage.	  	  For	  example,	  “Populist	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  referenda	  also	  create	  openings	  for	  Christian	  right	  opponents	  to	  enact	  barriers	  to	  LGBT	  rights,	  further	  slowing	  the	  pace	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towards	  inclusion	  of	  sexual	  minorities”	  (Rayside	  and	  Wilcox	  2011:	  8).	  In	  this	  way,	  when	  taking	  advantage	  of	  vulnerable	  political	  structures,	  “protesting	  groups	  can	  unwittingly	  create	  political	  opportunities	  for	  their	  opponents”	  	  (McAdam	  1996:	  59).	  	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  for	  gay	  marriage	  in	  the	  US;	  every	  time	  a	  step	  is	  made	  in	  favour	  of	  gay	  marriage	  we	  see	  an	  energized	  conservative	  movement	  prepared	  to	  strike	  back	  against	  the	  “gay	  agenda”	  (Fetner	  2008).	  	  	  	   The	  use	  of	  popular	  referenda	  is	  a	  unique	  component	  of	  the	  American	  political	  structure	  and	  backlash	  to	  gay	  rights	  victories	  often	  utilizes	  a	  ballot	  initiative	  or	  popular	  referendum,	  “a	  [structural]	  tool	  the	  religious	  right	  is	  well	  equipped	  to	  wield”	  (Rayside	  2008:	  144).	  	  The	  2003	  Massachusetts	  Supreme	  Judicial	  Court	  decision	  in	  favour	  of	  gay	  marriage	  was	  a	  victory	  for	  LGBT	  activists	  that	  subsequently	  created	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  gay	  marriage	  counter-­‐movement.	  	  Despite	  the	  existence	  of	  federal	  DOMA	  legislation,	  “social	  conservatives	  in	  congress	  recognized	  the	  potential	  of	  using	  the	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  issue	  to	  mobilize	  their	  political	  base”	  (Rimmerman	  2007:	  285).	  	  Additional	  amendments	  have	  been	  in	  each	  election	  cycle	  since	  2004.	  	  Passing	  amendments	  to	  ban	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  only	  exists	  outside	  of	  legal	  reality	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  redundant	  measure	  that	  is	  mostly	  symbolic.	  	  However,	  DOMA	  statutes	  may	  be	  overturned	  legislatively	  but	  amendments	  must	  be	  overturned	  via	  popular	  referendum,	  therefore	  giving	  amendments	  more	  “teeth”.	  	   Framing	  is	  often	  seen	  as	  the	  cultural	  component	  of	  the	  more	  structurally	  oriented	  political	  process-­‐opportunity	  and	  resource	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mobilization	  theories.	  Social	  movement	  actors	  utilize	  important	  cultural	  symbols	  to	  “frame”	  an	  issue	  in	  a	  way	  that	  will	  mobilize	  constituencies	  and	  articulate,	  define,	  or	  construct	  movement	  claims	  and	  grievances	  (McAdam,	  McCarthy,	  and	  Zald	  1996,	  Tarrow	  1998).	  	  The	  gay	  marriage	  movement	  is	  no	  exception	  to	  these	  typifications	  of	  movement	  framing	  processes.	  According	  to	  Tadlock,	  Gordon,	  and	  Popp	  (2007)	  the	  iconic	  cultural	  frames	  most	  at	  issue	  in	  gay	  marriage	  are	  traditional	  values	  vs.	  equal	  rights.	  	  	  	  Tadlock	  and	  his	  colleagues	  argue	  that	  both	  “individuals	  and	  the	  media	  use	  frames	  to	  organize	  and	  simplify	  their	  attitudes	  and	  evaluations	  of	  an	  issue”	  and,	  knowing	  this,	  “interest	  groups	  attempt	  to	  frame	  issues	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  favourable	  to	  their	  position	  [and]	  are	  successful	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  are	  able	  to	  get	  the	  media	  to	  adopt	  their	  frame	  when	  reporting	  about	  the	  issue	  and	  also	  in	  getting	  the	  public	  to	  adopt	  their	  frame	  when	  thinking	  about	  the	  issue”	  (Tadlock,	  Gordon,	  and	  Popp	  2007:	  196).	  Both	  pro-­‐	  and	  anti-­‐	  gay	  marriage	  activists	  use	  tropes	  of	  freedom,	  equality,	  and	  family	  to	  bolster	  arguments	  for	  their	  position.	  	  	  	  	   Although	  political	  process	  and	  opportunity	  models	  have	  typically	  dominated	  social	  movement	  theory,	  they	  are	  not	  without	  their	  critics.	  	  For	  example,	  framing	  analysis	  was	  developed	  by	  political	  process	  and	  opportunity	  theorists	  to	  answer	  what	  critics	  have	  called	  their	  overly	  structural	  analytics.	  	  Yet,	  even	  after	  the	  addition	  of	  framing	  analysis	  questions	  and	  considerations	  about	  this	  approach	  remain	  unanswered.	  	  For	  example,	  what	  accounts	  for	  the	  uptake	  of	  particular	  frames	  in	  various	  times	  and	  places	  but	  not	  others?	  	  How	  are	  political	  structures	  themselves	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mediated	  by	  cultural	  elements	  other	  than	  framing	  (Poletta	  2004)?	  	  How	  do	  the	  agency	  and	  strategy	  of	  social	  movement	  actors	  come	  into	  play	  (Ganz	  2004)?	  Critics	  of	  the	  political	  process/opportunity	  model	  argue	  that	  if	  we	  analyze	  social	  movements	  as	  a	  	  shifting	  playing	  field,	  with	  various	  institutions,	  cultural	  constructions,	  and	  strategic	  players,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  political	  action	  (and	  the	  impulses,	  grievances,	  and	  interests	  that	  go	  into	  it)	  is	  both	  channelled	  and	  created	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  without	  having	  to	  lapse	  into	  [political	  opportunity]	  “window”	  metaphors.	  	  Institutions	  inspire	  and	  demand	  action	  as	  well	  as	  constrain	  it.	  (Goodwin	  and	  Jasper	  2004:	  12).	  	  	  	  	   	  Indeed,	  the	  political	  process	  and	  opportunity	  model	  can	  explain	  much	  about	  the	  trajectory	  of	  gay	  marriage	  activism,	  but	  comprehensive	  considerations	  of	  culture	  and	  agency	  are	  central	  to	  the	  analysis	  as	  well.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  research	  I’ve	  presented	  so	  far	  suggests	  the	  uptake	  of	  a	  particular	  frame	  may	  be	  more	  or	  less	  successful	  depending	  on	  variations	  in	  demographic	  patterns	  and	  regional	  cultural	  attitudes;	  in	  some	  regions	  conservative	  religious	  arguments	  are	  most	  successful,	  in	  some	  areas	  “special	  rights”	  may	  be	  the	  resonant	  frame,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  the	  equality	  frame	  will	  win	  the	  day	  (Gozemba	  2006,	  Hull	  2006,	  Stein	  2001).	  	  	  Activists	  also	  use	  skill	  and	  strategy	  to	  frame	  arguments	  in	  a	  way	  that	  will	  resonate	  with	  their	  constituents.	  	  For	  example,	  Massachusetts’	  activists	  skilfully	  (and	  successfully)	  co-­‐opted	  the	  “family	  values”	  frame	  to	  argue	  that	  all	  families	  should	  be	  valued	  and	  protected,	  including	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  families.	  	  Although	  LGBT	  activists	  elsewhere	  also	  attempted	  this	  strategy	  with	  less	  success,	  Massachusetts	  had	  cultural	  elements	  in	  place	  that	  facilitated	  the	  uptake	  of	  LGBT	  family	  friendly	  frames.	  	  Specifically,	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early	  LGBT	  rights	  successes	  had	  created	  cultural	  space	  for	  LGBT	  families	  to	  be	  more	  visible	  in	  Massachusetts	  than	  elsewhere,	  and	  a	  series	  of	  court	  decisions,	  like	  second	  parent	  adoption	  and	  de	  facto	  parenting	  rights,	  created	  legal	  support	  and	  definition	  for	  LGBT	  families	  that	  still	  exists	  in	  few	  other	  places.	  	  	   Taking	  steps	  to	  advance	  cultural	  analyses	  in	  social	  movement	  theory,	  Francesca	  Poletta	  (2004)	  urges	  social	  movement	  scholars	  to	  consider	  the	  way	  political	  opportunities	  and	  structures	  are	  intertwined	  with	  culture.	  	  Here	  culture	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  “symbolic	  dimension	  of	  all	  structures,	  institutions,	  and	  practices	  (political,	  economic,	  educational,	  etc.);	  symbols	  are	  signs	  that	  have	  meaning	  and	  significance	  through	  their	  interrelations;	  the	  patterns	  of	  those	  relations	  is	  culture”	  (Poletta	  2004:	  100).	  	  This	  definition	  emphasizes	  the	  influence	  of	  culture	  beyond	  framing.	  	  Whereas	  framing	  analysis	  may	  explain	  how	  some	  constituencies	  become	  mobilized	  and	  how	  movement	  actors	  socially	  construct	  their	  grievances,	  a	  broader	  conception	  of	  culture	  reveals	  that	  political	  structures,	  the	  elite	  actors	  within	  those	  structures,	  and	  the	  movement	  activists	  that	  challenge	  those	  structures	  “are	  suspended	  in	  webs	  of	  meaning”	  	  (Poletta	  2004:	  100).	  	  This	  point	  is	  made	  salient	  by	  considering	  populism	  or	  populist	  ideology	  as	  a	  cultural	  value	  in	  the	  US	  and	  the	  use	  of	  popular	  referenda	  and	  citizens’	  initiatives	  to	  repeal	  gains	  made	  by	  gay	  marriage	  activists:	  populist	  frames	  are	  often	  used	  to	  argue	  against	  gay	  marriage	  (i.e.	  “Let	  the	  people	  vote”	  was	  a	  frame	  used	  by	  opponents	  of	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts)	  and	  the	  strength	  of	  these	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frames	  is	  reinforced	  by	  political	  structures	  that	  enable	  the	  use	  of	  referenda	  to	  repeal	  gay	  rights	  initiatives	  (Adam	  2003,	  Cahill	  2007,	  Gozemba	  2007,	  Rayside	  2008).	  	  Also,	  regional	  differences	  in	  attitudes	  about	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage	  in	  the	  US	  indicate	  that	  social	  movement	  actors	  may	  be	  constrained	  and/or	  aided	  by	  the	  regional	  cultures	  and	  “webs	  of	  meaning”	  in	  which	  they	  are	  embedded.	  Such	  regional/cultural	  particularities	  affect	  the	  uptake	  of	  certain	  frames,	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  certain	  strategies,	  and	  the	  political	  opportunities	  and	  resources	  available	  to	  activists	  (Hull	  1999,	  Stein	  2001).	  	  	  	  	  	   Agency	  is	  another	  primary	  component	  in	  the	  success	  of	  LGBT	  activism	  in	  general,	  and	  for	  gay	  marriage	  in	  particular,	  yet	  remains	  under-­‐attended	  to	  in	  much	  of	  social	  movement	  theory	  and	  research.	  Part	  of	  the	  political	  process	  and	  opportunity	  model	  acknowledges	  that	  social	  movements	  do	  not	  just	  react	  to	  political	  opportunities,	  they	  also	  create	  them	  (Gamson	  and	  Meyer	  1996,	  McAdam	  1996,	  Tarrow	  1998).	  However,	  critics	  of	  such	  models	  argue	  that	  the	  use	  of	  agency	  and	  strategy	  in	  social	  movements	  needs	  greater	  theoretical	  consideration.	  	  According	  to	  these	  critics,	  the	  mere	  presence	  of	  an	  opportunity	  is	  no	  indication	  that	  a	  movement	  will	  act	  on	  that	  opportunity,	  or	  that	  if	  it	  does,	  whether	  activists	  will	  be	  successful.	  	  	  In	  the	  LGBT	  rights	  movement	  when	  an	  opening	  appears	  in	  the	  political	  structure,	  there	  is	  often	  a	  rush	  of	  movement	  and	  counter-­‐movement	  activity.	  	  Which	  side	  is	  successful	  in	  filling	  that	  opening	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  agency	  and	  strategic	  choices	  of	  social	  movement	  actors,	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  execute	  strategic	  moves	  that	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resonate	  within	  the	  cultural	  “webs	  of	  meanings”	  where	  social	  movement	  activity	  occurs.	  	  	   Movement	  success	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  opportunity	  alone.	  	  Consideration	  must	  be	  given	  to	  the	  agency	  expressed	  by	  social	  movement	  actors	  and	  the	  strategies	  they	  develop	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  existing	  structures	  and	  opportunities	  or	  to	  create	  new	  ones	  (Ganz	  2004,	  Morris	  2004).	  	  Moreover,	  this	  is	  a	  reflexive	  relationship	  between	  opportunity	  and	  strategy	  where	  “environmental	  change	  may	  generate	  the	  opportunities	  for	  social	  movements	  to	  emerge,	  but	  the	  outcomes	  and	  legacies	  of	  such	  movements	  have	  more	  to	  do	  with	  the	  strategies	  actors	  devise	  to	  turn	  these	  opportunities	  to	  their	  purpose,	  thus	  reshaping	  their	  environment”	  (Ganz	  2004:	  182).	  James	  Jasper	  (2005)	  positions	  activists	  in	  “fields	  of	  strategic	  contestation,	  along	  with	  many	  other	  types	  of	  players”	  and	  catalogues	  a	  series	  of	  strategic	  choices	  that	  must	  be	  made	  about	  organizing,	  setting	  goals,	  choosing	  tactics,	  and	  more.	  	  Importantly,	  Jasper	  (2005:	  4)	  emphasises	  the	  interplay	  of	  culture,	  structure,	  and	  agency	  when	  he	  asserts,	  “structured	  arenas	  shape	  players,	  players’	  decisions,	  and	  the	  outcomes	  of	  interactions…	  all	  strategic	  action	  is	  filtered	  through	  cultural	  understandings,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  cultural	  meanings	  are	  used	  strategically	  to	  persuade	  audiences”.	  	  	  This	  is	  analytically	  important	  to	  the	  gay	  marriage	  movement,	  where	  previous	  strategic	  gains	  (e.g.,	  state-­‐wide	  domestic	  partner	  benefits,	  anti-­‐discrimination	  ordinances)	  contribute	  to	  cultural	  change,	  thus	  creating	  a	  cultural	  climate	  where	  gay	  marriage	  may	  be	  accepted,	  or	  at	  least	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tolerated.	  	  	  To	  illustrate,	  Arlene	  Stein	  (2001)	  bases	  her	  analysis	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  anti-­‐gay	  measures	  were	  passed	  in	  Oregon	  because	  many	  Timbertowners	  already	  felt	  that	  their	  way	  of	  life	  was	  threatened	  by	  various	  groups	  of	  “outsiders”.	  	  Those	  who	  opposed	  the	  gay	  rights	  measure	  in	  Oregon	  tapped	  into	  these	  already	  existing	  emotions	  and	  successfully	  portrayed	  (i.e.	  “framed”)	  LGBT	  folks	  as	  one	  more	  group	  of	  “strangers”	  and	  “others”	  endangering	  the	  townspeople’s	  way	  of	  life.	  	  In	  Massachusetts	  it	  was	  more	  difficult	  to	  demonize	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  as	  shadowy	  “strangers	  in	  our	  midst”	  because	  	  Massachusetts	  activists	  had	  been	  at	  the	  forefront	  in	  creating	  a	  culture	  where	  LGBT	  people	  were	  visibly	  embedded	  in	  communities	  (Gozemba	  2006,	  The	  History	  Project	  1998).	  	  The	  legalization	  of	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts	  was	  the	  culmination	  of	  decades	  of	  social	  movement	  activity	  that,	  in	  many	  ways,	  made	  gay	  people	  and	  gay	  families	  “mainstream”,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  “strangers”	  to	  be	  feared	  and	  excluded.	  	  	   Lastly,	  Miriam	  Smith’s	  use	  of	  historical	  institutionalism	  to	  analyse	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  movements	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Canada	  is	  instructive.	  	  Smith	  (2008:	  13)	  advances	  historical	  institutionalism	  as	  complementary	  to	  political	  process	  models	  in	  two	  important	  ways:	  that	  “political	  opportunity	  is	  dynamic	  and	  historically	  shaped	  and	  constructed;	  and	  the	  idea	  that	  political	  institutions	  and	  legacies	  of	  previous	  policies	  form	  institutional	  structures	  that	  undergird	  the	  features	  identified	  in	  classic	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analyses	  of	  political	  opportunity”.	  	  	  This	  argument	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  point	  made	  by	  Ganz	  (2004):	  that	  past	  movement	  victories	  increase	  chances	  for	  current	  movement	  success,	  except	  where	  Ganz	  emphasizes	  the	  effect	  of	  movement	  successes	  on	  environment	  or	  culture,	  Smith	  emphasizes	  the	  institutional	  legacy	  of	  movement	  successes	  (or	  failures)	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  current	  movement	  activity.	  	  	  	  	   Smith	  positions	  her	  historical	  institutionalism	  as	  structural,	  yet	  her	  analysis	  illustrates	  Francesca	  Poletta’s	  (2004:	  97)	  assertion	  that	  “structures	  are	  cultural”.	  	  In	  her	  comparison	  of	  the	  movements	  to	  establish	  gay	  marriage	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Canada,	  Smith	  emphasizes	  the	  general	  importance	  of	  marital	  status	  in	  the	  US.	  	  She	  argues	  that	  although	  the	  US	  and	  Canada	  are	  similar	  in	  making	  certain	  assumptions	  about	  gender	  and	  family	  relationships	  (the	  primacy	  of	  the	  male	  breadwinner	  model,	  for	  example),	  Canadians	  do	  not	  generally	  imbue	  marital	  status	  with	  the	  same	  level	  of	  cultural	  and	  political	  import	  found	  in	  America.	  The	  importance	  of	  this	  point	  is	  echoed	  by	  Rayside	  and	  Wilcox	  (2011:	  19)	  who	  note	  that	  “from	  the	  1970s	  until	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  Canada	  and	  most	  of	  its	  provinces	  substantially	  narrowed	  the	  differential	  treatment	  of	  formal	  marriage	  and	  heterosexual	  cohabitation”,	  creating	  a	  policy	  legacy	  that	  “reduced	  resistance	  to	  according	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  couples	  the	  right	  to	  marriage”.	  	  Likewise,	  there	  are	  some	  rights	  conferred	  upon	  Canadians	  as	  citizens,	  like	  health	  care,	  Americans	  only	  have	  access	  to	  those	  rights	  through	  employment	  or	  marriage	  (Smith	  2009:	  113-­‐114).	  	  	  	   Additionally,	  Smith	  highlights	  how	  the	  politics	  of	  race,	  gender,	  and	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sexuality	  are	  intertwined	  in	  the	  US.	  	  A	  host	  of	  legal	  relationship	  issues-­‐-­‐	  marriage,	  recognition	  of	  heterosexual	  common	  law	  relationships,	  the	  status	  of	  children	  born	  out	  of	  wedlock-­‐-­‐	  are	  “linked	  to	  anxieties	  about	  the	  black	  family	  and	  the	  American	  welfare	  state,”	  making	  	  “debates	  over	  marriage	  not	  just	  a	  question	  of	  religious	  attitudes	  in	  the	  US;	  they	  are	  also	  a	  question	  of	  racial	  attitudes	  and	  the	  gender	  politics	  of	  regulating	  sexuality.”	  (Smith	  2009	  :114-­‐115).	  This,	  too,	  is	  a	  point	  underscored	  by	  Rayside	  and	  Wilcox	  (2011:	  18)	  who	  observe	  that	  “the	  race	  based	  fears	  and	  anxieties	  that	  permeate	  American	  political	  life	  may	  also	  fuel	  opposition	  to	  other	  human	  rights	  claims.”	  The	  cultural	  primacy	  placed	  on	  marriage	  (that	  is,	  “traditional”	  heterosexual	  marriage)	  as	  well	  as	  cultural	  attitudes	  about	  race,	  gender,	  and	  sexuality	  are	  written	  into	  American	  policies,	  political	  structures,	  and	  institutions.	  	  	  	   As	  challengers	  to	  these	  dominant	  cultural	  values	  and	  institutions,	  marriage	  equality	  proponents	  must	  learn	  to	  strategically	  engage	  both	  cultural	  and	  structural	  elements	  to	  be	  successful,	  remain	  nimble	  enough	  to	  defend	  successes	  against	  counter-­‐movement	  activity	  and,	  eventually,	  build	  on	  prior	  successes	  in	  ways	  that	  continue	  to	  advance	  the	  movement	  for	  full	  equality.	  	  Here	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  interaction	  of	  structure,	  culture,	  and	  agency	  is	  the	  key	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  LGBT	  movement	  in	  winning	  and	  defending	  marriage	  equality.	  	  	  	  	  There	  existed	  in	  Massachusetts	  cultural	  elements	  that	  early	  on	  tolerated	  some	  degree	  of	  queerness,	  and	  early	  LGBT	  activists	  were	  able	  to	  exploit	  these	  cultural	  openings	  to	  begin	  building	  a	  movement.	  	  As	  the	  movement	  grew	  activists	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built	  on	  movement	  successes,	  learned	  from	  movement	  failures,	  and	  used	  this	  knowledge	  to	  hone	  their	  strategic	  skills.	  	  Over	  a	  period	  of	  thirty	  years	  of	  activism,	  the	  Massachusetts	  LGBT	  movement	  penetrated	  political	  structures	  that	  were	  formerly	  closed	  to	  them,	  strategically	  engaged	  and	  overcame	  many	  prominent	  arguments	  against	  LGBT	  rights,	  and,	  in	  doing	  so,	  created	  a	  cultural	  base	  of	  acceptance,	  or	  at	  least	  tolerance,	  for	  LGBT	  people	  and	  a	  general	  belief	  that	  LGBT	  people	  deserve	  equality	  before	  the	  law.	  	  	  	  	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  winning	  marriage	  was	  easy	  for	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts,	  but	  it	  means	  that	  when	  the	  time	  came	  to	  fight	  on	  this	  front	  of	  the	  “culture	  war”,	  there	  was	  an	  army	  of	  elite	  and	  grassroots	  allies	  and	  supporters	  to	  be	  mobilized,	  an	  arsenal	  of	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  to	  be	  executed,	  and	  veteran	  movement	  leaders	  who	  knew	  how	  to	  wield	  these	  weapons	  effectively.	  	  	  The	  stakes	  in	  the	  battle	  for	  marriage	  equality	  in	  Massachusetts	  were	  high	  and	  outcome	  may	  have	  been	  uncertain,	  but	  no	  one	  was	  going	  to	  back	  down	  from	  the	  fight.	  Methods	  	   The	  primary	  questions	  I	  am	  considering	  here	  are:	  1)	  What	  are	  the	  social	  and	  historical	  forces	  at	  work	  undermining	  resistance	  to	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts,	  2)	  What	  political	  structures,	  opportunities,	  and	  constraints	  helped	  to	  shape	  an	  environment	  where	  the	  trend	  against	  gay	  marriage	  could	  be	  turned,	  3)	  Which	  specific	  frames	  and	  strategies	  were	  successfully	  used	  by	  activists	  to	  win	  rights	  and	  benefits,	  including	  marriage,	  for	  same	  sex	  couples	  in	  Massachusetts?	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   Historical	  data	  includes	  both	  primary	  (oral	  or	  written	  testimony	  of	  eyewitnesses,	  original	  documents,	  etc.)	  and	  secondary	  sources	  (oral	  or	  written	  testimony	  of	  people	  not	  present	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  the	  original	  event,	  journal	  articles,	  newspaper	  stories,	  etc.)	  (Berg	  2001:	  214).	  	  Both	  types	  of	  sources,	  for	  example	  articles	  in	  the	  gay	  and	  mainstream	  press	  and	  archival	  data	  from	  LGBT	  and	  marriage	  rights	  organizations,	  were	  used	  here	  to	  explicate	  the	  successful	  implementation	  of	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  Primary	  sources	  include	  interviews	  with	  activists	  who	  were	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  movement	  for	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts.	  Secondary	  sources	  include	  legal	  documents,	  newspaper	  accounts,	  and	  other	  sources	  that	  analyze	  and	  assess	  the	  actions	  and	  strategies	  contributing	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  gay	  marriage	  movement	  in	  the	  Massachusetts.	  	  These	  sources	  were	  amassed	  and	  catalogued	  prior	  to	  interviewing	  LGBT	  activists	  involved	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  same	  sex	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  Interview	  data	  then	  informed	  the	  material	  chosen	  for	  final	  analysis.	  	  For	  example,	  documents	  that	  highlighted	  key	  turning	  points	  identified	  by	  activists	  were	  used	  to	  triangulate	  interview	  data.	  	  	  	  To	  answer	  the	  questions	  listed	  above,	  I	  use	  data	  from	  major	  Massachusetts	  newspapers,	  archival	  data	  from	  The	  History	  Project	  (a	  Boston	  area	  group	  dedicated	  to	  preservation	  of	  the	  region’s	  LGBT	  history),	  and	  interviews	  with	  thirteen	  Massachusetts	  activists.	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   Documents	  on	  Massachusetts	  history	  generally,	  and	  Massachusetts	  LGBT	  history	  specifically,	  identify	  cultural	  factors	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  early	  spaces	  and	  places	  in	  Massachusetts	  that	  were	  more	  or	  less	  tolerant	  of	  what	  we	  might	  call	  “queer”	  activity.	  	  Women’s	  colleges,	  for	  example,	  where	  “passionate	  friendships”	  or	  “Boston	  marriages”	  between	  women	  were	  relatively	  common.	  	  These	  documents	  also	  outlined	  the	  place	  of	  Massachusetts	  in	  social	  movement	  history	  as	  a	  breeding	  ground	  for	  leaders	  of	  various	  social	  and	  reform	  movements	  throughout	  American	  history,	  making	  it	  less	  surprising	  that	  a	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  movement	  might	  develop	  earlier	  in	  this	  region	  than	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  the	  U.S.	  	  	  Newspaper	  articles,	  primarily	  from	  Massachusetts’	  major	  newspapers,	  Boston	  
Globe	  and	  Boston	  Herald,	  chronicle	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  movement	  from	  the	  early	  1970’s	  onward,	  culminating	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  gay	  marriage.	  	  Most	  articles	  I	  used	  here	  were	  accessed	  electronically	  using	  the	  NewsBank/NewsFile	  database.	  	  The	  Boston	  
Globe	  electronic	  archives	  started	  in	  1973	  and	  the	  Herald’s	  archives	  go	  back	  to	  1991.	  	  I	  performed	  repeated	  searches	  using	  phrases	  like	  gay	  rights,	  domestic	  partner	  benefits,	  defense	  of	  marriage	  act,	  gay	  marriage,	  same	  sex	  marriage,	  and	  others.	  Over	  time	  and	  across	  databases	  a	  total	  of	  25	  searches	  were	  performed	  that	  produced	  significant	  results.	  	  I	  combed	  through	  these	  sources	  and	  narrowed	  the	  field	  down	  to	  roughly	  512	  articles	  that	  informed	  my	  analysis.	  Articles	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were	  narrowed	  down	  to	  those	  that	  most	  specifically	  identified	  key	  proponents	  and	  opponents	  of	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  same	  sex	  marriage,	  provided	  the	  most	  detailed	  description	  of	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  utilized	  by	  those	  for	  or	  against	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage,	  and/or	  highlighted	  key	  advances	  or	  setbacks	  in	  the	  historical	  trajectory	  of	  LGBT	  rights	  advances	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  struggle	  for	  same	  sex	  marriage.	  	  Additionally,	  I	  downloaded	  and	  transcribed	  several	  videos	  from	  the	  websites	  of	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Advocates	  and	  Defenders	  and	  MassEquality.	  	  	  	   Other	  print	  materials	  used	  in	  my	  analysis	  were	  from	  archives	  at	  The	  History	  Project,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  personal	  archives	  of	  activist	  Lisa	  Thompson.	  	  	  The	  History	  Project	  archive	  was	  particularly	  useful	  for	  accessing	  material	  from	  social	  movement	  organizations	  (SMO’s)	  like	  the	  Religious	  Coalition	  for	  the	  Freedom	  to	  Marry	  and	  the	  Freedom	  to	  Marry	  Coalition.	  	  These	  organizations	  disbanded	  after	  winning	  the	  right	  to	  marry	  in	  Massachusetts	  in	  2007	  and	  I	  was	  unable	  to	  track	  down	  any	  representatives	  who	  were	  willing	  to	  participate	  in	  an	  interview.	  	  Hence,	  the	  material	  from	  the	  archive	  was	  the	  only	  available	  information.	  	  	  Additional	  archival	  material	  came	  from	  activist	  Lisa	  Thompson.	  Ms	  Thompson	  donated	  the	  use	  of	  her	  personal	  gay	  marriage	  archive	  for	  my	  research.	  	  Among	  the	  documents	  contained	  therein	  were	  newspaper	  articles	  from	  where	  she	  resides	  in	  western	  Massachusetts	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as	  well	  as	  personal	  correspondence	  between	  herself	  and	  elected	  officials,	  communication	  from	  the	  SMO’s	  that	  she	  was	  involved	  with,	  fellow	  activists,	  friends	  and	  family.	  	  The	  only	  material	  quoted	  from	  such	  correspondence	  is	  that	  of	  emails	  distributed	  by	  SMO’s.	  	  Because	  such	  correspondence	  is	  intended	  to	  reach	  mass	  email	  lists,	  and	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  crafted	  message	  on	  the	  part	  of	  SMO’s,	  it	  falls	  closer	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  public	  information	  for	  which	  the	  informed	  consent	  of	  the	  individual	  sending	  the	  email	  is	  not	  required.	  I	  did	  not	  quote	  any	  personal	  correspondence	  from	  individuals	  who	  did	  not	  give	  informed	  consent	  to	  their	  thoughts	  and	  writing	  being	  included	  in	  the	  study.	  	  	  	  I	  considered	  the	  materials	  donated	  by	  Ms.	  Thompson	  particularly	  important	  as	  they	  represented	  some	  insight	  into	  activism	  that	  took	  place	  outside	  of	  Boston,	  where	  the	  majority	  of	  my	  interviews	  subjects	  live.	  	   Historical	  research	  methods	  are	  straightforward	  in	  many	  ways,	  but	  still	  contain	  epistemological	  assumptions	  that	  must	  be	  deconstructed.	  	  For	  Gaye	  Tuchman	  (1994:	  306),	  one	  of	  these	  assumptions	  involves	  the	  idea	  that	  “a	  methodology	  includes	  a	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  phenomena”	  that	  specifies	  how	  a	  method	  “captures”	  an	  “object”	  of	  study.	  	  She	  further	  stresses	  that	  “one	  must	  have	  a	  point	  of	  view,	  including	  an	  interpretive	  framework	  that	  includes	  some	  notion	  of	  the	  ‘meaning’	  of	  history”.	  	  At	  issue	  is,	  of	  course,	  the	  reality	  that	  history	  often	  has	  many	  meanings.	  	  Activists	  may	  interpret	  the	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meaning	  of	  an	  event	  differently	  than	  a	  journalist,	  and	  activists	  may	  interpret	  the	  meaning	  of	  an	  event	  differently	  from	  each	  other.	  	  The	  initial	  stage	  of	  research	  involved	  newspaper	  database	  searches	  and	  reading	  documentary	  histories	  of	  the	  struggle	  for	  same	  sex	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts,	  including	  accessing	  material	  from	  Massachusetts	  LGBT	  organization	  websites	  as	  well	  as	  websites	  of	  organizations	  opposed	  to	  same	  sex	  marriage	  (i.e.	  Massachusetts	  Family	  Association).	  From	  this	  material	  I	  was	  able	  to	  identify	  a	  list	  individuals	  and	  organizations	  whose	  names	  appeared	  most	  frequently	  and	  were	  described	  as	  having	  a	  major	  impact	  on	  the	  fight	  for	  marriage	  equality.	  To	  prepare	  for	  the	  next	  stage	  of	  research,	  collecting	  interview	  data,	  I	  sent	  emails	  to	  several	  organizations	  where	  I	  identified	  major	  players	  to	  target	  for	  interviews:	  MassEquality,	  The	  Freedom	  to	  Marry	  Coalition,	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Advocates	  and	  Defenders,	  Massachusetts	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Political	  Caucus,	  and	  Religious	  Coalition	  for	  the	  Freedom	  to	  Marry.	  	  I	  also	  contacted	  several	  legislators	  who	  were	  integral	  in	  securing	  marriage	  equality	  for	  Massachusetts	  residents.	  	  Using	  these	  initial	  contacts	  I	  secured	  several	  activist	  interviews,	  and	  one	  legislator	  interview.	  	  These	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  the	  greater	  Boston	  area	  during	  the	  month	  of	  June	  in	  2009.	  	  While	  performing	  interviews	  in	  Boston,	  I	  made	  several	  additional	  contacts	  at	  local	  LGBT	  events	  and	  via	  snowball	  sampling	  for	  a	  total	  of	  thirteen	  interview	  subjects.	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   The	  group	  of	  respondents	  included	  six	  men	  and	  seven	  women,	  ranging	  from	  23	  to	  68	  years	  of	  age	  (average	  age	  was	  48).	  	  All	  respondents	  identified	  as	  either	  gay	  or	  lesbian.	  	  	  	  The	  sample	  was	  well-­‐educated:	  one	  respondent	  was	  in	  the	  process	  of	  completing	  his	  Bachelor’s	  degree	  and	  the	  rest	  had	  completed	  at	  least	  a	  Bachelor’s	  degree	  or	  higher	  for	  a	  total	  of	  five	  BA/BS	  degrees,	  three	  MA	  degrees	  (one	  of	  these	  was	  a	  Ph.D.	  candidate	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  interview),	  two	  JD	  degrees,	  and	  two	  Ph.D.’s.	  	  The	  sample	  is	  also	  generally	  well	  off	  financially;	  on	  the	  lower	  end	  of	  the	  income	  scale	  is	  the	  Ph.D.	  candidate	  who	  reported	  income	  at	  around	  $10,000	  annually.	  	  Two	  respondents	  reported	  annual	  incomes	  in	  the	  $30,000	  dollar	  range,	  two	  in	  the	  $60,000	  dollar	  range,	  one	  in	  $70,000	  range,	  three	  respondents	  reported	  making	  about	  $100,000	  dollars	  per	  year,	  and	  two	  reported	  earning	  over	  $200,000	  per	  year.	  	  One	  respondent	  chose	  to	  answer	  with	  “middle	  income”	  and	  one	  answered	  “upper	  middle”.	  For	  purposes	  of	  comparison,	  the	  average	  annual	  income	  in	  the	  US	  is	  43,000	  (United	  States	  Census	  2000c).	  Six	  respondents	  were	  married,	  five	  single,	  one	  listed	  “domestic	  partnership”,	  and	  one	  “partnered”.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  religious	  beliefs,	  three	  respondents	  were	  Jewish,	  one	  Jewish	  and	  Buddhist,	  one	  Buddhist,	  one	  identified	  as	  a	  “casual”	  Episcopalian,	  one	  Pagan,	  one	  non-­‐practicing	  Catholic,	  one	  who	  identified	  as	  “kind	  of”	  Catholic,	  and	  four	  with	  no	  religious	  affiliation.	  	  Twelve	  respondents	  identified	  their	  race	  as	  “white”	  or	  “Caucasian”,	  of	  these	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one	  listed	  an	  ethnic	  identity	  of	  “Irish-­‐American”	  and	  another	  identified	  ethnically	  as	  “French	  Canadian,	  Irish,	  and	  English”.	  	  One	  respondent	  identified	  racial	  status	  as	  “Black”.	  	  Four	  subjects	  are	  life-­‐long	  Massachusetts	  residents,	  one	  has	  lived	  in	  Massachusetts	  for	  over	  50	  years,	  one	  over	  30	  years,	  five	  for	  20	  years	  or	  more,	  one	  for	  more	  than	  10	  years,	  and	  one	  for	  7	  years.	  	  	  	  This	  small	  sample	  was	  by	  no	  means	  representative	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  population,	  nor	  was	  it	  representative	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  	  However,	  the	  combined	  experience	  of	  this	  group	  added	  up	  to	  nearly	  100	  years	  of	  political	  activism	  and	  advocacy	  for	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  other	  social	  justice	  issues	  in	  Massachusetts.	  Each	  interview	  respondent	  worked	  on	  some	  level	  (from	  volunteer	  to	  director)	  at	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  following	  organizations:	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Advocates	  and	  Defenders	  (GLAD,	  the	  legal	  advocacy	  group	  that	  filed	  and	  won	  the	  case	  for	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts),	  the	  Massachusetts	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Political	  Caucus	  (MGLPC),	  MassEquality,	  North	  Shore	  MassEquality,	  The	  History	  Project,	  the	  LGBT	  Aging	  Project,	  and	  the	  National	  Organization	  for	  Women	  (NOW).	  	  No	  matter	  what	  their	  title,	  or	  whether	  they	  were	  new	  to	  activism	  or	  had	  been	  active	  for	  thirty	  years,	  each	  interview	  subject	  attended	  rallies,	  wrote	  letters	  to	  local	  newspapers	  and	  to	  their	  elected	  officials,	  and	  personally	  lobbied	  elected	  officials.	  Nine	  of	  the	  interview	  subjects	  held	  a	  leadership	  position	  in	  one	  or	  more	  organizations	  as	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director,	  chairperson,	  board	  member,	  executive	  committee	  member,	  or	  paid	  employee.	  Four	  respondents	  could	  be	  described	  as	  participants	  rather	  than	  leaders,	  or	  as	  one	  of	  them	  states,	  “Not	  the	  ring	  leader,	  but	  part	  of	  the	  great	  marching	  army”.	  The	  first	  hand	  observations	  and	  perspectives	  of	  each	  respondent	  are	  instructive	  in	  rounding	  out	  the	  historical	  record	  on	  the	  struggle	  for	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  	  The	  interview	  data	  provided	  an	  important	  and	  necessary	  complement	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  documents	  on	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  The	  interviews	  took	  the	  shape	  of	  what	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  semi-­‐structured	  or	  semi-­‐standardized	  interview.	  	  Bruce	  Berg	  (2001:	  70)	  describes	  such	  interviews	  as	  the	  “implementation	  of	  a	  number	  of	  predetermined	  questions	  and/or	  special	  topics…	  typically	  asked	  of	  each	  interviewee	  in	  a	  systematic	  order,	  but	  the	  interviewers	  are	  allowed	  freedom	  to	  digress”.	  	  Given	  such	  a	  deeply	  nuanced	  topic	  as	  gay	  marriage,	  an	  allowance	  for	  probing	  and	  digression	  was	  essential.	  	  The	  interviews	  themselves	  cover	  several	  themes.	  	  The	  structured	  interview	  questions	  were:	  	  
• What	  strategies	  did	  your	  organization	  use	  to	  build	  a	  base	  of	  supporters?	  	  Which	  were	  most	  successful?	  	  	  
• How	  did	  your	  organization	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  financial	  resources	  necessary	  to	  launch	  and	  sustain	  a	  campaign	  for	  gay	  marriage?	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• What	  strategies	  did	  you	  use	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  and	  support	  from	  key	  legislators?	  	  
• What	  makes	  Massachusetts	  different	  from	  other	  states	  that	  do	  or	  do	  not	  recognize	  or	  allow	  gay	  marriage?	  	  
• What	  is	  the	  future	  of	  gay	  marriage	  in	  America?	  	  
• Can	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts	  offer	  any	  tactical	  or	  other	  lessons	  for	  activists	  in	  other	  states?	  	  	  	  Most	  interviews	  lasted	  about	  an	  hour,	  depending	  on	  the	  experience	  level	  of	  the	  interview	  subject	  and	  how	  much	  he	  or	  she	  wanted	  to	  tell	  me.	  	  One	  interview	  was	  as	  brief	  as	  45	  minutes;	  another	  continued	  over	  several	  one	  to	  two	  hour-­‐long	  sessions.	  	  	  The	  Research	  Ethics	  Board	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Windsor	  approved	  this	  study.	  Codes	  of	  ethics	  governing	  research	  on	  human	  subjects	  place	  primary	  emphasis	  on	  informed	  consent,	  privacy,	  and	  confidentiality	  for	  research	  participants	  (for	  example,	  see	  Christians	  2005:	  144-­‐145).	  	  All	  respondents	  in	  this	  study	  signed	  an	  informed	  consent	  form	  that	  outlined	  the	  research	  study	  and	  any	  possible	  risks	  of	  participation.	  Each	  respondent	  was	  also	  given	  the	  option	  of	  remaining	  anonymous.	  	  In	  every	  case,	  respondents	  declined	  anonymity	  because	  their	  names	  had	  already	  been	  made	  public	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another	  due	  to	  their	  activism.	  	  In	  every	  case,	  they	  were	  proud	  of	  the	  role	  they	  had	  played	  in	  the	  movement	  for	  gay	  marriage	  and	  had	  no	  desire	  to	  separate	  their	  identity	  from	  what	  they	  had	  done	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previously	  or	  what	  they	  might	  say	  in	  an	  interview.	  On	  one	  occasion,	  a	  participant	  assumed	  that	  the	  informed	  consent	  form	  was	  equivalent	  to	  a	  media	  consent	  form	  and	  was	  prepared	  to	  actually	  sign	  away	  the	  rights	  to	  what	  she	  might	  say	  in	  the	  interview!	  	  I	  took	  care	  to	  explain	  that	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case,	  and,	  in	  fact,	  the	  form	  she	  was	  signing	  was	  there	  to	  protect	  her	  rights,	  not	  limit	  them.	  Participants	  did	  occasionally	  ask	  that	  certain	  anecdotes	  or	  names	  of	  public	  officials	  remain	  off	  record.	  	  In	  these	  cases,	  I	  respected	  the	  request	  of	  my	  informants.	  	  	  Beyond	  issues	  of	  informed	  consent,	  privacy,	  and	  confidentiality,	  some	  methodologists	  require	  researchers	  to	  question	  the	  power	  relations	  and	  issues	  of	  trust	  that	  arise	  in	  qualitative	  research,	  particularly	  interview	  research.	  	  Fontana	  and	  Frey	  (2005)	  call	  on	  researchers	  to	  be	  reflexive	  about	  the	  interview	  process	  and	  to	  avoid	  exploiting	  subjects	  by	  contextualizing	  their	  own	  identities	  as	  researchers,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  social,	  historical,	  and	  political	  contexts	  in	  which	  the	  research	  takes	  place.	  	  When	  I	  completed	  these	  interviews	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  US	  states	  had	  legalized	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  (even	  now,	  the	  total	  number	  of	  states	  where	  same	  sex	  marriage	  is	  recognized	  stands	  at	  six).	  	  That	  the	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  used	  in	  Massachusetts	  might	  hold	  some	  important	  insight	  for	  activists	  working	  for	  marriage	  in	  other	  states	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  me,	  or	  my	  research	  participants.	  	  That	  the	  research	  took	  place	  in	  a	  social	  and	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historical	  moment	  where	  the	  results	  could	  help	  advance	  activism	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  outside	  of	  Massachusetts	  was	  an	  important	  backdrop	  for	  the	  study.	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  inverse	  is	  also	  true:	  that	  opponents	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  may	  also	  gain	  insights	  into	  the	  strategy	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists	  and	  work	  to	  turn	  those	  strategies	  to	  advance	  their	  own	  cause.	  	  	  Additionally,	  the	  participants	  in	  my	  study	  were	  aware	  of	  my	  own	  identity	  as	  an	  ally	  in	  the	  struggle,	  a	  lesbian,	  and	  a	  woman	  born	  and	  raised	  in	  the	  American	  Midwest	  employed	  at	  a	  university	  in	  the	  American	  South	  (even	  though	  I	  was	  working	  to	  complete	  my	  degree	  at	  a	  Canadian	  university).	  	  In	  some	  ways	  I	  feel	  I	  represented	  a	  carrier	  of	  a	  message	  that	  my	  respondents	  might	  send	  from	  Massachusetts	  to	  activists	  elsewhere	  in	  America,	  places	  where	  the	  struggle	  for	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  had	  been	  less	  successful.	  	  	  In	  my	  interactions	  with	  my	  informants,	  I	  was	  clear	  that	  my	  research,	  as	  a	  dissertation	  project	  designed	  to	  fulfil	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  Ph.D.	  program,	  primarily	  benefited	  me.	  However,	  I	  discussed	  with	  some	  of	  my	  informants	  the	  possibilities	  of	  disseminating	  my	  findings	  beyond	  the	  academy	  and	  we	  agreed	  that	  in	  this	  way	  their	  contributions	  to	  my	  work	  may	  very	  well	  benefit	  a	  broader	  base	  LGBT	  activists	  and	  perhaps	  advance	  the	  movement	  even	  further.	  	  	  	  	  	  	   I	  began	  the	  project	  with	  the	  intent	  of	  writing	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  contemporary	  movement	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  however,	  my	  
	  	   37	  
interview	  informants	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  story	  of	  how	  Massachusetts	  won	  gay	  marriage	  starts	  not	  in	  2003,	  but	  in	  the	  1970’s	  with	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  politicians	  like	  Barney	  Frank	  and	  Elaine	  Noble	  being	  elected	  as	  state	  representatives,	  or	  in	  1989	  with	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill.	  	  One	  participant	  was	  quite	  clear	  on	  this	  point,	  “The	  real	  issue	  is	  what’s	  happened	  [over	  the	  past	  thirty	  years]	  to	  create	  an	  environment	  in	  which	  the	  institutions	  are	  in	  place	  [and]	  the	  relationships	  are	  in	  place”	  (interview	  respondent	  Elyse	  Cherry).	  Some	  activists	  even	  reached	  back	  as	  far	  as	  John	  Adams	  writing	  equality	  into	  the	  Massachusetts’	  constitution	  to	  explain	  why	  Massachusetts	  became	  a	  frontrunner	  for	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage.	  	  Over	  and	  over	  these	  informants	  said	  that	  gay	  marriage	  was	  successful	  here	  because	  of	  the	  history	  and	  culture	  of	  Massachusetts.	  	  They	  said	  that,	  yes,	  what	  activists	  did	  made	  a	  difference,	  but	  it	  made	  a	  difference	  because	  of	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  historical	  and	  social	  conditions	  that	  made	  Massachusetts	  unique.	  It	  was	  then	  that	  I	  began	  reaching	  back	  further	  into	  Massachusetts	  history	  to	  explain	  the	  full	  trajectory	  of	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  (and	  later	  bisexual	  and	  transgender)	  movement.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  first	  several	  chapters	  examine	  the	  historical,	  social,	  and	  political	  impact	  of	  the	  series	  of	  rights	  struggles	  and	  victories	  that	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  marriage	  equality	  in	  Massachusetts;	  how	  these	  events	  lead	  from	  fighting	  for	  individual	  rights,	  to	  couple	  rights,	  to	  family	  rights,	  and	  then	  marriage;	  and	  how	  they	  created	  a	  policy	  legacy	  and	  SMO	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repertoire	  of	  tactics	  that	  enabled	  activists	  and	  allies	  to	  ultimately	  win	  the	  battle	  for	  marriage	  equality.	  One	  final	  note	  on	  terminology,	  I	  use	  the	  terms	  “lesbian	  and	  gay	  movement”	  or	  “lesbian,	  gay,	  bisexual,	  transgender	  (LGBT)	  movement”	  in	  historical	  context.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  addition	  of	  bisexual	  and	  transgender	  issues	  occurred	  after	  initial	  organizing	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  began.	  	  	  As	  my	  sources	  reflect	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  movement	  becoming	  more	  inclusive,	  I	  use	  the	  signifier	  LGBT.	  	  	  Importantly,	  some	  critics	  argue	  the	  current	  inclusion	  is	  still	  incomplete	  and/or	  inadequate.	  	  	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  specifically	  I	  limit	  the	  discussion	  to	  “lesbian	  and	  gay”	  because	  marriage	  equality	  may	  not	  be	  considered	  a	  primary	  goal	  of	  transgender,	  queer,	  and	  gender-­‐queer	  advocates.	  	  	  Some	  argue	  that	  marriage,	  even	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  is	  inherently	  unequal	  and	  exclusive	  to	  many,	  especially	  to	  transgender	  and	  other	  gender	  non-­‐conforming	  people	  who	  still	  lack	  basic	  non-­‐discrimination	  protections	  in	  employment,	  housing,	  and	  other	  areas	  and	  for	  whom	  these	  basic	  rights	  are	  more	  essential	  than	  marriage	  (http://katebornstein.typepad.com/kate_bornsteins_blog/2009/12/open-­‐letter-­‐to-­‐lgbt-­‐leaders-­‐who-­‐are-­‐pushing-­‐marriage-­‐equality.html).	  For	  example,	  at	  the	  time	  gay	  marriage	  was	  passed	  in	  Massachusetts,	  transgender	  people	  were	  struggling	  with	  basic	  rights	  protections	  in	  that	  state	  (and	  still	  are	  in	  a	  majority	  of	  states).	  	  Some	  national	  groups,	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like	  the	  National	  Centre	  for	  Transgender	  Equality,	  do	  have	  a	  platform	  for	  family	  recognition	  but	  transgender	  rights	  groups	  assert	  the	  need	  for	  a	  transgender	  person	  to	  be	  able	  to	  marry	  according	  to	  their	  gender	  rather	  than	  biological	  sex,	  and	  this	  is	  a	  different	  type	  of	  recognition	  than	  that	  offered	  by	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  (http://transequality.org/Issues/family.html).	  	  My	  language	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  honour	  critical	  and/or	  excluded	  voices	  on	  this	  issue	  in	  the	  LGBT	  community.	  	  These	  voices	  are	  essential	  to	  advancing	  a	  movement	  whose	  goal	  is	  inclusivity	  and	  equality	  for	  all	  people.	  	  These	  marginal	  voices	  in	  the	  “mainstream”	  LGTB	  movement	  deserve	  to	  be	  heard	  and	  represented	  in	  future	  research,	  research	  I	  hope	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of.	   Another	  potential	  problematic	  of	  this	  research	  is	  the	  use	  of	  movement	  frames	  that	  emphasize	  similarities	  between	  same	  sex	  couples	  and	  their	  families	  and	  traditional	  heterosexual	  families.	  My	  analysis	  shows	  that	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  family	  values	  frame	  was	  integral	  in	  Massachusetts’	  victory	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  yet	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  to	  this	  frame	  that	  is	  acknowledged	  by	  activists	  and	  writers	  who	  also	  critique	  the	  primacy	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  as	  a	  goal	  of	  the	  LGBT	  rights	  movement.	  	  Specifically,	  utilizing	  such	  tropes	  may	  win	  an	  advance	  in	  rights	  for	  those	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  couples	  who	  fit	  the	  mould,	  but	  may	  further	  marginalize	  lesbian,	  gay,	  queer,	  genderqueer,	  and	  transgender	  individuals	  (and	  their	  relationships)	  if	  they	  do	  not	  fit	  into	  
	  	   40	  
the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  family	  values	  paradigm.	  	  For	  example,	  feminist	  theorist	  Gayle	  Rubin	  (1984:	  11)	  describes	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  sexuality	  where	  married,	  monogamous,	  heterosexuals	  comprise	  the	  core	  of	  what	  she	  describes	  as	  a	  “charmed	  circle”	  and	  homosexual	  relationships	  fall	  outside	  that	  circle.	  	  	  For	  queer	  critics	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  the	  question	  becomes	  whether	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists	  are	  reifying	  that	  hierarchy	  by	  privileging	  the	  right	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  in	  married,	  (presumably)	  monogamous,	  homosexual	  relationships	  to	  become	  a	  part	  of	  the	  charmed	  circle	  rather	  than	  fighting	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  multiple	  forms	  of	  sexual	  and	  relational	  expression	  (D’Emilio	  2007).	  	  When	  living	  in	  a	  society	  where	  certain	  benefits	  are	  conferred	  through	  marriage	  (health	  insurance,	  social	  security	  and	  pension	  benefits,	  and	  immigration	  rights,	  among	  others)	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  marital	  status	  for	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  undergirds	  	  “coercive	  elements	  of	  society”	  (Colker	  1991:	  321)	  that	  may	  push	  couples	  into	  marrying	  who	  would,	  in	  fact,	  rather	  prefer	  not	  to	  be	  married	  (Colker	  1991,	  D’Emilio	  2007,	  Kitzinger	  and	  Wilkinson	  2004).	  	  	  	  Furthermore,	  even	  most	  married	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  would	  likely	  fall	  outside	  of	  the	  ‘hockey	  mom’	  archetype	  celebrated	  in	  the	  Massachusetts	  ad	  campaign.	  	  These	  are	  perspectives	  that	  must	  be	  considered	  and	  addressed	  by	  the	  larger	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  movement,	  and	  in	  research	  about	  the	  movement.	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What	  I	  present	  here	  is	  necessarily	  only	  a	  piece	  of	  a	  much	  larger	  picture.	  	  In	  my	  work	  I	  am	  acting	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Denzin	  and	  Lincoln	  (2005)	  conceptualize	  as	  a	  research	  bricoleur.	  	  In	  this	  vision	  of	  qualitative	  research	  the	  “interpretive	  ‘bricoleur’	  produces	  a	  bricolage—that	  is,	  a	  pieced-­‐together	  set	  of	  representations	  that	  is	  fitted	  to	  the	  specifics	  of	  a	  complex	  situation”	  (Denzin	  and	  Lincoln	  2005:	  4).	  	  	  	  In	  taking	  evidence	  from	  newspapers	  and	  other	  archival	  data,	  correspondence,	  and	  activists’	  statements	  I	  am	  piecing	  together	  a	  particular	  construction	  of	  this	  historical	  movement	  success.	  	  I	  have	  done	  my	  best	  to	  represent	  this	  construction	  as	  completely	  and	  accurately	  as	  possible,	  by	  “crystallizing”	  (Denzin	  and	  Lincoln	  2005:	  6)	  the	  various	  points	  of	  view	  on	  how	  the	  LGBT	  movement	  achieved	  success	  in	  fighting	  for	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  However,	  by	  focusing	  on	  explanations	  for	  movement	  success	  I	  am	  primarily	  representing	  those	  who	  were	  most	  active	  in	  the	  fight	  for	  marriage,	  therefore	  the	  facets	  of	  this	  crystal	  are	  made	  up	  of	  those	  who	  most	  supported	  gay	  marriage.	  The	  voices	  of	  those	  most	  opposed	  to	  gay	  marriage	  structure	  the	  story	  being	  told	  and	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  crystallization,	  even	  though	  they	  do	  not	  make	  up	  the	  core	  of	  the	  crystal.	  	  	  	  	  Overview	  	   The	  rest	  of	  this	  dissertation	  traces	  the	  development	  of	  the	  LGBT	  movement	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  	  I	  work	  to	  show	  how	  this	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movement	  is	  embedded	  in	  particular	  historical	  and	  social	  contexts	  that	  led	  to	  its	  eventual	  success	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  and	  explore	  how	  these	  contexts	  shaped	  the	  opportunities	  available	  to	  and	  strategies	  used	  by	  social	  movement	  activists.	  	  In	  chapter	  2,	  I	  situate	  Massachusetts	  in	  the	  history	  of	  social	  reform	  movements,	  changing	  attitudes	  about	  family	  and	  family	  structures,	  and	  early	  roots	  of	  Massachusetts’	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  communities.	  	  Chapter	  3	  chronicles	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  post-­‐Stonewall	  movement	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  in	  the	  1970’s	  and	  1980’s.	  	  This	  period	  of	  time	  is	  crucial	  for	  movement	  development	  as	  this	  is	  when	  activists	  win	  their	  first	  major	  victory,	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill.	  	  This	  early	  movement	  activity	  and	  eventual	  victory	  is	  credited	  with	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  the	  eventual	  success	  of	  the	  same	  sex	  marriage	  struggle.	  	  Chapter	  4	  highlights	  a	  shift	  in	  strategy	  for	  the	  LGBT	  movement	  in	  Massachusetts	  during	  the	  1990’s.	  	  During	  this	  time	  frame,	  movement	  goals	  shifted	  from	  individual	  rights	  to	  family	  rights,	  leading	  to	  important	  legislative	  outcomes	  and	  court	  decisions	  that	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  making	  a	  case	  for	  legal	  recognition	  of	  same	  sex	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  In	  chapter	  5,	  the	  fight	  for	  marriage	  heats	  up	  when	  Goodridge	  v	  
Massachusetts	  Department	  of	  Public	  Health	  is	  filed,	  and	  LGBT	  rights	  opponents	  fight	  to	  establish	  a	  series	  of	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Acts.	  	  This	  requires	  LGBT	  rights	  activists	  to	  channel	  all	  of	  the	  energy,	  resources,	  and	  knowledge	  they	  have	  accumulated	  into	  fighting	  off	  DOMA	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attempts	  that	  become	  even	  more	  acrimonious	  after	  the	  Supreme	  Judicial	  Court	  decides	  in	  favour	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  	  The	  last	  chapter,	  chapter	  6,	  offers	  a	  concluding	  analysis	  of	  the	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  central	  to	  creating	  a	  moment	  where	  marriage	  could	  be	  won	  for	  same-­‐sex	  couples.	  	  	  	   Quotes	  from	  activist	  interviews	  are	  interspersed	  with	  historical	  and	  documentary	  evidence.	  	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  brevity	  and	  flow	  throughout	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  document,	  I	  will	  offer	  a	  brief	  biography	  of	  each	  participant	  here.	  	  
• Bruce	  Bell:	  Long-­‐time	  supporter	  of	  LGBT	  rights	  groups,	  lobbied	  on	  behalf	  of	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Advocates	  and	  Defenders	  (GLAD)	  and	  MassEquality	  and	  is	  currently	  a	  staff	  member	  at	  GLAD.	  
• Ryan	  Brown:	  Field	  organizer	  for	  MassEquality.	  	  
• Elyse	  Cherry:	  Board	  member	  of	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Advocates	  and	  Defenders	  in	  the	  1990’s.	  	  Participated	  on	  behalf	  of	  MassEquality	  during	  the	  marriage	  struggle	  in	  the	  2000’s.	  
• Gary	  Daffin:	  Co-­‐chair	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Political	  Caucus	  (MGLPC).	  	  He	  first	  became	  involved	  with	  this	  organization	  in	  1989.	  	  	  
• Pat	  Gozemba:	  Co-­‐chair	  of	  The	  History	  Project	  (a	  group	  dedicated	  to	  preserving	  Boston’s	  LGBT	  history)	  and	  long-­‐time	  political	  activist	  on	  behalf	  of	  civil	  rights	  issues,	  anti-­‐war	  issues,	  the	  women’s	  movement,	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the	  LGBT	  movement,	  and	  the	  environment.	  	  Co-­‐author	  of	  Courting	  
Equality:	  A	  Documentary	  History	  of	  America’s	  First	  Same-­Sex	  
Marriages.	  
• Amy	  Hunt:	  	  Former	  director	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  LGBT	  Aging	  Project,	  and	  Creative	  Director	  of	  MassEquality’s	  “It’s	  Wrong	  to	  Vote	  on	  Rights”	  ad	  campaign.	  	  Also	  worked	  with	  MGLPC.	  
• Buzz	  Harris:	  Worked	  with	  the	  National	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Task	  Force	  and	  local	  Boston-­‐based	  LGBT	  rights	  groups	  for	  twenty	  years,	  served	  a	  board	  member	  of	  MassEquality	  during	  the	  marriage	  struggle	  in	  the	  2000’s.	  
• Arline	  Isaacson:	  Co-­‐chair	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Political	  Caucus.	  	  She	  began	  working	  for	  the	  organization	  in	  1983	  and	  acted	  as	  lead	  lobbyist	  during	  the	  marriage	  struggle	  in	  the	  2000’s.	  
• Lisa	  Poss	  (Thompson):	  Producer	  of	  “It	  Takes	  A	  Team”	  video	  project	  to	  reduce	  homophobia	  in	  sports.	  	  Lisa	  was	  active	  on	  behalf	  of	  MassEquality	  and	  the	  Freedom	  to	  Marry	  Coalition	  during	  the	  marriage	  struggle.	  	  	  
• Pat	  Ould:	  Board	  member	  of	  The	  History	  Project	  and	  a	  founder	  of	  North	  Shore	  MassEquality.	  
• Carl	  Sciortino:	  Openly	  gay	  legislator	  (2005-­‐present)	  and	  advocate	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  	  Worked	  with	  MassEquality,	  GLAD,	  MGLPC,	  and	  other	  groups	  during	  marriage	  struggle.	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• George	  Smart:	  Member	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Political	  Caucus,	  lobbied	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  on	  behalf	  of	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Advocates	  and	  Defenders	  and	  MassEquality.	  	  
• Ellen	  Zucker:	  Participated	  in	  LGBT	  advocacy	  with	  the	  National	  Organization	  for	  Women	  and	  the	  American	  Civil	  Liberties	  Union	  throughout	  the	  1980’s	  and	  1990’s.	  	  Participated	  on	  behalf	  of	  MassEquality	  during	  the	  marriage	  struggle	  in	  the	  2000’s.	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CHAPTER	  2:	  MASSACHUSETTS,	  MARRIAGE,	  AND	  CHANGING	  FAMILY	  FORMS	  	  Introduction	  	   Social	  movements	  do	  not	  come	  out	  of	  nowhere.	  	  As	  James	  Jasper	  (1997:	  60)	  states,	  “To	  explain	  the	  social	  movement,	  we	  need	  to	  explain	  why	  certain	  individuals	  come	  together	  at	  certain	  times	  and	  places	  and	  do	  things	  together.”	  	  For	  many	  years,	  social	  movement	  scholars	  focused	  on	  structural	  explanations	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  social	  movements,	  	  for	  example,	  a	  movement’s	  capacity	  for	  resource	  mobilization	  and/or	  the	  presence	  of	  widening	  political	  opportunities	  	  (for	  example	  Tarrow	  1997,	  McAdam,	  McCarthy,	  and	  Zald	  1996).	  In	  more	  recent	  social	  movement	  scholarship,	  an	  increasing	  emphasis	  has	  been	  placed	  on	  the	  cultural	  contexts	  that	  	  might	  facilitate	  (or	  constrain)	  the	  uptake	  of	  social	  movement	  activity	  in	  various	  ways.	  	  For	  example,	  Francesca	  Poletta	  (2004:	  100)	  asserts,	  “Culture	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  creating	  political	  opportunities,”	  and	  Goodwin	  and	  Jasper	  (2004:	  28)	  argue	  that	  “culture	  permeates	  the	  political	  opportunities	  and	  mobilizing	  structures”	  available	  to	  social	  movement	  actors.	  	  In	  fact,	  Jasper	  (1997:	  59)	  says,	  “structures	  themselves	  are	  reducible	  to	  culture	  and	  resources”	  because	  structures	  and	  institutions	  would	  not	  exist	  if	  they	  were	  not	  themselves	  supported,	  ideologically	  and	  materially,	  by	  the	  cultures	  in	  which	  they	  are	  embedded.	  	  When	  considering	  the	  rise	  of	  an	  LGBT	  rights	  movement,	  and,	  eventually,	  a	  movement	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  in	  Massachusetts,	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we	  must	  consider	  some	  of	  the	  broad	  cultural	  elements	  that	  facilitated	  the	  uptake	  of	  LGBT	  movement	  activity	  in	  this	  state.	  	  	  	  	  There	  exist	  several	  critical	  components	  of	  Massachusetts	  history	  and	  culture	  that	  fostered	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  culture	  and,	  later,	  a	  political	  movement	  to	  establish	  rights	  for	  LGBT	  people.	  	  While	  these	  elements	  may	  not	  have	  always	  been	  directly	  related	  to	  sexuality	  per	  se,	  they	  contributed	  to	  an	  overall	  atmosphere	  that	  accommodated	  organizing	  around	  issues	  of	  family,	  gender,	  and	  sexual	  orientation,	  and	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  the	  eventual	  legal	  recognition	  of	  same	  sex	  marriage.	  	  These	  critical	  elements	  include	  mutually	  reinforcing	  areas	  of	  culture	  and	  structure	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  politically	  active	  citizenry	  in	  Massachusetts	  and	  contributed	  to	  a	  long	  history	  of	  social	  movement	  and	  reformist	  activity	  	  on	  many	  different	  types	  of	  issues	  (Brown	  and	  Tager	  2000).	  	  	  This	  penchant	  for	  activism	  and	  social	  reform	  became	  intertwined	  with	  broad	  changes	  in	  family	  structure	  long	  before	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  became	  an	  issue,	  yet	  these	  earlier	  controversies	  about	  “the	  family”	  created	  a	  context	  for	  both	  supporters	  and	  opponents	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  to	  formulate	  culturally	  resonant	  frames	  and	  strategies.	  	  	  
Industrialization	  and	  changing	  cultural,	  gender,	  and	  family	  
norms	  As	  the	  development	  of	  capitalism	  and	  the	  processes	  of	  industrialization	  and	  urbanization	  become	  entrenched	  in	  a	  society,	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important	  changes	  occur	  in	  family,	  gender,	  and	  sexuality.	  	  As	  Barry	  Adam	  observed,	  more	  and	  more	  people	  move	  into	  urban	  areas	  to	  find	  work,	  away	  from	  the	  watchful	  eyes	  of	  parents	  or	  other	  family	  members,	  women	  have	  opportunities	  to	  earn	  wages	  of	  their	  own,	  “and	  the	  constraints	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  family	  ties…	  give	  way	  to	  personal	  freedoms	  and	  individualistic	  ethic”	  (Adam	  1995:	  3).	  	  These	  changes	  and	  the	  new	  freedoms	  associated	  with	  them	  ultimately	  set	  in	  motion	  the	  beginnings	  of	  a	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  culture,	  and	  later	  a	  movement	  for	  LGBT	  rights.	  	  	  This	  new	  world	  for	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  people	  represents	  the	  culmination	  of	  a	  series	  of	  broad	  shifts	  in	  family	  structure	  that	  occurred	  along	  with	  industrialization.	  	  Many	  of	  these	  shifts	  caused	  social	  unease	  in	  a	  way	  that	  may	  be	  comparable	  to	  the	  unease	  currently	  felt	  by	  many	  over	  gay	  marriage	  (Coontz	  2005,	  Cott	  2000).	  	  In	  the	  broadest	  sense,	  “a	  free	  market	  system,	  technological	  developments,	  the	  huge	  well-­‐off	  middle	  class	  [and]	  urbanization…	  all	  have	  been	  important	  elements	  of	  change;	  and	  they	  are	  also	  linked	  in	  complex	  chains	  of	  causation…	  [giving]	  rise	  [to]	  the	  individual	  as	  the	  locus	  of	  duties	  and	  rights.”	  (Friedman	  2004,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  	  This	  development	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  family	  law	  and	  custom,	  not	  least	  because	  “family	  law	  has	  indeed	  moved	  from	  status	  to	  contract”	  and	  where	  “marriage	  was	  once	  a	  matter	  for	  kinship	  to	  decide,”	  it	  is	  now	  a	  decision	  to	  be	  made	  by	  the	  individuals	  to	  be	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married	  (Friedman	  2004:	  6).	  	  Once	  marriage	  became	  less	  completely	  embedded	  in	  extended	  family	  structures	  and	  instead	  became	  a	  matter	  of	  two	  individuals	  entering	  into	  a	  private,	  contractual	  relationship	  based	  on	  mutual	  consent,	  the	  institution	  was	  forever	  changed.	  In	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  century,	  Stephanie	  Coontz	  (2005:	  146)	  argues,	  several	  “seismic”	  changes	  in	  marriage	  began	  and	  this	  new	  form	  of	  more	  individualized	  marriage,	  based	  on	  love,	  emerged	  in	  Western	  Europe	  and	  North	  America.	  Due	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  wage	  labour,	  young	  people	  gained	  a	  degree	  of	  independence	  from	  familial	  ties	  and	  pressure	  because,	  for	  example,	  a	  young	  man	  no	  longer	  had	  to	  wait	  to	  marry	  until	  he	  inherited	  land	  or	  a	  business	  from	  his	  father	  and	  young	  women	  could	  use	  their	  wages	  to	  build	  a	  dowry	  for	  themselves	  (Coontz	  2005:	  146).	  	  In	  addition,	  “the	  freedoms	  afforded	  by	  the	  free	  market	  economy	  had	  their	  parallel	  in	  new	  political	  and	  philosophical	  ideas”	  as	  “influential	  thinkers	  across	  Europe	  championed	  individual	  rights,”	  leading,	  eventually,	  to	  a	  more	  “secular”	  view	  of	  marriage	  as	  a	  “private	  contract”	  (Coontz	  2005:	  146).	  	  	  This	  new	  emphasis	  on	  individual	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  set	  in	  motion	  a	  series	  of	  social	  changes,	  including	  changes	  to	  gender	  and	  family	  norms,	  that	  caused	  ripples	  of	  controversy	  at	  nearly	  every	  turn.	  These	  developments	  led	  to	  a	  revolutionary	  social	  upheaval	  that	  overturned	  thousands	  of	  years	  of	  marital	  tradition	  and	  caused	  widespread	  fear	  over	  the	  collapse	  of	  	  civilization	  itself,	  namely,	  the	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“love	  match”.	  	  The	  love	  match,	  the	  idea	  that	  individuals	  could	  choose	  for	  themselves	  whom	  they	  were	  to	  marry	  without	  parental	  approval,	  horrified	  “traditionalists	  of	  all	  political	  stripes”,	  many	  of	  whom	  feared	  that	  the	  “the	  social	  order	  is	  entirely	  overturned”	  and	  because	  of	  this	  instability,	  “all	  families	  are	  trembling.”	  (Coontz	  2005:	  152).	  	  The	  love	  match,	  and	  its	  assumed	  inherent	  instability,	  also	  wrought	  increased	  concerns	  over	  the	  prevalence	  of	  divorce.	  	  In	  1888,	  for	  example,	  Massachusetts’	  lawyer	  Frank	  Gaylor	  Cook	  began	  a	  reform	  movement	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  strengthening	  the	  family	  against	  the	  “lax	  marriage	  and	  divorce	  laws”	  that	  he	  identified	  as	  the	  “prime	  causes	  of	  the	  all-­‐too-­‐apparent	  social	  disintegration,”	  and	  the	  New	  England	  Divorce	  Reform	  League	  (later	  the	  National	  League	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Family)	  was	  formed	  to	  assuage	  the	  “marriage	  crisis”	  	  (Grossberg	  1985:	  84,	  90).	  The	  historical	  path	  from	  the	  development	  of	  the	  love	  match	  in	  the	  1800’s	  to	  same	  sex	  marriage	  in	  the	  2000’s	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  linear	  one,	  but	  this	  link	  establishes	  same	  sex	  marriage	  as	  only	  the	  newest	  manifestation	  of	  a	  long	  line	  of	  changes	  to	  family	  norms	  that	  have	  been	  the	  cause	  of	  social	  distress.	  	  As	  love	  became	  increasingly	  regarded	  as	  the	  primary	  basis	  for	  marriage,	  love	  also	  came	  to	  be	  a	  highly	  valued	  and	  idealized	  emotional	  component	  of	  friendship	  (Coontz	  2005).	  	  	  This,	  combined	  with	  industrialization’s	  effect	  of	  redefining	  economic	  and	  social	  conventions	  facilitated	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  ‘Boston	  marriage’,	  or	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romantic	  friendship,	  among	  women.	  	  	  The	  development	  of	  opportunities	  for	  women	  to	  materially	  support	  themselves	  allowed	  at	  least	  some	  women	  to	  choose	  not	  to	  marry,	  and	  to	  live	  with	  another	  woman	  instead	  (Eskridge	  2003).	  	  In	  a	  social	  context	  where	  love	  is	  the	  primary	  emotion	  undergirding	  not	  only	  romantic	  heterosexual	  relations	  but	  friendships	  between	  members	  of	  the	  same	  sex	  as	  well,	  women	  could	  express	  strong,	  even	  passionate,	  feelings	  for	  one	  another	  without	  raising	  suspicions	  about	  inappropriate	  physical	  intimacy	  (Rupp	  1980,	  Smith-­‐Rosenberg	  1975).	  	  Boston	  marriage	  is	  a	  term	  coined	  in	  the	  1800’s	  to	  describe	  romantic	  friendships	  or	  intimate	  relationships	  between	  women.	  	  The	  social	  acceptability	  of	  these	  relationships	  rested	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  such	  relationships	  were	  non-­‐sexual,	  and	  certainly	  this	  may	  have	  been	  the	  case	  for	  many	  women	  who	  entered	  into	  them,	  although	  there	  is	  sufficient	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  was	  physical	  intimacy	  occurring	  in	  at	  least	  some	  such	  “marriages”	  (Eskridge	  2003,	  Faderman	  1981,	  Rupp	  1980).	  	  Carroll	  Smith-­‐Rosenberg	  (1975:	  24)	  reminds	  us	  that	  although	  the	  bonds	  of	  these	  intimate	  friendships	  were	  “physical	  as	  well	  as	  emotional”,	  and	  even	  had	  a	  “sensual”	  component,	  	  what	  is	  most	  important	  is	  not	  the	  potential	  for	  sexual	  activity	  but	  that	  such	  relationships,	  and	  the	  passionate	  feelings	  accompanying	  them,	  were	  normal	  in	  their	  social	  and	  historical	  context	  as	  long	  as	  the	  women	  went	  on	  to	  marry	  men.	  However,	  women	  who	  chose	  such	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relationships	  with	  other	  women	  over	  marriage	  to	  a	  man	  were	  defying	  the	  gender	  norms	  of	  the	  day,	  regardless	  of	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  physical	  intimacy.	  The	  phenomenon	  of	  romantic	  friendships,	  of	  course,	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  women	  in	  Boston	  or	  even	  Massachusetts,	  but	  there	  were	  enough	  of	  them	  in	  Boston	  and	  around	  the	  state	  that	  “Boston	  marriage”	  became	  a	  generic	  term	  to	  describe	  the	  phenomenon.	  This	  suggests	  	  something	  unique	  about	  social	  circumstances	  in	  Massachusetts	  that	  allowed	  for	  such	  relationships	  to	  bloom.	  	  	  While	  any	  two	  women	  could	  presumably	  enter	  into	  what	  might	  be	  called	  a	  ‘romantic	  friendship’,	  a	  Boston	  marriage	  (where	  the	  women	  declare	  commitment	  to	  each	  other	  and	  live	  together)	  could	  only	  be	  undertaken	  by	  women	  who	  had	  some	  way	  to	  support	  themselves	  without	  attachment	  to	  a	  male	  breadwinner	  (Eskridge	  2003).	  	  This	  effectively	  limited	  the	  Boston	  marriage	  to	  upper	  class	  and/or	  educated,	  professional	  women.	  	  Women’s	  colleges,	  for	  example,	  often	  provided	  a	  place	  for	  women	  to	  meet,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  means	  for	  professional	  women	  to	  earn	  wages	  and	  live	  together	  without	  the	  support	  of	  a	  husband.	  	  In	  fact,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  Massachusetts	  the	  Boston	  Marriage	  was	  renamed	  the	  ‘Wellesley	  marriage’	  after	  the	  Seven	  Sisters	  school	  of	  the	  same	  name.	  At	  Simmons	  College	  there	  was	  an	  annual	  ritual	  involving	  a	  mock	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wedding	  	  between	  two	  female	  students	  complete	  with	  a	  “groom”	  and	  “groomsmen”	  in	  tuxedoes	  (The	  History	  Project,	  1998).	  	  	  	  These	  types	  of	  relationships	  were	  not	  for	  women	  only.	  A	  high	  number	  of	  wealthy,	  educated	  professionals	  in	  Massachusetts	  meant	  that	  men	  might	  engage	  in	  “companionate	  friendships”	  as	  well.	  	  Although	  norms	  around	  masculinity	  meant	  that	  close	  relationships	  between	  men	  were	  scrutinized	  in	  a	  way	  that	  women’s	  romantic	  friendships	  were	  not,	  there	  is	  ample	  evidence	  of	  men	  forming	  intimate	  (though	  perhaps	  not	  always	  sexual)	  relationships	  with	  other	  men.	  	  The	  Boston-­‐based	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  history	  organization,	  The	  History	  Project,	  chronicles	  many	  such	  relationships	  that	  flourished	  in	  the	  1800’s	  in	  communities	  of	  artists	  and	  writers,	  and	  in	  theatre	  societies	  (for	  example,	  see	  Improper	  Bostonians,	  1998).	  	  Again,	  whether	  these	  relationships	  were	  sexual	  is	  difficult	  to	  know,	  but,	  most	  importantly,	  these	  relationships	  defied	  the	  general	  conventions	  and	  expectations	  of	  gender	  and	  family	  norms	  of	  the	  time,	  thus	  indicating	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  “queer”	  activity	  woven	  into	  Massachusetts	  history.	  	  The	  thrust	  of	  industrialization	  and	  Enlightenment	  thinking	  continued	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  individual	  rights.	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  1900’s	  many	  fears	  over	  the	  institution	  of	  marriage	  were	  played	  out	  against	  advances	  in	  women’s	  rights.	  	  Despite	  social	  concerns	  regarding	  the	  love	  match,	  marriage	  had	  retained	  its	  position	  as	  the	  center	  of	  emotional	  life	  for	  men	  and	  women.	  	  As	  women	  continued	  to	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press	  for	  equal	  rights	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  “once	  again	  observers	  worried	  about	  the	  future	  of	  marriage…	  the	  combined	  assaults	  of	  sexual	  freedom	  and	  women’s	  political	  emancipation	  seemed	  likely	  to	  topple	  marriage	  from…	  the	  center	  of	  people’s	  emotional	  commitments”	  (Coontz	  2005:	  201).	  	  	  For	  instance,	  as	  the	  women’s	  suffrage	  movement	  gained	  momentum,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  “the	  marital	  model	  in	  which	  the	  individuality	  and	  citizenship	  of	  the	  wife	  disappeared	  into	  her	  husband’s	  legal	  persona	  had	  to	  go,	  logically,	  once	  women	  gained	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  1920”	  (Cott	  2000:	  157).	  	  	  During	  the	  1930’s,	  because	  of	  the	  Great	  Depression,	  “the	  once	  red	  hot	  concerns	  about	  the	  future	  of	  marriage	  were	  put	  on	  the	  back	  burner”	  (Coontz	  2005:	  218).	  	  However,	  tensions	  lingered	  over	  fears	  that	  women	  were	  displacing	  men	  in	  the	  workforce	  in	  the	  1930’s	  and	  “wives	  with	  jobs	  became	  the	  target	  of	  economic	  discrimination”	  (Cott	  2000:	  172).	  	  The	  1940’s	  presented	  its	  own	  challenges	  to	  gender	  and	  marriage	  when	  WWII	  separated	  families	  and	  women	  entered	  into	  the	  workforce	  in	  record	  numbers,	  and,	  again	  in	  1948	  when	  the	  California	  Supreme	  Court	  struck	  down	  laws	  against	  inter-­‐racial	  marriage	  (Cott	  2000:	  184-­‐185).	  	  While	  the	  1950’s	  brought	  a	  brief	  reprieve	  from	  these	  decades	  of	  tumult,	  society	  erupted	  and	  social	  norms	  changed	  again	  throughout	  the	  1960’s	  and	  1970’s.	  	  	  In	  the	  1960’s	  the	  sexual	  revolution	  and	  the	  women’s	  rights	  movement	  served	  to	  restructure	  many	  aspects	  of	  gendered	  behaviour	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and	  romantic/marital	  relationships.	  	  For	  example	  the	  1960’s	  saw	  the	  relaxation	  of	  divorce	  laws,	  and,	  in	  many	  states,	  the	  establishment	  of	  no-­‐fault	  divorce.	  	  Although	  women’s	  rights	  proponents	  “did	  not	  speak	  for	  the	  no-­‐fault	  principle	  [they]	  did	  press	  for	  subsequent	  reforms	  treating	  post-­‐divorce	  arrangements	  such	  as	  child	  custody,	  child	  support,	  alimony,	  and	  the	  division	  of	  marital	  assets”	  (Cott	  2000:	  206).	  	  By	  the	  1970’s,	  the	  idea	  that	  couples	  could	  “redefine	  marriage	  on	  their	  own	  terms	  resounded	  appealingly”,	  for	  example,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  titles	  of	  books	  such	  as	  Beyond	  Monogamy,	  The	  Extramarital	  Sex	  
Contract,	  and	  The	  Love	  Contract:	  Handbook	  for	  a	  Liberated	  Marriage	  (Cott	  2000:	  208).	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  economic	  trends	  in	  the	  1970’s	  continued	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  traditional	  marriage	  as	  de-­‐industrialization	  hit	  men’s	  manufacturing	  jobs	  particularly	  hard,	  drawing	  women	  into	  the	  workforce	  by	  necessity	  if	  not	  by	  choice,	  again	  changing	  prescriptions	  for	  conventional	  gendered	  behaviour	  (Coontz	  2005:	  258).	  	  Stephanie	  Coontz	  (2005:	  262)	  sums	  up	  the	  momentous	  changes	  in	  gender	  and	  family	  norms	  this	  way:	  In	  less	  than	  twenty	  years,	  the	  whole	  legal,	  political,	  and	  economic	  context	  of	  marriage	  was	  transformed.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970’s	  women	  had	  access	  to	  legal	  rights,	  education,	  birth	  control,	  and	  decent	  jobs.	  	  Suddenly	  divorce	  was	  easy	  to	  get.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  traditional	  family	  arrangements	  became	  more	  difficult	  to	  sustain	  in	  the	  new	  economy.	  	  And	  new	  sexual	  mores,	  growing	  tolerance	  for	  out-­‐of-­‐wedlock	  births	  and	  rising	  aspirations	  for	  self-­‐fulfillment	  changed	  the	  cultural	  milieu	  in	  which	  people	  made	  decisions	  about	  their	  personal	  relationships.	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  Despite	  growing	  cultural	  unease	  over	  such	  rapid	  change	  in	  fundamental	  social	  institutions	  and	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  best	  efforts	  of	  a	  conservative	  backlash	  designed	  to	  re-­‐assert	  ‘traditional	  family	  values’	  during	  the	  1980’s	  and	  1990’s,	  these	  changing	  conditions	  could	  not	  be	  reversed.	  	  These	  conditions	  represent	  the	  culmination	  of	  social	  processes	  set	  in	  motion	  centuries	  ago	  with	  the	  development	  of	  free	  market	  economics	  and	  individual	  rights,	  and	  these	  same	  processes	  contributed	  directly	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  identities,	  communities,	  and,	  eventually,	  an	  LGBT	  rights	  movement.	  	  
Massachusetts	  Cultural	  Contexts	  Cultures	  are	  ultimately	  created,	  maintained,	  challenged,	  and	  changed	  by	  the	  people	  who	  live	  in	  them.	  	  But	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  people	  making	  up	  a	  culture	  are	  educated,	  the	  religions	  they	  practice,	  the	  political	  parties	  or	  ideologies	  they	  are	  loyal	  to,	  and	  other	  factors	  go	  a	  long	  way	  in	  determining	  the	  structures	  and	  beliefs	  that	  challengers	  must	  engage	  to	  achieve	  social	  change	  (Camp	  2006,	  Rayside	  2008).	  	  In	  Massachusetts	  these	  variables	  coalesce	  in	  a	  way	  that	  facilitated	  the	  eventual	  rise	  of	  a	  powerful	  movement	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights.	  	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  support	  for	  gay	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage,	  some	  of	  the	  most	  consistent	  demographic	  correlations	  are	  education,	  religion,	  income,	  political	  affiliation	  (conservative	  or	  liberal)	  and	  geographic	  location	  (urban	  or	  rural).	  	  That	  is,	  the	  more	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educated,	  more	  politically	  liberal,	  more	  urban,	  and	  less	  religious	  (or,	  at	  least,	  less	  fundamentalist)	  a	  person	  is	  the	  more	  likely	  he	  or	  she	  is	  to	  support	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights,	  including	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  (Camp	  2006,	  Rayside	  2008).	  	  	  Each	  of	  these	  factors	  has	  an	  important	  historical	  relationship	  to	  Massachusetts	  that	  sets	  this	  state	  apart	  from	  many	  others.	  	  	  	   Perhaps	  Puritanism	  is	  the	  most	  obvious	  religious	  trait	  associated	  with	  Massachusetts	  because	  the	  Massachusetts	  Bay	  Colony	  was	  founded	  by	  Puritans	  escaping	  religious	  persecution	  in	  England,	  .	  	  When	  considering	  Americans	  overall	  resistance	  to	  gay	  marriage	  and	  generally	  weak	  support	  of	  gay	  rights,	  some	  people	  still	  blame	  the	  “Puritanical	  influence”	  of	  the	  first	  colonists.	  	  However,	  by	  	  the	  mid-­‐eighteen	  hundreds	  the	  Puritans	  had	  split	  into	  two	  groups,	  the	  Unitarians	  and	  what	  is	  today	  the	  United	  Church	  of	  Christ,	  and	  these	  religious	  bodies	  are	  among	  the	  most	  liberal	  in	  modern	  Christendom	  (Unitarian	  Universalist	  Historical	  Society	  1999).	  	  In	  fact,	  Unitarian	  Universalists	  	  and	  the	  United	  Church	  of	  Christ	  are	  consistently	  among	  the	  most	  supportive	  religious	  denominations	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights	  and	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  (Pew	  Forum	  on	  Religion	  and	  Public	  Life	  2009,	  Association	  of	  Religion	  Data	  Archives	  2011,	  Rayside	  2008).	  	  	  	  	  	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  early	  Puritan	  values	  like	  education	  and	  respect	  for	  authority	  set	  Massachusetts	  apart	  from	  the	  evangelical	  Christian	  beliefs	  and	  practices	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  found	  
	  	   58	  
across	  the	  expanding	  US	  frontier,	  so	  that	  as	  the	  Puritans	  evolved	  into	  Unitarians,	  their	  religious	  legacy	  became	  one	  of	  liberalism,	  tolerance,	  and	  cosmopolitanism	  (Brown	  and	  Tager	  2000:	  148).	  	  	  	  Evangelicalism	  remains	  strong	  particularly	  across	  the	  US	  Midwest	  and	  south,	  and	  this	  strain	  of	  Christianity	  is	  typically	  quite	  resistant	  to	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  (Fetner	  2008).	  	  Currently,	  26%	  of	  Americans	  identify	  as	  Evangelical	  Protestants,	  and	  in	  some	  individual	  states	  (e.	  g.	  Tennessee,	  Arkansas,	  and	  Oklahoma)	  this	  percentage	  tops	  50%	  of	  the	  population	  (Pew	  Forum	  on	  Religion	  and	  Public	  Life	  2008).	  	  	  Evangelical	  denominations	  tend	  to	  believe	  most	  strongly	  in	  a	  singular	  version	  of	  ‘traditional	  family	  values’,	  based	  on	  a	  particular	  interpretation	  of	  Christian	  scripture	  which	  they	  believe	  advocates	  the	  Biblical	  and	  familial	  authority	  of	  the	  male-­‐dominated,	  breadwinner/homemaker,	  nuclear	  family.	  	  In	  addition,	  many	  evangelical	  Christians	  believe	  that	  America	  is	  a	  Christian	  nation	  (as	  defined	  by	  their	  own	  interpretation	  of	  Christian	  scripture)	  founded	  on	  Christian	  values	  and	  that	  this	  should	  be	  reflected	  in	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  land.	  	  	  Most	  importantly,	  evangelical	  leaders	  are	  often	  politically	  well-­‐connected	  nationally	  and	  locally	  in	  states	  with	  large	  evangelical	  populations.	  	  For	  followers	  of	  this	  particular	  faith	  tradition,	  there	  is	  a	  direct	  line	  between	  the	  pulpit	  and	  politics	  (Fetner	  2008,	  McVeigh	  and	  Diaz	  2010).	  	  	  	  Regions	  with	  large	  populations	  of	  evangelical	  Christians	  are	  the	  areas	  where	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights	  are	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most	  strongly	  opposed.	  	  Few	  such	  states	  have	  any	  legal	  protections	  in	  place	  for	  gay	  people,	  not	  even	  basic	  protections	  against	  discrimination	  in	  housing	  or	  employment,	  and	  anti-­‐gay	  marriage	  amendments	  have	  typically	  passed	  in	  these	  states	  by	  very	  high	  margins.	  	  	  In	  religious	  terms,	  present	  day	  Massachusetts	  is	  most	  often	  associated	  with	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  influx	  of	  immigrants	  from	  predominantly	  Roman	  Catholic	  European	  countries	  (most	  notably	  Ireland,	  but	  also	  Italy	  and	  Poland)	  over	  the	  course	  the	  late	  1800’s	  and	  throughout	  the	  1900’s	  Roman	  Catholics	  became	  the	  predominant	  religious	  group	  in	  Massachusetts	  (Brown	  and	  Tager	  2000,	  Peirce	  1976).	  	  Today,	  43%	  of	  Massachusetts	  residents	  identify	  with	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church.	  	  The	  next	  highest	  group	  is	  “unaffiliated”	  (17%),	  followed	  closely	  by	  “Mainline	  Protestant”	  (15%),	  and	  then	  “Evangelical	  Protestant”	  (11%)	  (Pew	  Forum	  on	  Religion	  and	  Public	  Life	  2008).	  	  This	  configuration	  of	  denominations	  is	  important	  because	  evangelical	  Protestants	  are	  the	  religious	  group	  that	  most	  consistently	  and	  vehemently	  opposes	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  This	  group	  also	  has	  the	  most	  political	  influence	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  staving	  off	  or	  reversing	  advances	  in	  such	  rights	  (Fetner	  2008,	  Rayside	  2008,	  Rimmerman	  2002).	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  leadership	  is	  also	  a	  staunch	  opponent	  of	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  same	  sex	  marriage,	  but	  while	  evangelical	  believers	  present	  a	  fairly	  united	  front	  on	  the	  issue	  (81%	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opposed),	  Catholics	  tend	  to	  be	  somewhat	  more	  evenly	  split	  on	  the	  issue	  (45%	  opposed)	  (Pew	  Forum	  on	  Religion	  and	  Public	  Life	  2008).	  	  	  Education	  is	  another	  uniquely	  important	  part	  of	  Massachusetts	  history,	  from	  colonial	  times	  to	  the	  present,	  and	  educational	  attainment	  continues	  to	  set	  this	  state	  apart	  from	  most	  others.	  	  	  The	  earliest	  known	  U.S.	  laws	  regarding	  education	  were	  passed	  in	  Massachusetts	  in	  1642	  (requiring	  that	  all	  children	  be	  taught	  to	  read	  and	  write)	  and	  1647	  (requiring	  that	  communities	  provide	  teachers	  and	  schools	  to	  instruct	  children),	  and	  are	  considered	  the	  first	  compulsory	  education	  laws	  in	  the	  American	  territory	  (Dejnozka	  1982,	  Katz	  1976).	  	  While	  these	  laws	  laid	  down	  rules	  regarding	  compulsory	  education,	  they	  are	  not	  the	  same	  as	  the	  compulsory	  education	  laws	  we	  know	  of	  today	  which	  require	  free,	  universal	  public	  education.	  	  It	  was	  more	  than	  200	  years	  later	  that	  those	  laws	  were	  put	  in	  place,	  also	  established	  first	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  In	  1852	  Massachusetts	  became	  the	  first	  state	  that	  required	  parents	  to	  send	  their	  children	  to	  public	  school;	  it	  would	  take	  66	  years	  before	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  caught	  up	  in	  1918	  (Katz	  1976).	  	  Even	  today	  Massachusetts’	  early	  commitment	  to	  education	  is	  borne	  out	  in	  the	  state’s	  consistently	  high	  levels	  of	  educational	  achievement	  and	  attainment.	  	  For	  instance,	  in	  2009	  average	  education	  attainment	  values	  for	  the	  United	  States	  were	  the	  following:	  85.3%	  of	  the	  population	  had	  earned	  a	  high	  school	  diploma	  or	  more,	  27.9%	  had	  earned	  a	  Bachelor’s	  degree	  or	  more,	  and	  10.3%	  
	  	   61	  
had	  an	  advanced	  degree	  or	  more.	  	  In	  Massachusetts,	  89%	  of	  the	  population	  has	  earned	  at	  least	  a	  high	  school	  diploma,	  38.2%	  have	  earned	  a	  Bachelor’s	  degree	  or	  more,	  and	  16.4%	  of	  Massachusetts	  have	  been	  awarded	  Advanced	  degree.	  (United	  States	  Census	  2000a)	  	  	  	  	  The	  implications	  of	  this	  emphasis	  on	  education	  are	  important	  for	  establishing	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  eventual	  emergence	  of	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  culture.	  	  For	  one,	  an	  educated	  population	  likely	  facilitates	  Massachusetts	  residents	  earning	  higher	  incomes	  than	  residents	  of	  many	  other	  states.	  	  Census	  data	  shows	  that	  Massachusetts	  consistently	  scores	  high	  on	  both	  measures	  of	  education	  and	  income	  (United	  States	  Census	  2000a,b).	  Not	  only	  is	  income	  a	  consistent	  correlate	  with	  support	  for	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  same	  sex	  marriage	  (Camp	  2006),	  but	  this	  combination	  of	  education	  and	  wealth	  is	  important	  in	  an	  historical	  sense	  as	  it	  contributed	  to	  early	  community	  development,	  organizing,	  and	  resource	  mobilization	  opportunities	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights.	  Massachusetts	  is	  also	  set	  apart	  from	  many	  other	  US	  states	  as	  a	  leader	  in	  political	  activity	  in	  social	  justice	  and	  reformist	  causes.	  Commitment	  to	  social	  justice	  	  and	  reform	  has	  long	  been	  a	  part	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Bay	  State.	  	  Apparently,	  “more	  than	  in	  most	  places,	  the	  people	  of	  the	  Bay	  State	  became	  involved	  with	  the	  general	  issues	  that	  excited	  concern…as	  Massachusetts	  emerged	  as	  a	  nursery	  for	  the	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missionaries	  of	  a	  hundred	  causes”	  (Brown	  and	  Tager	  2000:	  144).	  	  	  	  Early	  causes	  ranging	  from	  abolition,	  women’s	  suffrage,	  temperance,	  improved	  treatment	  for	  mentally	  ill	  persons,	  public	  health	  issues,	  prison	  reform,	  labour	  rights,	  and	  later	  causes	  such	  as	  resistance	  to	  McCarthyism,	  opposition	  to	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  feminism,	  and	  gay	  rights	  were	  supported	  in	  large	  measure	  by	  activists	  and	  social	  reformers	  from	  the	  Bay	  State.	  	  In	  fact,	  leaders	  of	  many	  such	  reform	  movements	  were	  born	  and	  bred	  in	  Massachusetts.	  However,	  not	  all	  Massachusetts’	  political	  activity	  was	  in	  pursuit	  of	  what	  we	  might	  call	  progressive	  social	  justice.	  	  	  	  Racial	  and	  ethnic	  tension	  has	  been	  known	  to	  flair	  up	  over	  the	  course	  of	  Massachusetts	  history,	  especially	  in	  response	  to	  increased	  competition	  for	  jobs	  during	  tight	  economic	  times.	  	  During	  such	  times	  some	  Massachusetts	  residents	  utilized	  their	  penchant	  for	  political	  organizing	  to	  push	  back	  against	  social	  justice	  reforms.	  	  For	  example,	  there	  was	  intense	  resistance	  to	  racial	  integration	  efforts	  in	  Boston	  (Brown	  and	  Tager	  2000:	  248,	  297).	  	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time	  that	  some	  politically	  active,	  social	  justice	  minded	  Massachusetts	  citizens	  rallied	  for	  racial	  integration,	  other	  politically	  active	  citizens	  fought	  back	  quite	  strongly	  in	  opposition	  to	  these	  changes.	  Later	  when	  it	  came	  to	  advances	  in	  LGBT	  rights,	  a	  similar	  pattern	  emerged.	  	  While	  many	  groups	  of	  politically	  active,	  social	  justice	  minded	  Massachusetts	  citizens	  supported	  the	  advancement	  of	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LGBT	  rights,	  many	  equally	  politically	  active	  citizens	  worked	  vigorously	  to	  dismantle	  those	  advances.	  	  As	  Massachusetts	  weathered	  the	  transition	  from	  a	  traditional	  farming	  community	  to	  an	  urban,	  industrial	  center,	  the	  state	  emerged	  on	  the	  forefront	  of	  many	  types	  of	  social	  change.	  	  Industrialization	  and	  urbanization	  are	  known	  to	  induce	  important	  changes	  in	  family	  structures,	  to	  foster	  women’s	  independence,	  and	  encourage	  labour	  organizing.	  	  These	  are	  true	  in	  terms	  of	  general	  social	  change	  and	  also	  contributed	  to	  change	  in	  Massachusetts	  specifically	  (Adam	  1995,	  Brown	  and	  Tager	  2000).	  	  	  Although	  the	  increased	  economic	  competition	  associated	  with	  these	  processes	  can	  contribute	  to	  discord	  amongst	  racial,	  ethnic,	  or	  religious	  groups,	  eventually	  urban,	  industrial	  centers	  become	  known	  for	  acceptance,	  or	  at	  least	  tolerance,	  of	  diversity	  in	  all	  its	  forms	  (Camp	  2006,	  Nicholson-­‐Crotty	  2006,	  Rayside	  2008).	  	  Indeed,	  for	  as	  long	  as	  attitudes	  about	  homosexuality	  have	  been	  studied	  greater	  acceptance	  of	  gay	  people	  and	  gay	  rights	  are	  found	  in	  industrial	  urban	  centers	  and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  college	  towns	  (Camp	  2006,	  Rayside	  2008).	  	  	   Massachusetts	  is	  a	  largely	  urban	  state.	  	  Since	  the	  very	  first	  United	  States	  census,	  Boston	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  urban	  centers	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  only	  recently	  dropping	  in	  ranks	  to	  the	  twentieth	  largest	  city	  in	  America	  in	  the	  2000	  census	  (United	  States	  Census	  2000b).	  	  	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1800’s	  urban	  life	  became	  predominant	  in	  Massachusetts;	  by	  1875	  farming	  was	  surpassed	  by	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manufacturing	  as	  the	  leading	  occupation	  and	  source	  of	  income,	  and	  religious	  and	  ethnic	  homogeneity	  gave	  way	  to	  diversity.	  Although	  tension	  between	  groups	  arose	  from	  time	  to	  time,	  in	  general,	  with	  the	  changes	  brought	  by	  industrialization	  “innovation	  and	  variety	  became	  characteristic	  of	  religious	  and	  social	  life	  as	  well	  as	  economic	  activity”	  (Brown	  and	  Tager	  2000:	  113).	  	  	  As	  Massachusetts	  took	  its	  place	  on	  the	  cutting	  edge	  of	  industrialization,	  the	  result	  was	  drastic	  demographic,	  cultural,	  and	  political	  changes	  in	  the	  Bay	  State.	  	  	  
The	  Emergence	  of	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Communities	  As	  Barry	  Adam	  (1995)	  observes	  in	  his	  examination	  of	  	  the	  rise	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  activism,	  coinciding	  with	  the	  normative	  changes	  in	  heterosexual	  romantic	  and	  marital	  relationships,	  the	  broad	  social	  changes	  attributed	  to	  industrialization	  and	  its	  emphasis	  on	  individualism	  and	  individual	  rights	  heralded	  far-­‐reaching	  changes	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  relationships	  as	  well.	  	  	  Urbanization	  meant	  that	  large	  	  metropolitan	  areas	  emerged	  as	  beacons	  of	  freedom	  for	  those	  living	  away	  from	  the	  potentially	  harsh	  judgement	  of	  family	  members	  back	  home.	  	  These	  places	  became	  potential	  centers	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  communities	  to	  develop,	  and	  these	  communities	  could	  later	  be	  drawn	  from	  to	  support	  social	  movement	  activity.	  	  	  Indeed,	  by	  the	  early	  1900’s	  there	  was	  an	  established	  network	  of	  bars,	  baths,	  social	  clubs,	  theatres,	  music	  halls,	  etc.,	  where	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  people	  could	  meet	  and	  greet	  in	  many	  cities,	  including	  Boston	  (Adam	  1995:	  43).	  	  Early	  on	  these	  social	  
	  	   65	  
spaces	  would	  have	  necessarily	  been	  clandestine,	  though	  there	  is	  evidence	  of	  “tolerance	  of	  open	  homosexual	  subcultures	  and	  interest	  in	  female-­‐impersonating	  entertainers,”	  at	  least	  through	  the	  1930’s	  when	  increased	  emphasis	  on	  heterosexual	  bonding	  and	  marriage	  led	  to	  greater	  stigmatisation	  of	  same-­‐sex	  relationships	  and	  sexual	  activity	  (Coontz	  2005:	  206).	  	  	  Even	  as	  tolerance	  for	  gays	  and	  lesbians	  diminished	  and	  same-­‐sex	  sexual	  activity	  became	  increasingly	  medicalized	  and	  criminalized,	  these	  early	  community	  spaces	  served	  as	  important	  seeding	  grounds	  for	  later	  movement	  activity	  (Adam,	  1995).	  	  	  Organizing	  for	  gay	  rights	  in	  Boston	  (and	  in	  a	  few	  other	  large	  metropolitan	  areas)	  began	  in	  earnest	  in	  the	  1950’s.	  	  This	  is	  more	  than	  a	  decade	  before	  the	  Stonewall	  Riots,	  the	  event	  that	  is	  often	  considered	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  movement.	  The	  first	  known	  attempt	  to	  start	  a	  gay	  rights	  organization	  was	  in	  1957	  when	  Prescott	  Townsend,	  after	  holding	  weekly	  social	  meetings	  on	  the	  discussion	  of	  homosexuality	  at	  his	  home	  throughout	  the	  1950’s,	  established	  a	  branch	  of	  the	  Mattachine	  Society	  in	  Boston.	  	  Due	  to	  personal	  conflicts,	  Townsend	  broke	  with	  the	  Mattachine	  Society	  in	  1962	  to	  form	  the	  Boston	  Demophile	  Society	  (Bullough	  2002,	  The	  History	  Project	  1998).	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  Mattachine	  Society	  in	  Boston	  sponsored	  discussions,	  lectures,	  and	  newsletters.	  	  Although	  many	  gay	  Bostonians	  may	  have	  been	  unaware	  of	  these	  activities,	  for	  those	  who	  participated	  in	  them	  it	  was	  often	  “their	  first	  substantive	  evidence	  that	  homosexuality	  was	  a	  widespread	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phenomenon	  that	  could	  be	  discussed	  as	  something	  other	  than	  a	  crime”	  (The	  History	  Project	  1998:	  198).	  	  These	  early	  attempts	  at	  organizing	  built	  a	  foundation	  for	  later	  movement	  activity,	  putting	  Boston	  (and	  other	  metropolitan	  areas)	  ahead	  of	  the	  curve	  when	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  movement	  began	  picking	  up	  momentum.	  By	  1969	  a	  spirit	  of	  protest	  against	  injustice	  was	  gripping	  America.	  	  Throughout	  the	  1960’s	  there	  were	  demonstrations	  against	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  in	  support	  of	  Civil	  Rights	  for	  African	  Americans,	  and	  against	  the	  oppression	  of	  women,	  and	  Massachusettans	  were	  visibly	  involved	  in	  each	  of	  these	  issues.	  	  As	  reformist	  fervour	  gripped	  not	  only	  Massachusetts,	  but	  much	  of	  the	  nation,	  it	  was	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  time	  before	  the	  accommodationist	  strategies	  of	  the	  likes	  of	  the	  Mattachine	  Society	  gave	  way	  to	  the	  revolutionary	  politics	  of	  gay	  liberation.	  	  A	  major	  shift	  occurred	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  “Stonewall	  Riots”	  of	  1969,	  when	  a	  group	  of	  working	  class	  lesbians,	  gay	  men,	  and	  drag	  queens	  refused	  to	  quietly	  accept	  a	  police	  raid	  at	  the	  Stonewall	  Inn	  in	  New	  York.	  	  This	  was	  a	  defining	  moment	  in	  gay	  history,	  often	  cited	  as	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  modern	  LGBT	  rights	  movement.	  	  However,	  “while	  the	  Stonewall	  riots	  of	  1969	  came	  to	  represent	  a	  symbolic,	  defining	  moment	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  movement,	  the	  roots	  of	  gay	  liberation	  had	  already	  taken	  hold	  in	  Boston”	  (The	  History	  Project	  1998:	  198).	  	  	  	  It	  is	  these	  “roots	  of	  gay	  liberation”	  outlined	  above,	  i.e.,	  early	  community	  building	  and	  organizing,	  that	  allowed	  the	  post-­‐Stonewall	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lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  movement	  in	  Boston	  to	  grow	  into	  a	  force	  to	  be	  reckoned	  with.	  	  	  	  Because	  of	  its	  early	  organizing,	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  movement	  in	  Boston	  emerged	  on	  the	  crest	  of	  a	  wave	  of	  post-­‐Stonewall	  zeitgeist,	  well	  positioned	  to	  challenge	  the	  political	  and	  cultural	  structures	  set	  out	  before	  them.	  	  Throughout	  the	  1970’s,	  80’s,	  and	  90’s	  LGBT	  activists	  launched	  a	  series	  of	  rights	  campaigns	  that	  they	  (eventually)	  won;	  learning	  along	  the	  way	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  setbacks,	  strategize	  for	  success,	  and	  defend	  themselves	  against	  attacks	  from	  a	  growing	  counter-­‐movement.	  	  The	  gains	  made	  by	  the	  movement	  in	  this	  period	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  battle	  for	  marriage	  equality.	  
Conclusion	  
	   James	  Jasper	  (1997:	  50)	  describes	  culture	  as	  “a	  set	  of	  rules	  we	  can	  use	  according	  to	  our	  own	  intentions.”	  	  As	  the	  Massachusetts	  LGBT	  rights	  movement	  developed,	  both	  proponents	  and	  opponents	  attempted	  to	  marshal	  culture	  in	  their	  favour.	  	  LGBT	  activists	  were	  able	  to	  win	  successive	  rights	  battles	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  1970s,	  80s,	  and	  90s,	  culminating	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  the	  2000s.	  	  LGBT	  movement	  activists	  were	  successful	  in	  advancing	  their	  rights	  agenda	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  foundation	  laid	  by	  the	  early	  organizing	  activity	  outlined	  above.	  	  	  	  This	  early	  activity	  provided	  a	  jump-­‐start	  to	  the	  LGBT	  movement	  in	  Massachusetts	  in	  several	  important	  ways.	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Notably,	  early	  organizing	  enabled	  the	  development	  of	  networks	  of	  people	  sympathetic	  to	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  and	  these	  networks	  could	  be	  tapped	  for	  resources.	  	  The	  development	  of	  networks	  and	  their	  potential	  for	  resource	  mobilization	  is	  important	  for	  the	  success	  of	  social	  movements	  (Jasper	  1997:	  62,	  Tarrow	  1998:	  131).	  	  Over	  time,	  movements	  not	  only	  build	  networks	  and	  accumulate	  resources,	  they	  develop	  strategy	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  agency,	  or	  “artfulness”	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  deploying	  strategic	  choices	  (Jasper	  1997:	  64,	  Ganz	  2004).	  	  	  With	  these	  networks,	  resources,	  and	  strategic	  knowledge	  in	  place,	  movements	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  emergent	  political	  opportunities,	  to	  create	  opportunities	  for	  themselves,	  and/or	  to	  fend	  for	  themselves	  in	  times	  of	  constricting	  opportunities	  (McAdam	  1996).	  	  	  	  Early	  organizing	  sowed	  the	  seeds	  that	  would	  eventually	  grow	  into	  the	  resources,	  and	  strategies	  needed	  for	  consistent	  successful	  advancement	  of	  LGBT	  movement	  goals,	  though	  it	  would	  take	  some	  years	  of	  cultivation	  before	  the	  full	  capacity	  of	  these	  resources	  and	  strategies	  would	  be	  reached.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  chronicle	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights	  movement	  in	  Massachusetts	  and	  highlight	  some	  of	  the	  key	  successes	  (and	  setbacks)	  that	  shaped	  this	  movement	  into	  the	  political	  force	  that	  eventually	  won	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  rights	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  couples	  in	  Massachusetts.	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CHAPTER	  3:	  POST-­‐STONEWALL	  COHESION	  AND	  LGBT	  MOVEMENT	  DEVELOPMENT	  	  Introduction	  	  	   Social	  movements	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  successful	  when	  activists	  successfully	  tap	  into	  the	  culture(s)	  and	  institutions	  in	  which	  they	  are	  embedded	  and	  mobilize	  the	  resources	  at	  their	  disposal	  to	  create	  political	  and	  social	  change	  (Goodwin	  and	  Jasper	  2004,	  McAdam,	  McCarthy,	  and	  Zald	  1996).	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1950’s	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts	  had	  developed	  networks	  and	  had	  begun	  early	  organizing	  that	  would	  enable	  them	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  moment	  that	  a	  political	  opportunity	  opened	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights.	  	  Such	  an	  opportunity	  might	  be	  a	  change	  in	  institutional	  access	  for	  challenging	  groups,	  a	  shift	  in	  elite	  alliances,	  or	  a	  change	  in	  available	  allies	  (Tarrow	  1998:	  71).	  	  Social	  movement	  theorist	  Francesca	  Poletta	  (2004:	  108)	  also	  describes	  political	  opportunities	  as	  “constitutional	  provisions	  for	  the	  use	  of	  political	  power,	  collective	  memories,	  and	  other	  cultural	  norms.”	  	  In	  a	  way	  that	  few	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  could	  have	  imagined	  in	  the	  1950’s,	  such	  opportunities,	  and	  activists’	  abilities	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  them,	  would	  change	  the	  parameters	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  life	  dramatically	  over	  the	  next	  two	  decades.	  Beginning	  in	  the	  late	  1960’s,	  Massachusetts	  activists	  became	  well	  practiced	  in	  making	  use	  of	  political	  opportunities,	  and	  though	  the	  success	  of	  their	  struggles	  would	  never	  be	  guaranteed,	  the	  strategic	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savvy	  with	  which	  they	  fought	  each	  one	  would	  ensure	  a	  lasting	  impact	  on	  the	  culture	  around	  them.	  	  	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists	  were	  successful	  in	  their	  political	  objectives,	  the	  policy	  and	  legal	  debates	  leading	  up	  to	  each	  success,	  as	  well	  as	  political	  change	  itself,	  would	  leave	  what	  Miriam	  Smith	  (2008:	  10)	  calls	  “policy	  legacies”	  that	  would	  shape	  future	  political	  opportunities,	  strategies,	  and	  outcomes	  for	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  movement.	  	  	  The	  policy	  legacies	  left	  by	  early	  activism	  from	  the	  1970’s	  onward	  are	  important	  in	  that	  “contemporary	  policy	  and	  legal	  debates	  and	  discourse	  are	  shaped	  by	  the	  past	  policies	  or	  policy	  legacies	  which	  have	  been	  institutionalized	  in	  ways	  that	  shape	  and	  structure	  the	  ongoing	  process	  of	  political	  conflict”	  and	  social	  movement	  goals	  (Smith	  2009:	  10).	  	  	  These	  early	  policy	  legacies	  set	  in	  motion	  political	  and	  cultural	  changes	  that	  were	  integral	  for	  the	  later	  success	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  The	  1960’s	  and	  1970’s	  were	  a	  period	  of	  rapid	  change	  and	  development	  for	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  movement.	  	  In	  the	  1960’s	  tension	  grew	  among	  the	  homophile	  movement	  over	  “whether	  the	  role	  of	  homophile	  organizations	  was	  to	  provide	  emotional	  support	  to	  homosexuals	  and	  create	  safe	  social	  spaces	  to	  gather…	  or	  to	  make	  demands	  on	  the	  state	  to	  end	  its	  harassment	  of	  gay	  men	  and	  women”	  (Fetner	  2008:	  15).	  	  By	  the	  late	  1960’s,	  inspired	  by	  the	  New	  Left,	  antiwar	  activists,	  and	  the	  Black	  Power	  movement	  ,	  gay	  activists	  could	  be	  heard	  calling	  for	  more	  radical	  change	  (Fetner	  2008,	  Adam	  1995).	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It	  was	  this	  spirit	  that	  carried	  the	  day	  during	  the	  Stonewall	  Rebellion.	  	  For	  three	  days	  in	  1969	  the	  Stonewall	  Inn	  was	  the	  site	  of	  a	  standoff	  between	  New	  York	  City	  police	  and	  a	  rag-­‐tag	  bunch	  of	  butches,	  nellies,	  and	  drag	  queens	  who	  refused	  to	  be	  lead	  off	  to	  jail	  in	  quiet	  shame	  (Rimmerman	  2002:	  55).	  	  This	  rebellion	  may	  have	  left	  the	  Stonewall	  Inn	  itself	  a	  burned	  out	  shell	  of	  a	  building,	  but	  from	  those	  ashes	  rose	  the	  spirit	  of	  gay	  liberation	  (Adam	  1995:	  81).	  	  	  Veering	  away	  from	  the	  assimilationist	  strategies	  of	  the	  early	  homophile	  organizations,	  gay	  liberation	  issued	  a	  direct	  challenge	  to	  the	  heteronormative	  social	  order,	  insisting	  that	  sexual	  norms	  be	  “subverted	  and	  eliminated”	  (Fetner	  2008:	  16),	  struggling	  to	  “free	  the	  homosexual	  in	  everyone”	  (Adam	  1995:	  84),	  and	  demanding	  that	  “even	  the	  most	  unassimilated	  needed	  to	  be	  represented	  as	  part	  of	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  movements”	  (Rimmerman	  2002:	  55).	  	  	  By	  the	  early	  1970’s	  gay	  liberation	  groups	  existed	  in	  most	  major	  cities	  across	  the	  US,	  including	  Boston,	  where	  activists	  organized	  Boston’s	  very	  first	  “all	  gay	  march	  and	  demonstration”	  in	  1971	  (Adam	  1995,	  Mitzel	  1971).	  	  The	  gay	  liberation	  era	  itself	  was	  short-­‐lived.	  	  The	  collapse	  of	  the	  New	  Left	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  New	  Right	  pushed	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists	  away	  from	  	  the	  liberationist	  goal	  of	  eliminating	  	  sexual	  and	  gender	  norms	  (Fetner	  2008:	  16),	  giving	  way	  	  to	  the	  less	  radical	  legal	  rights	  strategy.	  	  Gay	  liberation	  had	  an	  important	  and	  lasting	  influence	  on	  the	  future	  development	  and	  strategy	  of	  	  the	  gay	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rights	  movement,	  and	  perhaps	  it	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  movement	  maturity	  that	  activists	  began	  to	  take	  on	  the	  challenge	  of	  civil	  rights	  and	  legal	  reform	  (Adam	  1995,	  Fetner	  2008,	  Rimmerman	  2002).	  	  	  	  In	  Massachusetts,	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  movement	  during	  the	  late	  1960’s	  and	  into	  the	  1970’s	  inspired	  the	  formation	  of	  new	  groups,	  coalitions,	  and	  alliances	  that	  would	  later	  be	  instrumental	  in	  winning	  marriage	  equality.	  Decades	  of	  early	  organizing	  meant	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts,	  particularly	  in	  Boston,	  	  were	  well	  positioned	  to	  act	  on	  the	  new	  spirit	  of	  gay	  liberation	  and	  equality.	  	  By	  1972	  a	  number	  of	  bills	  addressing	  discrimination	  against	  gay	  people	  was	  filed	  with	  the	  clerk	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  legislature	  by	  Representative	  Barney	  Frank	  .	  Meanwhile,	  concerted	  grass	  roots	  organizing	  activity	  was	  taking	  place	  as	  well.	  	  For	  example,	  1973	  saw	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  Gay	  Political	  Caucus	  (a	  state	  House	  lobbying	  group);	  the	  Gay	  Community	  News	  was	  first	  published	  in	  1973;	  in	  1974	  Boston	  elected	  the	  first	  openly	  gay	  person	  to	  be	  elected	  to	  any	  position	  in	  American	  history	  by	  voting	  Elaine	  Noble	  into	  office	  as	  state	  representative;	  in	  1978	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Advocates	  and	  Defenders	  was	  formed	  to	  fight	  for	  gay	  rights	  through	  the	  judicial	  system;	  and	  in	  1979	  the	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Parents	  Project	  was	  formed	  	  (Adam	  1995,	  The	  Advocate	  1973,	  Gozemba	  	  and	  Kahn	  2007,	  Marks	  Ridinger	  1996).	  	  In	  fact,	  so	  many	  new	  gay	  rights	  organizations	  were	  formed	  in	  Massachusetts	  in	  the	  1970’s	  that	  embodied	  the	  liberatory,	  out-­‐and-­‐proud,	  politically	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active	  spirit	  of	  the	  times,	  that	  older,	  pre-­‐Stonewall	  organizations	  that	  focused	  on	  quiet	  assimilation,	  like	  the	  Homophile	  Union	  of	  Boston,	  collapsed	  (Fetner	  2008,	  Marks	  Ridinger	  1996).	  	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  took	  well	  over	  a	  decade	  for	  any	  of	  those	  initial	  gay	  rights	  bills	  to	  be	  passed,	  Massachusetts	  state	  representative	  Elaine	  Noble	  faced	  threats	  to	  both	  her	  office	  and	  her	  life	  during	  her	  campaign,	  and	  representative	  Barney	  Frank	  remained	  closeted	  until	  the	  late	  1980’s.	  	  But	  during	  the	  80’s	  the	  persistence	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  LGBT	  movement	  began	  to	  pay	  off:	  Gerry	  Studds	  came	  out	  of	  the	  closet	  amidst	  scandal	  in	  1983	  and	  was	  re-­‐elected;	  gays	  were	  barred	  from	  foster	  parenting	  in	  1985	  but	  succeeded	  in	  challenging	  the	  discriminatory	  policy	  in	  1990;	  	  in	  1989	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  was	  finally	  passed	  after	  having	  been	  re-­‐introduced	  in	  every	  legislative	  session	  since	  1973	  (Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2007).	  	  These	  early	  rights	  struggles	  were	  critical	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  gay	  rights	  movement	  strong	  enough	  to	  eventually	  win	  marriage	  equality	  and	  then	  fight	  off	  the	  anti-­‐gay	  forces	  working	  to	  roll	  back	  marriage	  rights	  for	  same	  sex	  couples.	  	  	  	  These	  early	  battles	  and	  their	  outcomes-­‐-­‐	  the	  eventual	  wins,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  losses	  and	  stalemates	  along	  the	  way-­‐-­‐	  highlight	  a	  nexus	  between	  culture,	  structure,	  and	  agency	  that	  began	  to	  coalesce	  in	  the	  Massachusetts	  gay	  rights	  movement.	  	  	  	  Many	  analyses	  of	  social	  movement	  success	  focus	  on	  structural	  explanations	  for	  movement	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success:	  resource	  mobilization,	  political	  opportunities,	  and	  /or	  cultural	  framing	  (i.e.	  McAdam,	  McCarthy,	  and	  Zald	  1996,	  Tarrow	  1998).	  	  But	  most	  scholars	  acknowledge	  that	  just	  because	  resources	  or	  political	  opportunities	  exist	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  will	  be	  acted	  on,	  or	  if	  acted	  upon,	  won.	  	  	  Political	  structures	  and	  opportunities	  exist	  for,	  and	  can	  be	  created	  by,	  both	  movements	  and	  counter-­‐movements	  to	  utilize,	  and	  both	  movements	  and	  counter-­‐movement	  strive	  to	  ingrain	  culturally	  relevant	  frames	  into	  the	  minds	  of	  citizens.	  	  Cultural	  variables	  must	  be	  in	  place	  that	  give	  traction	  to	  the	  strategies	  used	  by	  activists	  to	  advance	  their	  agenda.	  	  	  	  	  Though	  political	  and	  cultural	  conditions	  in	  Massachusetts	  are	  in	  many	  ways	  favourable	  to	  civil	  rights	  struggles,	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  fledgling	  gay	  rights	  movement	  was	  by	  no	  means	  certain.	  	  This	  stage	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  movement	  in	  Massachusetts	  sees	  social	  movement	  actors	  	  testing	  which	  strategies	  work	  best	  with	  the	  cultural	  elements	  in	  which	  they	  are	  embedded.	  	  This	  creates	  a	  feedback	  loop,	  whereby	  activists’	  strategic	  choices	  create	  positive	  cultural	  change,	  and	  continued	  cultural	  change	  leads	  to	  additional	  opportunities	  to	  advance	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights.	  Sidney	  Tarrow	  (1998:	  71)	  argues	  most	  strongly	  that	  social	  movement	  activity	  “is	  more	  closely	  related	  to	  opportunities	  for	  –	  and	  limited	  by	  constraints	  upon	  –	  collective	  actions”	  than	  individuals’	  subjective	  experience	  of	  economic	  or	  social	  inequality.	  	  Other	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theorists	  emphasize	  a	  synthesis	  of	  political	  opportunities	  (i.e.	  changes	  in	  institutional	  structures	  or	  informal	  power	  relations),	  mobilizing	  structures	  (formal	  or	  informal	  entities	  that	  move	  or	  facilitate	  individuals	  to	  engage	  in	  collective	  action)	  and	  framing	  processes	  (strategic	  portrayals	  of	  the	  movement	  and	  the	  world	  that	  legitimate	  movement	  activity)	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  social	  movement	  action	  (McAdam,	  McCarthy,	  and	  Zald	  1996:	  2-­‐6).	  	  	  It	  is	  most	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  while	  in	  some	  cases	  political	  opportunities	  and	  mobilizing	  structures	  exist	  outside	  of	  movements,	  there	  are	  many	  cases	  where	  movements	  themselves	  create	  their	  own	  political	  opportunities	  and	  develop	  their	  own	  vehicles	  for	  collective	  actions.	  	  Importantly,	  as	  this	  analysis	  of	  LGBT	  activism	  in	  Massachusetts	  will	  show,	  “political	  opportunities	  and	  mobilizing	  structures	  are	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  strategic	  considerations,	  by	  the	  choices	  movement	  leaders	  and	  activists	  make”	  and	  that	  all	  of	  the	  above	  (political	  opportunities,	  structures,	  frames,	  strategies)	  are	  mediated	  by	  culture(Goodwin	  and	  Jasper	  2004:	  28).	  	  	  It	  is	  because	  Massachusetts’	  activists	  learned	  over	  many	  years	  to	  skilfully	  manipulate	  this	  kaleidoscope	  of	  factors	  that	  	  this	  state	  became	  the	  first	  in	  America	  to	  legally	  recognize	  same	  sex	  marriages.	  Social	  movement	  theorist	  Doug	  McAdam	  (1996:	  32-­‐33)	  argues	  the	  Stonewall	  Riot	  occurred	  during	  a	  time	  when	  political	  opportunities	  for	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  people	  were	  constricting	  rather	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than	  expanding,	  but	  that	  the	  gay	  rights	  movement	  likely	  benefitted	  from	  the	  “ideational,	  tactical,	  and	  organizational”	  lessons	  of	  earlier	  movements,	  such	  as	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement	  and	  the	  women’s	  movement.	  	  Given	  the	  long	  history	  of	  reform	  and	  social	  movement	  activity	  in	  Massachusetts,	  such	  lessons	  should	  be	  well	  embedded	  in	  the	  collective	  memory	  of	  most	  politically	  aware	  citizens,	  and	  certainly	  those	  that	  are	  politically	  active	  (Brown	  and	  Tager	  2000).	  	  	  Of	  course,	  “mobilization	  does	  not	  necessarily	  depend	  on	  expanding	  opportunities...opportunities,	  when	  they	  are	  important	  [it	  is	  because	  they	  arise	  from]	  situationally	  specific	  combinations	  and	  sequences	  of	  political	  processes”	  (Goodwin	  and	  Jasper	  2004:	  15).	  	  	  What	  happened	  in	  New	  York	  at	  the	  Stonewall	  Inn	  in	  1969	  became	  a	  “political	  opportunity”	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  in	  Boston	  only	  because	  it	  inspired	  and	  energized	  a	  group	  of	  people	  who	  had	  been	  organizing	  and	  developing	  networks	  for	  decades	  to	  increase	  their	  visibility	  and	  political	  activity,	  and	  by	  doing	  so,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  create	  additional	  opportunities	  for	  themselves.	  	  	  	  	  	  When	  I	  spoke	  with	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts	  about	  gay	  marriage,	  they	  were	  clear	  about	  one	  point	  in	  particular:	  that	  the	  struggle	  for	  marriage	  was	  successful	  because	  of	  the	  thirty	  years	  of	  gay	  rights	  activism	  that	  preceded	  it.	  	  Massachusetts	  activists	  emerged	  riding	  the	  crest	  of	  gay	  consciousness	  and	  activism	  that	  bloomed	  after	  1969,	  and	  built	  on	  the	  foundation	  of	  Massachusetts’	  historically	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reformist	  and	  civil	  rights	  minded	  culture.	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  1970’s	  and	  1980’s	  Massachusetts	  activists	  learned	  the	  ins	  and	  outs	  of	  the	  political	  structure,	  cultivated	  allies	  at	  elite	  and	  grassroots	  levels,	  gained	  resources,	  and	  developed	  cultural	  frames	  likely	  to	  resonate	  in	  their	  favour.	  	  Early	  losses	  were	  used	  as	  opportunities	  to	  hone	  strategies	  for	  future	  success,	  and	  eventually	  activists	  were	  able	  to	  not	  only	  take	  advantage	  of	  political	  opportunities	  as	  they	  emerged,	  but	  to	  create	  their	  own	  opportunities	  and	  sustain	  their	  victories;	  all	  of	  these	  skills	  are	  crucial	  to	  eventually	  establishing	  gay	  marriage.	  	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  explore	  several	  early	  movement	  turning	  points	  in	  detail,	  for	  example,	  the	  election	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  politicians,	  the	  battle	  to	  pass	  a	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill,	  and	  the	  struggle	  to	  regain	  the	  right	  to	  be	  foster	  parents.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  early	  struggles	  represents	  a	  valuable	  lesson	  for	  the	  burgeoning	  Massachusetts	  LGBT	  movement	  in	  accumulating	  and	  mobilizing	  resources;	  utilizing,	  creating,	  and/or	  sustaining	  political	  opportunities;	  working	  through	  times	  of	  diminishing	  political	  opportunities;	  developing	  and	  successfully	  deploying	  resonant	  cultural	  frames;	  and	  cultivating	  a	  repertoire	  of	  strategies	  available	  to	  and	  utilized	  by	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  	  Early	  Allies	  Emerge	  After	  Stonewall,	  as	  the	  cry	  for	  gay	  liberation	  evolved	  into	  the	  struggle	  for	  legal	  rights	  for	  gay	  men	  and	  lesbians,	  early	  political	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opportunities	  converged	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  elite	  allies.	  	  	  For	  example,	  one	  respondent,	  Ellen	  Zucker,	  said,	  “[Winning	  marriage]	  doesn’t	  start	  in	  2004,	  it	  starts	  in	  1974.	  It’s	  Elaine	  Noble	  coming	  out	  in	  the	  Mid-­‐1970’s	  as	  the	  first	  openly	  lesbian	  or	  gay	  member	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  legislature”.	  	  	  	  And	  Bruce	  Bell	  was	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  that	  “having	  Gerry	  Studds	  and	  Barney	  Frank	  as	  out	  legislators	  made	  [Massachusetts]	  unique.”	  	  These	  contemporary	  activists	  were	  reinforcing	  the	  assertion	  of	  social	  movement	  theorist	  Sydney	  Tarrow	  (1998:	  79)	  that	  “challengers	  are	  encouraged	  to	  take	  collective	  action	  when	  they	  have	  allies	  who	  can	  act	  as	  friends	  in	  court,	  as	  guarantors	  against	  repression,	  or	  as	  acceptable	  negotiators	  on	  their	  behalf”.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  election	  to	  Massachusetts	  State	  Legislature	  of	  Barney	  Frank	  in	  1972	  and	  Elaine	  Noble	  in	  1974	  gave	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists	  important	  allies	  who	  could	  assert	  equal	  rights	  protections	  and	  other	  important	  advances	  for	  the	  early	  LGBT	  movement.	  	  	  Although	  Barney	  Frank	  remained	  closeted	  until	  the	  late	  1980’s,	  he	  was	  an	  immediate	  ally	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  constituents	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  Frank	  was	  first	  elected	  in	  1972,	  and	  that	  same	  year	  filed	  four	  anti-­‐discrimination	  bills	  on	  behalf	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  citizens,	  including	  “a	  constitutional	  amendment	  which	  would	  provide	  equality	  ‘regardless	  of	  sexual	  preference’	  and	  a	  measure	  repealing	  a	  variety	  of	  existing	  laws	  on	  sexuality”	  (Marks	  Ridinger	  1996:	  211).	  	  	  Frank	  reintroduced	  some	  version	  of	  a	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  every	  year	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that	  he	  was	  a	  state	  representative.	  	  Although	  no	  such	  bill	  passed	  during	  his	  tenure	  as	  state	  representative,	  the	  fight	  for	  passage	  of	  these	  bills	  became	  a	  defining	  struggle	  for	  the	  LGBT	  movement	  in	  Massachusetts	  (Blake	  1983a).	  	  	  	  After	  being	  elected	  as	  a	  federal	  representative	  in	  1981,	  Barney	  Frank	  remained	  an	  outspoken	  supporter	  of	  gay	  rights,	  pushing	  for	  passage	  of	  gay	  rights	  legislation	  on	  the	  federal	  level	  and	  continuing	  to	  support	  local	  gay	  friendly	  legislation	  as	  well.	  	  Frank	  was	  re-­‐elected	  to	  his	  seat	  fourteen	  times,	  and	  a	  poignant	  1998	  Boston	  Globe	  article	  describes	  Frank’s	  break-­‐up	  with	  long-­‐time	  partner	  Herb	  Moses	  and	  credits	  Frank	  with	  helping	  to	  show	  that	  “gays	  are	  human	  beings”	  (Marcus	  1998).	  	  	  Elaine	  Noble’s	  election	  to	  state	  office	  in	  1974	  was	  especially	  significant	  because	  she	  was	  the	  first	  openly	  gay	  person	  to	  be	  elected	  to	  state	  office	  in	  America	  (http://www.outhistory.org/wiki/Elaine_Noble).	  	  She	  called	  her	  first	  campaign	  “very	  ugly”	  and	  described	  the	  various	  intimidation	  tactics	  used	  against	  her:	  “there	  was	  a	  lot	  of	  shooting	  through	  my	  windows,	  destroying	  my	  car,	  breaking	  windows	  at	  my	  campaign	  headquarters,	  serious	  harassment	  of	  people	  visiting	  my	  house	  and	  campaign	  office”.	  	  Regardless,	  she	  won	  her	  first	  term	  in	  office	  with	  nearly	  60%	  of	  the	  vote	  (http://www.outhistory.org/wiki/Elaine_Noble).	  	  After	  Noble’s	  election	  victory,	  “one	  group	  planned-­‐-­‐	  but	  later	  dropped-­‐-­‐	  an	  attempt	  to	  stop	  her	  from	  being	  seated	  on	  grounds	  that	  homosexuality	  is	  illegal	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in	  the	  state”,	  but	  despite	  this	  initial	  unease	  Noble	  came	  to	  be	  generally	  accepted	  by	  her	  fellow	  legislators,	  being	  described	  as	  “one	  of	  the	  boys”	  and	  “a	  good	  broad”	  by	  her	  colleagues	  (Roberts	  1977).	  	  One	  may	  wonder	  whether	  other,	  presumably	  heterosexual,	  women	  colleagues	  of	  these	  legislators	  would	  be	  described	  in	  such	  a	  way,	  indicating	  that	  acceptance	  of	  Noble	  as	  a	  colleague	  was	  coloured	  by	  their	  perceptions	  of	  her	  as	  a	  lesbian.	  	  Nevertheless,	  being	  accepted	  as	  “one	  of	  the	  boys”	  is	  an	  improvement	  over	  being	  excluded	  as	  a	  result	  of	  her	  sexual	  orientation.	  	  While	  in	  office,	  Noble	  co-­‐sponsored	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  with	  Barney	  Frank,	  and	  was	  also	  an	  outspoken	  supporter	  of	  the	  controversial	  strategy	  of	  school	  desegregation	  by	  bussing	  (http://www.outhistory.org/wiki/Elaine_Noble).	  	  	  The	  role	  of	  Gerry	  Studds	  as	  an	  openly	  gay	  political	  ally	  was	  complicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  came	  out	  under	  the	  pressure	  of	  a	  congressional	  page	  scandal.	  	  First	  elected	  to	  United	  States	  Congress	  in	  1972,	  Studds	  was	  forced	  out	  of	  the	  closet	  	  in	  1983	  when	  allegations	  surfaced	  that	  ten	  years	  earlier	  he	  had	  sexual	  relations	  with	  a	  seventeen	  year	  old	  congressional	  page	  (Chavez	  1983).	  	  Studds	  was	  censured	  by	  congress	  but	  won	  re-­‐election	  in	  his	  district	  where	  he	  continued	  to	  serve	  until	  the	  mid-­‐1990’s.	  	  	  After	  coming	  out,	  Studds	  became	  an	  outspoken	  supporter	  of	  gay	  rights	  issues.	  	  However,	  gay	  rights	  opponents	  sometimes	  used	  his	  sexual	  misconduct	  charge	  as	  a	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rallying	  cry	  against	  LGBT	  anti-­‐discrimination	  bills	  and	  other	  gay	  friendly	  legislation	  (Blake	  1983c).	  	  	  	  These	  three	  individuals,	  Barney	  Frank,	  Elaine	  Noble,	  and	  Gerry	  Studds,	  were	  certainly	  not	  the	  only	  political	  allies	  that	  LGBT	  activists	  had,	  nor,	  arguably,	  were	  they	  the	  most	  important.	  	  But	  each	  played	  an	  instrumental	  role	  in	  advancing	  gay	  rights	  in	  Massachusetts,	  especially	  Noble	  and	  Frank	  for	  introducing	  the	  first	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  and	  continuing	  to	  re-­‐introduce	  the	  bill	  and	  support	  it	  year	  after	  year.	  	  After	  Noble	  and	  Frank	  left	  the	  state	  legislature,	  other	  allies	  emerged	  who	  continued	  to	  support	  and	  fight	  for	  this	  bill	  in	  coalition	  with	  LGBT	  activists	  over	  a	  seventeen	  year	  struggle	  in	  the	  Massachusetts	  State	  House	  on	  Boston’s	  Beacon	  Hill.	  	  	  Starting	  in	  1973	  gay	  rights	  activists	  stayed	  the	  course	  as	  the	  civil	  rights	  bill	  periodically	  advanced	  only	  to	  be	  met	  with	  new	  setbacks,	  until	  it	  finally	  passed	  in	  1989.	  With	  each	  passing	  year,	  activists	  gained	  additional	  allies,	  created	  new	  opportunities,	  and	  learned	  new	  strategies	  with	  which	  to	  thwart	  opponents.	  	  	  The	  battle	  for	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  forged	  the	  Massachusetts	  gay	  rights	  movement	  into	  ‘a	  force	  to	  reckoned	  with’.	  	  	  	  By	  the	  time	  this	  bill	  passed	  in	  1989,	  the	  Massachusetts	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  movement	  had	  emerged	  as	  a	  finely	  tuned	  machine	  with	  enough	  political	  weight	  to	  win	  the	  advances	  it	  set	  out	  to	  achieve,	  and	  nimble	  enough	  to	  fight	  back	  against	  opponents	  who	  sought	  to	  roll	  back	  movement	  gains.	  	  	  These	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skills	  would	  prove	  essential	  for	  each	  victory	  this	  movement	  would	  win,	  especially	  the	  victory	  for	  marriage	  equality.	   	  Battling	  for	  Basic	  Rights	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  in	  Massachusetts’s	  LGBT	  history	  and	  activism	  cannot	  be	  underestimated.	  	  Arline	  Isaacson,	  who	  began	  lobbying	  on	  Beacon	  Hill	  in	  1983	  with	  the	  Massachusetts	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Political	  Caucus,	  emphasised,	  “That	  which	  happened	  in	  the	  80’s	  took	  on	  enormous	  importance	  in	  the	  marriage	  years.	  	  It	  had	  enormous	  impact	  on	  the	  fight,	  the	  strategy,	  the	  coalition	  work,	  and	  the	  final	  outcome.	  	  What	  we	  learned	  in	  the	  process	  was	  extremely	  valuable	  in	  terms	  of	  field	  organizing,	  marketing,	  and	  volunteer	  recruitment.”	  	  	  The	  passage	  of	  this	  bill	  also	  underscores	  the	  assertion	  of	  political	  theorist	  Miriam	  Smith	  (2008:	  11)	  that	  the	  legacies	  of	  previous	  policies	  shape	  the	  structure	  of	  political	  opportunities	  in	  the	  future	  .	  	  	  As	  Bruce	  Bell,	  who	  works	  with	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Advocates	  and	  Defenders	  (GLAD)	  pointed	  out,	  “If	  there	  isn’t	  any	  protection	  from	  discrimination	  it’s	  very	  difficult	  [to	  participate	  in	  political	  action]	  because	  people	  are	  afraid	  of	  coming	  out	  for	  fear	  that	  they	  could	  lose	  their	  job,	  lose	  their	  housing.”	  	  Thus,	  informants	  in	  this	  study	  felt	  passage	  of	  this	  bill	  was	  important	  for	  several	  reasons:	  developing	  	  lasting	  legislative	  relationships,	  informing	  strategy	  decisions,	  and	  giving	  people	  the	  freedom	  to	  be	  “out”,	  visible,	  and	  active	  in	  their	  communities.	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Perhaps	  the	  primary	  lesson	  of	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  was	  persistence.	  	  First	  filed	  in	  1973	  by	  Barney	  Frank	  and	  Elaine	  Noble,	  it	  took	  ten	  years	  for	  the	  gay	  rights	  bill	  to	  pass	  the	  Massachusetts	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  	  Throughout	  the	  70’s,	  because	  of	  the	  lobbying	  efforts	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  Gay	  Political	  Caucus	  and	  the	  perennial	  sponsorship	  of	  the	  legislation	  by	  Frank	  and	  Noble,	  the	  number	  of	  allies	  in	  the	  legislature	  continued	  to	  grow.	  	  Legislative	  allies	  cultivated	  by	  Frank	  and	  Noble	  were	  significant	  in	  that	  after	  Frank	  and	  Noble	  left	  the	  House	  in	  1978	  and	  1981	  respectively,	  the	  bill	  continued	  to	  be	  filed	  and	  supported	  by	  other	  legislators.	  With	  the	  support	  of	  allies	  like	  Representatives	  Tom	  Vallely,	  Barbara	  Gray,	  Bruce	  Bolling,	  and	  others	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  was	  finally	  passed	  by	  the	  House	  in	  1983.	  	  	  	  Media	  coverage	  of	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  in	  the	  early	  80’s	  indicated	  that	  legislative	  debate	  centered	  on	  whether	  representatives	  could	  put	  aside	  misgivings	  about	  possibly	  sending	  a	  message	  that	  they	  might	  condone	  homosexuality	  versus	  believing	  that	  a	  person	  should	  not	  be	  discriminated	  against	  for	  any	  reason.	  	  For	  example,	  one	  of	  the	  1981	  co-­‐sponsors	  of	  the	  bill,	  Barbara	  Gray,	  a	  Republican,	  said,	  “	  We’re	  not	  saying	  we	  condone	  a	  life-­‐style.	  	  What	  we’re	  saying	  is	  that	  if	  they	  [homosexuals]	  are	  discriminated	  against,	  they	  should	  have	  redress”	  (Boston	  Globe	  editorial	  1981a).	  	  While	  opponents	  like	  William	  Flynn	  charged	  that,	  “Approval	  of	  this	  bill	  is	  putting	  the	  House’s	  stamp	  of	  approval	  on	  a	  perverted	  lifestyle”	  (Boston	  Globe	  editorial	  1981b),	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other	  opponents	  claimed	  that	  the	  bill	  would	  lead	  to	  affirmative	  action	  programs	  for	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  workers	  and	  worried	  that	  passing	  a	  non-­‐discrimination	  bill	  would	  make	  Massachusetts	  a	  “mecca”	  for	  gays.	  	  A	  Republican	  from	  the	  town	  of	  Wellesley,	  Massachusetts,	  Royall	  Switzler,	  exclaimed,	  “They’ll	  be	  dancing	  in	  the	  streets,	  these	  men	  and	  women,	  dancing	  in	  each	  other’s	  clothes.	  	  If	  that’s	  what	  you	  want,	  vote	  for	  this	  bill”	  (Boston	  Globe	  editorial	  1981a).	  	  Thomas	  Valleley	  stayed	  on	  point	  by	  drawing	  a	  line	  between	  approving	  of	  homosexuality	  and	  disapproving	  discrimination:	  “We	  don’t	  allow	  discrimination	  against	  religions,	  but	  we	  certainly	  don’t	  agree	  with	  all	  religions”	  (Boston	  Globe	  editorial	  1981b).	  	  	  After	  the	  bill	  passed	  the	  House	  in	  1983,	  it	  continued	  to	  gain	  momentum	  as	  it	  headed	  toward	  final	  passage	  by	  the	  Senate,	  and	  opponents	  broadened	  the	  scope	  of	  their	  attacks,	  continuing	  to	  stoke	  fears	  of	  impending	  gay	  affirmative	  action	  programs	  and	  playing	  on	  paranoia	  over	  child	  abuse.	  	  To	  secure	  passage	  of	  the	  bill	  in	  the	  House,	  Valleley	  amended	  the	  bill	  to	  assure	  opponents	  that,	  “There	  is	  nothing	  in	  this	  that	  requires	  affirmative	  action…or	  prohibits	  firing	  (a	  homosexual)	  for	  failure	  to	  perform	  a	  job”	  (Boston	  Globe	  staff	  1983).	  	  	  Opponents	  added	  several	  of	  their	  own	  amendments:	  one	  that	  would	  “deny	  protection	  to	  members	  of	  an	  organization	  promoting	  relationships	  between	  men	  and	  boys	  and	  to	  those	  who	  have	  been	  convicted	  of	  child	  molestation”;	  another	  specifying	  “that	  anyone	  who	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commits	  a	  sexual	  act	  against	  a	  child	  is	  not	  protected	  by	  the	  proposed	  law	  and	  that	  criminal	  activity	  by	  a	  tenant	  in	  an	  owner	  occupied	  home	  would	  be	  grounds	  for	  eviction	  regardless	  of	  sexual	  preference”,	  and	  another	  to	  ensure	  that	  	  “public	  and	  private	  employees	  who	  have	  sexual	  relations	  with	  a	  minor	  of	  the	  same	  sex	  would	  not	  be	  protected	  by	  the	  law	  and	  could	  be	  fired”	  	  (Boston	  Globe	  staff	  1983).	  	  	  	  The	  victory	  proved	  to	  be	  short	  lived.	  	  In	  the	  same	  Senate	  chamber	  where	  during	  previous	  debates	  gays	  and	  lesbians	  were	  referred	  to	  as	  “fags	  and	  Lesbos”,	  called	  “sick	  and	  disgusting”	  and	  accused	  of	  contributing	  only	  “AIDS	  and	  herpes”	  to	  society,	  plans	  were	  set	  in	  motion	  to	  kill	  the	  anti-­‐discrimination	  bill	  (Blake	  1983b).	  	  	  Supporters	  of	  the	  bill	  in	  the	  Senate	  eventually	  pressured	  Senate	  leadership	  to	  allow	  a	  vote	  on	  the	  bill	  rather	  than	  sending	  it	  to	  the	  Ways	  and	  Means	  Committee	  with	  the	  intention	  to	  kill	  the	  bill,	  only	  to	  have	  the	  Senator	  presiding	  over	  the	  vote	  use	  a	  tactic	  known	  as	  a	  ‘fast	  gavel’	  to	  ‘railroad’	  the	  bill	  without	  actually	  voting	  on	  it	  (Blake	  1983b).	  	  This	  action	  effectively	  laid	  the	  bill	  to	  rest	  for	  the	  1983	  legislative	  session,	  but	  the	  lessons	  of	  this	  experience	  were	  not	  lost.	  	  Recounting	  this	  episode,	  Arline	  Isaacon,	  who	  was	  new	  to	  lobbying	  at	  the	  time,	  remembered,	  “They	  [the	  Senate]	  did	  some	  parliamentary	  game	  playing	  and	  we	  lost.	  This	  caused	  me	  to	  determine	  that	  I	  would	  make	  sure	  that	  parliamentary	  rules	  would	  never	  be	  used	  against	  us	  for	  lack	  of	  knowing.	  	  They	  may	  be	  used	  against	  us	  because	  we	  didn’t	  have	  the	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power	  to	  stop	  them,	  but	  never	  would	  it	  be	  because	  we	  didn’t	  see	  it	  coming.”	  This	  determination	  had	  important	  ramifications	  for	  the	  future	  of	  this	  bill	  and	  the	  future	  of	  the	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  	  	  	  Although	  the	  bill	  was	  lost,	  this	  period	  of	  movement	  activity	  shows	  that	  LGBT	  activists	  were	  honing	  their	  skills	  by	  engaging	  in	  the	  cultures	  and	  structures	  in	  which	  the	  movement	  was	  embedded	  and	  developing	  strategies	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  and	  create	  opportunities	  to	  advance	  movement	  objectives.	  	  Movement	  development	  in	  these	  areas	  may	  be	  integral	  to	  the	  eventual	  success	  of	  movement	  objectives,	  according	  to	  social	  movement	  theorists.	  For	  example,	  theorist	  Mayer	  N.	  Zald	  (1996:	  266)	  argued,	  “social	  movements	  exist	  in	  a	  larger	  societal	  context	  [and]	  draw	  on	  stock	  images	  of	  what	  is	  an	  injustice,	  for	  what	  is	  a	  violation	  of	  what	  ought	  to	  be”.	  	  By	  framing	  grievances	  in	  ways	  that	  emphasized	  that	  discrimination	  is	  always	  wrong,	  activists	  were	  drawing	  on	  Massachusetts’	  “deep	  traditions	  of	  fairness	  and	  equality”(Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2007:	  36).	  	  Additionally,	  William	  Gamson	  and	  David	  Meyer	  (1996:	  282)	  suggested,	  “we	  can	  think	  of	  political	  opportunity	  structure,	  as	  other	  structures,	  as	  dynamic	  rather	  than	  static	  [and]	  there	  is	  a	  mutually	  sustaining	  relationship	  between	  institutions	  and	  culture”.	  	  	  Thought	  of	  in	  this	  way,	  it	  becomes	  possible	  to	  conceptualize	  ways	  to	  penetrate	  political	  structures	  by	  using	  cultural	  values.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  way	  that	  tropes	  of	  discrimination	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were	  used	  to	  gain	  legislators’	  support	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  bill,	  or	  the	  various	  ways	  political	  and/or	  movement	  actors	  used	  parliamentary	  tactics	  to	  influence	  the	  legislative	  process.	  	  	  Once	  we	  accept	  that	  structures	  are	  dynamic	  and	  permeable,	  the	  next	  step	  is	  strategizing	  	  how	  to	  influence	  these	  structures	  to	  achieve	  a	  desired	  outcome.	  	  According	  to	  the	  theoretical	  perspective	  of	  Marshall	  Ganz	  (2003:	  182)	  “environmental	  change	  may	  generate	  the	  opportunities	  for	  social	  movements	  to	  emerge	  ,	  the	  outcomes	  and	  legacies	  of	  such	  movements	  have	  more	  to	  do	  with	  the	  strategies	  actors	  devise	  to	  turn	  these	  opportunities	  to	  their	  purposes,	  thus	  reshaping	  their	  environment”,	  including	  the	  shape	  	  of	  the	  political	  institutions	  and	  structures	  that	  make	  up	  that	  environment.	  	  This	  last	  point	  supports	  the	  nexus	  of	  culture,	  structure,	  and	  agency	  that	  is	  central	  to	  my	  analysis.	  	  As	  the	  struggle	  for	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  continued	  throughout	  the	  1980’s	  the	  Massachusetts	  LGBT	  movement	  became	  increasingly	  adept	  at	  strategically	  deploying	  cultural	  elements	  to	  penetrate	  more	  deeply	  into	  institutions;	  gaining	  allies,	  creating	  opportunities,	  and	  mitigating	  setbacks	  along	  the	  way;	  acquiring	  skills	  that	  were	  vital	  to	  eventually	  winning	  the	  struggle	  for	  marriage	  equality.	  	  	  Of	  course,	  as	  theorist	  Sidney	  Tarrow	  (1996:	  89)	  reminded	  us,	  “political	  opportunities	  are	  fickle	  friends”.	  	  That	  is,	  as	  movements	  gain	  momentum,	  increase	  their	  ranks	  of	  allies,	  and	  mine	  opportunities	  for	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success,	  they	  may	  unwittingly	  create	  opportunities	  for	  their	  own	  opponents.	  After	  being	  narrowly	  defeated	  by	  parliamentary	  manoeuvring	  in	  1983,	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  faced	  a	  series	  of	  increasingly	  complicated	  setbacks	  before	  finally	  being	  passed	  in	  1989.	  	  First,	  in	  1984	  the	  religious	  battle	  lines	  of	  the	  gay	  rights	  debate	  were	  drawn	  when	  four	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Bishops	  issued	  a	  statement	  of	  opposition	  to	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill.	  	  The	  Boston	  Globe	  reported	  that,	  after	  remaining	  largely	  silent	  on	  the	  bill,	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  issued	  a	  statement	  against	  passage	  of	  the	  gay	  rights	  bill	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  would	  “legitimate	  a	  ‘homosexual	  lifestyle’…however,	  the	  bishops	  also	  went	  on	  record	  to	  oppose	  the	  ‘unjust	  treatment	  of	  homosexuals’”	  (Franklin	  1984).	  	  The	  same	  article	  included	  a	  counter-­‐argument	  that	  “some	  religious	  organizations	  actively	  back	  the	  bill”	  with	  a	  quote	  from	  a	  Unitarian	  minister	  emphasizing	  that	  the	  bill	  did	  not	  ask	  for	  “special	  favours,	  but	  simply	  equal	  protection	  under	  the	  law”	  (Franklin	  1984).	  	  	  	  As	  the	  story	  of	  gay	  rights	  continued	  to	  unfold	  in	  Massachusetts,	  religious	  groups,	  especially	  the	  Catholic	  Church,	  became	  increasingly	  important	  players.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  outspoken	  opposition	  of	  the	  Church	  toward	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  prompted	  some	  to	  wonder	  if	  the	  “opposition	  of	  Bishops	  would	  kill”	  the	  bill	  (Wessling	  1984).	  	  Although	  many	  religious	  leaders	  continued	  to	  oppose	  the	  bill,	  some	  religious	  groups	  supported	  the	  anti-­‐discrimination	  measure,	  and	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  opposed	  favoured	  an	  amendment	  allowing	  for	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religious	  exemption	  from	  the	  legislation	  rather	  than	  killing	  the	  bill	  altogether	  (Associated	  Press	  1985).	  	  	  	  Confronting	  outright	  (and	  increasingly	  well	  organized)	  opposition	  to	  gay	  rights	  from	  religious	  leaders	  may	  have	  created	  a	  drag	  on	  momentum	  for	  the	  gay	  rights	  bill,	  but	  it	  also	  helped	  activists	  identify	  and	  solidify	  relationships	  with	  religious	  allies.	  	  This	  early	  work	  on	  the	  civil	  rights	  bill	  was	  important	  in	  building	  a	  social	  movement	  structure	  that	  could	  withstand	  the	  next	  challenge	  to	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights.	  	  	  Fighting	  Back	  on	  Foster	  Care	  As	  gay	  rights	  advanced,	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  issues	  increasingly	  became	  part	  of	  the	  public	  sphere.	  	  This	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  creating	  scrutiny	  in	  places	  where	  previously	  there	  had	  been	  none.	  	  One	  such	  area	  was	  the	  foster	  care	  system.	  This	  created	  a	  political	  opportunity	  for	  opponents;	  as	  Tarrow	  	  (1998:	  87)	  points	  out,	  such	  opportunities	  move	  in	  “dialectic	  between	  movements	  and	  counter	  movements.”	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  Massachusetts	  Department	  of	  Social	  Services	  had	  no	  policy	  on	  record	  regarding	  the	  sexual	  orientation	  of	  potential	  foster	  parents.	  As	  such,	  social	  workers	  in	  Massachusetts	  were	  free	  to	  place	  children	  in	  foster	  care	  with	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  parents,	  and	  had	  done	  so	  without	  controversy	  until	  1985.	  This	  changed	  abruptly	  when	  the	  
Boston	  Globe	  featured	  a	  story	  titled,	  “Some	  Oppose	  Foster	  Placement	  with	  Gay	  Couple”	  on	  May	  8,	  1985.	  	  By	  two	  o’clock	  that	  afternoon,	  the	  Department	  of	  Social	  Services	  had	  removed	  the	  children	  from	  the	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home	  of	  Donald	  Babets	  and	  David	  Jean	  Roxbury,	  and	  the	  next	  day	  Governor	  Michael	  Dukakis	  demanded	  a	  review	  of	  foster	  care	  policy	  in	  the	  state.	  	  	  Foster	  care	  policy	  was	  ripe	  to	  become	  an	  area	  of	  contention	  given	  the	  extensive	  domain	  that	  foster	  parents	  in	  the	  United	  States	  typically	  have	  over	  the	  children	  in	  their	  care.	  	  Once	  a	  child	  is	  removed	  from	  the	  home	  of	  a	  biological	  parent	  by	  Child	  Protective	  Services,	  legal	  custody	  is	  remanded	  to	  the	  state’s	  child	  welfare	  agency,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  Massachusetts	  Department	  of	  Social	  Services.	  	  When	  the	  child	  is	  placed	  in	  a	  foster	  home,	  legal	  custody	  is	  retained	  by	  the	  state	  child	  welfare	  agency;	  however,	  through	  that	  agency	  foster	  parents,	  not	  biological	  parents,	  are	  able	  to	  make	  decisions	  for	  the	  foster	  child	  regarding	  schooling,	  healthcare,	  and	  other	  issues	  (http://www.legalmatch.com/law-­‐library/article/foster-­‐parent-­‐rights.html).	  	  In	  this	  context,	  in	  many	  cases	  a	  foster	  parent	  has	  the	  same	  rights	  as	  a	  biological	  parent,	  and,	  in	  addition,	  may	  enact	  proceedings	  to	  terminate	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  natural	  parent,	  pending	  state	  approval	  (http://www.legalmatch.com/law-­‐library/article/foster-­‐parent-­‐rights.html).	  	  	  Given	  the	  potentially	  powerful	  influence	  of	  foster	  parents	  over	  the	  children	  in	  their	  care,	  this	  system	  became	  a	  screen	  onto	  which	  society	  projected	  its	  anxieties	  over	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  people	  in	  general,	  and	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  parents	  in	  particular.	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The	  original	  Globe	  article,	  described	  as	  sensationalistic	  by	  many	  in	  the	  gay	  community,	  included	  some	  commentary	  in	  support	  of	  the	  gay	  foster	  parents	  (for	  example,	  from	  the	  church	  pastors	  who	  recommended	  that	  the	  couple	  be	  approved	  for	  foster	  parent	  status	  to	  begin	  with)	  and	  some	  commentary	  against,	  mostly	  from	  neighbours	  who	  questioned	  whether	  gay	  foster	  homes	  are	  “normal	  and	  healthy”	  (Cooper	  1985g,	  Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2007:	  45).	  	  	  To	  distance	  itself	  from	  the	  ensuing	  uproar,	  the	  Globe	  defended	  its	  coverage	  of	  the	  story	  in	  an	  editorial	  piece	  making	  such	  claims	  as,	  “no	  power	  on	  earth	  will	  ever	  change	  the	  immutable	  natural	  law	  involving	  conception	  of	  babies	  and	  the	  optimum	  environment	  in	  which	  this	  law	  dictates	  they	  be	  raised”,	  taking	  care	  to	  point	  out	  that	  “there	  is	  a	  potential	  for	  abuse	  of	  male	  children	  by	  some	  gay	  men”	  (Farrell	  1985).	  	  	  	  Just	  two	  weeks	  after	  the	  initial	  story	  broke,	  the	  Massachusetts	  House	  of	  Representatives	  voted	  to	  ban	  gay	  foster	  parents	  altogether	  (Cooper	  1985e).	  	  As	  the	  Massachusetts	  Senate	  debated	  whether	  to	  uphold	  the	  outright	  ban	  on	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  foster	  parents	  that	  was	  approved	  in	  the	  House,	  the	  Massachusetts	  Department	  of	  Social	  Services	  announced	  a	  new	  policy	  on	  foster	  care.	  The	  new	  policy	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  placing	  children	  in	  “traditional”	  family	  settings,	  essentially	  creating	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  potential	  foster	  care	  families	  in	  which	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  foster	  parents,	  while	  not	  banned	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outright,	  were	  explicitly	  designated	  as	  a	  last	  resort	  (Black	  1985,	  Cooper	  1985f).	  	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  foster	  care	  debate	  many	  LGBT	  allies	  were	  put	  in	  a	  defensive	  position,	  especially	  those	  in	  the	  legislature.	  	  Facing	  criticism	  from	  opponents	  of	  gay	  foster	  parents,	  elected	  officials	  like	  Bruce	  Bolling,	  a	  supporter	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  bill,	  was	  forced	  to	  backtrack,	  making	  statements	  like,	  “I	  never	  said	  I	  supported	  the	  placement”,	  explaining	  that	  he	  stood	  up	  for	  the	  two	  gay	  parents	  because	  “they	  were	  being	  discriminated	  against”	  (Stack	  1985).	  	  Nevertheless,	  	  some	  officials	  voted	  against	  a	  strict	  policy	  against	  gay	  foster	  parents	  because	  it	  also	  denigrated	  single	  parent	  households.	  	  For	  instance,	  Representative	  Gloria	  Fox,	  who	  was	  very	  clear	  that	  she	  was	  “definitely	  against	  gay	  parenting”	  (Cooper	  1985e),	  voted	  against	  the	  measure	  proposed	  in	  the	  House	  because	  it	  also	  targeted	  single	  parents.	  While	  undeniably	  caught	  off-­‐guard,	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  community	  could	  draw	  on	  the	  repertoire	  of	  tactics	  learned	  in	  passing	  the	  civil	  rights	  bill	  to	  overturn	  a	  policy	  that	  would	  categorically	  deny	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  people	  the	  opportunity	  to	  be	  foster	  parents.	  	  	  	  	  Suddenly	  finding	  themselves	  at	  the	  center	  of	  a	  debate	  over	  their	  worthiness	  as	  parents,	  and	  indeed,	  as	  people,	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  community	  experienced	  this	  series	  of	  events	  as	  a	  “moral	  shock”,	  described	  by	  James	  Jasper	  (1998:	  106)	  as	  “an	  unexpected	  event	  or	  piece	  of	  information	  [that]	  raises	  such	  a	  sense	  of	  outrage	  in	  a	  person	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that	  she	  becomes	  inclined	  toward	  political	  action”.	  	  	  Although	  the	  removal	  of	  foster	  children	  and	  subsequent	  tightening	  of	  foster	  care	  policy	  with	  the	  explicit	  intention	  of	  squeezing	  out	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  foster	  parents	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  constricting	  opportunity	  for	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  movement,	  	  it	  in	  fact	  served	  to	  mobilize	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  community.	  	  	  Gay	  and	  lesbian	  citizens	  in	  Massachusetts	  responded	  with	  a	  broad	  and	  enduring	  campaign	  against	  the	  policy	  and	  against	  Governor	  Dukakis	  (who	  had	  previously	  been	  considered	  an	  ally	  to	  the	  LGBT	  community).	  	  	  The	  foster	  care	  debacle	  unleashed	  a	  relentless	  barrage	  of	  movement	  activity	  including	  the	  use	  of	  militant	  tactics,	  such	  as	  protests	  outside	  the	  governor’s	  home	  and	  sit-­‐ins	  at	  his	  office.	  	  One	  of	  the	  first	  responses	  by	  activists	  was	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Defense	  Committee,	  the	  group	  that	  led	  the	  Foster	  Equality	  campaign	  (Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2007:	  47).	  	  	  	  The	  first	  recorded	  protest	  on	  the	  matter	  took	  place	  at	  the	  State	  House	  on	  Beacon	  Hill	  on	  May	  28,	  less	  than	  three	  weeks	  after	  the	  Globe	  story	  that	  started	  it	  all.	  	  The	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Defense	  Committee,	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Advocates	  and	  Defenders,	  the	  Massachusetts	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Political	  Caucus	  were	  all	  there.	  	  One	  activist	  said,	  “We	  were	  unprepared	  for	  it”	  but	  predicted	  that	  the	  new	  restrictive	  foster	  policy	  would	  unite	  those	  	  targeted-­‐-­‐	  gays,	  lesbians,	  single	  parents-­‐-­‐	  who	  were	  willing	  to	  fight	  against	  their	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categorical	  denial	  of	  consideration	  for	  foster	  parenting	  privileges	  (Boston	  Globe	  staff	  1985).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  While	  legislative	  allies	  were	  equivocating	  under	  pressure	  during	  the	  foster	  care	  debacle,	  new	  allies	  emerged.	  	  Women’s	  groups,	  social	  workers,	  and	  children’s	  advocacy	  groups	  all	  testified	  in	  favour	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  parents.	  	  In	  testimony,	  organizations	  like	  the	  Massachusetts	  Society	  for	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Cruelty	  to	  Children	  spoke	  in	  favour	  of	  “non-­‐traditional”	  families,	  and	  representatives	  from	  the	  Child	  Welfare	  League	  of	  America	  stated	  that,	  because	  foster	  children	  had	  been	  placed	  with	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  foster	  parents	  so	  far	  without	  incident,	  the	  new	  policy	  of	  taking	  children	  away	  from	  gay	  foster	  parents	  “seems	  to	  fly	  in	  the	  face	  of	  what	  is	  current	  good	  practice”	  (Black	  1985).	  	  As	  months	  passed,	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  community	  also	  built	  support	  from	  psychiatrists	  and	  psychologists	  who	  spoke	  in	  favour	  of	  gay	  foster	  parenting	  and	  supplied	  information	  and	  statistics	  to	  challenge	  the	  stereotype	  of	  gays	  as	  child	  predators.	  	  Organizations	  that	  vocally	  opposed	  the	  restrictive	  new	  policy	  against	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  foster	  parents	  and	  publically	  challenged	  Dukakis	  to	  produce	  evidence	  that	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  foster	  parents	  caused	  harm	  to	  children	  included	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Social	  Workers,	  the	  Massachusetts	  Psychiatric	  Society,	  the	  Massachusetts	  Psychological	  Association,	  Women	  for	  Economic	  Justice,	  Simmons	  College	  of	  Social	  Work,	  and	  at	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least	  one	  representative	  of	  the	  Boston	  School	  Committee	  	  (Cooper	  1985b).	  	  	   Meanwhile,	  the	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Defense	  Committee	  kept	  the	  pressure	  on,	  and	  ramped	  up	  its	  use	  of	  confrontational	  tactics.	  	  On	  June	  20	  the	  group	  staged	  a	  sit	  in	  at	  the	  governor’s	  office.	  	  Dukakis	  left	  by	  the	  side	  door	  to	  avoid	  the	  protestors	  but	  the	  next	  day	  announced	  his	  readiness	  to	  arrange	  a	  meeting	  with	  the	  group	  (Bryson	  1985a,	  Ryan	  1985).	  	  When	  the	  group	  finally	  met	  with	  Dukakis	  on	  June	  22,	  it	  was	  on	  a	  day	  when	  the	  governor	  had	  already	  faced	  gay	  protestors	  during	  a	  morning	  speech	  in	  Cambridge,	  again	  at	  an	  afternoon	  event	  in	  Provincetown,	  and	  still	  again	  as	  he	  spoke	  at	  his	  office	  with	  the	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Defense	  Committee	  while	  an	  additional	  sixty	  protestors	  remained	  outside	  his	  office	  door	  chanting	  and	  singing.	  	  	  During	  the	  meeting	  GLDC	  activists	  demanded	  Dukakis	  produce	  evidence	  supporting	  his	  assertions	  against	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  and	  single	  parents.	  	  When	  he	  couldn’t	  do	  so	  the	  activists	  vowed	  to	  step	  up	  their	  campaign	  against	  the	  policy,	  some	  vowing	  to	  “fight	  Dukakis	  himself”	  (Cooper	  1985c).	  	  This	  was	  no	  empty	  threat.	  	  As	  the	  foster	  care	  controversy	  continued,	  protests	  and	  demonstrations	  continued	  to	  dog	  Dukakis’	  days	  as	  governor	  and	  escalated	  yet	  again	  when	  Dukakis	  became	  a	  presidential	  candidate	  in	  1988.	  	  AIDS	  Complicates	  Civil	  Rights	  Advances	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   Amidst	  the	  furor	  over	  foster	  care,	  another	  setback	  occurred	  for	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  movement-­‐-­‐	  AIDS.	  	  The	  fear	  and	  uncertainty	  whipped	  up	  during	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  AIDS	  crisis	  was	  turned	  into	  powerful	  ammunition	  against	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights.	  	  In	  this	  climate,	  with	  the	  foster	  care	  debate	  raging	  and	  AIDS	  hysteria	  taking	  hold,	  perhaps	  it	  was	  inevitable	  that	  some	  of	  the	  momentum	  for	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  would	  be	  lost.	  	  	  When	  the	  time	  came	  again	  to	  debate	  the	  civil	  rights	  bill	  on	  Beacon	  Hill,	  opponents	  asserted	  that	  if	  the	  bill	  passed	  “Boston	  might	  become	  the	  mecca	  for	  AIDS”	  and	  some	  supporters	  of	  the	  bill	  began	  to	  waiver	  because	  “it’s	  not	  just	  a	  civil	  rights	  or	  discrimination	  question...it’s	  a	  very	  serious	  public	  health	  issue”	  (Cooper1985a).	  	  Again,	  allies	  fought	  back,	  staying	  on	  message	  and	  keeping	  the	  focus	  on	  discrimination.	  	  For	  example,	  Representative	  Tom	  Vallely	  shot	  back	  at	  opponents	  saying,	  “What’s	  this	  got	  to	  do	  with	  AIDS?	  You	  shouldn’t	  use	  AIDS	  as	  a	  cover	  for	  discriminating	  against	  people”	  (Cooper	  1985a).	  	  	  In	  the	  end	  this	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  calm	  the	  nerves	  of	  legislators	  jittery	  over	  foster	  care	  and	  AIDS.	  	  One	  unnamed	  legislative	  supporter	  of	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  predicted	  that	  because	  of	  unease	  over	  AIDS	  and	  foster	  care,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  “clear	  debate	  on	  civil	  rights	  for	  gays”	  and	  the	  bill	  would	  be	  “croaked”	  (Cooper	  1985a).	  	  This	  was	  indeed	  the	  case,	  and	  the	  bill	  failed	  to	  pass	  the	  House	  in	  1985	  (Cooper	  1985d).	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   The	  onset	  of	  the	  AIDS	  epidemic	  was	  exploited	  by	  the	  religious	  right	  and	  social	  conservatives	  in	  a	  way	  that	  ratcheted	  up	  fear	  and	  homophobia	  across	  the	  US.	  Early	  on,	  the	  AIDS	  crisis	  was	  generally	  considered	  to	  cause	  a	  significant	  setback	  for	  the	  national	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights	  movement;	  Massachusetts	  is	  no	  exception.	  	  	  Arline	  Isaacson	  called	  AIDS	  “a	  disaster	  [for	  the	  gay	  rights	  bill],	  we	  were	  doing	  fine	  and	  then	  the	  AIDS	  crisis	  came	  and	  [support]	  went	  down	  because	  everyone	  thought	  that	  gay	  people	  were	  going	  to	  make	  them	  sick.”	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  respondent	  Elyse	  Cherry	  pointed	  out,	  “the	  AIDS	  crisis	  led	  to	  a	  whole	  different	  level	  of	  mobilizing	  within	  the	  gay	  community.”	  	  	  The	  AIDS	  crisis	  was	  another	  example	  of	  a	  time	  when	  movement	  activity	  	  flourished	  even	  as	  political	  opportunities	  appeared	  to	  shrink.	  	  This	  phenomenon	  is	  one	  of	  the	  conceptual	  holes	  in	  political	  process	  opportunity	  theory.	  	  	  One	  explanation	  for	  why	  movement	  activity	  may	  at	  times	  increase	  when	  opportunities	  appear	  to	  wane	  is	  that	  “constricting	  political	  opportunities	  generate	  emotions	  that	  facilitate	  protest”	  (Gould	  2004:	  164).	  	  Gould	  argues	  that	  AIDS	  activists	  	  were	  able	  to	  successfully	  harness	  the	  anger,	  grief,	  and	  fear	  that	  built	  up	  in	  the	  gay	  community	  as	  friends	  and	  lovers	  died	  while	  the	  crisis	  was	  ignored	  and/or	  used	  as	  an	  excuse	  to	  denigrate	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  people	  by	  society	  at	  large.	  	  As	  the	  debates	  about	  gay	  civil	  rights,	  AIDS,	  and	  foster	  care	  raged	  on,	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  citizens	  in	  Massachusetts	  lived	  in	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an	  environment	  where	  they	  were	  regularly	  harangued	  as	  unfit	  parents,	  dangerous	  to	  children,	  sick,	  disgusting,	  and	  undeserving	  of	  even	  basic	  legal	  protections.	  	  	  Rather	  than	  back	  down,	  activists	  and	  allies	  fought	  back.	  	  Mobilizing	  the	  energy	  of	  an	  “outraged”	  community,	  “the	  foster	  care	  controversy	  and	  the	  AIDS	  crisis	  forced	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  community	  to	  regroup	  and	  build	  stronger	  allies”,	  and	  because	  of	  this	  “in	  the	  late	  80’s,	  through	  the	  work	  of	  the	  gay	  community	  in	  educating	  lawmakers	  and	  the	  public,	  compassion	  replaced	  fear	  and	  a	  less	  hostile	  environment	  emerged”	  (Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2007:	  48).	  	  	  In	  addition,	  addressing	  these	  stereotypes	  in	  the	  1980’s	  made	  it	  difficult	  for	  opponents	  to	  make	  them	  “stick”	  in	  later	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  struggles,	  including	  the	  struggle	  for	  marriage.	  The	  Tide	  Turns	  	   Several	  turning	  points	  took	  place	  in	  1986	  and	  1987	  on	  the	  way	  to	  the	  more	  “compassionate	  environment”	  referred	  to	  above,	  eventually	  leading	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  gay	  rights	  bill	  and	  the	  loosening	  of	  foster	  care	  restrictions	  against	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  parents.	  	  These	  turning	  points	  occurred	  as	  the	  Massachusetts	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights	  movement	  began	  to	  hone	  their	  strategic	  prowess,	  continuing	  a	  multi-­‐pronged	  approach	  that	  repeated	  tactics	  which	  had	  proven	  successful	  and	  developed	  new	  tactics	  as	  necessary.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Defense	  Committee	  kept	  up	  their	  confrontational	  tactics	  against	  the	  foster	  care	  policy,	  regularly	  holding	  protests	  and	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demonstrations	  at	  the	  State	  House	  and	  keeping	  the	  pressure	  on	  governor	  Dukakis,	  showing	  up	  at	  his	  speeches	  around	  the	  state	  and	  holding	  sit-­‐ins	  at	  his	  office	  where	  activists	  were	  repeatedly	  arrested	  	  for	  trespassing	  (Boston	  Globe	  staff	  1986a).	  	  Activists	  continued	  the	  strategy	  of	  lining	  up	  allies	  who	  pressed	  for	  change	  in	  the	  foster	  care	  policy,	  again	  keeping	  the	  pressure	  on	  Dukakis.	  	  The	  Boston	  Globe	  (Associated	  Press	  1986)	  reported	  this	  statement	  made	  by	  activists	  at	  a	  rally	  against	  the	  foster	  care	  policy:	  	  In	  the	  year	  and	  a	  half	  since	  he	  wrote	  the	  policy,	  Dukakis	  has	  not	  produced	  a	  shred	  of	  clinical	  data	  to	  support	  his	  contention	  that	  traditional	  heterosexually	  married	  couples	  are	  the	  ideal	  family	  setting	  for	  foster	  children.	  	  In	  the	  meantime,	  social	  workers,	  labour	  unions,	  political	  organizations,	  feminists,	  child	  care	  experts	  and	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  activists	  have	  raised	  their	  voices	  again	  and	  again,	  asking	  Dukakis	  to	  rescind	  this	  injurious	  policy.	  	  The	  voters	  of	  the	  state,	  therefore,	  have	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  unequivocally	  tell	  him,	  in	  this	  lacklustre	  election	  year,	  that	  he	  must	  change	  his	  policy	  or	  suffer	  political	  consequences.	  	   	  This	  statement	  suggested	  the	  continued	  use	  of	  some	  previous	  strategies	  (i.e.	  direct	  action,	  demonstrations,	  and	  building	  allies),	  but	  it	  also	  revealed	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  shift	  in	  framing	  strategy	  	  for	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  movement.	  	  	  As	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  allies	  began	  to	  speak	  up	  for	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  foster	  parents,	  it	  undermined	  the	  state’s	  argument	  that	  denying	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  people	  the	  chance	  to	  foster	  was	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  child.	  	  This	  created	  what	  Mayer	  Zald	  (1996:	  268)	  described	  as	  a	  “cultural	  contradiction”,	  a	  situation	  where	  “the	  realities	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of	  behaviour	  are	  seen	  to	  be	  substantially	  different	  than	  the	  ideological	  justifications	  for	  the	  movement”.	  	  Recognizing	  this	  logical	  fallacy	  in	  the	  state’s	  policy,	  activists	  strategically	  shifted	  their	  framing	  of	  the	  foster	  care	  debate	  in	  order	  to	  force	  the	  state’s	  hand.	  	  Arline	  Isaacson	  explained:	  “A	  lot	  of	  people	  wanted	  to	  argue	  that	  we	  had	  the	  right	  to	  be	  parents,	  and	  it	  was	  a	  totally	  wrong	  construct.	  	  That	  frames	  the	  debate	  about	  “me”	  and	  “us”	  but	  it	  always	  has	  to	  about	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  kids.	  	  So	  we	  said,	  ‘Yes,	  you	  can	  ban	  us	  [from	  being	  foster	  parents]	  if	  it	  is	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  children’.	  	  It’s	  an	  unproveable	  [sic]	  premise,	  and	  we	  knew	  the	  regulatory	  agencies	  were	  our	  allies.	  	  So	  we	  created	  a	  win-­‐win	  situation.”	  	  	  This	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  the	  Goodwin	  and	  Jasper’s	  (2003:	  28)	  theoretical	  assertion	  that	  “political	  opportunities	  and	  mobilizing	  structures	  are	  heavily	  shaped	  by	  strategic	  considerations,	  by	  the	  choices	  movement	  leaders	  and	  activists	  make”.	  When	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists	  made	  this	  tactical	  shift	  they	  were	  actively	  seeking	  new	  ways	  to	  create	  opportunities	  for	  themselves	  both	  in	  the	  political	  structure	  and	  public	  sphere-­‐	  and	  they	  succeeded.	  By	  harnessing	  the	  ‘best	  interests	  of	  the	  child’,	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  activists	  and	  their	  allies	  in	  the	  foster	  care	  issue	  tapped	  into	  a	  ideology	  that	  had	  come	  to	  define	  nearly	  all	  aspects	  of	  legal	  decision	  making	  concerning	  child	  and	  family	  welfare.	  	  The	  “’best	  interests	  of	  the	  child’	  became	  a	  judicial	  yardstick	  used	  to	  measure	  all	  claims	  for	  children”	  in	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the	  1800’s	  (Grossberg	  1985:	  239).	  	  Over	  time,	  children	  have	  increasingly	  come	  to	  viewed	  as	  individuals	  with	  individual	  human	  rights	  that	  must	  be	  protected,	  and	  because	  children	  cannot	  protect	  their	  own	  rights	  they	  must	  be	  protected	  by	  the	  state	  (Friedman	  2004:	  96,	  142).	  	  Throughout	  the	  1900’s	  the	  number	  of	  children	  available	  for	  adoption	  and	  foster	  care	  surged	  as	  “courts	  monitored	  parents	  and	  children,	  enforcing	  new	  standards	  of	  family	  life	  and	  overseeing	  arranging	  the	  removal	  and	  the	  treatment	  of	  children	  from	  homes	  that	  failed”	  (Grossman	  1985:	  279).	  	  Taking	  children	  away	  from	  “failed”	  families	  allowed	  the	  state	  the	  opportunity	  to	  create	  a	  new	  family	  in	  its	  place.	  Unfortunately,	  	  it	  was	  not	  always	  easy	  to	  determine	  the	  ‘best	  interests	  of	  the	  child’	  and	  the	  values	  used	  to	  determine	  such	  interests	  have	  been	  and	  remain	  in	  dispute	  (Friedman	  2004:	  103,	  Grossberg	  1985:	  267).	  	  The	  controversy	  over	  foster	  parenting	  in	  Massachusetts	  situated	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  people	  at	  the	  nexus	  of	  this	  dispute	  over	  what,	  exactly,	  is	  in	  the	  ‘best	  interests’	  of	  children,	  and	  pushed	  the	  boundaries	  of	  this	  controversy	  even	  further	  by	  forcing	  the	  state	  and	  its	  citizens	  to	  reckon	  with	  a	  larger	  question:	  What,	  exactly,	  is	  a	  family?	  	  That	  made	  settling	  the	  foster	  care	  issue	  particularly	  important	  in	  Massachusetts	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  history,	  because	  it	  established	  a	  path	  for	  future	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  family	  recognition	  and	  legal	  rights,	  including	  the	  right	  to	  marry.	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As	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  activists	  argued	  that	  the	  stability,	  care,	  and	  love	  offered	  by	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  foster	  parents	  was	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  child	  the	  Massachusetts	  Supreme	  Judicial	  Court	  issued	  a	  ruling	  that	  lent	  some	  official	  credence	  to	  their	  statements.	  Social	  movement	  theorists	  Goodwin	  and	  Jasper	  (2003:	  28)	  argue	  that	  “strategic	  decisions	  depend	  heavily	  on	  interaction	  between	  movements	  and	  other	  players”.	  	  In	  this	  case	  activists	  were	  able	  to	  use	  the	  court	  decision	  to	  their	  advantage.	  The	  above	  strategic	  shift	  in	  framing	  devices	  picked	  up	  momentum	  for	  the	  movement	  when	  the	  state	  was	  questioned	  about	  an	  apparent	  	  cultural	  contradiction	  by	  the	  Massachusetts	  Supreme	  Judicial	  Court	  (SJC).	  	  When	  the	  state	  asked	  the	  SJC	  to	  throw	  out	  a	  lawsuit	  filed	  against	  the	  foster	  care	  policy	  by	  Donald	  Babets	  and	  David	  Jean	  Roxbury,	  the	  couple	  that	  was	  forced	  to	  give	  up	  their	  foster	  children,	  Chief	  Justice	  Thomas	  Morse	  reasoned:	  It	  is	  “anomalous	  and	  ‘perplexing’	  that	  the	  state	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  two	  children’s	  ‘emotional	  and	  physical	  condition	  improved	  dramatically’	  because	  of	  the	  ‘exceptional’	  care	  given	  to	  them	  by	  the	  gay	  couple,	  ‘and	  now	  the	  state	  comes	  into	  court	  postulating	  that	  its	  preference	  for	  married	  couples	  is	  rationally	  related	  to	  a	  legitimate	  purpose”	  (Howe	  1986).	  	  More	  momentum	  was	  gained	  in	  favour	  of	  gay	  foster	  parents	  when	  a	  state	  appointed	  advisory	  panel	  on	  foster	  care,	  after	  hearing	  the	  testimony	  of	  gay	  activists,	  social	  workers,	  and	  child	  advocates,	  recommended	  changing	  the	  foster	  parent	  policy	  (Witcher	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1986).	  	  	  This	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  turn	  the	  tide	  completely,	  however.	  	  Governor	  Dukakis	  ignored	  the	  recommendation	  of	  his	  own	  advisory	  panel	  and	  failed	  to	  loosen	  restrictions	  on	  gays	  and	  foster	  parents	  as	  the	  panel	  had	  recommended	  (Witcher	  1987a).	  	  After	  this,	  momentum	  for	  overturning	  the	  foster	  care	  policy	  appeared	  to	  sputter,	  	  but	  at	  the	  same	  it	  began	  to	  build	  for	  the	  civil	  rights	  bill.	  	  By	  1986,	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights	  activists	  had	  been	  pressing	  for	  passage	  of	  an	  anti-­‐discrimination	  bill	  for	  over	  a	  decade,	  steadily	  building	  public	  and	  legislative	  support,	  only	  to	  be	  derailed	  by	  the	  vitriol	  unleashed	  during	  the	  AIDS	  crisis	  and	  foster	  care	  controversy.	  	  As	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  activists	  grappled	  with	  the	  new	  challenges	  thrust	  in	  their	  path,	  ground	  began	  to	  shift	  on	  the	  old	  civil	  rights	  bill	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  	  One	  is	  that	  the	  debates	  over	  AIDS	  and	  foster	  care	  forced	  gay	  activists,	  allies,	  and	  the	  public	  to	  confront	  the	  basest	  and	  ugliest	  stereotypes	  of	  gays	  and	  lesbians	  head	  on.	  	  Actively	  confronting	  stereotypes	  of	  gays	  as	  disease-­‐laden,	  dangerous	  child	  abusers	  meant	  activists	  worked	  hard	  to	  get	  out	  honest	  portrayals	  of	  gays	  and	  lesbians.	  	  	  For	  the	  media,	  covering	  the	  stories	  about	  AIDS	  or	  foster	  care	  meant	  exploring	  every	  angle,	  including	  the	  angle	  presented	  by	  gay	  activists	  and	  their	  allies.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  around	  this	  time	  the	  Boston	  Globe	  showed	  a	  marked	  increase	  in	  positive	  and/or	  sympathetic	  coverage	  of	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  people	  and	  issues.	  	  For	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example,	  the	  Globe	  reported	  on	  discrimination	  against	  gays	  and	  lesbians	  in	  the	  workplace	  (Adams	  1986),	  interviews	  with	  people	  living	  with	  AIDS	  (Adams	  1987a),	  coverage	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  families,	  including	  	  feature	  stories	  about	  children	  with	  gay	  parents	  (Thomas	  1987,	  Adams	  1987b),	  as	  well	  as	  reports	  on	  a	  shortage	  of	  foster	  parents	  in	  the	  state	  (Witcher	  1987b).	  	  While	  the	  Globe’s	  coverage	  of	  gay	  issues,	  including	  foster	  parenting,	  certainly	  did	  not	  become	  predominantly	  positive,	  such	  in	  depth	  reporting	  likely	  made	  a	  difference.	  	  For	  example,	  portrayals	  of	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  parents	  who	  wanted	  the	  best	  for	  their	  child	  like	  any	  other	  parent,	  raised	  questions	  about	  whether	  categorically	  excluding	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  people	  from	  foster	  parenting	  was	  truly	  in	  the	  children’s	  best	  interest.	  	  Similarly,	  analyses	  of	  discrimination	  in	  the	  workplace	  helped	  make	  the	  case	  that	  a	  civil	  rights	  bill	  was	  necessary.	  Another	  potential	  reason	  that	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  gained	  momentum	  was	  that	  the	  struggle	  over	  foster	  care	  created	  what	  social	  movement	  theorists	  call	  a	  “radical	  flank	  effect”.	  	  Radical	  flank	  effects	  occur	  “when	  the	  presence	  of	  extremists	  encourages	  support	  for	  moderates	  as	  a	  way	  of	  undercutting	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  radicals…the	  end	  result	  is	  often	  state	  support	  for	  legislative	  or	  policy	  changes	  once	  deemed	  far	  too	  radical”	  (McAdam,	  McCarthy,	  and	  Zald	  1996:	  14).	  	  Most	  gay	  and	  lesbians	  activists	  would	  probably	  not	  define	  the	  fight	  over	  foster	  care	  as	  “radical”.	  	  Gay	  and	  lesbian	  people	  had	  been	  foster	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parents	  for	  years	  before	  the	  furor	  erupted	  that	  forced	  foster	  children	  to	  be	  taken	  out	  of	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  homes.	  	  For	  gays	  and	  lesbians	  this	  struggle	  was	  a	  fight	  to	  restore	  a	  previously	  held	  right	  (the	  right	  to	  not	  be	  categorically	  excluded	  as	  potential	  foster	  parents)	  that	  was	  taken	  away	  unfairly	  rather	  than	  a	  push	  for	  radical	  new	  movement	  gains.	  However,	  for	  legislators,	  policy	  makers,	  and	  members	  of	  the	  general	  public	  uncomfortable	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights	  in	  general,	  allowing	  gay	  people	  the	  privilege	  to	  work	  without	  fear	  of	  being	  arbitrarily	  fired	  likely	  felt	  less	  radical	  than	  allowing	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  people	  to	  be	  foster	  parents.	  	  	  	  Lastly,	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  movement	  had	  become	  increasingly	  influenced	  by	  Michael	  Dukakis’	  presidential	  ambitions.	  	  Throughout	  the	  1980’s	  Dukakis	  had	  been	  an	  ambivalent	  ally	  for	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  movement.	  	  He	  was	  a	  supporter	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  bill,	  and	  was	  consistently	  reported	  as	  having	  pledged	  to	  sign	  the	  bill	  if	  it	  crossed	  his	  desk.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Dukakis	  was	  the	  primary	  progenitor	  of	  the	  restrictive	  foster	  care	  policy	  and	  a	  steadfast	  opponent	  	  of	  loosening	  the	  restrictions	  on	  placement	  of	  children	  with	  gay	  foster	  parents	  once	  those	  restrictions	  were	  set	  in	  place.	  	  	  However,	  since	  introducing	  his	  controversial	  foster	  care	  policy	  in	  May	  of	  1985,	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights	  activists	  relentlessly	  protested	  at	  Dukakis’	  speeches	  and	  events,	  held	  multiple	  sit-­‐in’s	  at	  his	  office,	  and	  organized	  numerous	  demonstrations	  against	  the	  policy.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  Dukakis	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had	  damaged	  relations	  with	  a	  once	  reliable	  contingent	  of	  supporters,	  who,	  now	  that	  they’d	  been	  alienated,	  	  had	  protested	  angrily	  against	  him	  for	  two	  full	  years	  and	  showed	  no	  sign	  of	  letting	  up.	  	  While	  holding	  steady	  against	  foster	  care,	  Dukakis	  took	  a	  more	  active	  role	  in	  support	  of	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill,	  publicly	  urging	  its	  passage,	  making	  personal	  phone	  calls	  to	  legislators,	  and	  	  distributing	  letters	  of	  support	  to	  every	  House	  member	  assuring	  them	  that	  the	  bill	  “comments	  in	  no	  way	  on	  whether	  homosexuality	  is	  good	  or	  bad,	  or	  right	  or	  wrong”	  (Boston	  Globe	  staff	  1986b,	  Black	  1987a,	  Boston	  Globe	  staff	  1987).	  	  This	  did	  little	  to	  patch	  his	  frayed	  ties	  to	  the	  gay	  community.	  	  	  As	  Dukakis’	  presidential	  ambitions	  became	  clearer,	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  activists	  threatened	  to	  organize	  protests	  at	  Dukakis’	  events	  nationwide.	  	  Massachusetts	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  organizations	  eventually	  enlisted	  the	  help	  of	  the	  National	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Task	  Force	  to	  create	  a	  “Duke-­‐Watch”	  at	  the	  Iowa	  and	  New	  Hampshire	  Democratic	  primary	  contests	  and	  other	  campaign	  events	  (Mohl	  1987a).	  	  While	  Governor	  Dukakis’s	  sudden	  surge	  of	  commitment	  to	  gay	  civil	  rights	  did	  not	  impress	  the	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Defense	  Committee,	  it	  may	  have	  held	  sway	  with	  some	  key	  legislators:	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  1983	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  passed	  the	  Massachusetts	  House	  of	  Representatives	  on	  May	  5,	  1987	  (Black	  1987a).	  	  	  	  In	  the	  debates	  that	  ensued	  in	  this	  round	  of	  fighting	  over	  the	  gay	  rights	  bill,	  opponents	  recycled	  the	  old	  criticism	  that	  passing	  the	  bill	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may	  “endorse	  a	  homosexual	  lifestyle”	  but	  they	  had	  some	  new	  tropes	  up	  their	  sleeve	  as	  well.	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  1980’s	  the	  religious	  right	  formed	  groups	  like	  the	  Christian	  Coalition,	  Focus	  on	  the	  Family,	  and	  Concerned	  Women	  for	  America;	  these	  groups	  grew	  to	  become	  an	  increasingly	  powerful	  counter-­‐movement	  seeking	  to	  roll	  back	  gains	  won	  by	  both	  the	  women’s	  movement	  and	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  movement	  (Fetner	  2008).	  	  As	  the	  debate	  swung	  back	  to	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  in	  Massachusetts,	  phrases	  popular	  with	  national	  Christian	  Right	  organizations	  like	  “family	  values”	  and	  “traditional	  values	  of	  America”	  appeared	  to	  be	  used	  to	  argue	  against	  the	  gay	  anti-­‐discrimination	  measure	  for	  the	  first	  time	  (Black	  1987b).	  	  These	  new	  tactics	  of	  gay	  rights	  opponents	  were	  not	  enough	  to	  stop	  the	  momentum	  built	  up	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  bill,	  and	  on	  the	  day	  of	  the	  vote	  all	  sides	  agreed	  that	  the	  Senate	  contained	  enough	  supporters	  of	  the	  bill	  that	  it	  would	  pass	  if	  voted	  on.	  	  The	  only	  chance	  for	  opponents	  to	  win	  was	  to	  kill	  the	  bill	  in	  committee,	  and	  with	  the	  Senate	  leadership	  lined	  up	  against	  the	  bill’s	  passage,	  that	  was	  exactly	  what	  they	  did	  (Phillips	  1987).	  	  	  	  As	  the	  Senate	  used	  parliamentary	  delay	  tactics	  to	  kill	  the	  bill,	  the	  debate	  continued	  to	  play	  out	  in	  the	  State	  House	  and	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  	  The	  Catholic	  Church	  increased	  its	  vocal	  opposition	  and	  defended	  editorials	  from	  lay	  leaders	  that	  regurgitated	  every	  possible	  negative	  stereotype	  or	  association	  against	  gays:	  promiscuous,	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unhealthy,	  dangerous,	  diseased	  (Ribadeniera	  1987).	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  American	  Jewish	  Congress	  and	  Massachusetts	  Council	  of	  Churches	  became	  more	  vocal	  in	  support	  of	  the	  bill,	  releasing	  a	  statement	  against	  the	  “increasingly	  vitriolic”	  tone	  of	  the	  debate	  and	  urging	  passage	  of	  the	  gay	  rights	  bill	  in	  the	  name	  of	  “civil	  justice”	  (Franklin	  1987).	  Legislators	  also	  continued	  activity	  for	  and	  against	  the	  bill.	  	  A	  leading	  opponent,	  for	  example,	  distributed	  an	  anti-­‐gay	  rights	  book	  that	  “depict[ed]	  homosexuals	  as	  promiscuous	  individuals	  who	  indulge	  in	  bizarre	  sexual	  habits	  and	  are	  a	  threat	  to	  children”	  (Frank1987b).	  	  The	  
Boston	  Globe	  continued	  to	  offer	  in-­‐depth	  reporting	  of	  both	  sides;	  one	  week	  the	  paper	  featured	  an	  interview	  with	  Arline	  Isaacson,	  lobbyist	  and	  co-­‐chair	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Political	  Caucus	  (Frank	  1987a),	  the	  next	  week	  an	  interview	  with	  leading	  gay	  rights	  opponent	  (and	  distributor	  of	  the	  books	  described	  above),	  Senator	  Arthur	  Joseph	  Lewis,	  Jr.	  	  (Sleeper	  1987),	  and	  the	  week	  after	  that	  a	  story	  that	  Senator	  Lewis’s	  nephew	  had	  publicly	  come	  out	  as	  gay	  (Mohl	  1987b).	  	  	  	  	  Lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists	  kicked	  off	  1988	  with	  a	  protest	  at	  the	  State	  House	  where	  several	  were	  arrested	  for	  chaining	  themselves	  in	  the	  gallery.	  The	  protestors	  criticized	  the	  Senate’s	  stalling	  tactics	  on	  the	  civil	  rights	  bill	  and	  demanded	  an	  apology	  from	  Arline	  Isaacson	  for	  failing	  to	  get	  the	  bill	  passed	  (Phillips	  1988).	  	  Unfortunately	  the	  action	  was	  condemned	  by	  most	  legislators	  and	  used	  to	  rationalize	  continued	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suppression	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  bill.	  	  Although	  when	  allegations	  later	  surfaced	  that	  State	  House	  police	  officers	  had	  punched	  and	  kicked	  the	  activists,	  some	  sympathy	  was	  generated	  for	  the	  movement	  (Quill	  1988,	  Feeney	  1988).	  	  Energized	  by	  a	  recent	  march	  for	  gay	  rights	  in	  Washington,	  DC	  and	  outraged	  that	  the	  bid	  for	  civil	  rights	  was	  thwarted,	  yet	  again,	  members	  of	  groups	  like	  Mass	  Act	  Out	  and	  the	  Greater	  Boston	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Political	  Alliance	  pledged	  a	  broad	  offensive	  designed	  to	  keep	  pressure	  on	  legislators	  to	  finally	  pass	  the	  anti-­‐discrimination	  measure	  (Adams1988,	  Golden	  1988).	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  a	  vow	  of	  increased	  militancy	  by	  activists	  other	  important	  elements	  shifted	  in	  early	  1988	  as	  well.	  	  A	  gay	  rights	  supporter,	  Rep.	  Bruce	  Bolling,	  showed	  off	  his	  own	  knowledge	  of	  parliamentary	  tactics	  by	  blocking	  some	  key	  bills	  (an	  important	  foreshadowing	  of	  a	  	  later	  strategy	  	  integral	  to	  the	  eventual	  passage	  of	  the	  gay	  rights	  bill).	  	  The	  Globe	  reported	  that	  polls	  showed	  nearly	  70%	  of	  Massachusetts	  residents	  supported	  passage	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  bill,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  majority	  of	  House	  and	  Senate	  members	  (Golden	  1988).	  	  Governor	  Dukakis	  was	  seeking	  to	  “mend	  fences	  with	  the	  gay	  community”	  and	  ramped	  up	  his	  support	  of	  the	  bill	  yet	  again,	  writing	  letters	  to	  legislators	  arguing	  that	  the	  civil	  rights	  bill	  was	  necessary	  for	  “the	  protection	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  and	  freedom	  of	  all	  our	  citizens”	  (Mansfield	  1988).	  	  All	  that	  was	  needed	  now	  was	  to	  budge	  the	  Senate	  leadership	  who	  were	  holding	  the	  bill	  in	  committee,	  seeking	  to	  delay	  or	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kill	  it	  one	  more	  time.	  	  No	  one	  budged,	  and	  the	  bill	  died	  yet	  again.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1988	  legislative	  session,	  a	  key	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  ally	  in	  the	  legislature,	  Sen.	  Michael	  Barrett,	  “filed	  a	  package	  of	  Senate	  rules	  changes	  aimed	  at	  changing	  the	  practices	  that	  helped	  kill	  the	  bill	  in	  previous	  sessions”	  	  (Loth	  1988).	  	  	  By	  the	  1989	  legislative	  session,	  even	  the	  bills	  strongest	  opponents	  knew	  they	  could	  not	  hold	  it	  up	  forever.	  	  Rep.	  Marie	  Parente,	  a	  staunch	  opponent	  of	  the	  bill,	  conceded	  that	  she	  and	  her	  likeminded	  “colleagues	  feel	  it	  is	  a	  fait	  accompli”	  (Malone	  1989).	  	  Indeed,	  the	  bill	  passed	  in	  the	  House	  on	  March	  28,	  1989	  and	  cleared	  the	  next	  hurdle,	  endorsement	  by	  a	  Senate	  panel,	  on	  May	  16.	  	  In	  June,	  there	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  delay	  the	  bill	  by	  attaching	  an	  amendment	  forcing	  a	  referendum,	  but	  the	  amendment	  was	  voted	  down	  (Phillips	  1989a).	  	  One	  major	  difference	  in	  the	  fight	  this	  time	  was	  that	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  legislative	  allies	  increased	  attempts	  at	  using	  parliamentary	  rules	  to	  their	  own	  advantage,	  for	  example	  calling	  for	  a	  cloture	  vote1	  to	  force	  a	  vote	  on	  the	  bill	  (though	  the	  cloture	  vote	  was	  lost),	  supporting	  an	  amendment	  for	  religious	  exemption	  from	  the	  bill	  (a	  move	  that	  took	  	  some	  force	  out	  of	  religious	  opposition	  to	  the	  bill),	  and	  making	  a	  “tactical	  decision	  to	  move	  the	  whole	  gay	  rights	  bill	  as	  a	  budget	  amendment”	  so	  that	  delaying	  the	  vote	  indefinitely	  was	  not	  an	  option	  (Phillips	  1989b).	  	  By	  this	  time,	  even	  opponents	  of	  the	  bill	  were	  tiring	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A	  cloture	  vote	  is	  a	  parliamentary	  move	  to	  bring	  debate	  to	  an	  end	  on	  a	  particular	  bill	  so	  that	  the	  legislature	  must	  vote.	  
	  	   111	  
of	  the	  increasingly	  elaborate	  legislative	  stunts	  used	  to	  delay	  a	  vote,	  and	  the	  bill	  was	  released	  from	  committee	  on	  September	  26,	  voted	  on	  and	  passed	  by	  the	  Senate	  on	  October	  12,	  1989.	  	  Even	  as	  the	  ink	  dried	  on	  Governor	  Dukakis’	  signature	  making	  the	  bill	  a	  law,	  opponents	  vowed	  to	  “go	  to	  the	  voters”	  and	  hold	  a	  referendum	  on	  the	  issue	  (Phillips	  1989b).	  	  	  What	  makes	  the	  Massachusetts	  movement	  truly	  unique	  is	  not	  just	  its	  ability	  to	  win	  rights,	  but	  its	  ability	  to	  fend	  off	  challenges	  to	  those	  new	  rights.	  	  	  When	  anti-­‐gay	  opponents	  were	  unsuccessful	  in	  blocking	  pro-­‐gay	  legislation	  outright,	  they	  were	  successful	  in	  overturning	  such	  legislation	  via	  referendum	  (Fetner	  2008,	  Rayside	  2008).	  	  After	  the	  gay	  rights	  bills	  passed	  muster	  in	  Massachusetts,	  opponents	  tried	  on	  two	  separate	  occasions	  to	  bring	  a	  referendum	  to	  the	  voters.	  	  The	  first	  effort	  to	  overturn	  the	  law	  was	  thrown	  out	  by	  the	  attorney	  general	  due	  to	  the	  religious	  exemption	  amendment,	  as	  the	  state	  constitution	  “stipulates	  that	  certain	  issues	  such	  as	  religious	  practices…cannot	  be	  subject	  of	  a	  referendum”	  (Phillips	  1989b).	  	  Including	  this	  amendment	  was	  primarily	  a	  strategic	  decision	  to	  assuage	  religious	  opposition	  to	  the	  bill,	  however	  “some	  strategists	  for	  the	  gay	  rights	  bill	  were	  aware	  that	  the	  amendment…would	  make	  the	  statute	  immune	  from	  a	  referendum	  to	  appeal	  it”,	  and	  leading	  opponents	  of	  the	  bill	  reported	  feeling	  “mousetrapped”	  by	  the	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amendment	  (Phillips	  1989b).	  	  This	  is	  an	  example	  of	  activists	  and	  allies	  strategically	  gaming	  the	  political	  structure	  to	  meet	  their	  own	  ends.	  	  	  The	  other	  major	  1980’s	  battle	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists,	  foster	  care,	  was	  settled	  on	  April	  5,	  1990	  when	  the	  Dukakis	  administration	  reversed	  its	  controversial	  1985	  anti-­‐gay	  foster	  care	  policy.	  	  Efforts	  to	  thwart	  the	  reversal	  in	  the	  legislature	  fell	  short,	  but	  this	  issue	  was	  swept	  up	  in	  another	  round	  of	  referenda	  when	  in	  1991	  petitions	  were	  filed	  to	  challenge	  the	  new	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  civil	  rights	  law	  and	  other	  gay	  friendly	  advances.	  	  This	  time	  the	  Committee	  to	  Restore	  Traditional	  Morality	  filed	  a	  series	  of	  petitions:	  one	  removed	  the	  phrase	  “sexual	  orientation”	  from	  the	  anti-­‐discrimination	  law,	  another	  sought	  to	  ban	  discussion	  of	  homosexuality	  in	  schools,	  a	  third	  banned	  public	  advertising	  of	  the	  “homosexual	  lifestyle”,	  a	  fourth	  banned	  gays	  and	  lesbians	  from	  foster	  care,	  and	  the	  last	  would	  ban	  legal	  recognition	  of	  homosexual	  unions	  (Biddle	  1991a).	  	  Here	  again	  opponents	  overreached	  and	  the	  petitions	  were	  ruled	  unconstitutional	  on	  various	  grounds,	  such	  as	  violating	  free	  speech	  and	  infringing	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  Commission	  Against	  Discrimination	  to	  hear	  cases	  (Biddle	  1991b).	  	  Importantly,	  leaders	  of	  both	  major	  political	  parties	  in	  Massachusetts	  publicly	  opposed	  the	  changes	  proposed	  by	  the	  petitions	  (Biddle	  1991a).	  	  	  	  	  	   On	  the	  heels	  of	  these	  victories,	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  movement	  headed	  into	  the	  1990’s	  having	  established	  itself	  as	  a	  force	  to	  be	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reckoned	  with.	  	  The	  explanation	  for	  this	  movement’s	  success	  is	  more	  complicated	  than	  the	  suggestion	  that	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  appeared	  and	  they	  acted	  on	  it,	  though	  external	  political	  opportunities	  were	  no	  doubt	  important.	  	  The	  success	  of	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  movement	  in	  Massachusetts	  was	  a	  result	  of	  the	  complex	  interaction	  between	  cultural	  elements,	  political	  structures,	  and	  the	  agency	  of	  activists.	  	  	  In	  the	  end,	  it	  was	  the	  strategic	  decision	  making	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists	  that	  won	  the	  day.	  	  After	  being	  active	  for	  nearly	  twenty	  years,	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  movement	  leaders	  had	  developed	  intimate	  knowledge	  of	  the	  culture	  and	  structures	  in	  which	  they	  were	  embedded.	  	  This	  knowledge	  was	  what	  allowed	  them	  to	  finally	  win	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill,	  as	  movement	  leaders	  developed	  strategic	  thinking	  that	  “is	  reflexive	  and	  imaginative,	  based	  on	  ways	  leaders	  learn	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  past,	  attend	  to	  the	  present,	  and	  anticipate	  the	  future”	  (Ganz	  2003:	  180).	  	  	  When	  the	  civil	  rights	  bill	  finally	  passed	  it	  was	  due	  to	  several	  factors.	  Certainly	  not	  least	  was	  that	  over	  the	  course	  of	  twenty	  years	  of	  lobbying	  and	  activism,	  the	  movement	  had	  succeeded	  in	  changing	  the	  culture	  and	  garnering	  increasing	  support	  for	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights.	  	  Of	  course,	  political	  institutions	  exist	  in	  a	  cultural	  structure	  and	  “the	  strategies	  used	  by	  advocacy	  groups	  and	  social	  movement	  organizations	  are	  	  structured	  by	  the	  institutional	  openings	  available	  to	  them”	  (Smith	  2009:	  161).	  	  While	  these	  tactics	  and	  strategies	  might	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have	  been	  tried	  in	  other	  states	  at	  the	  time,	  different	  cultural	  configurations	  would	  have	  made	  their	  success	  difficult	  in	  many	  areas.	  	  The	  presence	  and	  power	  of	  religious	  and	  political	  groups	  that	  oppose	  LGBT	  rights	  is	  stronger	  throughout	  much	  of	  the	  United	  States	  than	  it	  is	  in	  Massachusetts,	  thus	  hindering	  the	  availability	  of	  political	  opportunities,	  resource	  mobilization,	  or	  other	  ways	  to	  build	  momentum	  for	  political	  and/or	  cultural	  change.	  	  For	  instance,	  in	  2011,	  still	  fewer	  than	  half	  of	  US	  states	  offer	  the	  basic	  anti-­‐discrimination	  protections	  in	  that	  were	  won	  by	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts	  in	  1989	  (http://www.thetaskforce.org/reports_and_research/nondiscrimination_laws).	  
Conclusion	  The	  cultural	  influence	  of	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  movement	  is	  refracted	  through	  existing	  political	  structures,	  and	  also	  changes	  them.	  	  As	  Miriam	  Smith	  argues	  (2008:	  195),	  “Understanding	  the	  institutional	  context	  in	  which	  contending	  social	  movements	  as	  political	  actors	  are	  operating	  assists	  us	  in	  thinking	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  might	  work	  successfully	  within	  the	  realities	  of	  these	  institutions.”	  For	  example,	  part	  of	  this	  understanding	  in	  Massachusetts	  is	  considering	  that	  as	  years	  went	  by	  allies	  were	  amassed	  in	  the	  House	  and	  Senate	  who	  could	  manipulate	  a	  bill	  and/or	  ensure	  that	  when	  a	  vote	  was	  held,	  the	  measure	  passed.	  	  But	  in	  addition	  to	  gaining	  	  allies	  (and	  votes)	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other	  key	  elements	  to	  the	  successful	  passage	  of	  the	  bill	  included	  the	  strategic	  decision	  made	  by	  activist	  Arline	  Isaacson	  and	  Senator	  Tom	  Barrett	  to	  attach	  the	  bill	  to	  the	  budget,	  ensuring	  that	  opponents	  could	  not	  delay	  a	  vote	  indefinitely,	  and	  the	  decision	  to	  add	  the	  religious	  exemption	  amendment	  so	  that,	  once	  passed,	  the	  bill	  could	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  a	  referendum.	  	  This	  is	  why	  movement	  theorists	  Goodwin	  and	  Jasper	  (2004:	  37)	  assert	  that	  “local	  knowledge	  of	  constituencies,	  opponents,	  and	  third	  parties	  with	  which	  one	  is	  interacting”	  is	  so	  important:	  in	  this	  case	  activists	  used	  this	  knowledge	  to	  anticipate	  a	  referendum	  attempt	  by	  opponents	  and	  were	  able	  to	  include	  a	  measure	  to	  thwart	  these	  efforts	  in	  advance.	  	   As	  important	  as	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  was	  as	  an	  offensive	  victory	  that	  proved	  the	  movement	  could	  achieve	  advances	  it	  sets	  out	  to	  win,	  the	  foster	  care	  struggle	  was	  equally	  important	  as	  a	  defensive	  victory.	  Foster	  care	  was	  a	  victory	  that	  proved	  that	  the	  movement	  could	  successfully	  challenge	  counter	  movement	  attacks.	  	  The	  controversy	  over	  foster	  care	  underscored	  the	  reality	  that	  “enormous	  collective	  action	  can	  burst	  forth	  precisely	  during	  times	  when	  the	  political	  authorities	  close	  ranks,	  and	  when	  heavy	  repression	  is	  unleashed”	  (Morris	  2003:	  236).	  	  The	  decision	  to	  enact	  a	  restrictive	  policy	  against	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  foster	  parents	  caught	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  movement	  off	  guard	  and	  forced	  activists	  to	  think	  and	  strategize	  on	  their	  feet.	  	  As	  the	  controversy	  grew,	  activists	  learned	  to	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harness	  the	  influence	  of	  external	  actors	  (social	  workers,	  child	  advocacy	  groups,	  and,	  eventually	  the	  Supreme	  Judicial	  Court)	  and	  engaged	  a	  highly	  salient	  cultural	  frame,	  “the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  child”,	  	  and	  then	  turned	  that	  frame	  in	  their	  favour.	  	  This	  turn	  exposed	  the	  logical	  fallacy	  behind	  the	  state’s	  restrictive	  policy.	  	  Because	  all	  social	  actors	  and	  institutions	  are	  suspended	  in	  “webs	  of	  meaning”	  (Poletta	  2003:	  102),	  shifting	  the	  tone	  of	  the	  debate	  so	  that	  “the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  child”	  no	  longer	  included	  the	  automatic	  exclusion	  of	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  foster	  parents	  created	  openings	  for	  the	  movement	  to	  garner	  support	  in	  the	  culture	  at	  large	  as	  well	  as	  within	  political	  structures.	  	  Because	  political	  and	  cultural	  spheres	  are	  connected,	  gains	  made	  in	  either	  area	  can	  be	  used	  to	  influence	  the	  other.	  	  For	  example,	  when	  there	  are	  cultural	  shifts	  in	  favour	  of	  gay	  rights,	  they	  can	  be	  used	  to	  influence	  shifts	  in	  political	  institutions	  and	  policies,	  i.e.,	  it	  was,	  in	  part,	  the	  enormous	  pressure	  exerted	  on	  the	  Dukakis	  administration	  from	  the	  cultural	  sphere	  that	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  reversal	  of	  the	  foster	  care	  policy	  restrictions.	  Conversely,	  political	  institutions	  and	  policies	  can	  	  exert	  pressure	  for	  cultural	  change.	  	  	   The	  reason	  that	  these	  particular	  struggles	  are	  so	  important	  theoretically	  is	  that	  “political	  institutions	  and	  policy	  legacies	  are	  the	  unseen	  structures	  behind	  the	  vociferous	  battle	  between	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  advocates	  and	  defenders”	  (Smith	  2009:	  159).	  	  Therefore,	  when	  the	  battle	  over	  marriage	  heated	  up,	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	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movement	  had	  developed	  relationships,	  strategies,	  and	  frames	  necessary	  to	  win.	  	  As	  Elyse	  Cherry	  said,	  “We	  had	  individuals	  and	  institutions	  all	  the	  way	  back	  to	  the	  1970’s	  who	  could	  play	  an	  insider	  game.	  	  Part	  of	  how	  we	  got	  to	  2003	  without	  DOMA	  is	  because	  along	  the	  way	  those	  relationships	  were	  created”.	  	  Those	  relationships	  included	  connections	  to	  legislators,	  but	  also	  allies	  in	  the	  religious	  community,	  labour	  organizations,	  	  and	  other	  grassroots	  action	  groups	  who	  would	  go	  to	  bat	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  community.	  	  Another	  respondent,	  legislator	  Carl	  Sciortino,	  was	  blunt	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  legacies	  of	  these	  policies,	  “Having	  non-­‐discrimination	  so	  early	  led	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  have	  other	  advances”,	  including	  marriage.	  	  Partly	  because	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  people	  did	  not	  need	  to	  live	  in	  fear	  of	  losing	  their	  jobs	  or	  their	  home,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  be	  out	  and	  act	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  own	  rights	  and	  interests.	  	  	  Another	  important	  legacy	  is	  that	  the	  arguments	  and	  frames	  used	  by	  opponents	  of	  gay	  marriage	  had	  already	  been	  debunked	  by	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  activists	  and	  allies.	  	  When	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  opponents	  used	  arguments	  that	  gays	  and	  lesbians	  were	  harmful	  to	  children	  or	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  family,	  those	  arguments	  had	  already	  been	  addressed	  during	  the	  foster	  care	  debate	  and,	  as	  Bruce	  Bell	  observed,	  “the	  legislature	  had	  already	  conceded	  that	  gay	  people	  are	  ok	  to	  parent	  so	  those	  arguments	  didn’t	  hold	  water”.	  	  Bruce’s	  statement	  also	  underscores	  the	  interaction	  between	  culture	  and	  structure,	  and	  the	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ability	  of	  legislative	  decisions	  to	  influence	  culture	  (Goodwin	  and	  Jasper	  2004,	  Smith	  2009).	  	  Mayer	  Zald	  (1996:	  269)	  argued	  that	  this	  is	  important	  because	  “movements	  and	  counter-­‐movements	  not	  only	  are	  involved	  in	  mobilization	  contests	  to	  demonstrate	  who	  has	  the	  most	  support	  and	  resources	  at	  their	  command,	  they	  are	  involved	  in	  framing	  contests	  attempting	  to	  persuade	  authorities	  and	  bystanders	  of	  the	  rightness	  of	  their	  cause”.	  	  When	  there	  is	  a	  previous	  policy	  decision	  in	  your	  favour,	  it	  helps	  to	  persuade	  others	  of	  the	  rightness	  of	  your	  cause	  (Smith	  2009).	  	  	  Lastly,	  these	  early	  battles	  contributed	  to	  the	  “collective	  memory”	  of	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  movement.	  	  This	  collective	  memory	  can	  be	  powerfully	  utilized	  by	  movement	  actors	  (Poletta	  2003:	  108).	  	  For	  example,	  the	  fight	  for	  the	  civil	  rights	  bill	  and	  other	  early	  battles	  created	  what	  Ellen	  Zucker	  called	  “a	  sort	  of	  muscle	  knowledge	  in	  the	  community	  that	  could	  be	  flexed	  again”	  when	  the	  time	  came	  to	  win	  the	  battle	  for	  marriage.	  	  This	  muscle	  knowledge	  would	  be	  worked	  throughout	  the	  1990’s	  as	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  movement	  goals	  shift	  from	  individual	  rights	  to	  family	  rights,	  and	  the	  battle	  for	  marriage	  and	  against	  DOMA	  comes	  to	  the	  fore.	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CHAPTER	  4:	  FROM	  INDIVIDUAL	  RIGHTS	  TO	  FAMILY	  RIGHTS	  	  Introduction	  
	  	   Nothing	  succeeds	  like	  success.	  	  The	  Massachusetts	  LGBT	  movement	  ushered	  in	  the	  1990’s	  energized	  by	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  civil	  rights	  bill	  and	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  discriminatory	  foster	  parenting	  policy.	  	  Winning	  these	  struggles	  indicated	  a	  significant	  change	  in	  the	  political	  climate	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  Theoretically,	  shifting	  political	  momentum	  in	  favour	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  is	  integral	  for	  movement	  success	  because	  “the	  broad	  political	  environment	  in	  which	  the	  movement	  is	  embedded	  will	  constitute	  constraints/opportunities	  affecting	  [movement]	  development”	  (McAdam,	  McCarthy,	  and	  Zald	  1996:	  12).	  On	  the	  heels	  of	  these	  legislative	  victories	  activists	  shifted	  their	  aim	  from	  individual	  rights	  to	  family	  rights.	  	  Now	  established	  and	  gaining	  momentum,	  success	  came	  again	  in	  the	  form	  of	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Cambridge	  and	  a	  Massachusetts	  Supreme	  Judicial	  Court	  decision	  awarding	  adoption	  rights	  to	  gay	  couples	  in	  1992.	  	  	  Miriam	  Smith’s	  (2008:	  25)	  application	  of	  historical	  institutionalism	  to	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  movement	  emphasizes	  that	  political	  and	  legal	  policy	  decisions	  such	  as	  these	  lay	  down	  a	  foundation	  for	  future	  advances	  in	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights,	  yet	  she	  makes	  clear	  these	  political	  and	  judicial	  institutions	  “exist	  in	  a	  cultural	  structure”.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  national	  politics	  and	  the	  growth	  of	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organizations	  dedicated	  to	  resisting	  the	  cultural	  change	  sought	  by	  women’s	  rights	  and	  gay	  rights	  groups,	  the	  1990’s	  would	  prove	  to	  hold	  significant	  challenges	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  LGBT	  rights	  in	  spite	  of	  this	  decade’s	  auspicious	  beginning.	  	  	  	  	   As	  the	  LGBT	  movement	  grew	  stronger	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  1970’s	  and	  80’s,	  so,	  too,	  did	  the	  counter-­‐movement	  against	  LGBT	  rights	  grow	  in	  strength	  and	  numbers.	  	  Throughout	  the	  1980’s	  in	  particular,	  the	  Christian	  Right	  and	  other	  groups	  that	  sought	  to	  protect	  or	  restore	  ‘traditional	  family	  values’	  coalesced	  into	  a	  well-­‐oiled	  political	  machine	  prepared	  to	  fight	  the	  ‘homosexual	  agenda’	  across	  the	  United	  States	  (Fetner	  2008:	  60,	  Hunter	  1990:	  90).	  	  Many	  activists	  in	  the	  counter-­‐movement	  were	  veterans	  of	  anti-­‐feminist	  and	  anti-­‐abortion	  movements,	  where	  they	  felt	  continually	  moved	  to	  act	  in	  order	  to	  defend	  traditional	  values	  and	  morality	  from	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  perceived	  attacks	  on	  multiple	  fronts	  (D’	  Emilio	  and	  Freedman	  1997).	  	  Because	  many	  of	  them	  had	  past	  movement	  experience,	  countermovement	  activists	  were	  able	  to	  draw	  on	  a	  vast	  store	  of	  strategic	  and	  political	  knowledge,	  and	  were	  culturally	  savvy	  as	  well	  (Fetner	  2008:	  59,	  Smith	  2009:	  27).	  	  By	  the	  1990’s	  the	  countermovement	  was	  striking	  back	  against	  gains	  made	  for	  gay	  rights,	  and	  working	  fast	  to	  head	  off	  advances	  that	  may	  be	  coming	  down	  the	  pike.	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With	  the	  LGBT	  movement	  and	  the	  religious	  right	  developing	  simultaneously,	  a	  new	  “cycle	  of	  contention”	  emerged	  in	  the	  fight	  for	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights.	  	  According	  to	  social	  movement	  theorist	  Sidney	  Tarrow	  (1998:	  142)	  a	  cycle	  of	  contention	  refers	  to	  a	  “phase	  of	  heightened	  conflict	  across	  the	  social	  system:	  with	  a	  rapid	  diffusion	  of	  collective	  action	  from	  more	  mobilized	  to	  less	  mobilized	  sectors;	  a	  rapid	  pace	  of	  innovation	  in	  the	  forms	  of	  contention;	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  and	  transformed	  action	  frames;	  a	  combination	  of	  organized	  and	  unorganized	  participation”.	  	  	  This	  cycle	  of	  contention	  coalesced	  in	  Massachusetts	  in	  the	  1990’s	  when	  local	  struggles	  for	  domestic	  partnerships	  were	  folded	  into	  national	  hysteria	  and	  backlash	  to	  pro-­‐gay	  marriage	  court	  decisions	  in	  Hawai’i.	  This	  tension	  set	  in	  motion	  the	  introduction	  and	  defeat	  of	  a	  Massachusetts	  DOMA	  statute,	  and,	  later,	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  battle	  over	  legalization	  of	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  	  Within	  such	  cycles	  of	  contention	  “organizations	  and	  authorities,	  movements	  and	  interest	  groups,	  and	  members	  of	  the	  polity	  and	  challengers	  interact,	  conflict,	  and	  cooperate…	  the	  outcome	  depends	  less	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  and	  the	  resources	  of	  any	  pair	  of	  opponents	  than	  on	  the	  generalized	  structure	  of	  contention	  and	  the	  reaction	  to	  it	  of	  elites,	  opponents,	  and	  potential	  allies”	  (Tarrow	  1998:	  143).	  	  Given	  the	  complex	  interaction	  of	  these	  political	  and	  cultural	  forces	  across	  the	  US	  and	  in	  Massachusetts,	  it	  turns	  out	  contenders	  on	  both	  sides	  had	  their	  work	  cut	  out	  for	  them.	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New	  Decade,	  New	  Strategy,	  New	  Challenges	  After	  winning	  individual	  rights	  in	  1989,	  activists	  were	  considering	  their	  next	  steps.	  	  At	  this	  point	  in	  time,	  “marriage	  didn’t	  even	  pass	  the	  laugh	  test”,	  said	  Arline	  Isaacson,	  co-­‐chair	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Political	  Caucus,	  “but	  there	  was	  this	  new	  thing	  called	  domestic	  partner	  benefits.	  	  The	  first	  protection	  we	  chose	  to	  go	  after	  was	  a	  bite	  size	  version	  of	  domestic	  partner	  benefits.”	  The	  fight	  to	  secure	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  consumed	  much	  of	  the	  1990’s	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  Much	  like	  the	  decade	  long	  struggle	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill,	  winning	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  was	  characterized	  by	  intense	  push	  and	  pull	  between	  activists	  and	  opponents,	  and	  contained	  significant	  wins	  and	  losses	  for	  both	  sides.	  	  While	  activists	  were	  careful	  to	  frame	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  as	  an	  issue	  of	  “equal	  pay	  for	  equal	  work”	  rather	  than	  relationship	  recognition	  per	  se,	  the	  shift	  from	  individual	  rights	  to	  couple	  rights	  alarmed	  opponents.	  	  	  	  Movement	  activity,	  including	  framing,	  conveys	  information	  about	  movement	  formation	  and	  strategy,	  thereby	  “communicating	  information	  about	  what	  they	  do…	  diffusing	  collective	  action	  …	  creating	  political	  space	  for	  kindred	  movements	  and	  counter	  movements,	  and	  producing	  incentives	  for	  elites	  and	  third	  parties	  to	  respond	  to”	  (Tarrow	  1998:	  72).	  	  	  No	  matter	  how	  it	  was	  framed,	  fighting	  for	  domestic	  partner	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benefits	  clearly	  signalled	  a	  shift	  in	  strategy	  that	  rattled	  opponents,	  and	  even	  some	  allies.	  	   While	  marriage	  may	  not	  have	  passed	  the	  “laugh	  test”	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists,	  the	  issue	  was	  a	  serious	  one	  for	  opponents	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights.	  	  It	  was	  so	  serious	  that	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  were	  immediately	  opposed	  because,	  according	  to	  one	  senator,	  it	  would	  “downgrade	  the	  institution	  of	  marriage	  by	  putting	  it	  on	  a	  par	  with	  nonmarital	  relationships.	  Even	  though	  others	  might	  look	  at	  it	  as	  something	  that	  spreads	  fairness	  through	  society,	  it	  is	  actually	  overlooking	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  marriage”	  (Fehrnstrom	  1991).	  	  When	  Governor	  Bill	  Weld,	  a	  libertarian-­‐leaning	  Republican,	  issued	  a	  1992	  executive	  order	  that	  extended	  modest	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  (like	  bereavement	  leave)	  to	  state	  employees	  the	  repercussions	  were	  immediate.	  	  Weld	  became	  the	  “target	  of	  right	  wing	  rage”	  because	  “recognizing	  same-­‐sex	  relationships”	  put	  Weld	  “at	  odds	  with	  President	  Bush’s	  pro-­‐family	  agenda”	  (Fehrnstrom	  1992).	  	  	  Neither	  side	  could	  have	  known	  at	  the	  time,	  but	  this	  foreshadowed	  much	  of	  the	  tone	  and	  rhetoric	  that	  would	  emerge	  later	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  gay	  marriage.	  	  	  Indeed,	  the	  tone	  and	  rhetoric	  shaping	  this	  issue	  was	  itself	  a	  reflection	  of	  shifting	  cultural	  and	  political	  forces.	  	   The	  late	  1980’s	  and	  early	  1990’s	  ushered	  in	  a	  period	  of	  struggle	  over	  what	  some	  call	  the	  “culture	  wars”	  that	  featured	  “battles	  over	  the	  family,	  art,	  education,	  law,	  and,	  politics”	  (Hunter	  1990).	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Underlying	  the	  culture	  wars	  was	  a	  fight	  to	  define	  America	  itself,	  a	  fight	  primarily	  about	  “national	  identity-­‐over	  the	  meaning	  of	  America”	  (Hunter	  1990:50,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  This	  larger	  battle	  to	  define	  America,	  in	  turn,	  had	  a	  “decisive	  impact	  on	  the	  family	  [including]	  the	  limits	  (if	  any)	  of	  legitimate	  sexuality	  [and]	  even	  what	  constitutes	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  family	  in	  the	  first	  place”	  (Hunter	  1990:	  50).	  	  Some	  scholars	  have	  challenged	  Hunter’s	  assertion	  that	  tension	  over	  moral	  ‘wedge	  issues’,	  like	  homosexuality	  or	  abortion,	  amounted	  to	  what	  can	  be	  called	  a	  culture	  war	  (Fiorina	  2005).	  	  However,	  attention	  to	  such	  issues	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  national	  cultural	  and	  political	  discourse	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	  	  Even	  local	  movements	  are	  embedded	  in	  national	  cultures,	  and	  these	  cultures	  shape	  movement	  opportunities,	  strategies	  available	  to	  activists	  to	  make	  the	  most	  of	  such	  opportunities,	  and	  the	  political	  structure	  and	  environment	  in	  which	  opportunities	  appear	  and	  strategies	  are	  to	  be	  executed.	  For	  Francesca	  Poletta	  (2004:	  102),	  proper	  attention	  to	  culture	  requires	  “attention	  to	  cultural	  traditions,	  ideological	  principles,	  institutional	  memories,	  and	  political	  taboos	  that	  structure	  the	  behaviour	  both	  of	  political	  elites	  and	  challengers”.	  	  Opposing	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  is	  a	  central	  ideological	  position	  to	  those	  who	  might	  consider	  themselves	  ‘culture	  warriors’	  and	  as	  national	  attention	  turned	  to	  such	  issues,	  ‘culture	  war’	  rhetoric	  seeped	  into	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  struggles	  in	  Massachusetts.	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   The	  emergence	  of	  the	  ‘culture	  wars’	  coincided	  with	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  religious	  right.	  	  As	  the	  religious	  right	  and	  its	  coexisting	  organizations	  (i.e.	  the	  Christian	  Coalition,	  Concerned	  Women	  of	  America)	  came	  of	  age,	  a	  new	  passion	  was	  infused	  into	  debates	  over	  women’s	  rights	  and	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  in	  particular.	  	  The	  growing	  influence	  of	  these	  groups	  had	  important	  cultural	  and	  political	  consequences	  in	  the	  national	  political	  arena,	  within	  the	  Republican	  Party,	  and	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  Nationally,	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  Religious	  Right	  was	  to	  establish	  a	  “Christian	  commonwealth	  that	  both	  sustained	  and	  enforced	  a	  particular	  vision	  of	  morality”	  and	  this	  	  “animated	  their	  commitment”	  to	  organizing	  for	  traditional	  family	  values	  (D’Emilio	  and	  Freedman	  1997:	  363).	  	  	  The	  vehicle	  chosen	  by	  those	  within	  the	  Religious	  Right	  to	  manifest	  their	  agenda	  was	  the	  Republican	  Party.	  	  According	  to	  D’Emilio	  and	  Freedman	  (1997:	  362),	  “the	  impact	  of	  the	  Christian	  Right	  on	  American	  politics	  remained	  indirect	  and	  attenuated	  until	  the	  1988	  presidential	  campaign	  of	  Pat	  Robertson”,	  whose	  “ambitious	  political	  agenda	  included	  a	  conservative	  takeover	  of	  the	  GOP”	  (Fetner	  2008:	  68).	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  evangelical	  leaders	  like	  Robertson	  and	  their	  supporters,	  “many	  moderate	  Republicans	  were	  squeezed	  out	  of	  the	  party”	  and	  “the	  new	  social	  conservativism	  of	  the	  religious	  right	  competed	  with	  and	  sometimes	  replaced	  the	  fiscal	  conservativism	  of	  the	  old	  guard	  Republicans,	  and	  it	  competed	  directly	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with	  the	  libertarian	  leanings	  of	  many	  in	  the	  party”	  (Fetner	  2008:	  68).	  	  This	  explains	  the	  particular	  tension	  that	  Bill	  Weld	  faced	  for	  his	  (limited)	  support	  for	  gay	  rights	  in	  Massachusetts,	  and	  the	  growing	  reluctance	  of	  Republicans	  of	  all	  stripes	  and	  socially	  conservative	  Democrats	  in	  Massachusetts	  and	  elsewhere	  to	  support	  even	  modest	  gay	  rights	  initiatives.	  	  	  
Fighting	  for	  Domestic	  Partnership	  Benefits	  	   In	  this	  climate,	  the	  fight	  for	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  became	  a	  long	  slog	  for	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  In	  Boston	  proper,	  Councillor	  David	  Scondras	  filed	  the	  “Family	  Protection	  Act”,	  designed	  to	  extend	  benefits	  to	  domestic	  partners	  in	  same-­‐sex	  or	  heterosexual	  relationships,	  in	  1991.	  	  However,	  the	  first	  city	  to	  succeed	  was	  Cambridge,	  just	  outside	  of	  Boston,	  in	  1992,	  followed	  later	  by	  neighbouring	  municipalities	  Brewster	  and	  Brookline.	  Municipal	  or	  city	  domestic	  partner	  benefit	  policies	  provided	  benefits	  to	  those	  employees	  of	  the	  municipality	  or	  city	  itself,	  but	  had	  no	  jurisdiction	  over	  private	  employers.	  Boston	  city	  council	  went	  back	  and	  forth	  over	  the	  issue	  for	  several	  years	  in	  the	  1990’s.	  The	  Family	  Protection	  Act	  was	  sidelined	  once	  in	  1995	  when	  the	  mayor’s	  chief	  legal	  adviser	  counselled	  that	  state	  law	  made	  it	  illegal	  to	  offer	  health	  insurance	  to	  city	  employees	  if	  those	  same	  benefits	  were	  not	  also	  offered	  by	  the	  state.	  Mayor	  Menino	  later	  mandated	  benefits	  in	  1998,	  which	  were	  down	  when	  a	  lawsuit	  was	  brought	  against	  the	  city	  in	  1999	  by	  the	  
	  	   127	  
conservative	  American	  Center	  for	  Law	  and	  Justice	  (Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2008).	  	  	  	  	  A	  statewide	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  bill	  was	  introduced	  in	  1993,	  but	  languished	  throughout	  the	  1990’s	  despite	  the	  best	  efforts	  of	  activists	  and	  legislative	  allies.	  	  	  At	  first,	  advocates	  were	  successful	  in	  framing	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  in	  terms	  of	  financial	  benefits,	  rather	  than	  relationship	  recognition.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  activists	  chose	  what	  Sidney	  Tarrow	  (1998:	  110-­‐111)	  calls	  an	  “injustice	  frame”	  with	  the	  intent	  of	  locating	  such	  a	  frame	  “at	  the	  intersection	  between	  a	  target	  population’s	  culture	  and	  their	  own	  values	  and	  goals”.	  	  When	  frames	  are	  successful,	  they	  may	  become	  “master	  frames”	  that	  are	  used	  as	  “symbols…to	  justify	  and	  dignify	  collective	  action”	  (Tarrow	  1998:	  146).	  	  In	  this	  case	  the	  target	  population	  was	  elected	  officials	  who	  ostensibly	  believed	  in	  equal	  pay,	  or	  at	  least	  were	  required	  to	  follow	  the	  law	  as	  it	  guaranteed	  equal	  pay	  for	  equal	  work,	  and	  had	  the	  power	  to	  institute	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  for	  city	  and	  state	  employees.	  	  	  By	  arguing	  that	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  employees	  have	  a	  right	  to	  the	  same	  pay	  and	  benefits	  package	  as	  their	  heterosexual	  co-­‐workers,	  activists	  drew	  on	  the	  “American	  concept	  of	  	  ‘rights’”,	  a	  concept	  that	  has	  been	  used	  as	  a	  master	  frames	  by	  SMO’s	  since	  the	  1960’s	  (Tarrow	  1998:	  146).	  Proponents	  argued	  that	  equal	  pay	  for	  equal	  work	  included	  equal	  benefits,	  and	  opponents	  countered	  that	  it	  was	  simply	  too	  expensive	  to	  extend	  benefits	  to	  domestic	  partners.	  	  When	  moral	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arguments	  were	  made,	  the	  benefits	  master	  frame	  generally	  overshadowed	  them.	  Even	  the	  staunchest	  opponents	  stuck	  to	  the	  bottom	  line	  that	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  amounted	  to	  a	  costly	  “special	  privilege”	  for	  lesbians	  and	  gays	  that	  forced	  taxpayers	  to	  “pick	  up	  the	  tab	  for	  this	  stroll	  down	  the	  alternative	  lifestyle	  lane”	  (Fehrnstrom	  1992).	  	  	  One	  commentator	  pointed	  to	  potential	  fraud	  (i.e.	  that	  individuals	  not	  in	  a	  relationship	  would	  claim	  one	  another	  as	  domestic	  partners	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  health	  insurance	  or	  other	  benefits)	  as	  a	  reason	  to	  oppose	  the	  measure:	  “It	  goes	  way	  beyond	  making	  Boston	  the	  ‘Niagara	  Falls’	  for	  gay	  honeymooners.	  The	  scam	  potential	  here	  is	  unbelievable.	  It’s	  going	  to	  be	  world-­‐class	  fraudarama”	  (Carr	  1992).	  	  In	  fact,	  even	  the	  Catholic	  Archdiocese’s	  criticism	  played	  up	  the	  fiscal	  sensibilities	  of	  the	  matter	  by	  calling	  the	  appeal	  for	  domestic	  partnerships,	  “a	  political	  ploy	  by	  a	  vocal,	  well-­‐financed,	  advantaged	  class	  in	  our	  society	  who	  want	  to	  force	  our	  society	  to	  accept	  ‘gay	  lifestyles’	  as	  normal,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  state	  by	  finagling	  money	  to	  support	  their	  friendships	  “	  (Marchoki	  1992).	  	  	  	  That	  the	  domestic	  partner	  debate	  took	  this	  tone	  is	  in	  part	  a	  reflection	  of	  LGBT	  activists’	  strategy	  to	  frame	  the	  benefits	  as	  “equal	  pay	  for	  equal	  work”	  rather	  than	  relationship	  recognition,	  so	  when	  “traditional	  family	  values”	  arguments	  were	  raised	  they	  did	  not	  quite	  fit	  into	  the	  conversation	  as	  initiated	  by	  the	  LGBT	  rights	  movement.	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For	  example,	  in	  a	  hearing	  on	  the	  state	  domestic	  partner	  bill	  Arline	  Isaacson	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Political	  Caucus	  asked	  legislators	  to	  imagine	  two	  employees	  at	  the	  same	  firm,	  “The	  one	  who	  just	  got	  hired	  is	  able	  to	  have	  his	  wife’s	  [insurance]	  covered	  by	  the	  company,	  but	  the	  one	  that’s	  been	  there	  for	  twenty-­‐five	  years	  can’t	  have	  his	  partner	  covered.	  That’s	  discrimination”	  (Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2008:	  50).	  	  Yet,	  despite	  activists’	  careful	  strategizing,	  the	  debate	  shifted	  as	  the	  news	  broke	  and	  tension	  built	  over	  the	  gay	  marriage	  case	  winding	  its	  way	  through	  the	  Hawai’i	  court	  system.	  	  	  The	  tide	  turned	  again	  in	  Massachusetts	  as	  the	  nation	  reacted	  to	  the	  distinct	  possibility	  of	  legal	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Hawai’i	  and	  the	  strength	  of	  that	  reaction	  was	  felt	  from	  coast	  to	  coast.	  	  	  
Hawai’i	  Shifts	  the	  Debate	  	  As	  the	  cycle	  of	  contention	  over	  relationship	  recognition	  and	  family	  rights	  for	  lesbian	  	  and	  gay	  people	  intensified,	  so	  did	  the	  reaction	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  opponents.	  	  One	  key	  component	  of	  such	  cycles	  is	  “the	  diffusion	  of	  a	  propensity	  for	  collective	  action	  from	  the	  initiators…to	  antagonists…countermovements	  are	  a	  frequent	  reaction	  to	  the	  onset	  of	  contention”	  (Tarrow	  1998:	  145).	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  development	  of	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  movement	  for	  marriage	  and	  family	  rights	  cannot	  be	  understood	  outside	  of	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  counter-­‐movement	  it	  was	  forced	  to	  contend	  with.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  lesbian	  and	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gay	  rights	  movement,	  “opposing	  movements,	  by	  shifting	  political	  venues,	  disputing	  social	  movement	  claims,	  lobbying	  politicians,	  and	  introducing	  new	  frames,	  alter	  the	  political	  context,	  and	  create	  new	  problems	  for	  activists,	  or	  new	  opportunities”	  (Fetner	  2008:	  xvi).	  	  Because	  of	  the	  interactive	  and	  dynamic	  relationship	  between	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  movement	  and	  its	  countermovement,	  decisions	  of	  Hawai’i	  courts	  in	  favour	  of	  gay	  marriage	  led	  to	  a	  series	  of	  what	  movement	  theorist	  Aldon	  Morris	  (2004:	  245)	  calls	  “transformative	  events”	  for	  both	  contenders.	  	  Morris	  (2004:	  245)	  argues	  that	  such	  events	  are	  important	  because	  they	  “can	  produce	  radical	  turning	  points	  in	  collective	  action	  and	  affect	  the	  outcome	  of	  social	  movements”.	  	  The	  initial	  court	  decisions	  in	  Hawai’i	  led	  to	  increased	  activism	  on	  the	  part	  of	  gay	  rights	  opponents	  who	  were	  shocked	  into	  action	  by	  the	  thought	  of	  same-­‐sex	  weddings.	  This	  mobilization	  on	  the	  part	  of	  gay	  rights	  opponents	  illustrates	  “the	  role	  of	  opposing	  movements	  in	  setting	  agendas	  and	  selecting	  the	  issue	  that	  requires	  focus	  at	  a	  given	  point	  in	  time”	  (Fetner	  2008:	  99).	  	  Marriage	  was	  not	  a	  serious	  part	  of	  Massachusetts	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists’	  agendas	  in	  1996,	  yet	  the	  galvanized	  opposition	  to	  gay	  marriage	  meant	  activists	  had	  to	  contend	  with	  marriage	  and	  its	  consequences	  whether	  they	  wanted	  to	  or	  not.	  Because	  cycles	  of	  contention	  are	  characterized	  by	  “broad	  sectoral	  and	  geographic	  diffusion”	  (Tarrow	  1998:	  144),	  Massachusetts	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lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists	  experienced	  several	  consequences	  related	  to	  the	  Hawai’i	  gay	  marriage	  fight.	  	  First,	  as	  Religious	  Right	  rhetoric	  and	  tactics	  gained	  traction	  nationally	  this	  increased	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  such	  strategies	  against	  domestic	  partnership	  benefits	  in	  Massachusetts,	  eventually	  culminating	  in	  the	  repeal	  of	  domestic	  partner	  benefit	  policies	  enacted	  in	  Boston,	  Brookline,	  Cambridge,	  and	  Brewster	  with	  a	  lawsuit	  filed	  by	  the	  right-­‐wing	  American	  Center	  for	  Law	  and	  Justice	  in	  1999	  (Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2008).	  	  Second,	  the	  prospect	  of	  legal	  gay	  marriage	  raised	  the	  stakes	  and	  energized	  the	  anti-­‐LGBT	  rights	  faction	  while	  ramping	  up	  emotional	  investment	  in	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  and	  marriage	  debates	  for	  LGBT	  activists	  and	  their	  opponents	  in	  Massachusetts.	  Third,	  it	  awakened	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  in	  Massachusetts	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  legal	  marriage,	  leading	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  new	  groups	  like	  the	  Freedom	  to	  Marry	  Coalition.	  	  These	  advances	  in	  turn	  influenced	  strategy	  development	  and	  movement	  cohesion.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  gay	  marriage	  debate	  in	  Hawai’i	  reverberated	  across	  the	  United	  States.	  Massachusetts	  activists	  believed	  that	  “the	  legislature	  was	  still	  uncomfortable	  with	  gay	  relationships”	  and	  were	  careful	  to	  continue	  to	  frame	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  in	  terms	  of	  equal	  pay	  rather	  than	  relationship	  recognition	  (Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2008:	  49),	  but	  with	  the	  nation’s	  eyes	  now	  locked	  on	  Hawai’i,	  marriage	  was	  in	  the	  air	  and	  there	  was	  no	  escaping	  it.	  	  State	  after	  state	  enacted	  Defense	  of	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Marriage	  Act	  statutes,	  and	  the	  federal	  government	  was	  gearing	  up	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  	  Meanwhile,	  in	  Massachusetts	  the	  domestic	  partner	  benefit	  debate	  was	  folded	  into	  the	  national	  drama	  over	  gay	  marriage,	  and	  frames	  shifted	  away	  from	  discussions	  of	  benefits	  and	  budgets	  and	  began	  to	  focus	  more	  on	  relationship	  recognition	  and	  defending	  the	  family,	  morality,	  and	  civilization	  from	  the	  destructive	  consequences	  of	  the	  gay	  agenda.	  	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  controversy	  over	  gay	  marriage	  was	  easily	  exploited	  as	  a	  wedge	  issue	  during	  the	  1996	  election	  cycle.	  	  	  As	  tension	  grew	  over	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Hawai’i,	  coverage	  of	  this	  issue	  overwhelmed	  coverage	  of	  domestic	  partnership	  benefits	  in	  Massachusetts’s	  news,	  and	  the	  major	  newspapers	  reflected	  the	  uptake	  of	  these	  frames.	  	  Media	  outlets,	  of	  course,	  “are	  far	  from	  neutral	  bystanders	  in	  the	  framing	  of	  movement	  events”,	  and	  while	  movement	  or	  countermovement	  activists	  may	  find	  a	  sympathetic	  ear	  among	  journalists,	  “more	  often,	  however,	  the	  media	  choose	  to	  frame	  a	  story	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  because	  it	  sells	  newspapers	  or	  attracts	  viewers”	  (Tarrow	  1998:	  116).	  	  As	  the	  controversy	  over	  gay	  marriage	  rippled	  across	  the	  country,	  Massachusetts’s	  media	  dove	  in.	  	  In	  Boston,	  the	  Herald	  was	  generally	  most	  critical	  of	  gay	  issues,	  including	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  and	  gay	  marriage.	  	  In	  the	  Herald,	  opinion	  columnists	  and	  editors	  overwhelmingly	  took	  the	  side	  of	  the	  opposition.	  For	  example,	  in	  addition	  to	  opposing	  gay	  marriage,	  columnist	  Don	  Feder	  swung	  an	  election	  year	  jab	  at	  Republicans	  as	  he	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exclaimed	  in	  his	  column,	  “It’s	  the	  social	  issues,	  stupid!”	  and	  criticized	  the	  Republican	  party	  for	  taking	  what	  he	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  weak	  stance	  on	  social	  issues	  like	  gay	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage.	  	  Feder	  then	  quoted	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  Family	  Research	  Council	  who	  said,	  	  “There’s	  no	  sense	  that	  the	  [Republican]	  party	  understands	  the	  anxiety	  level	  in	  Middle	  America.	  Sometime	  this	  summer,	  Hawai’i’s	  Supreme	  Court	  will	  probably	  rule	  that	  the	  state	  must	  sanction	  homosexual	  unions,	  forcing	  every	  other	  state	  to	  recognize	  gay	  marriages	  contracted	  there”	  (Feder	  1996).	  Just	  days	  later,	  the	  Herald’s	  editorial	  staff	  weighed	  in	  and	  criticized	  the	  Hawai’i	  Supreme	  Court	  for	  “flouting	  tradition,	  religion,	  and	  common	  sense”	  and	  asked	  incredulously,	  “Whoever	  thought	  the	  day	  would	  come	  when	  marriage	  would	  have	  to	  be	  defined?”	  (Boston	  Herald	  1996).	  	  	  The	  Boston	  Globe	  offered	  a	  less	  critical,	  but	  still	  deeply	  ambivalent	  view	  of	  the	  prospect	  of	  gay	  marriage.	  	  For	  example,	  a	  Globe	  editorial	  piece	  observed	  that	  “many	  people	  are	  content	  with	  the	  traditional	  marriage	  model	  of	  man,	  woman,	  and	  children.	  	  With	  the	  institution	  under	  strain	  from	  divorce	  and	  unwed	  motherhood,	  they	  feel	  no	  need	  to	  stretch	  it	  further.	  Legal	  improvements	  in	  the	  status	  of	  gay	  people	  can	  be	  made	  without	  redefining	  this	  bedrock	  institution	  of	  society”	  (Boston	  Globe	  1996).	  	  And	  one	  Boston	  Globe	  writer,	  who	  in	  other	  columns	  was	  generally	  supportive	  of	  gay	  rights,	  stated	  flatly,	  “If	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Hawai’i	  legalizes	  gay	  marriage,	  the	  honeymoon	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  brief.	  And	  the	  backlash	  harsh”	  (Goodman	  1996).	  	  	  	  These	  responses	  to	  the	  gay	  marriage	  controversy	  in	  Massachusetts	  reflected	  an	  overriding	  concern	  in	  the	  United	  States	  at	  the	  time	  that	  ‘the	  family’	  was	  under	  siege.	  	  This	  sentiment	  was	  repeatedly	  raised	  in	  media	  coverage	  during	  the	  1996	  election,	  and	  not	  just	  in	  reference	  to	  gay	  marriage.	  	  Journalist	  David	  Shribman	  observed	  that	  both	  Democrats	  and	  Republicans	  increasingly	  invoked	  the	  language	  of	  the	  “the	  family”	  with	  two	  goals	  in	  mind	  “first,	  to	  buttress	  the	  family	  at	  a	  time	  when	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  under	  siege,	  and,	  second,	  to	  be	  rewarded	  by	  voters	  for	  saying	  such	  things”	  (Shribman	  1996).	  	  Shribman’s	  observation	  showed	  that	  “the	  ‘family	  issue’	  emerged	  as	  a	  way	  to	  talk	  about	  a	  lot	  of	  issues	  at	  once,	  quality	  of	  life,	  job	  security,	  the	  economy,	  and	  lifestyle	  changes”	  and	  that	  “people	  are	  worried	  about	  what	  will	  happen	  to	  us	  as	  a	  nation”	  if	  family	  bonds	  continue	  to	  put	  under	  pressure	  (Shribman	  1996).	  	  	  	  	  This	  generalized	  national	  anxiety	  about	  ‘the	  family’	  made	  a	  ready	  frame	  for	  opposition	  to	  gay	  marriage.	  	  	  As	  a	  commentator	  from	  the	  Herald	  explained,	  “Marriage	  has	  been	  under	  siege	  again	  for	  some	  time.	  No-­‐fault	  divorce,	  a	  sex-­‐saturated	  culture,	  and	  fiscal	  and	  social	  pressures	  have	  sundered	  many	  a	  marriage.	  	  Many	  Americans	  are	  wrestling	  with	  the	  pain	  of	  broken	  families…[and]	  fatherlessness	  has	  spawned	  America’s	  most	  destructive	  problems”,	  he	  lamented,	  “Why	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don’t	  we	  move	  to	  strengthen	  this	  irreplaceable	  institution?	  Well,	  we	  should.	  Yet	  we	  are	  being	  asked	  to	  pretend	  that	  two	  men	  could	  replace	  a	  mother	  in	  a	  child’s	  life	  or	  two	  women	  a	  father”	  (Bauer	  1996).	  	  	  Given	  the	  predominant	  cultural	  anxiety	  over	  the	  family,	  the	  family	  values	  frame	  resonated	  deeply	  with	  many	  Americans.	  While	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists	  and	  allies	  in	  Massachusetts	  had	  worked	  hard	  to	  frame	  their	  arguments	  for	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  in	  terms	  of	  equal	  pay,	  as	  gay	  marriage	  became	  the	  dominant	  issue	  they	  lost	  the	  ability	  to	  control	  how	  their	  issues	  were	  framed.	  	  Marriage	  and	  family	  are	  powerful	  cultural	  symbols,	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Hawai’i	  inspired	  both	  movement	  and	  countermovement	  agents	  to	  utilize	  marriage	  and	  family	  as	  frames	  of	  contention.	  	  This,	  in	  turn,	  inspired	  action	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  battle	  for	  marriage	  because	  “it	  is	  the	  combination	  of	  new	  frames	  embedded	  within	  a	  cultural	  matrix	  that	  produces	  explosive	  collective	  action	  frames”	  (Tarrow	  1998:	  122).	  	  Although	  this	  was	  a	  framing	  strategy	  that	  Massachusetts	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  activists	  had	  wished	  to	  avoid,	  the	  shift	  in	  frames	  was	  not	  entirely	  negative.	  	  In	  fact,	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  all	  the	  negative	  talk	  about	  gay	  marriage	  threatening	  the	  family	  and	  through	  the	  din	  of	  cries	  to	  restore	  traditional	  family	  values,	  positive	  portrayals	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  families	  began	  to	  emerge.	  	  	  In	  Boston,	  it	  was	  the	  Globe	  that	  began	  including	  positive	  coverage	  of	  gay	  families	  and	  gay	  marriage.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  September	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1996	  the	  Globe	  featured	  a	  story	  titled	  “Is	  Anything	  Wrong	  with	  this	  Picture?	  In	  the	  South	  End,	  a	  couple	  wants	  to	  seal	  their	  love	  with	  marriage,	  in	  Congress,	  lawmakers	  try	  to	  stop	  them.”	  	  The	  text	  of	  this	  article	  referred	  to	  the	  “emotional	  benefits”	  and	  “concrete	  advantages”	  conferred	  by	  marriage,	  and	  asserted	  that	  being	  unable	  to	  marry	  leaves	  this	  couple	  “perpetually	  second	  class	  and	  vulnerable”	  (Sege	  1996).	  	  Articles	  such	  as	  this	  implicitly	  asked	  that	  if	  the	  benefits	  of	  marriage	  are	  so	  great	  for	  society,	  why	  not	  strengthen	  the	  institution	  by	  making	  it	  more	  inclusive,	  rather	  than	  less	  so?	  	  Even	  the	  court	  testimony	  from	  the	  Hawai’i	  case	  made	  clear	  that	  “children	  of	  single	  parents,	  foster	  parents,	  adoptive	  parents,	  step-­‐parents,	  and	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  could	  be	  raised	  with	  the	  same	  level	  of	  success	  as	  that	  of	  a	  heterosexual	  couple”	  (Associated	  Press	  1996).	  	  Having	  these	  ideas	  on	  the	  table	  in	  1996,	  controversy	  notwithstanding,	  made	  them	  part	  of	  the	  collective	  consciousness	  so	  that	  in	  2003	  these	  images	  and	  arguments	  were	  familiar	  to	  many	  Massachusetts	  residents.	  	  It	  is	  important	  that	  Massachusetts	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  activists	  and	  allies	  continued	  pressing	  for	  family	  rights,	  including	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  and	  later,	  marriage,	  throughout	  the	  gay	  marriage	  panic	  that	  engulfed	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  1990’s.	  	  This	  continued	  action	  kept	  positive	  images	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  families	  in	  the	  media,	  and	  in	  the	  collective	  consciousness	  of	  Massachusetts	  residents,	  even	  after	  the	  case	  in	  Hawai’i	  was	  closed.	  	  	  
	  	   137	  
Emotions	  Intensify,	  Opportunities	  Close…and	  Open	  Throughout	  1996	  national	  anxiety	  continued	  to	  build	  over	  the	  impending	  marriage	  decision	  in	  Hawai’i,	  and	  in	  September	  of	  that	  year	  a	  national	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act	  was	  passed	  in	  Congress	  and	  the	  Employment	  Non-­‐Discrimination	  Act	  (known	  as	  ENDA,	  a	  bill	  to	  create	  national	  employment	  protection	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people)	  was	  defeated.	  	  Political	  opportunities,	  whether	  expanding	  or	  constricting,	  have	  emotional	  effects	  on	  social	  movements	  actors,	  and	  may	  inspire	  citizens	  who	  have	  yet	  to	  take	  part	  in	  social	  movement	  activity.	  	  As	  a	  political	  opportunity	  opens,	  it	  “might	  generate	  feelings	  like	  hope	  or	  pride	  or	  might	  legitimize	  emotions	  like	  anger	  or	  indignation”	  and	  even	  constricting	  opportunities	  can	  “generate	  emotions	  that	  facilitate	  protest”	  (Gould	  2004:	  164).	  	  	  Given	  the	  cultural	  weight	  carried	  by	  the	  intensely	  personal	  nature	  of	  relationships,	  marriage,	  and	  family,	  the	  ups	  and	  downs	  of	  the	  marriage	  debate,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  drama	  being	  staged	  against	  gay	  marriage	  in	  the	  national	  theatre,	  generated	  a	  series	  of	  emotions	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  and	  these	  emotions	  led	  many	  to	  act	  in	  their	  own	  defense.	  	  	  In	  such	  a	  volatile	  climate	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  nationally	  and	  locally,	  Massachusetts	  activists	  experienced	  many	  emotions	  that	  inspired	  movement	  activity.	  	  For	  example,	  after	  the	  vote	  that	  enacted	  DOMA	  and	  blocked	  ENDA,	  one	  headline	  read	  “In	  Boston,	  Community	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Responds	  with	  Anger”	  as	  activists	  and	  allies	  staged	  protests,	  criticized	  lawmakers	  for	  “demagoguery”,	  and	  promised	  to	  fight	  the	  bill	  in	  court	  (Leung	  1996).	  	  	  This	  anger	  also	  inspired	  proactive	  responses,	  such	  as	  increased	  publicity	  and	  participation	  in	  groups	  like	  the	  Boston	  Freedom	  to	  Marry	  Coalition.	  	  Sidney	  Tarrow	  (1998:	  111)	  calls	  anger	  a	  “vitalizing”	  emotion	  that	  is	  “likely	  to	  be	  present	  in	  triggering	  acts	  of	  resistance”,	  but	  also	  emphasizes	  the	  mobilizing	  qualities	  of	  other	  emotions,	  like	  love.	  	  	  Love,	  of	  course,	  is	  a	  primary	  motivation	  for	  relationship	  formation	  and	  marriage,	  thus	  attacks	  on	  marriage	  may	  inspire	  an	  personal,	  emotional	  response	  that	  could	  lead	  people	  to	  action.	  Amelia	  Craig,	  then	  executive	  director	  of	  GLAD,	  identified	  love	  as	  a	  motivation	  to	  take	  action	  against	  anti-­‐gay	  marriage	  forces	  when	  she	  said,	  “The	  decision	  to	  get	  married	  should	  belong	  to	  the	  couple	  in	  love,	  not	  the	  state”	  (Leung	  1996).	  	  It	  could	  be	  said	  that	  love,	  as	  much	  as	  identity,	  in	  a	  sense,	  undergirds	  all	  LGBT	  movement	  activity	  and	  that	  love	  can	  be	  turned	  to	  anger	  when	  LGBT	  relationships	  and	  families	  are	  targeted	  and	  attacked.	  	  	  Emotions	  like	  anger	  and	  love,	  then,	  also	  served	  as	  a	  primary	  motivator	  for	  action	  in	  the	  movement	  for	  gay	  marriage,	  even	  when	  political	  opportunities	  appeared	  to	  be	  diminishing.	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  precisely	  when	  opportunities	  appear	  to	  be	  diminishing	  that	  it	  may	  be	  most	  important	  to	  remind	  people	  “that	  the	  indignities	  of	  everyday	  life	  are	  not	  written	  in	  the	  stars-­‐-­‐	  that	  they	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  some	  agent	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and	  that	  the	  actions	  they	  take	  collectively	  can	  change	  that	  condition”	  (Tarrow	  1998:	  111).	  So	  emotion	  is	  important	  to	  inspire	  action	  and	  keep	  up	  the	  morale	  of	  activists,	  but	  it	  is	  more	  than	  that,	  as	  well.	  Emotions	  do	  not	  occur	  in	  a	  vacuum.	  Verta	  Taylor	  (1995:	  227)	  argues	  that	  emotions	  are	  also	  “a	  site	  for	  articulating	  the	  links	  between	  cultural	  ideas,	  structural	  inequality,	  and	  individual	  action.”	  Emotions	  not	  only	  inspire	  individuals	  to	  participate	  in	  social	  movements,	  but	  emotions	  can	  help	  individuals	  understand	  their	  actions	  in	  a	  broader	  social	  context.	  	  As	  the	  backlash	  to	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Hawai’i	  brought	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  people	  under	  attack	  across	  the	  country,	  it	  complicated	  the	  conditions	  faced	  by	  Massachusetts	  activists.	  Activists’	  emotional	  responses	  to	  these	  changing	  circumstances	  in	  turn	  influenced	  actions	  and	  strategy	  for	  future	  movement	  gains.	  Despite	  the	  apparent	  setbacks	  posed	  by	  the	  passage	  of	  DOMA,	  the	  defeat	  of	  ENDA,	  and	  the	  increasingly	  vitriolic	  rhetoric	  against	  gay	  marriage,	  the	  court	  rulings	  that	  favoured	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Hawai’i	  opened	  activists’	  eyes	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  winning	  marriage	  equality.	  	  Although	  the	  Hawai’i	  gay	  marriage	  saga	  ended	  with	  gay	  marriage	  banned	  in	  the	  state	  (though	  gay	  couples	  were	  extended	  some	  rights	  and	  benefits	  of	  marriage	  via	  domestic	  partnerships)	  and	  led	  to	  a	  string	  of	  DOMAs	  enacted	  across	  the	  country,	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Advocates	  and	  Defender’s	  (GLAD)	  Mary	  Bonauto	  (lead	  council	  on	  the	  case	  that	  won	  marriage	  rights	  in	  Massachusetts)	  described	  the	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Hawai’i	  Supreme	  Court	  decision	  supporting	  gay	  marriage	  as	  an	  emotional	  and	  strategic	  turning	  point.	  	  She	  said,	  “When	  the	  Hawai’i	  Supreme	  Court	  ruled	  in	  May	  of	  1993	  that	  a	  marriage	  case	  by	  three	  couples	  should	  not	  be	  dismissed	  because	  it	  looked	  like	  discrimination…it	  was	  a	  jaw	  dropping	  experience,	  like	  ‘Whoa!’”	  (GLAD	  panel	  discussion	  “From	  Civil	  Unions	  to	  Marriage”	  2009).	  	  The	  historical	  record	  shows,	  and	  my	  informants	  corroborated,	  that	  events	  in	  Hawai’i	  did	  not	  signify	  an	  overall	  shift	  in	  movement	  strategy	  for	  Massachusetts	  activists.	  	  As	  the	  debate	  over	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  Hawai’i	  played	  out,	  fighting	  for	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  remained	  the	  primary	  goal	  of	  Massachusetts	  activists.	  However,	  events	  in	  Hawai’i	  did	  sow	  the	  seeds	  for	  the	  movement	  for	  marriage	  that	  would	  come	  later,	  for	  example,	  by	  inspiring	  the	  eventual	  creation	  of	  new	  social	  movement	  goals	  and	  generally	  encouraging	  activists	  to	  envision	  new	  possibilities	  for	  the	  future.	  	  	  The	  battle	  for	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Hawai’i	  began	  winding	  down	  in	  July	  1997.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  a	  series	  of	  favourable	  court	  rulings,	  in	  the	  end	  gay	  marriage	  was	  banned	  in	  the	  state.	  However,	  in	  the	  process	  Hawai’i	  became	  the	  first	  state	  to	  “offer	  benefits	  to	  couples	  who	  aren’t	  allowed	  to	  wed…reciprocal	  benefits	  that	  also	  apply	  to	  cohabiting	  couples	  [or	  others]	  such	  as	  a	  widow	  and	  an	  adult	  son	  to	  siblings	  or	  to	  roommates”	  (Associated	  Press	  1997).	  	  By	  1998,	  a	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act	  had	  been	  implemented	  federally	  as	  well	  as	  in	  a	  majority	  of	  US	  states,	  and	  voters	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in	  Hawai’i	  and	  Alaska	  succeeded	  in	  passing	  constitutional	  amendments	  against	  gay	  marriage.	  	  	  These	  events	  illustrate	  Gamson	  and	  Meyer’s	  (1996:	  277)	  assertion	  that	  political	  opportunities	  are	  “relatively	  volatile,	  shifting	  with	  events,	  policies,	  and	  political	  actors”.	  By	  the	  time	  all	  was	  said	  and	  done	  in	  Hawai’i,	  tension	  over	  gay	  marriage	  was	  reduced	  from	  a	  boil	  to	  a	  simmer	  but	  it	  remained	  quite	  clear	  that	  the	  issue	  would	  not	  be	  fading	  away	  anytime	  soon.	  	  While	  many	  Massachusetts	  activists	  continued	  to	  work	  on	  winning	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  in	  Boston	  and	  state	  wide,	  other	  advocates,	  having	  watched	  Hawai’i	  come	  so	  close	  to	  achieving	  marriage	  equality,	  set	  their	  sights	  on	  winning	  marriage	  rights.	  	  The	  next	  phase	  of	  the	  struggle	  for	  same	  sex	  marriage	  occurred	  closer	  to	  home	  in	  Vermont.	  	  	  Some	  Massachusetts	  activists	  were	  involved	  in	  this	  struggle	  through	  GLAD,	  a	  regional	  organization	  that	  operate	  throughout	  New	  England,	  and	  most	  realized	  that	  an	  advance	  in	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights	  in	  one	  state	  could	  help	  build	  momentum	  for	  advances	  in	  other	  states.	  Indeed,	  if	  Hawai’i	  shifted	  the	  field	  of	  play,	  what	  happened	  next	  in	  Vermont	  was	  a	  game	  changer,	  and	  events	  in	  both	  states	  played	  integral	  roles	  in	  bringing	  marriage	  to	  Massachusetts.	  	  Importantly,	  GLAD,	  while	  headquartered	  in	  Boston,	  operated	  regionally	  across	  the	  New	  England	  states.	  	  In	  this	  region,	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists	  had	  been	  active	  for	  decades	  and	  achieved	  policy	  gains	  essential	  to	  creating	  a	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political	  and	  cultural	  climate	  more	  conducive	  to	  advancing	  LGBT	  rights	  than	  found	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  country.	  	  Because	  “climates	  are	  less	  volatile	  than	  policy	  windows”	  (Gamson	  and	  Meyer	  1996:	  282),	  the	  New	  England	  region	  seemed	  like	  a	  reasonable	  place	  to	  stage	  the	  next	  front	  in	  the	  battle	  for	  gay	  marriage.	  	  	  	  	  As	  the	  case	  in	  Hawai’i	  was	  being	  wrapped	  up,	  Mary	  Bonauto	  of	  GLAD	  and	  Beth	  Robinson,	  a	  lawyer	  and	  LGBT	  rights	  advocate	  in	  Vermont,	  recognized	  the	  political	  opening	  created	  by	  the	  events	  in	  Hawai’i.	  	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Mary	  Bonauto,	  “It	  was	  looking	  like	  Hawai’i	  was	  in	  tough	  shape	  and	  it	  really	  did	  make	  sense	  not	  to	  put	  all	  of	  one’s	  eggs	  in	  any	  one	  state	  and	  to	  really	  think	  about	  bringing	  marriage	  to	  the	  mainland…it	  made	  sense	  to	  say	  ‘Yes,	  we	  should	  take	  another	  risk	  here.	  We	  can’t	  just	  let	  this	  opening	  close	  on	  us’”	  (GLAD	  panel	  2009).	  	  Using	  lessons	  gleaned	  from	  the	  struggle	  for	  marriage	  in	  Hawai’i,	  Vermont	  was	  strategically	  chosen	  as	  the	  next	  state	  in	  which	  same	  sex	  marriage	  might	  be	  likely	  to	  succeed.	  	  Beth	  Robinson	  reflected	  on	  the	  lessons	  from	  Hawai’i	  that	  influenced	  movement	  strategy	  in	  Vermont,	  	  	  Massachusetts	  learned	  a	  lot	  from	  what	  we	  did	  and	  didn’t	  do	  in	  Vermont	  and,	  likewise,	  we	  learned	  from	  Hawai’i.	  	  [We	  learned]	  you	  can	  have	  the	  best	  legal	  arguments	  in	  the	  world	  and	  they	  may	  be	  made	  vulnerable	  by	  a	  political	  response.	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  first	  things	  we	  looked	  at	  when	  we	  were	  thinking	  of	  filing	  the	  case	  was	  ‘What’s	  the	  constitutional	  amendment	  process	  in	  Vermont?’	  	  It	  was	  quite	  easy	  in	  Hawai’i	  and	  that	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  an	  unfortunate	  fact.	  	  Turns	  out	  in	  Vermont	  it	  was	  pretty	  challenging.	  	  Once	  we	  built	  some	  infrastructure	  we	  focused	  on	  making	  sure	  there	  was	  no	  chance	  that	  2/3	  of	  the	  Senate	  would	  vote	  for	  an	  amendment.	  	  We	  did	  our	  work	  in	  the	  executive	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branch	  and	  with	  the	  attorney	  general’s	  office	  and	  other	  places.	  	  The	  biggest	  factor	  [in	  deciding	  when	  to	  file	  the	  case]	  was	  feeling	  like	  we	  had	  done	  the	  work	  we	  needed	  to	  do	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  political	  response	  we	  might	  have.”	  	  (GLAD	  Panel	  2009).	  	   	  This	  shows	  that	  activists	  were	  very	  aware	  of	  what	  “fickle	  friends”	  policy	  windows	  and	  political	  opportunities	  could	  be,	  and	  made	  strategic	  choices	  to	  create	  an	  opportunity	  for	  gay	  marriage	  and/or	  to	  enhance	  opportunities	  perceived	  to	  be	  already	  available.	  	  Having	  witnessed	  the	  spectacular	  opening	  and	  shutting	  of	  one	  such	  opportunity	  in	  Hawai’i,	  activists	  were	  ready	  to	  take	  a	  chance	  in	  Vermont,	  but	  only	  after	  studying	  and	  engaging	  the	  political	  structures	  in	  place	  there	  in	  order	  to	  lay	  the	  groundwork	  for	  success.	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  On	  July	  22,	  1997	  the	  Boston	  Globe	  reported	  that	  three	  gay	  couples	  in	  Vermont	  filed	  suit	  for	  marriage,	  citing	  the	  guarantees	  of	  equality	  in	  the	  state	  charter	  (Canellos	  1997).	  	  	  Lawyers	  for	  the	  plaintiffs	  in	  Vermont	  clearly	  drew	  on	  cultural	  elements	  most	  likely	  to	  resonate	  with	  residents	  of	  the	  state,	  politicians,	  and	  judges,	  interpreting	  the	  state	  charter	  to	  say	  that	  “the	  government	  is,	  or	  ought	  to	  be,	  instituted	  for	  the	  common	  benefit,	  protection,	  or	  security	  of	  the	  people	  [and]	  that	  if	  a	  benefit	  is	  provided	  to	  anyone	  it	  must	  be	  provided	  for	  all”,	  and	  citing	  cases	  where	  Vermont	  courts	  previously	  recognized	  various	  types	  of	  non-­‐traditional	  families	  (Canellos	  1997).	  	  Vermont	  activists	  fighting	  for	  marriage	  were	  able	  to	  draw	  on	  earlier	  experiences	  and	  strategic	  responses	  that	  had	  been	  successful	  in	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engaging	  the	  culture	  and	  politics	  of	  their	  state	  (for	  example,	  see	  Bernstein	  2002).	  	  In	  the	  end,	  Vermont	  succeeded	  in	  civil	  unions	  rather	  than	  marriage,	  but	  these	  civil	  unions	  represented	  the	  most	  advanced	  level	  of	  LGBT	  equality	  at	  the	  time	  and	  the	  events	  in	  Vermont	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  bringing	  marriage	  to	  Massachusetts.	  	  	   In	  theoretical	  terms,	  a	  social	  movement	  is	  “a	  field	  of	  actors,	  not	  a	  unified	  entity”	  so	  “movements	  often	  have	  a	  range	  of	  actors	  pursuing	  numerous	  strategies”	  (Gamson	  and	  Meyer	  1996:	  283).	  	  As	  activists	  in	  Vermont	  made	  the	  case	  for	  marriage	  and	  the	  case	  subsequently	  wound	  its	  way	  through	  the	  courts	  there,	  in	  Massachusetts	  activists	  continued	  the	  fight	  for	  domestic	  partner	  benefits.	  	  The	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  struggle	  limped	  along,	  hampered	  by	  continued	  challenges	  and	  disagreements	  about	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  including	  benefits	  for	  non-­‐married	  heterosexual	  couples	  in	  the	  bill.	  	  In	  1998	  Boston	  Mayor	  Tom	  Menino	  issued	  an	  executive	  order	  extending	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  to	  city	  workers	  inclusive	  of	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  and	  unmarried	  heterosexual	  couples.	  This	  was	  made	  null	  by	  Governor	  Paul	  Celucci’s	  veto	  of	  the	  measure	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  making	  benefits	  available	  to	  heterosexual	  partners	  “undermines	  marriage”	  and	  “contributes	  to	  fatherlessness”	  (Battenfeld	  and	  Kreiger	  1998).	  	  	  This	  was	  Celluci’s	  personal	  interpretation	  of	  the	  family	  values	  frame.	  He	  insisted	  he	  would	  sign	  the	  bill	  only	  if	  it	  was	  amended	  so	  that	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  were	  “limited	  to	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  [because	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otherwise]	  it	  will	  encourage	  heterosexual	  couples	  to	  get	  these	  benefits.	  	  We	  have	  to	  say	  that	  marriage	  is	  important”	  (Kreiger	  and	  O’Brien	  1998).	  	  Cellucci	  insisted	  he	  supported	  LGBT	  rights,	  but	  his	  stance	  nevertheless	  held	  back	  the	  advancement	  of	  legislation	  that	  would	  have	  benefited	  LGBT	  individuals	  and	  their	  families.	  	  	  	  	   While	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  legislation	  languished	  in	  Massachusetts,	  the	  LGBT	  movement	  and	  its	  opponents	  were	  catalyzed	  as	  events	  continued	  to	  unfold	  in	  Vermont.	  	  As	  the	  case	  crept	  toward	  the	  Vermont	  Supreme	  Court,	  all	  eyes	  turned	  to	  Vermont	  to	  see	  what	  would	  happen	  there.	  	  The	  Globe	  featured	  several	  articles	  highlighting	  the	  arguments	  set	  forth	  for	  and	  against	  marriage	  in	  the	  Green	  Mountain	  State.	  	  One	  of	  these	  highlighted	  the	  plight	  of	  a	  couple	  raising	  a	  young	  daughter,	  comparing	  the	  anti-­‐gay	  marriage	  laws	  to	  now	  unconstitutional	  anti-­‐miscegenation	  laws,	  and	  also	  included	  the	  opinions	  of	  the	  group	  Take	  it	  to	  the	  People,	  who	  wanted	  to	  allow	  a	  statewide	  vote	  on	  the	  issue	  (Shea	  1998).	  	  	  From	  the	  Herald	  there	  was	  the	  prolific	  Don	  Feder	  arguing	  that	  the	  “Vermont	  judiciary	  is	  poised	  to	  rewrite	  Genesis”	  and	  warning	  that	  the	  Vermont	  case	  “could	  end	  up	  legislating	  gay	  marriage	  not	  just	  for	  its	  state,	  but	  for	  the	  entire	  nation”	  (Feder	  1998).	  	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  this	  heightened	  controversy,	  a	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act	  bill	  was	  filed	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  	  	  
A	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act	  for	  Massachusetts?	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   Although	  a	  federal	  level	  DOMA	  was	  enacted	  in	  2006,	  this	  law	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  stop	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  from	  being	  legally	  recognized	  in	  the	  United	  States	  outright.	  	  However,	  if	  a	  state	  were	  to	  legalize	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  the	  federal	  DOMA	  would	  limit	  the	  benefits	  of	  marriage	  that	  would	  be	  available	  to	  the	  couple.	  	  Specifically,	  in	  a	  state	  where	  such	  a	  marriage	  was	  legally	  recognized,	  the	  couple	  would	  receive	  all	  of	  the	  state	  level	  benefits	  of	  marriage	  but	  none	  of	  the	  federal	  benefits	  of	  marriage,	  for	  example,	  social	  security	  benefits	  of	  a	  spouse	  upon	  their	  death.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  despite	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  federal	  DOMA,	  opponents	  of	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts	  remained	  determined	  to	  enact	  a	  DOMA	  in	  the	  Bay	  State.	  	  	  By	  the	  time	  a	  DOMA	  bill	  was	  filed	  in	  Massachusetts,	  29	  other	  states	  had	  already	  passed	  one.	  	  This	  made	  Massachusetts	  a	  latecomer	  to	  the	  DOMA	  game;	  but	  as	  the	  case	  in	  Vermont	  picked	  up	  momentum,	  things	  began	  to	  hit	  close	  to	  home	  for	  conservative	  Massachusetts	  residents.	  	  As	  the	  Herald’s	  Don	  Feder	  (1999)	  illustrated,	  “The	  [gay]	  movement	  only	  needs	  a	  victory	  in	  one	  state.	  	  Then,	  gay	  couples	  from	  other	  states	  will	  flock	  there	  for	  a	  license	  and	  ceremony,	  return	  home	  and	  demand	  recognition	  of	  their	  unions…	  It	  is	  crucial	  for	  states	  to	  be	  on	  record	  defining	  marriage	  as	  it	  has	  been	  understood	  for	  millennia.”	  	  	  The	  Globe	  reported	  “Battle	  Lines	  Form	  Over	  Same	  Sex	  Marriage	  Bill”,	  however	  these	  were	  the	  same	  battle	  lines	  that	  had	  been	  drawn	  over	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gay	  rights	  in	  Massachusetts	  for	  some	  time.	  	  Supporting	  the	  bill	  were	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  and	  other	  conservative	  religious	  groups	  and	  socially	  conservative	  organizations,	  like	  the	  Massachusetts	  Family	  Institute	  (backed	  by	  the	  national	  Focus	  on	  the	  Family	  organization)	  and	  this	  reflected	  the	  battle	  lines	  drawn	  over	  gay	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage	  issues	  around	  the	  nation.	  	  Notably,	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  carries	  more	  weight	  in	  Massachusetts	  than	  it	  does	  in	  other	  regions,	  and	  conservative	  evangelical	  traditions	  are	  less	  strong	  here	  than	  in	  other	  places.	  	  However,	  what	  makes	  Massachusetts	  different	  is	  the	  number	  and	  strength	  of	  religious	  groups	  that	  came	  out	  in	  favour	  of	  gay	  marriage.	  	  	  	  While	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  does	  exert	  a	  great	  amount	  of	  pressure	  on	  culture	  and	  politics	  in	  Massachusetts,	  Massachusetts	  is	  also	  home	  to	  a	  number	  of	  diverse	  religious	  traditions	  including	  mainline	  Protestant	  denominations,	  Reform	  Jews,	  and	  other	  religious	  groups	  that	  are	  more	  favourably	  disposed	  to	  LGBT	  rights.	  	  	  For	  Doug	  McAdam	  (1996:	  25),	  cultural	  factors,	  such	  as	  the	  presence	  of	  diverse	  religious	  traditions,	  are	  important	  because	  they	  can	  “create	  opportunities	  for	  movement	  activity”	  (McAdam	  1996:	  25).	  	  For	  example,	  the	  Unitarian	  Universalist	  church	  is	  headquartered	  in	  Massachusetts	  and	  this	  denomination	  led	  the	  way,	  with	  the	  United	  Church	  of	  Christ	  and	  the	  Reconstruction	  and	  Reform	  branches	  of	  Judaism,	  by	  performing	  gay	  marriages	  in	  Massachusetts,	  in	  some	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cases,	  since	  the	  1970’s	  (albeit	  marriages	  that	  were	  not	  legally	  recognized)	  (Ribadeniera	  1998).	  	  	  	  While	  conservative	  religious	  groups	  across	  the	  country	  were	  busy	  working	  against	  gay	  marriage,	  these	  religious	  groups,	  along	  with	  representatives	  of	  mainline	  Protestant	  Churches	  like	  the	  United	  Methodist	  Church	  and	  the	  Presbyterian	  Church,	  were	  organizing	  in	  support	  of	  gay	  marriage.	  	  Because	  the	  influence	  of	  evangelical	  Christian	  groups	  and	  other	  religious	  opponents	  of	  gay	  marriage	  was	  less	  pronounced	  in	  Massachusetts	  than	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  US,	  denominations	  that	  supported	  same	  sex	  marriage	  were	  more	  successful	  in	  shifting	  the	  debate	  in	  Massachusetts.	  When	  DOMA	  was	  filed	  in	  Massachusetts,	  religious	  leaders	  from	  these	  and	  other	  religious	  groups	  formed	  the	  Religious	  Coalition	  for	  the	  Freedom	  to	  Marry	  and	  presented	  200	  signatures	  from	  clergy	  members	  supporting	  gay	  marriage	  in	  testimony	  on	  Boston’s	  Beacon	  Hill	  (Ribadeniera	  and	  Robertson	  1999).	  	  	  	  	  In	  general,	  DOMA	  arguments	  in	  Massachusetts	  took	  shape	  in	  a	  way	  similar	  to	  the	  arguments	  used	  across	  the	  US.	  	  Those	  against	  gay	  marriage	  claimed	  that	  it	  threatened	  the	  family,	  defied	  tradition,	  and/or	  went	  against	  religious	  teaching,	  and	  those	  in	  support	  of	  gay	  marriage	  cited	  freedom,	  equality,	  and	  justice	  in	  their	  favour	  (Nelson	  1999,	  Ribadeniera	  and	  Robertson	  1999).	  	  However,	  given	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  LGBT	  movement	  in	  Massachusetts	  and	  the	  allies	  they	  had	  with	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religious	  leaders,	  political	  leaders,	  and	  other	  important	  constituencies,	  this	  fight	  would	  prove	  more	  difficult	  for	  DOMA	  proponents	  than	  were	  most	  other	  DOMA	  fights	  that	  took	  place	  across	  America.	  
The	  Role	  of	  Massachusetts’	  Supreme	  Judicial	  Court	  As	  activists	  struggled	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  1990’s	  to	  win	  legislative	  victories	  for	  domestic	  partnerships	  and	  family	  recognition,	  the	  Massachusetts	  Supreme	  Judicial	  Court	  issued	  a	  series	  of	  important	  rulings.	  	  Drawing	  on	  the	  historical	  institutionalist	  perspective,	  court	  decisions,	  even	  minor	  ones,	  are	  important	  because	  “other	  political	  institutions	  interact	  with	  courts…react	  to,	  and	  make	  judgments	  about	  court	  rulings”,	  and	  furthermore,	  “political	  opportunities	  are	  themselves	  …	  dynamically	  and	  historically	  shaped	  and	  constructed	  by…legacies	  of	  previous	  policies”	  like	  court	  decisions	  (Smith	  2009:	  13).	  	  The	  decisions	  made	  by	  the	  Massachusetts	  Supreme	  Judicial	  Court	  (SJC)	  in	  the	  1990’s	  indicated	  the	  court’s	  readiness	  to	  identify	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  families	  as	  a	  legitimate	  and	  legally	  viable	  family	  form	  even	  though	  other	  political	  institutions	  (legislative,	  executive)	  were	  not	  yet	  on	  the	  same	  page.	  	  These	  rulings	  were	  included	  in	  media	  coverage,	  but	  not	  given	  the	  same	  attention	  in	  the	  major	  Massachusetts	  papers	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  local	  debate	  over	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  and	  the	  national	  panic	  over	  gay	  marriage.	  	  These	  SJC	  decisions	  were	  nonetheless	  essential	  to	  building	  a	  series	  of	  precedents	  for	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recognition	  of	  LGBT	  families	  that	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  legalization	  of	  gay	  marriage.	  	  	  The	  first	  ruling	  of	  major	  import	  was	  when	  the	  SJC	  decided	  in	  favour	  of	  second	  parent	  adoption	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  parents	  in	  1993.	  	  Later,	  in	  1998	  the	  court	  strengthened	  its	  position	  on	  same	  sex	  parenting	  when	  it	  ruled	  in	  support	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  ‘de	  facto	  parents’.	  	  	  This	  decision	  was	  handed	  down	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  ex-­‐partner	  of	  a	  lesbian	  mother	  who	  was	  denied	  visitation	  rights	  to	  the	  biological	  child	  of	  her	  former	  partner.	  	  Although	  the	  non-­‐biological	  mother	  had	  not	  adopted	  the	  child	  legally,	  the	  SJC	  declared,	  “the	  nonbiological	  mother	  is	  essentially	  a	  parent	  because	  she	  helped	  raise	  the	  child	  and	  paid	  for	  almost	  all	  the	  family’s	  expenses”	  (Ring	  1999).	  	  In	  a	  4-­‐2	  ruling,	  “the	  SJC	  recognized	  ‘de	  facto	  parents’	  as	  the	  reality	  of	  ‘the	  modern	  family’”	  (Lawrence	  1999).	  	  This	  decision	  had	  implications	  for	  de	  facto	  heterosexual	  parents,	  as	  well,	  but	  by	  issuing	  the	  decision	  specifically	  in	  support	  of	  a	  non-­‐biological	  parent	  in	  a	  same-­‐sex	  relationship,	  the	  court	  made	  clear	  that	  it	  took	  seriously	  the	  need	  to	  establish	  clear	  legal	  rights	  and	  recognition	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  families.	  	  The	  Court	  also	  recognized	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  the	  modern	  family	  in	  its	  ruling	  on	  domestic	  partnerships.	  	  After	  wrangling	  over	  the	  issue	  for	  the	  better	  part	  of	  the	  decade,	  the	  issue	  was	  finally	  brought	  before	  the	  court	  by	  a	  lawsuit	  against	  the	  City	  of	  Boston.	  	  The	  court	  issued	  a	  mixed	  ruling	  here,	  as	  far	  as	  gay	  rights	  were	  concerned.	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Legally	  the	  domestic	  partner	  laws	  in	  Boston	  had	  to	  be	  declared	  unconstitutional	  because	  they	  were	  “inconsistent”	  with	  state	  law	  (Marantz	  1999).	  	  However,	  the	  Court	  “urged	  lawmakers	  to	  address	  ‘new	  social	  and	  economic	  realities’	  [because]	  the	  category	  of	  covered	  dependents	  of	  city	  employees,	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  legislature	  in	  1955	  and	  1960,	  no	  longer	  fully	  reflects	  all	  household	  members	  for	  whom	  city	  employees	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  continuing	  obligations	  to	  provide	  support”	  (Marantz	  1999).	  	  For	  LGBT	  activists,	  this	  was	  a	  sign	  that	  the	  court	  was	  a	  potentially	  a	  friendly	  one	  for	  a	  gay	  marriage	  case.	  	  However,	  no	  plans	  for	  a	  marriage	  case	  were	  set	  in	  motion	  right	  away,	  as	  activists	  remained	  fixated	  on	  the	  gay	  marriage	  case	  in	  Vermont.	  In	  December	  1999	  the	  Vermont	  Case	  was	  decided	  in	  favour	  of	  equality	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  families	  but	  the	  court	  left	  the	  details	  of	  implementation	  to	  the	  legislative	  branch.	  
Conclusion	  The	  1990’s	  closed	  with	  the	  same	  ambivalent	  spirit	  that	  prevailed	  through	  much	  of	  the	  decade	  in	  terms	  of	  advancement	  of	  LGBT	  rights.	  	  The	  Massachusetts	  SJC	  had	  recognized	  the	  need	  to	  support	  changing	  family	  structures,	  but	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  were	  eliminated	  for	  city	  workers	  across	  greater	  Boston.	  	  The	  Vermont	  Supreme	  Court	  recognized	  the	  equality	  of	  gay	  families,	  but	  those	  same	  families	  were	  forced	  to	  watch	  with	  bated	  breath	  as	  their	  fate	  was	  decided	  in	  the	  legislature.	  	  And	  a	  DOMA	  bill	  was	  being	  pushed	  through	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the	  Massachusetts	  legislature,	  with	  both	  supporters	  and	  opponents	  of	  the	  bill	  now	  energized	  by	  the	  recent	  court	  rulings	  in	  Massachusetts	  and	  Vermont.	  	  	  	  While	  the	  1990’s	  may	  appear	  to	  have	  ended	  in	  a	  stalemate	  for	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts,	  this	  decade	  was	  important	  in	  terms	  of	  setting	  a	  course	  for	  the	  struggle	  over	  same	  sex	  marriage	  that	  would	  begin	  in	  earnest	  in	  the	  2000’s.	  	  In	  the	  1990s,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  growing	  countermovement	  and	  a	  climate	  of	  diminishing	  political	  opportunities,	  Massachusetts	  activists	  held	  their	  ground.	  	  In	  Sidney	  Tarrow’s	  (1998:	  89)	  theory	  of	  social	  movements	  he	  argues	  that	  because	  political	  opportunities	  “migrate	  from…movements	  to	  countermovements…then	  something	  more	  durable	  is	  necessary	  to	  turn	  contention	  into	  a	  sustained	  social	  movement.”	  	  There	  are,	  in	  fact,	  several	  things	  necessary	  for	  a	  sustained	  social	  movement	  to	  emerge,	  “the	  forms	  of	  contention	  that	  people	  employ	  to	  gain	  support…the	  collective	  action	  frames	  that	  dignify	  and	  justify	  their	  actions;	  and	  the	  mobilizing	  structures	  that	  reinforce	  challengers”	  (Tarrow	  1998:	  90).	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  1990’s,	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights	  activists	  continued	  to	  build	  their	  strategic	  repertoires	  (i.e.	  forms	  of	  contention),	  developed	  collective	  action	  frames	  that	  would	  justify	  their	  demands	  for	  equal	  rights	  on	  individual	  and	  family	  terms,	  and	  they	  continued	  to	  cultivate	  the	  mobilizing	  structures	  necessary	  to	  carry	  on	  a	  sustained	  cycle	  of	  contention	  in	  which	  they	  sought	  to	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advance	  rights	  claims	  at	  the	  same	  time	  they	  defended	  gains	  already	  won	  against	  increasingly	  powerful	  counter-­‐movement	  opponents.	  	  	  Although	  activists	  were	  not	  successful	  in	  every	  attempt	  to	  advance	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights	  in	  the	  1990’s,	  their	  movement	  was	  strong	  enough	  to	  ensure	  that	  setbacks	  remained	  temporary.	  	  For	  example,	  when	  the	  conservative	  American	  Center	  for	  Law	  and	  Policy	  brought	  a	  lawsuit	  against	  the	  city	  of	  Boston’s	  domestic	  partner	  benefit	  policy	  and	  succeeded	  in	  striking	  the	  policy	  down,	  this	  was	  no	  doubt	  a	  loss	  for	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  movement.	  	  Yet,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  the	  SJC	  ruled	  the	  policy	  unconstitutional,	  the	  Justices	  included	  in	  their	  legal	  opinion	  that	  the	  laws	  as	  they	  stood	  did	  not	  reflect	  the	  current	  reality	  of	  modern	  families	  and	  should	  be	  changed	  in	  the	  legislature.	  	  Thus	  the	  decision	  created	  a	  political	  opportunity	  for	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  activists	  to	  exploit.	  In	  the	  next	  decade,	  the	  Massachusetts	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  movement	  utilized	  their	  forms	  of	  contention,	  collective	  action	  frames,	  and	  mobilizing	  structures	  to	  create	  and	  sustain	  an	  opportunity	  to	  establish	  legal	  recognition	  for	  same	  sex	  marriages	  in	  spite	  of	  intense	  counter-­‐movement	  pressure	  to	  institute	  a	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act.	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CHAPTER	  5:	  ANYBODY’S	  GAME:	  THE	  BATTLE	  FOR	  MARRIAGE	  	  Introduction	  	  	   As	  the	  new	  millennium	  opened	  the	  Massachusetts	  LGBT	  rights	  movement	  remained	  gridlocked	  with	  the	  religious	  right	  and	  the	  state.	  	  This	  was	  a	  stalemate	  that	  either	  side	  could	  win	  or	  lose.	  	  In	  the	  Bay	  State,	  LGBT	  activists	  were	  still	  struggling	  to	  advance	  domestic	  partner	  benefits,	  opponents	  of	  LGBT	  rights	  were	  struggling	  to	  advance	  DOMA,	  and	  legislative	  allies	  of	  both	  sides	  were	  pushing	  and	  pulling	  against	  each	  other.	  	  Everyone	  with	  a	  stake	  in	  this	  game	  kept	  an	  eye	  on	  Vermont	  as	  that	  state’s	  legislature	  struggled	  to	  honour	  a	  December	  1999	  court	  decision	  declaring	  that	  same	  sex	  couples	  are	  entitled	  to	  the	  same	  rights	  as	  married	  ones.	  	  	  In	  Baker	  v	  State	  the	  Vermont	  Supreme	  Court	  “justices	  left	  room	  for	  heated	  debate,	  by	  giving	  lawmakers	  the	  option	  of	  allowing	  gays	  to	  marry	  or	  of	  creating	  a	  parallel	  system”	  and	  as	  that	  debate	  took	  place	  interested	  Massachusetts	  residents	  were	  paying	  steadfast	  attention,	  knowing	  that	  “Vermont’s	  choice	  could	  set	  a	  national	  precedent”	  (Good	  2000).	  	  	  In	  April,	  when	  the	  Vermont	  legislature	  finally	  approved	  a	  civil	  union	  bill	  described	  in	  the	  Boston	  Globe	  as	  the	  “closest	  thing	  to	  gay	  marriage	  in	  America”,	  LGBT	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts	  celebrated	  “an	  historic	  moment	  in	  the	  history	  of	  gay	  rights	  while	  opponents	  bashed	  Vermont’s	  move	  as	  an	  assault	  on	  the	  institution	  of	  marriage”	  (Lawrence	  2000).	  	  This	  brought	  new	  energy	  to	  gay	  rights	  struggles	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taking	  place	  in	  Massachusetts,	  where	  supporters	  of	  gay	  rights,	  like	  Mary	  Bonauto	  of	  GLAD,	  were	  inspired	  by	  what	  she	  called	  “a	  new	  era	  of	  understanding”	  and	  opponents	  of	  gay	  rights,	  like	  C.J.	  Doyle	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Action	  League	  of	  Massachusetts,	  declared	  “the	  Vermont	  bill	  underscores	  the	  need	  for	  Massachusetts	  and	  other	  states	  to	  pass	  ‘defense	  of	  marriage’	  acts”	  (quoted	  in	  Lawrence	  2000).	  	  	  	  	   While	  Vermont	  was	  strategically	  chosen	  as	  a	  state	  where	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  was	  winnable,	  the	  final	  outcome	  of	  civil	  unions	  was	  one	  about	  which	  many	  activists	  felt	  ambivalent.	  	  On	  one	  hand	  civil	  unions	  were	  a	  significant	  advance	  in	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights;	  on	  the	  other	  civil	  unions	  did	  not	  guarantee	  the	  same	  rights	  as	  marriage.	  Given	  this	  outcome,	  in	  pressing	  for	  marriage	  in	  Vermont,	  New	  England	  activists	  may	  have	  overestimated	  their	  chances	  of	  success.	  Beth	  Robinson,	  lead	  attorney	  on	  the	  case	  that	  led	  to	  civil	  unions	  in	  Vermont,	  was	  philosophical	  when	  reflecting	  on	  the	  Baker	  decision,	  “The	  civil	  union	  case	  always	  makes	  me	  shudder	  because	  it	  wasn’t	  actually	  a	  civil	  union	  case.	  	  It	  was	  a	  marriage	  case	  and	  we	  didn’t	  win	  but	  we	  didn’t	  lose.	  	  We	  came	  out	  with	  this	  middle	  ground	  decision…civil	  union”	  (GLAD	  Civil	  Union	  to	  Marriage	  Panel,	  2009).	  	  However,	  that	  “middle	  ground	  decision”	  was	  central	  to	  breathing	  new	  life	  into	  mobilization	  for	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  	  Regardless	  of	  the	  outcome,	  William	  Gamson	  and	  David	  Meyer	  (1996:	  284-­‐285)	  contend	  that	  “Activists	  systematically	  overestimate	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the	  degree	  of	  political	  opportunity	  and	  if	  they	  did	  not,	  they	  would	  not	  be	  doing	  their	  job	  wisely.	  Their	  job	  is	  to	  convince	  potential	  challengers	  that	  action	  leading	  to	  change	  is	  possible	  and	  desirable.”	  That	  was	  exactly	  the	  outcome	  in	  Vermont.	  	  The	  end	  result	  may	  have	  fallen	  short	  of	  marriage,	  but	  the	  establishment	  of	  civil	  unions	  worked	  to	  convince	  activists	  elsewhere	  to	  continue	  to	  press	  for	  marriage	  equality.	  For	  LGBT	  rights	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts,	  the	  civil	  union	  case	  in	  Vermont	  was	  another	  “transformative	  event”	  that	  energized	  activists	  as	  it	  revealed	  how	  a	  well	  organized	  campaign	  could	  win	  rights	  that	  few	  had	  previously	  imagined	  possible	  (Morris	  2004:	  245).	  	  In	  this	  case	  the	  establishment	  of	  “the	  most	  comprehensive	  set	  of	  legal	  protections	  for	  same	  sex	  couples	  in	  the	  country”	  in	  neighbouring	  Vermont	  embodied	  transformative	  energy	  for	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts	  (GLAD	  Civil	  Union	  to	  Marriage	  Panel	  2009).	  	  Trying	  to	  build	  momentum	  on	  top	  of	  the	  new	  civil	  union	  legislation	  in	  Vermont,	  Massachusetts	  activists	  lobbying	  for	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  incorporated	  this	  decision	  into	  their	  framing	  of	  why	  such	  benefits	  should	  be	  granted,	  asserting	  that	  events	  in	  Vermont	  “demonstrate	  that	  Massachusetts	  is	  falling	  behind	  in	  protecting	  civil	  rights”	  (Weiss	  2000).	  	  	  While	  many	  activists	  continued	  lobbying	  for	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  up	  front,	  other	  activists	  were	  thinking	  beyond	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  and	  strategizing	  ways	  to	  win	  marriage	  rights	  for	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same	  sex	  couples	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  For	  example,	  coverage	  in	  the	  
Boston	  Globe	  and	  the	  Boston	  Herald	  featured	  action	  on	  domestic	  partner	  benefits,	  while	  the	  LGBT	  press	  included	  additional	  coverage	  of	  groups	  seeking	  full	  marriage	  rights.	  For	  activists	  seeking	  marriage,	  the	  resistance	  to	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  in	  Massachusetts	  indicated	  that	  their	  window	  of	  political	  opportunity	  remained	  closed.	  	  However,	  when	  civil	  unions	  were	  legally	  recognized	  in	  Vermont	  it	  was	  viewed	  by	  some	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  significant	  cultural	  and	  political	  shift	  that	  may	  be	  exploited	  as	  a	  political	  opportunity.	  	  After	  the	  Vermont	  case	  was	  decided,	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts	  watched	  for	  signs	  of	  cultural	  or	  political	  shifts	  indicating	  the	  time	  was	  right	  to	  press	  beyond	  domestic	  partnership	  benefits.	  	  Advocating	  for	  marriage	  would	  involve	  intense	  interactions	  with	  legislative,	  political,	  and	  cultural	  institutions	  so	  the	  decision	  to	  press	  for	  marriage	  had	  to	  be	  made	  strategically.	  Here	  activists	  illustrated	  Francesca	  Poletta’s	  (2004:	  103)	  position	  that	  political	  structures	  themselves	  are	  cultural	  and	  “rather	  than	  seeing	  political	  structures,	  states,	  and	  actors,	  as	  separate	  from	  the	  insurgents	  who	  confront	  them”	  we	  should	  see	  “mobilization	  potential	  in	  their	  linkages”.	  	  In	  response	  to	  political,	  structural,	  and	  cultural	  change	  symbolized	  by	  civil	  unions	  in	  Vermont,	  Massachusetts	  activists	  began	  to	  press	  for	  those	  same	  changes	  at	  home.	  The	  strategic	  choices	  being	  discussed	  by	  activists	  at	  this	  time	  relied	  heavily	  on	  the	  cultural	  and	  political	  structures	  they	  had	  to	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engage	  to	  be	  successful,	  and	  not	  all	  activists	  were	  convinced	  that	  mobilization	  for	  marriage	  would	  be	  successful	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  	  When	  considering	  political	  structures	  and	  opportunities	  to	  win	  a	  marriage	  case	  in	  Massachusetts,	  activists	  like	  Mary	  Bonauto	  at	  GLAD	  focused	  on	  potential	  openings	  in	  the	  political	  structure.	  In	  a	  2009	  panel	  discussion	  sponsored	  by	  GLAD,	  Bonauto	  reflected	  that	  the	  decision	  to	  file	  Goodridge	  was	  based,	  in	  part,	  on	  past	  Massachusetts	  Supreme	  Judicial	  Court	  rulings	  where	  the	  court	  emphasized	  “equal	  protection	  and	  due	  process”,	  “equality	  provisions	  in	  the	  Massachusetts	  Constitution”,	  as	  well	  as	  “cultural	  reasons	  why	  gay	  people	  are	  part	  of	  the	  fabric	  of	  the	  community”	  in	  Massachusetts	  (GLAD	  From	  Civil	  Union	  to	  Marriage	  Panel,	  2009).	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  were	  some	  activists	  who	  pointed	  out	  political	  and	  structural	  
constraints	  that	  would	  make	  winning	  marriage	  difficult.	  	  Arline	  Isaacson	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Political	  Caucus	  was	  initially	  hesitant	  about	  opening	  a	  campaign	  for	  marriage.	  	  She	  recalls	  telling	  her	  fellow	  activists,	  “If	  we	  go	  for	  marriage,	  I	  can	  guarantee	  there	  will	  be	  an	  initiative	  petition	  for	  a	  constitutional	  amendment	  in	  a	  nanosecond.	  	  And	  the	  way	  initiative	  petitions	  work	  in	  this	  state	  we	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  stop	  it.	  	  If	  they	  get	  the	  signatures	  against	  us,	  they’ll	  only	  need	  25%	  of	  the	  legislature	  to	  vote	  with	  them,	  not	  even	  a	  majority.	  We’ll	  be	  creamed.”	  	  The	  stakes	  here	  are	  undoubtedly	  high	  as	  getting	  “creamed”	  in	  a	  fight	  against	  a	  constitutional	  amendment	  is	  a	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significant	  loss.	  	  Overturning	  a	  constitutional	  amendment	  is	  no	  small	  undertaking,	  and	  gathering	  the	  political	  and	  public	  support	  to	  do	  so	  could	  easily	  take	  a	  decade	  or	  longer.	  	  As	  LGBT	  activists	  considered	  strategies	  to	  advance	  their	  rights,	  their	  countermovement	  opponents	  were	  ramping	  up	  strategies	  against	  them.	  	  	  For	  LGBT	  rights	  opponents,	  the	  creation	  of	  civil	  unions	  in	  Vermont	  amounted	  to	  a	  “moral	  shock”	  (Jasper	  2007)	  that	  led	  to	  increased	  mobilization	  efforts	  to	  enact	  a	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  Isaacson	  recalls,	  “Once	  civil	  unions	  happened	  in	  Vermont	  the	  movement	  for	  DOMA	  here	  became	  hotter.”	  Considering	  “domestic	  partnership	  benefits	  an	  assault	  on	  both	  the	  conscience	  and	  pocketbook	  of	  voters…conservatives	  believe	  there’s	  even	  more	  at	  stake	  now,	  since	  the	  Vermont	  Legislature	  approved	  civil	  unions	  of	  gay	  couples”	  said	  C.J.	  Doyle	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Action	  League	  of	  Massachusetts	  (quoted	  in	  Weiss	  2000),	  speaking	  for	  opponents	  of	  domestic	  partnerships	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  providing	  relationship	  and	  legal	  rights	  for	  same	  sex	  couples.	  	  	  Now	  both	  sides	  were	  keeping	  an	  eye	  on	  the	  other	  as	  they	  anticipated	  their	  opponents’	  next	  move	  and	  planned	  for	  ways	  to	  advance	  their	  own	  agendas.	  	  	  By	  that	  time,	  LGBT	  activists,	  with	  the	  support	  of	  legislative	  allies	  like	  Tom	  Birmingham	  and	  Byron	  Rushing,	  had	  successfully	  defeated	  a	  string	  of	  proposed	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Acts	  starting	  in	  Massachusetts	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.	  	  These	  bills	  had	  so	  far	  been	  defeated	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because	  they	  were	  far-­‐reaching	  enough	  to	  eliminate	  any	  possibility	  of	  providing	  benefits	  for	  same	  sex	  couples,	  and	  even	  many	  conservative-­‐leaning	  legislators	  voted	  against	  such	  bills	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  some	  benefit	  option	  for	  same	  sex	  couples	  in	  the	  future,	  however	  token.	  	  However,	  another	  legislative	  DOMA	  attempt	  had	  just	  been	  introduced	  by	  conservative	  Democratic	  Representative	  John	  H.	  Rogers,	  this	  time	  for	  a	  constitutional	  amendment	  that	  would	  ban	  gay	  marriage.	  	  	  LGBT	  activists	  were	  aware	  that	  if	  DOMAs	  continued	  to	  be	  introduced	  and	  defeated	  in	  the	  legislature,	  the	  spectre	  of	  an	  initiative	  petition	  drive	  became	  an	  increasingly	  real	  possibility.	  With	  a	  ballot	  initiative	  gay	  marriage	  opponents	  could	  establish	  DOMA	  via	  the	  ballot	  box,	  and	  allies	  in	  the	  legislature	  would	  have	  few	  options	  for	  blocking	  such	  an	  initiative.	  How	  long	  could	  they	  keep	  winning?	  	  The	  actions	  taken	  by	  movement	  leaders	  do	  not	  happen	  in	  a	  vacuum,	  social	  movement	  strategy	  “develops	  in	  interaction	  with	  an	  ever	  changing	  environment,	  especially	  the	  actions	  and	  reactions	  of	  other	  actors”	  (Ganz	  2004:	  182).	  	  In	  this	  case	  the	  anticipation	  that	  opponents	  would	  start	  an	  initiative	  petition	  against	  gay	  marriage	  drove	  the	  strategies	  of	  LGBT	  activists.	  	  According	  to	  Mary	  Bonauto,	  “After	  Vermont	  we	  were	  absolutely	  planning	  on	  moving	  forward	  in	  Massachusetts	  but	  something	  really	  hastened	  our	  timing	  and	  making	  sure	  we	  got	  the	  case	  prepared	  and	  filed.	  	  That	  was	  we	  almost	  had	  a	  constitutional	  amendment	  vote	  that	  would	  have	  come	  to	  fruition	  in	  2004”	  (GLAD	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panel,	  2009).	  	  Therefore,	  Bonauto	  and	  GLAD	  filed	  Goodridge	  v	  
Massachusetts	  Department	  of	  Public	  Health	  in	  April	  2001	  on	  behalf	  of	  seven	  same-­‐sex	  Massachusetts	  couples	  that	  had	  been	  denied	  marriage	  licenses.	  When	  GLAD	  initially	  filed	  the	  case	  in	  Suffolk	  Superior	  Court,	  it	  was	  expected	  that	  any	  decision	  lower	  courts	  made	  would	  likely	  be	  appealed	  to	  the	  Massachusetts	  Supreme	  Judicial	  Court.	  	  Bonauto	  argued	  that	  denying	  the	  rights	  and	  benefits	  of	  marriage	  to	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  violated	  Massachusetts’	  law	  under	  the	  equal	  protection	  clause	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  constitution	  (Goodridge	  v	  Department	  of	  Public	  
Health	  2003:	  8).	  	  Massachusetts	  state	  attorney	  general	  Tom	  Reilly’s	  counter	  arguments	  were	  that	  “same	  sex	  couples	  cannot	  procreate	  on	  their	  own	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  accomplish	  the	  ‘main	  object’	  of	  marriage…	  as	  historically	  understood”,	  that	  the	  “various	  statutory	  benefits	  of	  marriage	  that	  plaintiffs	  seek	  to	  obtain	  were	  also	  designed	  with	  heterosexual	  marriage	  in	  mind”	  and	  “limiting	  such	  benefits	  to	  opposite-­‐sex	  couples	  conserves	  the	  commonwealth’s	  scarce	  resources,	  undoubtedly	  a	  legitimate	  state	  interest”	  (Reilly	  2001).	  	  	  The	  Goodridge	  case	  was	  not	  chosen	  at	  random.	  	  The	  name	  of	  the	  case	  comes	  from	  the	  lead	  plaintiffs,	  Hillary	  and	  Julie	  Goodridge.	  	  The	  Goodridges	  were	  (they	  have	  since	  divorced)	  an	  attractive	  middle	  class	  lesbian	  couple	  with	  a	  young	  child	  and	  they,	  like	  several	  of	  the	  other	  plaintiffs	  in	  the	  case,	  represented	  the	  ideal	  of	  traditional	  nuclear	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family	  in	  every	  way	  except	  that	  they	  were	  a	  same	  sex	  couple.	  Same-­‐sex	  marriage	  advocates	  knew	  the	  choice	  of	  plaintiffs	  was	  important	  because	  once	  chosen	  they	  would	  become,	  “ambassadors	  for	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  families	  across	  the	  state,	  putting	  real	  faces	  on	  what	  for	  some	  was	  a	  frightening	  concept”	  (Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2008:	  61).	  Nor	  was	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  case	  chosen	  at	  random,	  “Mary	  Bonauto	  filed	  the	  
Goodridge	  case	  in	  2001,	  in	  part	  because	  she	  knew	  the	  anti-­‐gay	  marriage	  ballot	  initiative	  was	  on	  the	  horizon	  [and]	  the	  lawsuit	  would	  serve	  as	  an	  education	  tool,	  mobilising	  gay	  men	  and	  lesbians	  as	  well	  as	  allies	  in	  the	  fight	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage”	  (Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2008:	  61).	  	  By	  filing	  in	  2001,	  Bonauto	  and	  Glad	  were	  gaming	  the	  timing	  of	  an	  SJC	  decision	  against	  the	  timeline	  of	  the	  initiative	  petition	  process	  thus	  ensuring	  that	  if	  an	  initiative	  petition	  drive	  were	  started,	  the	  case	  for	  gay	  marriage	  would	  be	  decided	  first.	  	  	  LGBT	  rights	  opponents	  were	  not	  caught	  off	  guard	  by	  this,	  and	  had	  a	  follow	  up	  strategy	  at	  the	  ready.	  	  According	  to	  Arline	  Isaacson,	  “they	  anticipated	  we	  were	  going	  to	  file	  a	  lawsuit,	  and	  we	  did	  file	  a	  lawsuit,	  and	  the	  inevitable	  happened.	  	  In	  2001	  our	  opponents	  announced	  they	  were	  coming	  in	  with	  an	  initiative	  petition.”	  	  LGBT	  rights	  opponents,	  first	  shocked	  into	  action	  by	  the	  Baker	  v	  State	  case	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  civil	  unions	  in	  Vermont,	  then	  again	  when	  GLAD	  filed	  the	  Goodridge	  case	  in	  Massachusetts,	  announced	  in	  July	  2001	  that	  they	  were	  gathering	  signatures	  to	  allow	  citizens	  to	  vote	  on	  a	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constitutional	  amendment	  that	  would	  ban	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  Mary	  Bonauto	  acknowledged	  that	  when	  Goodridge	  was	  filed	  same	  sex	  marriage	  “was	  still	  ahead	  of	  many	  people’s	  comfort	  level,	  but	  for	  Massachusetts	  it	  was	  the	  right	  case	  to	  bring	  at	  the	  time”	  (GLAD	  From	  Civil	  Unions	  to	  Marriage	  panel,	  2009).	  	  	  Indeed,	  it	  looks	  this	  way	  in	  hindsight,	  but	  at	  the	  time,	  with	  LGBT	  rights	  opponents	  already	  angry	  over	  domestic	  partnerships	  and	  civil	  unions	  and	  with	  many	  allies	  ambivalent,	  at	  best,	  about	  gay	  marriage,	  success	  was	  anything	  but	  certain.	  	  It	  was	  a	  risk,	  but	  there	  were	  several	  factors	  at	  play	  that	  made	  pushing	  the	  envelope	  with	  Goodridge	  a	  reasonable	  risk	  to	  take.	  	  	  Importantly,	  Massachusetts’	  LGBT	  activists	  had	  in	  place	  what	  many	  theorists	  consider	  keys	  to	  movement	  success.	  	  Political	  process	  and	  resource	  mobilization	  theorists,	  for	  example,	  identify	  political	  opportunities	  and	  availability	  of	  organizational	  resources	  as	  integral	  to	  movement	  mobilization	  and	  success.	  Accordingly,	  any	  change	  in	  the	  “relative	  openness	  or	  closure	  of	  the	  institutionalized	  political	  system,	  the	  stability	  of	  that	  broad	  set	  of	  elite	  alignments	  that	  typically	  undergird	  a	  polity,	  the	  presence	  of	  elite	  allies,	  [and/or]	  the	  state’s	  capacity	  and	  propensity	  for	  repression”	  can	  create	  political	  opportunities	  that	  encourage	  mobilization	  (McAdam,	  McCarthy,	  and	  Zald	  1996:	  10).	  	  Once	  an	  opportunity	  for	  action	  appears,	  the	  fate	  of	  social	  movements	  is	  “heavily	  shaped	  by	  their	  own	  actions”	  so	  that	  if	  a	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movement	  is	  not	  sufficiently	  organized	  it	  may	  not	  succeed	  in	  co-­‐opting	  a	  given	  opening	  in	  the	  political	  structure	  (McAdam,	  McCarthy,	  and	  Zald	  1996:	  15).	  	  	  	  Other	  social	  movement	  theorists	  assert	  that	  political	  process	  theories	  over-­‐emphasize	  political	  structures	  and	  downplay	  the	  importance	  of	  culture	  and	  agency	  in	  social	  movement	  outcomes.	  	  From	  this	  perspective,	  what	  are	  often	  perceived	  as	  political	  opportunities	  “are	  better	  analyzed	  as	  strategic	  rather	  than	  structural”;	  such	  an	  analysis	  should	  “entail	  attention	  to	  timing	  [and]	  the	  choice	  of	  tactics	  within	  repertoires”	  (Goodwin	  and	  Jasper	  2004:	  16).	  	  Additionally,	  Goodwin	  and	  Jasper	  (2004:	  28)	  emphasize,	  “culture	  permeates	  the	  political	  opportunities	  and	  mobilizing	  structures	  of	  process	  theorists”	  and	  “meanings	  and	  emotions	  keep	  social	  networks	  alive,	  and	  do	  much	  of	  the	  work	  normally	  credited	  to	  ‘structures’”.	  	  Taken	  together	  this	  means	  that	  a	  movement	  has	  the	  best	  chance	  for	  success	  if	  it	  recognizes	  a	  political	  opportunity	  (or	  creates	  one),	  is	  sufficiently	  organized	  to	  mobilize	  its	  resources	  (human	  and	  financial,	  elite	  and	  grassroots)	  to	  capitalize	  on	  such	  an	  opportunity,	  and	  makes	  the	  right	  strategic	  choices	  so	  that	  its	  mobilization	  resonates	  with	  the	  broader	  culture	  (including	  drawing	  on	  symbols,	  images,	  and	  discourses	  with	  emotional	  import)	  in	  which	  the	  movement	  is	  embedded.	  	  The	  presence	  of	  this	  combination	  of	  factors	  proved	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essential	  to	  winning	  equal	  marriage	  rights	  for	  same	  sex	  couples	  in	  Massachusetts.	  One	  of	  the	  primary	  advantages	  of	  the	  Massachusetts’	  LGBT	  activists,	  as	  opposed	  to	  LGBT	  activists	  in	  other	  states,	  was	  the	  longevity	  of	  the	  movement	  and	  its	  history	  of	  mobilization.	  	  This	  meant	  activists	  had	  policies	  in	  place	  that	  they	  could	  build	  on	  to	  advance	  additional	  rights	  claims	  (Smith	  2009),	  as	  well	  as	  an	  accumulation	  of	  resources	  (both	  human	  and	  financial)	  to	  draw	  from.	  Individuals	  like	  Arline	  Isaacson	  and	  Mary	  Bonauto,	  for	  example,	  had	  been	  working	  for	  LGBT	  rights	  in	  Massachusetts	  since	  the	  1980’s	  and	  the	  organizations	  they	  represented	  had	  been	  around	  since	  the	  1970’s.	  	  The	  long-­‐term	  presence	  of	  these	  and	  other	  organizations	  meant	  that	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts	  had	  cultivated	  a	  cadre	  of	  elite	  allies	  in	  the	  State	  House,	  as	  well	  as	  others	  outside	  of	  politics	  who	  might	  be	  called	  ‘financial	  elites’,	  in	  addition	  to	  alliances	  cultivated	  among	  other	  types	  of	  grassroots	  and	  social	  movement	  organizations.	  	  	  Such	  linkages	  to	  well-­‐positioned	  elites	  in	  the	  political	  and	  social	  structures	  of	  Massachusetts	  were	  essential	  to	  creating	  and	  sustaining	  political	  opportunities	  and	  reflect	  the	  strategic	  choices	  made	  by	  activists	  for	  many	  years.	  Long-­‐time	  activist	  and	  former	  GLAD	  board	  member	  Elyse	  Cherry	  said,	  	  When	  the	  moment	  came	  [to	  fight	  for	  marriage]	  there	  were	  twenty	  years	  of	  relationships	  in	  place.	  	  We	  had	  business	  and	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  legislature,	  we	  had	  lots	  of	  clergy	  and	  religious	  organizations	  [who	  supported	  LGBT	  rights].	  	  There	  was	  this	  huge	  panoply	  of	  organizations	  from	  inside	  the	  LGBT	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community	  and	  from	  outside	  the	  LGBT	  community	  [working	  together].	  	  Therefore,	  after	  sensing	  an	  opportunity	  to	  go	  for	  marriage,	  Massachusetts	  activists	  were	  sufficiently	  well	  organized	  to	  seize	  the	  day	  and	  mobilize	  the	  political	  and	  financial	  resources	  they	  had	  cultivated	  for	  decades	  in	  order	  to	  make	  winning	  marriage	  viable.	  	  Cherry	  emphasized	  that	  it	  was	  the	  result	  of	  strategic	  decisions	  made	  by	  movement	  leaders	  to	  “create	  an	  environment	  in	  which	  the	  institutions	  are	  in	  place,	  the	  relationships	  are	  in	  place,	  and	  the	  connections	  made	  between	  the	  legislators”	  in	  the	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  Goodridge	  case	  that	  made	  same	  sex	  marriage	  possible	  in	  Massachusetts.	  Another	  long-­‐time	  activist,	  Ellen	  Zucker,	  who	  began	  working	  for	  LGBT	  rights	  in	  the	  1980’s	  via	  the	  American	  Civil	  Liberties	  Union	  and	  the	  National	  Organization	  for	  Women,	  cites	  cultural	  variables	  that	  aided	  in	  the	  success	  of	  LGBT	  rights	  campaigns	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  She	  said,	  	  	  I	  think	  the	  thing	  that	  is	  powerful	  in	  Massachusetts	  is	  a	  mobilized	  progressive	  core	  that	  you	  don’t	  have	  in	  other	  states-­‐	  thanks	  to	  universities,	  thanks	  to	  a	  history	  from	  the	  Adamses2	  on	  up,	  that	  is	  counter-­‐balanced	  to	  the	  old	  institutions	  and	  old	  style	  power	  broking.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  creating	  social	  change	  this	  creates	  the	  ability	  to	  have	  outside	  forces	  working	  in	  a	  way	  [to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Referring	  to	  John	  Adams,	  Massachusetts’	  delegate	  to	  the	  Continental	  Congress	  where	  he	  advocated	  for	  American	  independence	  from	  England,	  he	  also	  assisted	  in	  writing	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  and	  served	  as	  second	  president	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  His	  son,	  John	  Quincy	  Adams,	  was	  a	  Massachusetts	  representative	  to	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  was	  the	  sixth	  president	  of	  the	  United	  States.	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create	  public	  pressure]	  on	  political	  insiders.	  	  The	  gay	  rights	  movement	  had	  a	  mobilized	  progressive	  constituency	  on	  whose	  shoulders	  it	  could	  go	  forward.	  	  	  	  	  This	  illustrates	  the	  interconnectedness	  of	  political	  structures,	  culture,	  and	  strategic	  choices	  of	  activists	  because	  by	  building	  on	  a	  cultural	  variable,	  i.e.	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  politically	  progressive	  core,	  LGBT	  activists	  created	  a	  base	  for	  engaging	  political	  structures	  and	  pressuring	  political	  insiders.	  	  	  Moving	  forward	  into	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  battle	  for	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts	  requires	  sensitivity	  to	  “the	  historically	  and	  situationally	  contingent	  combinations	  and	  sequences	  of	  processes	  and	  events	  that	  give	  rise	  to…collective	  action”	  (Goodwin	  and	  Jasper	  2004:	  27).	  	  That	  is,	  the	  interaction	  between	  culture,	  structure,	  and	  agency.	  	  	  When	  Goodridge	  was	  filed,	  LGBT	  activists	  were	  well	  aware	  that	  they	  would	  be	  cashing	  in	  on	  every	  ounce	  of	  political,	  cultural,	  and	  organizational	  capital	  they	  had	  accumulated	  over	  the	  years.	  	  For	  all	  of	  the	  resources	  at	  their	  disposal,	  they	  were	  facing	  a	  counter-­‐movement	  that	  was	  equally	  matched	  or,	  considering	  the	  weighty	  cultural	  and	  political	  influence	  of	  opponents	  like	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  and	  the	  financial	  backing	  of	  national	  traditional	  family	  values	  organizations,	  one	  that	  completely	  outflanked	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  resources.	  The	  struggle	  over	  same	  sex	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts	  would	  engulf	  the	  state	  for	  the	  next	  several	  years	  culminating	  in	  a	  heated	  emotional	  battle	  like	  none	  that	  came	  before,	  a	  battle	  that	  would	  only	  be	  decided	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after	  a	  dizzying	  array	  of	  twists,	  turns,	  advances,	  retreats,	  and	  reversals	  of	  fate.	  	  As	  it	  began,	  it	  was	  anybody’s	  game.	  	  	  On	  April	  12,	  2001	  the	  news	  broke	  that	  GLAD	  had	  filed	  
Goodridge	  v.	  Massachusetts	  Department	  of	  Public	  Health	  after	  several	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  couples	  “applied	  recently	  for	  marriage	  licenses	  at	  city	  and	  town	  clerk’s	  offices	  and	  were	  rejected”	  (Abraham	  2001b).	  	  The	  case	  was	  filed	  in	  Suffolk	  Superior	  Court,	  but	  was	  fully	  expected	  to	  be	  appealed	  to	  the	  Massachusetts	  Supreme	  Judicial	  Court.	  This	  initial	  article	  from	  the	  Boston	  Globe	  foreshadowed	  many	  of	  the	  strategic	  framing	  devices	  that	  would	  be	  used	  over	  the	  next	  several	  years	  as	  the	  gay	  marriage	  struggle	  took	  its	  course	  in	  Massachusetts.	  Gay	  marriage	  proponents	  argued	  “unequal	  treatment	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  Massachusetts	  constitution”	  and,	  referring	  to	  civil	  unions,	  that	  “separate	  institutions	  are	  inherently	  unequal”,	  while	  opponents	  of	  gay	  marriage	  decried	  the	  suit	  as	  evidence	  of	  gays	  and	  lesbians	  pushing	  an	  agenda	  to	  “deconstruct	  and	  break	  down	  society’s	  framework	  regarding	  sexuality	  and	  relationships”	  by	  utilizing	  the	  “liberal,	  activist	  court	  system”	  (Abraham	  2001b).	  	  Most	  telling	  was	  that,	  from	  the	  outset,	  “both	  sides	  have	  hitched	  their	  wagons	  to	  the	  cause	  of	  family	  values”(Abraham	  2001b).	  	  Such	  framing	  devices	  highlight	  the	  “interactive	  effect	  between	  opposing	  movements:	  the	  effect	  that	  each	  movement	  has	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  interaction	  on	  social	  movement	  goals	  [including]	  creating	  new	  framing	  opportunities”	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(Fetner	  2008:	  121-­‐122).	  	  As	  supporters	  and	  opponents	  of	  gay	  marriage	  swung	  into	  action	  themes	  of	  freedom,	  equality,	  justice,	  family,	  religion,	  and	  democratic	  values	  emerged	  as	  the	  dominant	  focal	  points	  that	  shaped	  the	  debate.	  	  	  	  	  In	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Goodridge	  case	  being	  filed,	  the	  pending	  marriage	  case	  caused	  a	  “radical	  flank	  effect”,	  where	  pressure	  for	  some	  right	  or	  benefit	  previously	  considered	  “extreme”	  pushed	  moderates	  to	  adopt	  positions	  that	  they	  formerly	  shunned	  (McAdam,	  McCarthy	  and	  Zald	  1996:	  14).	  This	  effect	  created	  forward	  motion	  in	  the	  lagging	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  campaign	  as	  the	  prospect	  of	  gay	  marriage	  made	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  more	  palatable	  to	  people	  like	  acting	  Massachusetts	  Governor	  Jane	  Swift,	  who,	  after	  having	  “taken	  some	  heat	  for	  her	  opposition	  to	  same	  sex	  marriage,”	  hastily	  announced	  her	  support	  for	  domestic	  partner	  benefits”(Abraham	  2001c).	  Similarly,	  Boston	  City	  Council	  member	  Jim	  Kelly,	  considered	  to	  be	  “the	  conservative	  lion	  of	  the	  council”,	  in	  a	  change	  of	  position,	  indicated	  that	  he	  might	  “look	  favourably	  on	  benefits	  for	  same	  sex	  partners”	  (Schweitzer	  2001).	  	  	  As	  the	  possibility	  of	  gay	  marriage	  became	  more	  real	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  Massachusetts	  residents,	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  (and,	  later,	  civil	  unions)	  came	  to	  be	  viewed	  by	  many	  as	  a	  more	  acceptable	  and	  moderate	  position	  to	  hold.	  	  Such	  changes	  of	  heart	  led	  to	  increased	  pressure	  to	  bring	  the	  domestic	  partner	  benefit	  bill	  to	  a	  vote,	  and	  also	  increased	  a	  sense	  of	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optimism	  that	  even	  if	  there	  were	  a	  negative	  outcome	  to	  the	  gay	  marriage	  case	  there	  might	  be	  some	  advancement	  in	  other	  movement	  goals.	  	  However,	  any	  positive	  outcome	  was	  by	  no	  means	  certain.	  	  	   	  At	  the	  same	  time	  that	  Rep.	  John	  Roger’s	  legislative	  DOMA	  bill	  was	  pending	  in	  the	  Massachusetts	  House	  of	  Representatives	  (a	  so-­‐called	  super	  DOMA	  that	  would	  not	  only	  eliminate	  gay	  marriage	  but	  would	  nix	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  as	  well),	  gay	  marriage	  opponents	  announced	  in	  July	  2001	  that	  they	  would	  begin	  collecting	  signatures	  for	  a	  ballot	  initiative	  for	  a	  constitutional	  amendment	  that	  would	  ban	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  and	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  (Abraham	  2001a,	  Gedan	  2001).	  	  On	  the	  day	  that	  the	  Massachusetts	  Citizens	  Alliance	  held	  a	  press	  conference	  to	  announce	  their	  initiative	  petition	  drive,	  Mary	  Bonauto	  and	  Arline	  Isaacson	  were	  in	  the	  audience.	  	  Isaacson	  recalled,	  	  The	  key	  was	  in	  how	  they	  would	  word	  it.	  	  Mary	  and	  I	  were	  really	  paying	  attention	  to	  understanding	  the	  ramifications,	  and	  the	  wording	  would	  make	  all	  the	  difference	  to	  having	  any	  chance	  of	  succeeding	  against	  it.	  	  Thank	  God	  they	  were	  greedy.	  	  They	  went	  too	  broad.	  	  They	  knocked	  out	  not	  just	  marriage	  but	  all	  the	  benefits…domestic	  partner	  benefits,	  civil	  unions,	  everything.	  	  	  With	  past	  attempts	  to	  eliminate	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  LGBT	  advocates	  could	  typically	  count	  on	  enough	  allies	  in	  the	  legislature	  who	  wanted	  to	  leave	  open	  the	  possibility	  for	  some	  benefits	  to	  defeat	  a	  bill	  that	  would	  eliminate	  all	  benefits.	  	  This	  strategy	  so	  far	  had	  worked	  to	  defeat	  both	  legislative	  and	  constitutional	  DOMA	  attempts,	  yet	  Isaacson	  admitted,	  
	  	   171	  
“I	  was	  still	  scared	  shitless	  because	  I	  figured	  the	  odds	  were	  hugely	  stacked	  against	  us	  winning,	  but	  at	  least	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  went	  broad	  gave	  us	  one	  little	  tiny	  way	  in	  to	  a	  possible	  pathway	  to	  defeat	  it.”	  	  With	  this,	  LGBT	  activists	  swung	  into	  action	  for	  what	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  heated	  rights	  battles	  in	  Massachusetts	  history,	  even	  before	  the	  Supreme	  Judicial	  Court	  reached	  a	  decision	  on	  Goodridge.	  	  	  Mobilizing	  against	  the	  ballot	  initiative	  to	  create	  a	  constitutional	  amendment	  banning	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  required	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  formal	  “ballot	  question	  committee”,	  so	  a	  loose	  coalition	  of	  Massachusetts	  activists’	  groups	  that	  had	  been	  meeting	  together	  for	  years	  under	  the	  informal	  title	  “the	  group	  of	  groups”	  became	  MassEquality.	  	  The	  “group	  of	  groups”	  coalition	  that	  became	  MassEquality	  drew	  from	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  Freedom	  to	  Marry	  Coalition,	  Massachusetts	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Political	  Caucus,	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Advocates	  and	  Defenders,	  the	  Religious	  Coalition	  for	  the	  Freedom	  to	  Marry,	  and	  the	  American	  Civil	  Liberties	  Union,	  so	  at	  its	  inception	  MassEquality	  not	  only	  represented	  a	  broad	  cross-­‐section	  of	  the	  LGBT	  community	  but	  also	  had	  access	  to	  the	  consolidated	  resources,	  volunteers,	  and	  allies	  of	  nearly	  every	  major	  LGBT	  and	  LGBT	  supportive	  organization	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  Marshalling	  these	  resources	  and	  strengthening	  them	  proved	  necessary	  as	  “Massachusetts	  plunged	  into	  a	  nasty,	  expensive	  street	  fight	  over	  the	  local	  DOMA”	  (Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2008:	  57).	  	  Particularly	  under	  such	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high-­‐pressure	  conditions	  “the	  tactical	  choices	  leaders	  make	  matter…leaders	  must	  make	  choices	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  inter-­‐organizational	  relations…about	  whom	  to	  build	  external	  allies	  with,	  and	  about	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  opposition.	  [In	  addition	  to]	  exploiting	  the	  external	  political	  structure	  [and]	  media	  coverage”	  (Morris	  2004:	  242).	  	  By	  utilizing	  the	  collective	  knowledge	  and	  resources	  of	  the	  LGBT	  community	  and	  its	  allies,	  activists	  made	  decisions	  and	  developed	  strategies	  and	  frames	  that	  had	  political	  import	  and	  cultural	  resonance.	  In	  strategizing	  to	  beat	  the	  DOMA	  legislation	  “lesbian	  and	  gay	  organizations	  began	  to	  frame	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  in	  terms	  of	  relationships	  and	  families”	  (Fetner	  2008:	  112).	  This	  strategy	  was	  particularly	  useful	  in	  a	  state	  like	  Massachusetts,	  where	  previous	  policy	  decisions	  had	  already	  put	  in	  place	  protections	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  families	  (like	  second	  parent	  adoption	  rights).	  From	  the	  theoretical	  perspective	  of	  historical	  institutionalism	  such	  policy	  legacies	  “do	  not	  dictate	  outcomes”	  but	  they	  do	  “create	  a	  number	  of	  different	  possibilities	  and	  pathways	  for	  political	  action”	  (Smith	  2009:	  172).	  	  Institutional	  recognition	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  previous	  policies	  that	  protect	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  families	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  activists	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  danger	  the	  current	  measure	  posed	  to	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  families	  because	  it	  could	  potentially	  eliminate	  all	  forms	  of	  benefits.	  	  	  For	  example,	  the	  Boston	  Globe	  reported	  “gay	  advocates	  say	  the	  petitions	  could	  harm	  citizens	  who	  are	  not	  part	  of	  traditional	  families”	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and	  quoted	  Mary	  Bonauto,	  “These	  measures	  attempt	  to	  stop	  the	  clock	  and	  pretend	  all	  families	  resemble	  Ozzie	  and	  Harriett.	  	  We	  have	  no	  quarrel	  with	  those	  families.	  But	  the	  truth	  is	  families	  come	  in	  all	  shapes	  and	  sizes”	  (Marantz	  2001).	  	  That	  the	  ballot	  initiative	  was	  harmful	  to	  children	  and	  families	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  was	  the	  message	  that	  advocates	  of	  gay	  marriage	  wanted	  to	  impart	  both	  to	  the	  public	  and	  to	  politicians	  who	  would	  have	  to	  vote	  on	  the	  measure	  in	  order	  to	  send	  it	  to	  the	  ballot.	  	  Since	  Goodridge	  had	  not	  yet	  been	  decided,	  lead	  lobbyist	  Arline	  Isaacson’s	  strategy	  was	  to	  focus	  on	  “benefits,	  benefits,	  benefits.”	  	  She	  explained,	  	  We	  can’t	  frame	  it	  as	  debate	  about	  marriage.	  	  It	  has	  to	  be	  about	  the	  benefits.	  	  Since	  they	  were	  greedy	  when	  they	  drafted	  it	  and	  they	  threw	  in	  benefits,	  that’s	  what	  we	  were	  going	  for	  because	  that’s	  where	  we	  would	  get	  the	  most	  sympathy	  and	  support.	  	  We	  would	  go	  to	  legislators	  and	  talk	  about	  families	  and	  kids	  denied	  benefits	  of	  insurance	  and	  hospital	  visitation	  rights.	  	  Legislators	  would	  be	  sympathetic	  [to	  these	  issues]	  even	  if	  they	  didn’t	  support	  marriage.	  	  	  	  Focusing	  on	  benefits	  allowed	  activists	  to	  avoid	  the	  more	  controversial	  marriage	  debate,	  for	  the	  moment,	  while	  preserving	  the	  possibility	  of	  winning	  marriage	  in	  the	  future	  by	  defeating	  the	  current	  DOMA	  attempt.	  The	  air	  of	  uncertainty	  under	  which	  Massachusetts	  activists	  had	  to	  make	  decisions	  created	  “the	  conditions	  under	  which	  strategic	  capacity	  may	  matter	  most”	  (Ganz	  2004:	  192).	  In	  this	  environment,	  movement	  leaders	  continued	  to	  develop	  new	  and	  novel	  strategies	  to	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protect	  their	  rights.	  One	  of	  the	  more	  controversial	  tactics	  used	  by	  activists	  to	  make	  the	  public	  aware	  of	  DOMA’s	  potential	  to	  harm	  LGBT	  families	  was	  called	  “truth-­‐squadding”.	  Arline	  Isaacson	  explained	  this	  tactic,	  “Essentially,	  while	  they’re	  gathering	  signatures	  against	  us,	  we	  have	  volunteers	  who	  stand	  there	  and	  say	  to	  the	  potential	  signer,	  ‘I’d	  like	  to	  ask	  you	  not	  to	  sign,	  and	  here’s	  why…’	  So	  we’re	  giving	  them	  two	  points	  of	  view	  when	  they’re	  presented	  with	  the	  paper	  to	  sign.	  	  It	  was	  incredibly	  successful”	  (personal	  interview,	  2009).	  	  In	  fact,	  this	  strategy	  was	  described	  by	  a	  Globe	  reporter	  (Ebbert	  2001)	  who	  observed	  a	  woman	  at	  a	  shopping	  centre	  being	  approached	  by	  a	  petitioner	  who	  asked	  if	  she	  believed	  in	  traditional	  marriage.	  As	  the	  woman	  answered	  that,	  yes,	  she	  did	  believe	  in	  traditional	  marriage,	  she	  was	  then	  approached	  by	  an	  LGBT	  ally	  who	  explained,	  ‘The	  measure	  proposed	  in	  the	  petition	  could	  threaten	  health	  benefits	  offered	  to	  same-­‐sex	  partners	  and	  their	  children’.	  	  This	  then	  caused	  the	  woman	  to	  change	  her	  mind	  about	  signing,	  saying,	  ‘I	  think	  marriage	  is	  between	  a	  man	  and	  a	  woman,	  but	  I	  don’t	  want	  children	  to	  suffer’”.	  	  	  	  This	  tactic	  was	  not	  successful	  enough	  to	  stop	  gay-­‐marriage	  opponents	  from	  gathering	  the	  signatures	  needed	  for	  their	  petition	  drive,	  but	  it	  did	  keep	  them	  from	  getting	  as	  many	  signatures	  as	  they	  otherwise	  would	  have.	  	  	  Perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  the	  truth	  squad	  volunteers	  observed	  that	  petitioners,	  many	  of	  whom	  were	  paid	  employees	  of	  a	  signature	  gathering	  firm,	  were	  using	  trickery	  by	  asking	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people	  to	  sign	  a	  petition	  against	  horse	  slaughter	  and	  then	  slipping	  the	  anti-­‐gay	  marriage	  petition	  underneath	  it	  (Ebbert	  2001,	  2002).	  	  This	  fraud	  was	  exposed,	  and	  activists	  set	  up	  a	  website	  listing	  the	  names	  of	  who	  had	  signed	  onto	  each	  petition,	  causing	  many	  people	  to	  come	  forward	  and	  claim	  that	  they	  had	  never	  intended	  to	  sign	  an	  anti-­‐gay	  marriage	  petition.	  	  Unfortunately	  for	  LGBT	  activists,	  the	  petitions	  could	  not	  be	  recalled	  but	  some	  of	  the	  moral	  high	  ground	  of	  the	  campaign	  against	  gay	  marriage	  was	  ceded.	  	  Once	  signatures	  are	  gathered	  and	  certified	  by	  the	  Attorney	  General,	  a	  ballot	  initiative	  must	  be	  passed	  by	  25%	  of	  the	  legislature	  in	  two	  consecutive	  constitutional	  conventions	  held	  in	  successive	  legislative	  sessions.	  	  As	  testimony	  began	  in	  the	  months	  leading	  up	  and	  into	  the	  constitutional	  convention	  cycle	  the	  proceedings	  were	  heated	  and,	  at	  times,	  acrimonious.	  	  An	  email	  massage	  sent	  to	  supporters	  of	  MassEquality	  (and	  forwarded	  via	  other	  organizations	  like	  The	  Freedom	  to	  Marry	  Coalition)	  described	  what	  to	  expect	  if	  attending	  the	  constitutional	  conventions	  and	  advised	  supporters	  how	  to	  behave,	  	  During	  the	  last	  Convention	  a	  few	  weeks	  ago	  the	  anti-­‐gay	  proponents	  of	  this	  measure	  showed	  up	  at	  the	  State	  House	  in	  buses	  prepared	  to	  cause	  a	  disturbance	  if	  they	  did	  not	  get	  the	  win	  they	  wanted	  when	  they	  wanted	  it.	  	  When	  Senate	  President	  Tom	  Birmingham	  postponed	  the	  Convention-­‐-­‐	  by	  just	  a	  few	  weeks!-­‐-­‐	  the	  mob	  erupted.	  	  The	  court	  officers	  had	  to	  physically	  remove	  them	  from	  the	  visitors	  Gallery.	  	  The	  mob	  then	  followed	  Birmingham	  to	  his	  office,	  blocked	  him	  in,	  and	  chanted	  “We	  want	  a	  vote!”	  for	  well	  over	  an	  hour...	  	  They	  also	  made	  inflammatory,	  provocative	  public	  accusations	  about	  “the	  homosexuals”	  who	  were	  there…	  	  If	  you	  think	  it	  will	  be	  difficult	  for	  you	  to	  stay	  calm,	  unaffected,	  and	  IGNORE	  any	  provocation,	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PLEASE	  stay	  home.	  The	  Gallery	  is	  a	  place	  for	  quiet,	  respectful	  observation.	  	  	  Activist	  Amy	  Hunt	  described	  attending	  these	  hearings	  and	  constitutional	  conventions	  as	  “torturous”.	  She	  says,	  “It	  was	  torturous	  personally	  to	  go	  up	  to	  the	  state	  house	  and	  see	  signs	  that	  were	  reportedly	  about	  you	  and	  everybody	  all	  up	  in	  a	  tizzy	  about	  you.”	  	  Similarly,	  Arline	  Isaacson	  remembered	  the	  anger	  of	  gay	  marriage	  opponents,	  	  	  They	  were	  in	  the	  gallery	  screaming	  and	  yelling,	  ‘Let	  the	  people	  vote!’	  They	  were	  screaming	  at	  legislators.	  There	  was	  so	  much	  anger	  it	  really	  shook	  them	  and	  we	  lost	  votes,	  I	  could	  tell.	  	  They	  started	  screaming	  at	  me.	  	  I	  didn’t	  care,	  but	  it	  was	  hard	  for	  legislators	  to	  take.	  	  	  	  This,	  in	  turn,	  reinforced	  the	  strategy	  of	  LGBT	  activists	  to	  continue	  to	  present	  themselves	  as	  a	  calm,	  peaceful	  foil	  to	  their	  opponents’	  anger	  and	  vitriol.	  When	  the	  constitutional	  convention	  reconvened,	  activists	  knew	  they	  could	  not	  convince	  over	  75%	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  legislature	  to	  vote	  against	  the	  initiative	  on	  its	  merits	  so	  they	  had	  to	  kill	  the	  bill	  using	  parliamentary	  tactics.	  	  To	  do	  that	  they	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  alliances	  they	  had	  cultivated	  with	  legislators.	  Now	  and	  in	  the	  future,	  despite	  whatever	  other	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  were	  developed	  by	  activists,	  “the	  structure	  of	  political	  opportunities,	  as	  defined	  by	  both	  the	  enduring	  and	  volatile	  features	  of	  a	  given	  political	  system,	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  ongoing	  fortunes	  of	  the	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movement”	  (McAdam,	  McCarthy,	  and	  Zald	  1996:	  12).	  This	  time,	  political	  allies	  came	  through	  for	  gay	  marriage	  advocates	  in	  several	  important	  ways,	  but	  later	  this	  would	  not	  be	  the	  case.	  	  	  Having	  political	  allies	  in	  the	  State	  House	  benefitted	  LGBT	  activists	  in	  many	  ways,	  leading	  up	  and	  into	  the	  reconvened	  constitutional	  convention	  on	  the	  Massachusetts	  DOMA	  petition.	  First,	  before	  an	  initiative	  petition	  goes	  to	  a	  constitutional	  convention	  it	  is	  assigned	  to	  a	  committee	  that	  studies	  the	  initiative	  and	  issues	  a	  report.	  	  The	  Senate	  president	  at	  the	  time	  was	  Tom	  Birmingham,	  a	  long-­‐time	  LGBT	  ally.	  Birmingham	  assigned	  the	  petition	  to	  a	  committee	  whose	  chairperson	  was	  known	  to	  support	  LGBT	  rights,	  the	  Joint	  Committee	  on	  Public	  Service.	  	  The	  committee	  chair	  took	  input	  from	  Arline	  Isaacson	  and	  other	  advocates	  and	  came	  out	  with	  a	  report	  favourable	  to	  the	  LGBT	  community	  that	  focused	  on	  the	  potential	  loss	  of	  benefits	  rather	  than	  gay	  marriage	  per	  se.	  	  The	  committee	  report	  called	  the	  proposed	  amendment,	  “discriminatory,	  and	  harmful	  to	  families	  and	  children”	  and	  recommended	  the	  legislature	  reject	  the	  measure	  (Abraham	  and	  Klein	  2002).	  	  	  Second,	  while	  the	  Speaker	  of	  the	  House,	  conservative	  Democrat	  Tom	  Finneran,	  was	  an	  opponent	  of	  LGBT	  rights,	  the	  second	  in	  command,	  Democrat	  Sal	  DiMasi,	  was	  an	  ally	  of	  the	  LGBT	  community.	  	  DiMasi	  used	  his	  position	  to	  put	  together	  a	  team	  of	  “whips”	  in	  the	  house	  to	  win	  over	  moderate	  to	  conservative	  Democrats	  and	  convince	  them	  to	  vote	  to	  kill	  the	  bill.	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Finally,	  on	  the	  day	  of	  the	  constitutional	  convention	  in	  July	  2002,	  Tom	  Birmingham	  called	  the	  measure	  “wrong-­‐hearted,	  mean-­‐spirited,	  discriminatory,	  and	  unfair”.	  Rather	  than	  calling	  for	  a	  vote	  on	  the	  ballot	  initiative	  itself	  he	  called	  for	  a	  vote	  to	  adjourn	  the	  constitutional	  convention,	  which	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  legislature	  supported,	  effectively	  killing	  the	  DOMA	  petition	  (Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2008:	  59).	  	  The	  good	  news	  for	  the	  LGBT	  community	  was	  that	  they	  had	  once	  again	  escaped	  DOMA,	  thanks	  in	  large	  part	  to	  political	  ally	  Tom	  Birmingham	  who	  put	  his	  own	  position	  on	  the	  line	  to	  kill	  the	  bill.	  	  Activist	  Elyse	  Cherry	  recalled,	  “Tom	  Birmingham	  really	  fell	  on	  his	  sword	  for	  us.”	  The	  bad	  news	  was	  that	  Birmingham	  later	  lost	  his	  bid	  for	  governor	  to	  conservative	  Republican	  and	  gay	  marriage	  opponent	  Mitt	  Romney	  and	  was	  replaced	  as	  Senate	  President	  by	  conservative	  Democrat	  Robert	  Travaglini,	  who	  opposed	  gay	  marriage.	  	  	  Lesbian	  and	  gay	  Massachusettans	  exhaled	  a	  collective	  sigh	  of	  relief	  after	  having	  dodged	  yet	  another	  DOMA	  bullet,	  but	  with	  the	  SJC’s	  
Goodridge	  decision	  still	  outstanding,	  activists	  knew	  the	  calm	  would	  not	  likely	  last	  long.	  	  The	  pending	  Goodridge	  case	  ensured	  that	  same	  sex	  marriage	  remained	  on	  the	  agenda,	  and	  before	  long	  another	  DOMA	  round	  began	  when	  another	  attempt	  to	  ban	  gay	  marriage	  was	  launched,	  this	  time	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  constitutional	  amendment	  introduced	  by	  Representative	  Philip	  Travis.	  	  Amendments	  initiated	  by	  legislators	  must	  be	  supported	  by	  50%	  of	  the	  legislature	  in	  two	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constitutional	  conventions,	  rather	  than	  the	  25%	  needed	  to	  endorse	  a	  citizens’	  petition	  to	  amend	  the	  constitution	  via	  the	  ballot	  box.	  However,	  the	  recent	  shifts	  in	  State	  House	  leadership	  had	  favoured	  gay	  marriage	  opponents,	  so	  success	  was	  far	  from	  certain.	  	  Nevertheless,	  LGBT	  activists,	  buoyed	  by	  the	  defeat	  of	  the	  last	  DOMA	  bill	  and	  anticipating	  the	  SJC	  decision	  on	  Goodridge	  v	  Massachusetts	  
Department	  of	  Public	  Health,	  continued	  to	  build	  on	  the	  momentum	  of	  those	  successes.	  At	  the	  time,	  they	  were	  anticipating	  the	  seriousness	  of	  future	  challenges	  as	  they	  gathered	  allies	  in	  the	  State	  House	  and	  the	  public	  alike,	  and	  strategized	  for	  success.	  	  	  By	  now	  the	  frames	  that	  emerged	  early	  on	  in	  the	  controversy	  over	  gay	  marriage	  had	  solidified:	  family,	  religion,	  and	  democratic	  values.	  	  Both	  supporters	  and	  opponents	  of	  gay	  marriage	  utilized	  these	  frames,	  but,	  of	  course,	  did	  so	  in	  very	  different	  ways.	  	  The	  debates	  boiled	  down	  to	  protecting	  “traditional	  marriage”	  versus	  protecting	  all	  families,	  espousing	  religious	  doctrine	  against	  gay	  marriage	  versus	  religious	  doctrine	  in	  support	  of	  gay	  marriage,	  and	  demands	  to	  “let	  the	  people	  vote”	  versus	  appeals	  for	  “no	  discrimination	  in	  the	  constitution”	  (Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2008:	  76).	  	  In	  gearing	  up	  to	  fight	  another	  round	  of	  DOMA	  related	  constitutional	  conventions,	  LGBT	  activists	  focused	  on	  fine-­‐tuning	  the	  frames	  and	  strategies	  they	  believed	  most	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  success.	  
	  	   180	  
Throughout	  the	  marriage	  campaign	  activists	  used	  careful	  framing	  and	  strategizing	  to	  upend	  that	  most	  common	  trope	  used	  against	  them:	  family	  values.	  	  	  Flipping	  the	  script	  on	  the	  family	  values	  frame	  and	  making	  it	  work	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  families	  rather	  than	  against	  them	  was	  a	  strategic	  choice	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Massachusetts	  activists.	  	  Their	  success	  at	  doing	  so	  reflected	  their	  advanced	  movement	  status,	  where	  “in	  the	  mature	  movement,	  framing	  processes	  are	  more	  likely	  (1)	  to	  be	  shaped	  by	  conscious,	  strategic	  decisions	  on	  the	  part	  of	  SMO’s,	  and	  (2)	  to	  be	  the	  subject	  of	  intense	  contestation	  between	  collective	  actors	  representing	  the	  movement,	  the	  state,	  and	  any	  existing	  countermovements.”	  (McAdam,	  McCarthy,	  and	  Zald	  1996:	  16).	  	  That	  the	  strategic	  focus	  was	  on	  “family”	  was	  no	  surprise	  given	  that	  ‘family	  values’	  has	  often	  been	  used	  to	  undermine	  gay	  right	  struggles,	  including	  the	  anti-­‐gay	  marriage	  position	  that	  legal	  recognition	  of	  same	  sex	  couples	  somehow	  undermines	  or	  threatens	  traditional	  families.	  	  In	  Massachusetts,	  activists	  were	  able	  to	  strategically	  deploy	  “family”	  and	  “family	  values”	  by	  using	  the	  poignant	  experiences	  of	  the	  plaintiffs	  in	  the	  Goodridge	  lawsuit	  to	  highlight	  the	  potentially	  devastating	  risks	  that	  face	  many	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  families	  who	  lack	  the	  benefits	  and	  protections	  offered	  by	  marriage	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	  Personal	  stories	  were	  often	  used	  to	  make	  the	  case	  that	  all	  families	  deserve	  the	  protection	  and	  benefits	  of	  marriage.	  For	  example,	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the	  lead	  plaintiffs	  in	  the	  case,	  Julie	  and	  Hilary	  Goodridge,	  were	  well	  aware	  of	  what	  was	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  marriage	  because	  of	  what	  that	  they	  experienced	  during	  their	  daughter’s	  birth:	  “In	  1996,	  when	  Julie	  Goodridge	  was	  going	  through	  the	  extremely	  difficult	  birth	  of	  her	  daughter,	  Annie,	  her	  partner,	  Hillary,	  was	  facing	  one	  barrier	  after	  another	  in	  getting	  to	  her	  side.	  	  Medical	  officials	  at	  the	  hospital	  did	  not	  recognize	  her	  as	  family,	  and	  only	  tears	  and	  lies	  overcame	  the	  resistance”	  (Rayside	  2008:	  142).	  	  As	  the	  Massachusetts	  SJC	  prepared	  to	  hear	  arguments	  on	  the	  Goodridge	  case,	  activists	  reiterated	  that	  the	  plaintiffs	  “wish[ed]	  to	  marry	  for	  the	  same	  reasons	  as	  heterosexual	  couples:	  to	  publicly	  dedicate	  themselves	  to	  each	  other	  and	  to	  legally	  protect	  their	  relationships.	  Four	  of	  the	  couples	  in	  the	  case	  have	  children	  together	  and	  they	  argue	  that	  their	  children	  deserve	  the	  same	  legal	  protections	  as	  children	  born	  to	  married	  parents”	  (Burge	  2003).	  	  That	  all	  families	  deserve	  protection	  became	  the	  rallying	  cry	  to	  counteract	  the	  rhetoric	  from	  opponents	  who	  asserted	  that	  gay	  marriage	  somehow	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  traditional	  families.	  	  	  	  	  Nearly	  every	  activist	  I	  spoke	  with	  emphasized	  the	  strategic	  importance	  of	  building	  support	  for	  LGBT	  families	  by	  sharing	  personal	  stories	  with	  legislators	  and	  the	  public.	  	  Former	  MassEquality	  board	  member,	  Buzz	  Harris,	  described	  studying	  pro-­‐gay-­‐marriage	  television	  ads	  that	  ran	  in	  other	  states	  and	  putting	  that	  knowledge	  to	  use	  in	  Massachusetts,	  “So	  our	  ads	  just	  put	  our	  families	  out	  there	  and	  said,	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‘This	  is	  who	  we	  are,	  this	  is	  where	  we	  live,	  and	  this	  is	  what	  we	  do.	  And	  this	  is	  our	  kid	  if	  we	  have	  a	  kid.	  And	  here’s	  how	  our	  relationship	  not	  being	  legally	  recognized	  affects	  us.’	  The	  tone	  was	  very	  low	  key	  and	  matter	  of	  fact,	  it	  felt	  like	  a	  neighbour	  talking	  with	  you	  over	  coffee”.	  	  Amy	  Hunt,	  former	  director	  of	  the	  LGBT	  Aging	  Project	  in	  Massachusetts	  and	  Creative	  Director	  for	  MassEquality’s	  “It’s	  Wrong	  to	  Vote	  on	  Rights”	  ad	  campaign,	  lobbied	  for	  gay	  marriage	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Political	  Caucus.	  	  	  Amy	  described	  what	  she	  felt	  was	  the	  most	  successful	  way	  of	  framing	  gay	  marriage:	  focusing	  on	  children	  and	  families:	  Since	  Harvey	  Milk	  the	  other	  side	  has	  picked	  up	  ‘the	  children’	  and	  made	  a	  run	  at	  us	  and	  said,	  ‘Look	  what	  you’re	  doing	  to	  the	  kids.’	  	  Children	  are	  the	  weapon	  of	  choice	  and	  I	  believe	  they	  like	  it	  because	  it	  taps	  into	  a	  fear	  that	  a	  lot	  of	  straight	  people	  have.	  	  And	  I	  think	  we	  have	  been	  intimidated	  by	  that	  and	  cowed	  by	  that	  for	  thirty	  years.	  	  But	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  we	  had	  the	  kids	  on	  our	  side.	  	  	  I	  shot	  an	  ad	  with	  an	  adult	  kid	  who	  had	  been	  raised	  by	  lesbian	  moms	  and	  one	  with	  a	  little	  kid	  who	  had	  an	  extended	  family,	  this	  grandma	  and	  grandpa,	  who	  did	  not	  want	  see	  this	  kid	  get	  teased	  and	  bullied	  on	  the	  playground.	  So	  we	  took	  kids	  and	  we	  redefined	  the	  state	  and	  religious	  issues.	  	  We	  took	  their	  very	  reliable	  frame	  of	  children	  and	  said,	  ‘Fine,	  let’s	  talk	  about	  kids	  ‘cause	  we	  have	  them,	  too,	  and	  we	  raise	  them,	  and	  we	  do	  a	  pretty	  damn	  good	  job.	  	  And,	  by	  the	  way,	  we	  have	  extended	  families.	  	  I	  have	  a	  mother	  and	  brother	  and	  sisters	  and	  I	  went	  to	  all	  their	  weddings	  and	  they	  would	  like	  to	  come	  to	  mine.’	  	  Importantly,	  activists	  focused	  not	  only	  on	  families	  with	  children,	  but	  pressed	  legislators	  and	  the	  public	  to	  think	  of	  many	  different	  types	  of	  families.	  Another	  activist,	  George	  Smart,	  who	  lobbied	  on	  behalf	  of	  MassEquality	  and	  GLAD,	  recounted	  that	  before	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lobbying,	  “We	  all	  got	  together	  ahead	  of	  time	  and	  talked	  about	  what	  arguments	  would	  be	  most	  compelling,	  so	  the	  people	  with	  kids	  would	  talk	  about	  kids	  and	  bring	  pictures	  of	  their	  kids.”	  	  George	  and	  his	  partner,	  Bruce,	  did	  not	  have	  children	  but	  still	  had	  a	  compelling	  story	  to	  illustrate	  that	  their	  family	  needed	  the	  protection	  of	  marriage	  as	  much	  as	  any	  other.	  “Bruce	  and	  I	  talked	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  had	  [an	  illness	  that	  can	  cause	  paralysis]	  early	  on	  in	  our	  relationship	  and	  he	  had	  become	  paralyzed	  for	  several	  months	  from	  the	  eyebrows	  down.	  	  We	  were	  at	  a	  hospital	  that,	  in	  1988,	  had	  never	  dealt	  with	  gay	  people	  before	  and	  suddenly	  they	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  this	  openly	  gay	  couple.”	  In	  her	  activism	  efforts,	  Amy	  Hunt	  also	  used	  her	  knowledge	  from	  the	  LGBT	  Aging	  Project	  to	  advocate	  for	  marriage	  by	  raising	  awareness	  about	  the	  risks	  for	  elderly	  couples	  not	  protected	  by	  marriage.	  	  She	  succeeded	  in	  getting	  a	  story	  in	  the	  Boston	  Globe	  about	  the	  benefits	  of	  marriage	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  senior	  citizens,	  and	  also	  used	  this	  knowledge	  to	  inform	  her	  lobbying	  experience,	  I’d	  talk	  to	  legislators	  and	  I’d	  say,	  ‘Do	  you	  know	  how	  MediCare	  works?	  Let	  me	  tell	  you	  what	  actually	  happens	  when	  someone	  needs	  to	  go	  into	  a	  nursing	  home	  costing	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  dollars	  a	  year.	  How	  much	  do	  you	  think	  they	  actually	  pay	  before	  they	  come	  to	  the	  state	  and	  say,	  ‘help	  me’,	  and	  how	  do	  you	  think	  the	  state	  manages	  their	  money	  as	  they	  deliver	  that	  health	  care,	  and	  do	  you	  know	  we	  have	  all	  these	  rules	  and	  regulations	  that	  help	  to	  protect	  a	  legally	  married	  spouse?	  	  When	  we	  go	  through	  that	  process	  are	  we	  going	  to	  throw	  Bob’s	  ‘friend’	  Sam	  out	  on	  the	  street	  to	  help	  Bob?	  	  Is	  that	  the	  business	  we’re	  in?	  Because	  that’s	  what	  would	  happen	  to	  an	  elderly	  gay	  couple	  who	  didn’t	  have	  a	  marriage	  license.’	  	  	  And	  [one	  legislator’s]	  jaw	  just	  dropped	  and	  he	  turned	  to	  his	  chief	  of	  staff	  and	  said,	  ‘Is	  that	  right?’	  And	  the	  guy	  said,	  ‘Yes,	  this	  is	  what	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happens.’	  I	  talked	  about	  that	  [when	  lobbying]	  and	  it	  really	  did	  stun	  [the	  legislators].	  	  These	  framing	  strategies	  encouraged	  legislators	  and	  the	  public	  to	  think	  about	  gay	  families	  in	  a	  whole	  new	  light,	  and	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  next	  several	  years	  this	  frame	  proved	  very	  effective	  in	  changing	  the	  hearts	  and	  minds	  of	  Massachusetts	  residents	  who	  were	  at	  first	  hesitant	  about	  supporting	  gay	  marriage.	  	  	  	  	  	   The	  other	  frame	  most	  commonly	  used	  against	  gay	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage	  was	  religion.	  	  	  Indeed,	  opponents	  of	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts	  mobilized	  behind	  conservative	  religious	  arguments	  against	  gay	  marriage	  but	  these	  arguments	  failed	  to	  “stick”	  as	  well	  in	  Massachusetts	  as	  they	  did	  in	  other	  regions.	  	  There	  were	  several	  reasons	  for	  this.	  	  One	  of	  these	  was	  the	  religious	  culture	  of	  the	  New	  England	  region.	  New	  England’s	  fundamentalists,	  who	  generally	  opposed	  gay	  rights,	  are	  less	  influential	  and	  well	  organized	  than	  they	  are	  in	  much	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country…	  [and]	  while	  Catholicism	  is	  officially	  opposed	  to	  civil	  recognition	  of	  same	  sex	  pairs,	  Catholics	  have	  proven	  that	  they	  don’t	  always	  follow	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  law	  of	  their	  faith.	  	  And	  some	  of	  New	  England’s	  oldest	  and	  most	  established	  religious	  denominations-­‐-­‐	  Unitarians,	  Congregationalists,	  and	  Reform	  Jews	  especially-­‐-­‐	  see	  the	  work	  toward	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  as	  part	  of	  their	  long	  time	  dedication	  to	  civil	  rights	  struggles.	  (Graff	  2001).	  	  	  	  These	  were	  among	  the	  reasons	  why	  the	  anti-­‐gay-­‐marriage	  campaigns	  that	  were	  so	  successful	  in	  other	  US	  regions	  struggled	  with	  success	  in	  this	  state.	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In	  Massachusetts,	  Unitarians	  had	  consistently	  been	  on	  the	  forefront	  of	  religious	  communities	  in	  support	  of	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  had	  even	  been	  performing	  marriages	  for	  same	  sex	  couples	  beginning	  in	  the	  1990’s	  (though	  these	  unions	  were	  not	  legally	  recognized).	  	  As	  the	  stakes	  continued	  to	  be	  raised	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  DOMA	  in	  Massachusetts,	  Unitarian	  pastors	  were	  among	  the	  first	  of	  those	  taking	  a	  public	  stand	  in	  support	  of	  gay	  marriage.	  Several	  Unitarian	  pastors	  even	  refused	  to	  sign	  state	  marriage	  licenses	  for	  heterosexual	  couples	  until	  marriage	  equality	  had	  been	  won	  for	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  couples	  (First	  Unitarian	  Church	  press	  release	  2002,	  Carbone	  2003).	  	  Other	  long-­‐time	  religious	  allies	  include	  the	  United	  Church	  of	  Christ,	  Episcopalians,	  and	  Reform	  Jews.	  	  	  These	  denominations	  were	  early	  supporters	  of	  the	  gay	  marriage	  movement	  in	  Massachusetts,	  and	  leaders	  of	  these	  groups	  were	  instrumental	  in	  forming	  the	  Religious	  Coalition	  for	  he	  Freedom	  to	  Marry	  (RCFM).	  	  This	  organization	  amassed	  hundreds	  of	  signatures	  from	  clergy	  representing	  denominations	  as	  varied	  as	  Unitarian,	  American	  Baptist,	  Jewish,	  Pagan,	  Quaker,	  Presbyterian,	  Episcopalian,	  Buddhist,	  and	  even	  a	  few	  Catholics,	  on	  a	  document	  stating,	  “We	  draw	  on	  many	  faith	  traditions	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  common	  conviction:	  we	  are	  resolved	  that	  the	  State	  should	  not	  interfere	  with	  same-­‐gender	  couples	  who	  choose	  to	  marry	  and	  share	  fully	  and	  equally	  in	  the	  rights,	  responsibilities,	  and	  commitments	  of	  civil	  marriage”	  (RCFM	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Declaration	  of	  Religious	  Support	  for	  the	  Freedom	  of	  Same-­‐Gender	  Couples	  to	  Marry).	  	  This	  document	  was	  presented	  as	  evidence	  to	  legislators	  to	  combat	  the	  notion	  that	  gay	  marriage	  was	  somehow	  anti-­‐religion.	  	  	  The	  group	  also	  launched	  campaigns	  to	  garner	  public	  support,	  for	  example,	  by	  forming	  a	  sub-­‐group	  called	  Roman	  Catholics	  for	  the	  Freedom	  to	  Marry	  and	  creating	  a	  special	  statement	  for	  Catholic	  supporters	  of	  gay	  marriage	  that	  emphasized	  “Catholic	  teaching	  on	  social	  justice”	  and	  “remembering	  that	  Roman	  Catholics	  were	  once	  denied	  civil	  rights,	  treated	  with	  suspicion,	  and	  ridiculed”(RCFM	  Roman	  Catholic	  Statement	  Supporting	  Marriage	  Equality	  for	  Same-­‐Sex	  Couples	  in	  Massachusetts).	  	  	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  this	  information	  made	  clear	  that	  there	  was	  no	  religious	  consensus	  on	  gay	  marriage.	  The	  most	  consistent,	  long	  time	  opponent	  of	  gay	  rights	  in	  Massachusetts	  was,	  in	  fact,	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church.	  	  The	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  carried	  so	  much	  political	  and	  cultural	  weight	  in	  Massachusetts,	  in	  particular,	  that	  it	  could	  be	  described	  as	  what	  Aldon	  Morris	  (2004:	  237)	  calls	  an	  “agency-­‐laden	  institution”,	  an	  institution	  that	  “houses	  cultural	  and	  organizational	  resources	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  launch	  collective	  action”.	  	  Unfortunately	  for	  LGBT	  activists	  and	  their	  allies,	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  consistently	  mobilized	  these	  resources	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  countermovement.	  Throughout	  the	  gay	  marriage	  controversy,	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  issued	  statements	  against	  domestic	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partner	  benefits,	  civil	  unions,	  and	  marriage	  for	  same	  sex	  couples,	  even	  as	  polls	  indicated	  that	  Massachusetts	  residents,	  “including	  many	  Catholics,	  are	  increasingly	  in	  favour	  of	  extending	  full	  marriage	  rights	  to	  gays”	  (Lewis	  2003a,	  Lewis	  2003c).	  	  	  However,	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  gay	  marriage	  debate	  the	  Church	  sex	  abuse	  scandal	  became	  breaking	  news.	  	  As	  it	  became	  known	  that	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  hierarchy	  had	  been	  involved	  for	  decades	  in	  extensive	  cover-­‐ups	  regarding	  priests	  who	  had	  sexually	  abused	  children	  in	  their	  parishes,	  the	  Church	  lost	  some	  of	  its	  moral,	  political,	  and	  cultural	  authority	  in	  the	  region.	  	  In	  the	  sense	  that	  “the	  broad	  political	  environment	  in	  which	  the	  movement	  is	  embedded	  will	  continue	  to	  constitute	  a	  powerful	  set	  of	  constraints/opportunities”	  (McAdam,	  McCarthy	  and	  Zald	  1996:	  12),	  this	  scandal	  changed	  the	  political	  environment	  for	  LGBT	  activists	  by	  weakening	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Church	  and	  giving	  some	  legislators,	  who	  in	  the	  past	  would	  have	  been	  unlikely	  to	  vote	  against	  the	  Church,	  a	  chance	  to	  make	  a	  break	  in	  time	  to	  vote	  in	  favour	  of	  gay	  marriage.	  	  Activist	  Amy	  Hunt	  recalled	  lobbying	  Catholic	  lawmakers	  at	  the	  time,	  	  The	  child	  abuse	  scandal	  made	  [the	  Church]	  far	  less	  effective	  than	  they	  might	  have	  been.	  Catholic	  lawmakers	  who	  otherwise	  would	  have	  said	  to	  me,	  ‘I’m	  sorry	  there’s	  nothing	  I	  can	  do,	  I’ve	  been	  talking	  to	  my	  priest…’	  instead	  came	  over	  and	  started	  crying	  because	  he’s	  incredibly	  disappointed	  in	  the	  Church	  that	  he	  lost	  his	  faith	  in.	  	  	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  call	  this	  very	  unfortunate	  event	  a	  political	  opportunity	  for	  LGBT	  activists,	  but	  it	  did	  serve	  to	  loosen	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	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Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  functioned	  as	  a	  political	  constraint	  on	  mobilization	  for	  LGBT	  rights.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  religious	  argument	  against	  gay	  marriage	  was	  buoyed	  as	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  was	  joined	  in	  coalition	  by	  Protestant	  evangelical	  denominations,	  including	  a	  coalition	  of	  local	  African-­‐American	  churches.	  Although	  Protestants	  as	  a	  group	  traditionally	  carried	  less	  political	  and	  cultural	  influence	  in	  the	  New	  England	  region,	  this	  coalition	  had	  access	  to	  the	  resources	  of	  influential	  national	  groups	  like	  Focus	  on	  the	  Family	  and	  Concerned	  Women	  for	  America.	  	  The	  Massachusetts	  Family	  Institute	  (MFI)	  was	  one	  of	  the	  prominent	  opponents	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  with	  the	  support	  of	  national	  groups	  like	  Focus	  on	  the	  Family.	  The	  MFI’s	  primary	  position	  was	  “in	  keeping	  with	  the	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  principles	  that	  our	  society	  was	  founded	  upon”	  they	  “strongly	  oppose	  any	  efforts	  by	  political	  activists	  to	  normalize	  homosexual	  behavior”	  (http://www.mafamily.org/issues/human-­‐sexuality/).	  	  The	  combined	  resources	  and	  influence	  of	  these	  national	  religious-­‐right	  political	  groups	  made	  them	  a	  formidable	  opponent	  to	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts.	  Another	  frame	  emerged	  in	  the	  constitutional	  convention	  cycle	  that	  gained	  traction	  for	  opponents,	  as	  conservative	  religious	  and	  anti-­‐family	  arguments	  did	  not	  take	  root	  as	  deeply	  as	  they	  might	  have	  hoped.	  	  That	  is	  the	  democratic	  values	  theme	  that	  urged	  legislators	  to	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“Let	  the	  people	  vote”.	  This	  position	  was	  put	  forth	  in	  addition	  to	  conservative	  religious	  arguments	  against	  same	  sex	  marriage	  by	  groups	  like	  MassResistance	  and	  Let	  the	  People	  Vote.	  	  Arline	  Isaacson	  recalled	  that	  this	  created	  an	  internal	  rift	  between	  activists	  and	  some	  of	  their	  legislative	  allies	  that	  she	  referred	  to	  as	  “good	  government	  types”	  and	  “process	  liberals”.	  These	  are	  people	  who	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  democratic	  process	  and	  want	  to	  preserve	  the	  integrity	  of	  that	  process,	  especially	  by	  foregoing	  the	  use	  of	  parliamentary	  tactics	  to	  advance	  a	  legislative	  agenda.	  	  	  This	  is	  an	  important	  frame	  because	  in	  a	  politically	  and	  historically	  aware	  region	  like	  New	  England	  arguments	  over	  democracy	  carry	  significant	  weight.	  	  But	  LGBT	  advocates	  have	  an	  equally	  weighty	  trope	  on	  their	  side:	  freedom	  and	  equality,	  to	  be	  sure,	  but	  also	  that	  the	  constitution	  should	  not	  be	  used	  to	  discriminate.	  	  Activist	  Lisa	  Thompson,	  who	  grew	  up	  in	  Boston	  and	  now	  lives	  in	  western	  Massachusetts,	  observed	  that	  Massachusetts	  residents	  take	  their	  history	  seriously	  and	  that	  amending	  the	  constitution	  was	  not	  something	  citizens	  considered	  lightly,	  “We’ve	  been	  around	  a	  long	  time,	  we	  have	  one	  of	  the	  oldest	  [state]	  constitutions,	  there’s	  a	  pride	  in	  being	  one	  of	  the	  early	  colonies	  [and	  a	  belief	  that]	  there’s	  a	  historical	  consequence	  to	  everything	  we	  do…	  it	  is	  part	  of	  the	  culture	  of	  our	  state.”	  	  Ryan	  Brown,	  a	  field	  organizer	  for	  MassEquality,	  emphasized	  the	  focus	  on	  equality,	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We	  spent	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  finding	  words	  and	  phrases	  that	  would	  resonate	  within	  our	  constituencies.	  	  What	  it	  came	  down	  to	  is	  that	  we	  had	  to	  stop	  the	  straight	  marriage	  vs.	  gay	  marriage	  so	  that	  it	  was	  not	  about	  marriage	  for	  same	  sex	  couples,	  it	  was	  about	  marriage	  equality.	  	  This	  is	  about	  equality	  for	  everyone.	  	  Our	  opponents,	  while	  it	  was	  partly	  about	  traditional	  family	  values,	  the	  way	  they	  really	  spun	  it	  for	  the	  legislature	  was	  that	  our	  legislature	  needed	  to	  follow	  through	  and	  let	  the	  people	  of	  Massachusetts	  vote	  on	  this	  issue.	  	  Their	  campaign	  was	  about	  letting	  the	  people	  vote…	  I	  think	  one	  of	  the	  contributing	  factors	  to	  our	  success	  is	  that	  marriage	  equality	  is	  such	  a	  personal	  thing,	  there’re	  emotions	  around	  that.	  	  There’s	  not	  a	  lot	  of	  emotions	  around	  putting	  the	  issue	  on	  the	  ballot.	  	  Another	  MassEquality	  activist,	  Buzz	  Harris,	  recalled,	  “Our	  newspaper,	  bumper	  sticker,	  our	  sort	  of	  print	  campaign	  focused	  on	  the	  message	  ‘No	  discrimination	  in	  the	  constitution’.	  	  We	  polled	  several	  different	  messages	  by	  phone	  and	  focus	  group	  and	  this	  was	  the	  one	  that	  got	  us	  the	  most	  traction.	  	  I	  don’t	  think	  it	  was	  as	  powerful	  as	  the	  television	  pieces	  [featuring	  LGBT	  families]	  but	  it	  got	  us	  some	  leverage.”	  	  Later,	  MassEquality’s	  2007	  “It’s	  wrong	  to	  vote	  on	  Rights”	  ad	  campaign	  combined	  the	  family	  frame	  with	  the	  democratic	  values	  frame,	  asserting	  that	  the	  fundamental	  democratic	  values	  of	  America	  make	  it	  wrong	  to	  vote	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  a	  minority	  group,	  especially	  rights	  that	  protect	  children	  and	  families,	  even	  gay	  ones.	  	   Meanwhile,	  supporters	  and	  opponents	  of	  gay	  marriage	  were	  gearing	  up	  for	  a	  major	  confrontation	  as	  hearings	  continued	  on	  both	  domestic	  partnership	  legislation	  and	  the	  latest	  DOMA	  attempt,	  and	  the	  SJC	  prepared	  to	  decide	  the	  Goodridge	  case.	  	  As	  gay	  marriage	  opponents	  at	  the	  Massachusetts	  Family	  Institute	  called	  for	  “marriage	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minutemen”	  to	  swarm	  the	  State	  House	  for	  hearings,	  legislators,	  who	  were	  being	  “flooded”	  with	  phone	  calls,	  letters,	  and	  emails	  from	  both	  sides,	  prepared	  for	  “an	  extremely	  emotional	  and	  contentious”	  legislative	  session	  (Abraham	  2003).	  	  Not	  knowing	  how	  the	  court	  would	  decide	  made	  strategizing	  difficult,	  but	  the	  longevity	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  LGBT	  movement	  meant	  that	  many	  activists	  had	  accumulated	  enough	  skill	  and	  knowledge	  to	  push	  on,	  proving	  that	  “in	  terms	  of	  strategy,	  mastery	  of	  specific	  skills-­‐-­‐	  or	  how	  to	  strategize-­‐-­‐	  is	  relevant,	  but	  so	  is	  access	  to	  local	  knowledge	  of	  the	  constituencies,	  opponents,	  and	  third	  parties	  with	  which	  one	  is	  interacting”	  (Ganz	  2004:	  186).	  	  Arline	  Isaacson	  demonstrated	  how,	  in	  a	  time	  when	  lobbying	  was	  difficult,	  she	  used	  local	  knowledge	  to	  develop	  effective	  strategies:	  	  The	  lobbying	  was	  difficult	  without	  knowing	  what	  the	  
Goodridge	  decision	  would	  say.	  	  It	  could	  say	  civil	  unions,	  marriage,	  domestic	  partner	  benefits,	  we	  didn’t	  know	  and	  legislators	  were	  getting	  worried.	  	  We	  needed	  to	  inoculate	  legislators.	  	  So	  we	  crafted	  some	  talking	  points	  that	  would	  give	  them	  some	  wiggle	  room,	  talking	  points	  that	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  say	  that	  they’re	  against	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  but	  not	  lock	  them	  into	  voting	  against	  us.	  And	  you	  can	  do	  that	  by	  saying	  things	  like,	  	  ‘I’m	  against	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  but	  I	  won’t	  vote	  to	  impose	  my	  religious	  beliefs	  on	  anyone	  else.’	  There	  are	  a	  whole	  bunch	  of	  ‘buts’	  that	  would	  inoculate	  them	  in	  that	  fashion	  so	  they	  wouldn’t	  be	  committed	  to	  taking	  a	  position	  against	  us	  in	  the	  constitutional	  convention.	  	  The	  SJC	  was	  taking	  longer	  than	  expected	  to	  decide	  and	  legislators	  grew	  increasingly	  nervous	  that	  the	  court	  would	  decide	  in	  favour	  of	  marriage.	  	  The	  longer	  legislators	  fretted	  over	  marriage,	  the	  more	  their	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nerves	  began	  to	  fray	  and	  they	  started	  to	  offer	  “deals”	  to	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  advocates.	  	  For	  example,	  Representative	  John	  Rogers,	  typically	  viewed	  as	  an	  opponent	  of	  gay	  rights,	  and	  who	  only	  the	  year	  before	  had	  proposed	  an	  amendment	  to	  ban	  gay	  marriage,	  announced	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  committee	  to	  explore	  a	  compromise	  solution	  that	  would	  ban	  gay	  marriage	  but	  allow	  Vermont-­‐style	  civil	  unions	  (Lewis	  2003c).	  	  This	  effort	  caused	  a	  mixed	  reaction	  among	  LGBT	  activists	  and	  their	  legislative	  allies	  between	  those	  who	  favoured	  taking	  the	  civil	  union	  deal	  now	  and	  those	  who	  favoured	  waiting	  for	  the	  court	  to	  decide	  and	  taking	  their	  chances	  in	  the	  constitutional	  conventions	  that	  would	  surely	  follow.	  	  They	  would	  not	  have	  long	  to	  wait.	  	  Within	  weeks,	  the	  Massachusetts	  Supreme	  Judicial	  Court	  issued	  its	  landmark	  ruling	  that	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  citizens	  have	  the	  right	  to	  marry.	  On	  November	  18,	  2003,	  the	  Massachusetts	  Supreme	  Judicial	  Court	  issued	  a	  4-­‐3	  decision	  on	  Goodridge	  v.	  Massachusetts	  Department	  
of	  Public	  Health.	  	  The	  justices	  declared	  that	  the	  “equal	  protection	  and	  due	  process	  provisions	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  constitution…guarantee	  the	  right	  for	  same	  sex	  couples	  to	  marry”	  and	  gave	  the	  legislature	  180	  days	  to	  change	  Massachusetts	  law	  to	  reflect	  the	  ruling	  (Burge	  2003).	  	  The	  opinion	  of	  the	  SJC	  acknowledged	  “full	  deference	  to	  the	  arguments	  made	  by	  the	  commonwealth”	  but	  declared	  the	  Commonwealth	  had	  “failed	  to	  identify	  any	  constitutionally	  adequate	  reason	  for	  denying	  civil	  marriage	  to	  same-­‐sex	  couples”	  (Goodridge	  v.	  Massachusetts	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Department	  of	  Public	  Health	  2003:	  3).	  	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  arguments	  of	  the	  state	  that	  marriage	  had	  historically	  been	  understood	  as	  a	  relationship	  between	  a	  man	  and	  a	  woman,	  the	  SJC	  responded	  that	  “history	  cannot	  and	  does	  not	  foreclose	  the	  constitutional	  question”	  (Goodridge	  v.	  Massachusetts	  Department	  of	  Public	  Health	  2003:	  16).	  	  On	  the	  question	  of	  procreation,	  the	  court	  responded,	  “Our	  laws	  of	  civil	  marriage	  do	  not	  privilege	  procreative	  heterosexual	  intercourse	  between	  married	  people	  above	  all	  other	  forms	  of	  adult	  intimacy	  and	  every	  other	  means	  of	  creating	  a	  family”	  (Goodridge	  v.	  Massachusetts	  
Department	  of	  Public	  Health	  2003:	  39).	  	  Additionally,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  a	  same-­‐sex	  couple	  can	  procreate	  on	  their	  own,	  many	  of	  them	  have	  children	  and	  the	  courts	  asserted	  that	  “the	  fact	  remains	  that	  children	  reap	  a	  measure	  of	  family	  stability	  and	  economic	  security	  based	  on	  their	  parents’	  legally	  privileged	  status	  that	  is	  largely	  inaccessible,	  or	  not	  as	  readily	  accessible,	  to	  nonmarital	  children”	  (Goodridge	  v.	  Massachusetts	  Department	  of	  Public	  Health	  2003:	  24).	  	  Lastly,	  on	  whether	  it	  is	  in	  the	  state’s	  economic	  interest	  to	  limit	  the	  benefits	  of	  marriage	  to	  heterosexual	  couples,	  the	  court	  stated	  flatly,	  “an	  absolute	  statutory	  ban	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  bears	  no	  rational	  relationship	  to	  the	  goal	  of	  economy”	  (Goodridge	  v.	  Massachusetts	  
Department	  of	  Public	  Health	  2003:	  49).	  	  Dissenting	  opinions	  questioned	  whether	  recognition	  of	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  was	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  state,	  argued	  that	  the	  legislature	  should	  make	  changes	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to	  marriage	  law	  without	  interference	  of	  the	  court,	  and/or	  were	  hesitant	  to	  rule	  in	  favour	  of	  social	  change	  when	  there	  was	  no	  scientific	  consensus	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  such	  change	  may	  be	  harmful	  (Goodridge	  v.	  Massachusetts	  Department	  of	  Public	  Health	  2003).	  	  Because	  the	  case	  was	  decided	  on	  state	  constitutional	  grounds	  rather	  than	  federal	  constitutional	  grounds,	  it	  could	  not	  be	  appealed	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  	  	  	  The	  Goodridge	  decision	  reflects	  a	  pattern	  of	  jurisprudence	  illustrated	  in	  previous	  family	  law	  decisions	  made	  by	  the	  SJC;	  specifically,	  that	  the	  court	  did	  not	  create	  new	  family	  forms	  per	  se,	  but	  recognised	  family	  forms,	  traditional	  or	  otherwise,	  that	  already	  existed.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  its	  ruling	  on	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  the	  court	  made	  clear	  that	  while	  it	  was	  outside	  of	  the	  SJC’s	  jurisdiction	  to	  change	  the	  law	  on	  domestic	  partner	  benefits,	  it	  supported	  such	  change	  because	  the	  current	  laws	  do	  not	  reflect	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  modern	  family	  (Pfeiffer	  1999).	  	  Similarly,	  in	  its	  decision	  on	  Goodridge,	  the	  court	  conceded	  that	  same-­‐sex	  families	  already	  existed,	  that	  many	  such	  families	  had	  children,	  and	  not	  only	  was	  it	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  state	  to	  extend	  the	  rights	  and	  benefits	  of	  marriage	  to	  these	  families,	  to	  not	  do	  so	  amounted	  to	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  state	  constitution.	  	  This	  reflects	  legal	  theorist	  Ronald	  Dworkin’s	  (1986:	  225)	  view	  that	  “legal	  claims	  are	  interpretive	  judgements	  and	  therefore	  combine	  backward	  and	  forward	  looking	  elements;	  they	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interpret	  contemporary	  legal	  practice	  seen	  as	  an	  unfolding	  political	  narrative.”	  	  In	  this	  case	  the	  Massachusetts	  Supreme	  Judicial	  Court	  looked	  back	  and	  saw	  same-­‐sex	  families	  were	  already	  there.	  	  They	  looked	  back	  to	  interpret	  existing	  state	  law	  and	  the	  state	  constitution,	  and	  then	  looked	  forward	  to	  see	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  families	  would	  benefit	  from	  legal	  protection.	  	  	  The	  SJC	  took	  its	  place	  in	  this	  unfolding	  political	  narrative,	  and	  made	  a	  decision	  in	  the	  case	  with	  a	  nod	  to	  the	  past	  and	  future	  of	  marriage	  law	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  Predictably,	  the	  LGBT	  community	  and	  allies	  celebrated	  the	  ruling	  while	  gay	  marriage	  opponents	  responded	  with	  renewed	  vigilance	  in	  fighting	  for	  a	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act.	  	  For	  LGBT	  activists,	  the	  question	  was	  how	  would	  the	  legislature	  react?	  	  Arline	  Isaacson	  said,	  It	  was	  a	  mind-­‐blowing	  decision	  for	  legislators	  who	  didn’t	  really	  see	  it	  coming.	  Most	  of	  them	  didn’t	  think	  we	  would	  really	  have	  marriage.	  	  Legislators	  who	  were	  previously	  opposed	  to	  all	  gay	  rights	  were	  suddenly	  tripping	  over	  themselves	  to	  give	  us	  civil	  unions,	  and	  we	  said,	  ‘Thank	  you	  very	  much,	  but	  we	  just	  want	  marriage.’	  	  Then	  House	  Speaker	  Tom	  Finneran	  asserted	  three	  options	  for	  the	  legislature	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  ruling	  within	  the	  180	  days	  allotted	  by	  the	  court,	  	  “a	  constitutional	  amendment	  to	  ban	  gay	  marriage,	  a	  civil	  unions	  bill	  for	  same	  sex	  partners,	  or	  doing	  nothing	  and	  letting	  the	  ruling	  stand”	  (Lewis	  2003b).	  	  Finneran	  did	  not	  indicate	  where	  he	  stood,	  though	  he	  had	  supported	  efforts	  to	  ban	  gay	  marriage	  in	  the	  past.	  	  Senate	  President	  Bob	  Travaglini	  came	  out	  against	  gay	  marriage	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but	  in	  support	  of	  civil	  unions,	  and	  Governor	  Mitt	  Romney	  came	  out	  “strongly	  against	  gay	  marriage”	  while	  supporting	  “a	  parallel	  track	  to	  establish	  some	  rights	  for	  same	  sex	  couples”	  (Klein	  2003,	  Lewis	  2003b).	  	  	  With	  the	  three	  most	  powerful	  lawmakers	  in	  the	  state	  against	  gay	  marriage	  and	  a	  DOMA	  amendment	  making	  its	  way	  through	  the	  legislature,	  this	  was	  not	  a	  comfortable	  place	  for	  LGBT	  activists	  and	  legislative	  allies	  who	  supported	  gay	  marriage.	  	  The	  interaction	  of	  the	  three	  most	  powerful	  politicians	  in	  the	  state	  (the	  governor,	  Senate	  president,	  and	  Speaker	  of	  the	  House)	  would	  underscore	  the	  observation	  that	  potentially	  “volatile	  elements	  [of	  political	  opportunity	  structures]	  are	  more	  useful	  in	  understanding	  the	  process	  of	  interaction	  between	  the	  opening	  and	  closing	  of	  political	  space	  and	  the	  strategic	  choices	  of	  movements”	  (Gamson	  and	  Meyer	  1996:	  289).	  Finally,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  seek	  some	  middle	  ground	  the	  Massachusetts	  Senate	  created	  a	  “sweeping	  civil	  unions	  bill	  that…provides	  all	  the	  protection,	  obligations,	  and	  benefits	  of	  civil	  marriage”	  and	  sent	  it	  to	  the	  SJC	  for	  an	  advisory	  opinion	  to	  ask	  if	  such	  legislation	  would	  be	  in	  line	  with	  the	  court’s	  decision.	  	  	  If	  Vermont’s	  civil	  unions	  were	  a	  “moral	  shock”	  for	  gay	  marriage	  opponents,	  the	  Goodridge	  decision	  pushed	  them	  one	  step	  further.	  	  One	  potential	  extension	  of	  moral	  shock	  was	  “attack	  mode”.	  	  Moving	  from	  moral	  shock	  to	  attack	  mode	  requires	  that	  “inchoate	  anxieties	  or	  fears	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must	  be	  transformed	  into	  moral	  indignation	  or	  anger	  toward	  concrete	  policies	  and	  decision	  makers”	  (Jasper	  1997:	  107).	  	  Mobilizing	  a	  constituency	  into	  attack	  mode	  “requires	  activists	  to	  weave	  together	  a	  moral,	  cognitive,	  and	  emotional	  package	  of	  attitudes.	  By	  framing	  the	  problem	  [in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to]	  suggest	  a	  moral	  judgment:	  disregard	  or	  abuse	  of	  humans	  by	  bureaucracy.	  	  The	  proper	  emotion	  shifts	  from	  dread	  to	  outrage.	  	  There	  is	  someone	  to	  blame”	  (Jasper	  1997:	  107).	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  target	  of	  gay	  marriage	  opponents’	  outrage	  became	  “unelected	  judges	  [who]	  have	  usurped	  the	  power	  of	  the	  legislature”	  and	  gay	  marriage	  opponents	  increasingly	  used	  criticism	  of	  “activist	  judges”	  to	  assert	  “that	  Bay	  State	  voters	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  vote	  on	  this	  divisive	  issue,	  not	  the	  Supreme	  Judicial	  Court”	  (Lewis	  2004d).	  	  Despite	  being	  weakened	  by	  the	  child	  sexual	  abuse	  scandal,	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  also	  swung	  into	  attack	  mode,	  launching	  what	  the	  four	  Massachusetts	  bishops	  described	  as	  an	  “unprecedented	  effort	  to	  mobilize	  the	  state’s	  3	  million	  Catholics”	  including	  the	  distribution	  of	  “mailings	  to	  1	  million	  households	  urging	  laypeople	  to	  speak	  out	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  state	  constitutional	  amendment	  defining	  marriage	  as	  a	  union	  between	  one	  man	  and	  one	  woman”	  (Paulson	  2004).	  	  	  	  With	  Massachusetts	  Democrats	  split	  on	  gay	  marriage	  and	  a	  pending	  Constitutional	  convention	  on	  Representative	  Travis’	  DOMA	  amendment,	  LGBT	  activists	  mobilized	  their	  supporters	  and	  sought	  to	  consolidate	  their	  lobbying	  efforts.	  	  Gay	  marriage	  opponents	  had	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recently	  formed	  the	  Coalition	  for	  Marriage,	  and	  had	  the	  backing	  of	  national	  groups	  whose	  budgets	  dwarfed	  those	  of	  even	  national	  LGBT	  rights	  organizations.	  	  Pro-­‐gay	  marriage	  activists	  knew	  grassroots	  mobilizing	  would	  be	  key,	  and	  in	  early	  2004	  gained	  the	  support	  of	  national	  gay	  rights	  groups	  who	  contributed	  money	  to	  hiring	  a	  campaign	  director	  who	  spearheaded	  the	  grassroots	  mobilization	  effort	  at	  MassEquality.	  As	  opponents	  like	  MassResistance	  and	  Let	  the	  People	  Vote	  cried	  out	  to	  “Let	  the	  people	  vote”	  on	  a	  constitutional	  amendment	  to	  ban	  gay	  marriage,	  MassEquality	  countered	  with,	  “The	  constitution-­‐-­‐	  defend	  it,	  don’t	  amend	  it”	  (Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2008:	  69).	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Religious	  Coalition	  for	  the	  Freedom	  to	  Marry,	  the	  public	  support	  of	  labour	  unions	  buoyed	  activists	  and	  added	  a	  much	  needed	  counterweight	  to	  the	  claims	  of	  the	  opposition	  that	  their	  side	  alone	  could	  claim	  both	  religious	  high	  ground	  and	  that	  only	  they	  spoke	  for	  average,	  hard	  working,	  tax	  paying	  citizens.	  	  	  As	  the	  February	  2004	  constitutional	  convention	  concerning	  Rep.	  Travis’s	  constitutional	  amendment	  approached,	  the	  SJC	  made	  clear	  that	  civil	  unions	  were	  not	  an	  acceptable	  compromise,	  saying	  such	  unions	  would	  create	  “an	  unconstitutional,	  inferior,	  and	  discriminatory	  status	  for	  same-­‐sex	  couples”	  and	  that	  “separate	  is	  seldom,	  if	  ever,	  equal”	  (Lewis	  2004c).	  	  The	  African	  American	  civil	  rights	  movement	  had	  seared	  into	  the	  American	  collective	  conscience	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that	  ‘separate	  is	  not	  equal’,	  and	  by	  engaging	  this	  past	  cultural	  trope	  the	  court	  reinforced	  the	  “mutually	  sustaining	  relationship	  between	  institutions	  and	  culture”	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  shaped	  the	  politics	  and	  culture	  of	  the	  present	  day	  (Gamson	  and	  Meyer	  1996:	  282).	  With	  the	  constitutional	  convention	  less	  than	  two	  weeks	  away,	  the	  SJC,	  by	  doing	  away	  with	  civil	  unions,	  had	  “eliminated	  any	  wiggle	  room	  for	  a	  very	  nervous	  political	  establishment	  to	  deal	  with	  what	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  politically	  and	  emotionally	  charged	  issue	  that	  has	  come	  to	  Beacon	  Hill	  in	  decades”,	  and	  the	  Boston	  Globe	  described	  a	  legislature	  “in	  turmoil”	  (Phillips	  2004).	  	  LGBT	  activists	  were	  also	  in	  turmoil	  over	  the	  upcoming	  vote,	  Arline	  Isaacson	  recalled,	  	  It	  was	  horrible	  timing	  because	  the	  legislature	  was	  still	  in	  panic	  mode.	  There	  has	  never	  been	  such	  a	  white	  hot,	  intensely	  passionate	  battle	  over	  anything	  in	  the	  last	  twenty	  years.	  	  Never	  had	  I	  seen	  so	  many	  legislators	  torn	  about	  what	  to	  do.	  	  Never	  had	  I	  seen	  so	  many	  legislators	  struggling.	  Never	  had	  I	  seen	  so	  many	  legislators	  cry.	  	  On	  the	  day	  the	  constitutional	  convention	  convened,	  the	  area	  in	  and	  around	  the	  State	  House	  was	  packed	  with	  thousands	  of	  supporters	  (many	  of	  whom	  sang	  patriotic	  songs	  and	  held	  signs	  urging	  legislators	  to	  “Defend	  the	  constitution-­‐-­‐	  Don’t	  amend	  it”)	  and	  perhaps	  just	  as	  many	  opponents	  of	  gay	  marriage	  (of	  whom	  many	  shouted	  and	  held	  signs	  saying	  “Let	  the	  people	  vote”,	  prayed,	  and	  otherwise	  invoked	  conservative	  religious	  reasons	  to	  oppose	  gay	  marriage).	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In	  an	  effort	  to	  ease	  the	  tension	  in	  the	  legislature,	  Senate	  President	  Travaglini	  and	  Senate	  minority	  leader	  Brian	  Lees	  had	  announced	  an	  alternative	  amendment	  to	  be	  voted	  on	  at	  the	  constitutional	  convention,	  one	  that	  would	  ban	  gay	  marriage	  but	  would	  also	  establish	  full	  and	  equal	  civil	  unions	  (Philips	  and	  Lewis	  2004).	  	  Neither	  gay	  rights	  activists,	  who,	  now	  having	  marriage,	  felt	  civil	  unions	  were	  a	  step	  back,	  nor	  their	  conservative	  opponents,	  who	  opposed	  any	  legal	  recognition	  for	  same	  sex	  couples,	  supported	  the	  Travaglini-­‐Lees	  version	  of	  the	  amendment.	  	  Then,	  in	  a	  surprise	  move,	  as	  he	  opened	  the	  convention	  Speaker	  of	  the	  House	  Tom	  Finneran	  announced	  his	  own	  amendment	  that	  would	  ban	  gay	  marriage	  but	  would	  “allow	  the	  legislature	  to	  create	  civil	  unions	  at	  a	  later	  date,	  if	  they	  so	  chose”	  (Klein	  2004a).	  	  Finneran’s	  amendment	  was	  defeated	  after	  several	  hours	  of	  deliberation	  but	  the	  Travaglini-­‐Lees	  compromise	  was	  left	  hanging	  in	  the	  air.	  	  Here	  activists’	  strategic	  capacity	  was	  imperative	  because	  of	  the	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  political	  and	  cultural	  climates	  at	  the	  time;	  “under	  conditions	  of	  uncertainty,	  the	  capability	  to	  generate	  new	  algorithms,	  when	  rooted	  in	  a	  deep	  understanding	  of	  the	  environment,	  is	  more	  strategically	  valuable	  than	  the	  capacity	  to	  apply	  known	  algorithms,	  no	  matter	  how	  expertly”	  (Ganz	  2004:	  195).	  	  	  Utilizing	  their	  deep	  understanding	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  legislature	  and	  political	  process,	  leading	  lobbyists	  Norma	  Shapiro	  of	  the	  ACLU	  and	  Arline	  Isaacson	  of	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the	  MGLPC	  immediately	  began	  to	  advocate	  a	  novel	  and	  controversial	  strategy	  to	  kill	  the	  Travaglini-­‐Lees	  amendment	  that	  they	  called	  the	  “yes,	  yes,	  no”	  strategy.	  	  They	  urged	  their	  allies	  in	  the	  State	  House	  to	  vote	  yes	  on	  the	  Travaglini-­‐Lees	  amendment	  that	  would	  ban	  gay	  marriage	  but	  guarantee	  civil	  unions	  in	  the	  first	  round	  of	  constitutional	  conventions.	  This	  would	  kill	  the	  Travis	  amendment	  that	  would	  have	  banned	  gay	  marriage	  altogether.	  The	  Traveglini-­‐Lees	  amendment	  passed	  which	  then	  required	  the	  constitutional	  convention	  process	  to	  begin	  again,	  this	  time	  to	  decide	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  Travaglini-­‐Lees	  version	  of	  the	  constitutional	  amendment.	  Legislative	  supporters	  were	  asked	  to	  vote	  yes	  on	  the	  Travaglini-­‐Lees	  amendment	  again	  at	  the	  first	  convention,	  then	  pull	  their	  support	  and	  vote	  no	  on	  the	  amendment	  at	  the	  second	  constitutional	  convention	  so	  that	  the	  SJC’s	  Goodridge	  decision	  would	  stand.	  	  	  This	  was	  controversial	  because	  it	  meant	  that	  legislative	  allies	  were	  essentially	  voting	  for	  an	  amendment	  to	  ban	  gay	  marriage	  (even	  though	  it	  would	  allow	  civil	  unions),	  but	  lobbyists	  were	  able	  to	  convince	  them	  to	  make	  this	  strategic	  vote	  that	  (they	  hoped)	  would	  end	  up	  preserving	  the	  SJC’s	  marriage	  decision.	  	  Arline	  Isaacson	  explains	  the	  rationale	  behind	  this	  strategy:	  	  The	  goal	  was	  to	  buy	  us	  time	  to	  get	  to	  the	  next	  legislative	  session.	  	  We	  knew	  in	  the	  intervening	  year	  [between	  legislative	  sessions],	  we’d	  have	  more	  time	  to	  lobby	  and	  win	  more	  votes.	  	  Time	  was	  on	  our	  side.	  	  Plus,	  people	  would	  be	  married	  and	  that	  would	  change	  how	  people	  viewed	  it.	  Then	  it	  wouldn’t	  be	  so	  threatening	  or	  so	  bad	  and	  more	  legislators	  would	  vote	  with	  us.	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  As	  alliances	  and	  strategies	  shifted,	  the	  first	  round	  of	  constitutional	  conventions	  in	  February	  2004	  ended	  and	  activists	  regrouped	  for	  the	  start	  of	  the	  next	  constitutional	  convention	  cycle	  in	  March.	  	  Over	  the	  next	  month,	  both	  sides	  continued	  to	  rally	  and	  push	  to	  gain	  support	  and	  votes	  in	  the	  legislature.	  LGBT	  allies	  stood	  outside	  of	  polling	  places	  at	  the	  March	  presidential	  primary	  and	  urged	  gay	  marriage	  supporters	  to	  contact	  their	  legislators,	  MassEquality	  continued	  to	  run	  television	  ads	  in	  support	  of	  marriage	  while	  their	  volunteers	  knocked	  on	  doors	  in	  “swing	  communities”	  around	  greater	  Boston,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  gay	  marriage	  opponents	  used	  churches	  to	  organize	  voter	  drives	  and	  focused	  on	  radio	  advertisements	  against	  gay	  marriage,	  and	  citizens	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  issue	  took	  out	  ads	  in	  their	  local	  papers	  (Abraham	  2004a,	  DeMarco	  2004,	  Jacobs	  2004,	  Weiss	  2004).	  	  When	  the	  constitutional	  convention	  re-­‐convened	  in	  March	  2004,	  gay	  marriage	  supporters	  again	  took	  pains	  to	  take	  the	  high	  road,	  remaining	  peaceful	  and	  singing	  patriotic	  and	  civil	  rights	  anthems	  like	  God	  Bless	  America	  and	  We	  Shall	  Overcome,	  which	  contrasted	  sharply	  with	  the	  angry	  shouting	  and	  demeaning	  signs	  held	  by	  many	  of	  their	  opponents.	  	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  convention,	  it	  appeared	  that	  the	  controversial	  yes,	  yes,	  no	  strategy	  had	  worked:	  essentially	  LGBT	  activists	  lost	  marriage	  that	  day	  but	  Isaacson	  said,	  “We	  lost	  in	  a	  way	  that	  was	  really	  a	  win.	  	  We	  beat	  the	  bad	  amendment,	  and	  in	  the	  end	  we	  had	  an	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amendment	  that	  took	  away	  marriage	  but	  guaranteed	  civil	  unions	  and	  it	  drove	  our	  opponents	  crazy.”	  Crazy	  enough,	  in	  fact,	  that	  opponents	  announced	  yet	  another	  petition	  drive	  for	  a	  ballot	  initiative	  that	  would	  ban	  gay	  marriage	  and	  civil	  unions	  if	  approved	  (Abraham	  2004c).	  	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  however,	  activists	  had	  the	  advantage	  of	  time	  to	  win	  over	  the	  hearts	  and	  minds	  of	  legislators	  and	  their	  fellow	  citizens	  before	  the	  current	  constitutional	  convention	  resumed	  for	  the	  final	  vote	  and	  the	  Travaglini-­‐Lees	  amendment	  in	  the	  2005	  legislative	  cycle.	  	  	  When	  the	  March	  constitutional	  convention	  ended	  with	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Traveglini-­‐Lees	  compromise,	  both	  sides	  were	  disappointed.	  	  One	  legislator	  recalled,	  “When	  the	  vote	  was	  announced	  there	  was	  no	  cheering,	  only	  an	  eerie	  silence	  in	  the	  chamber	  as	  legislators	  drifted	  out”	  (Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2008:	  95).	  	  LGBT	  activists	  and	  allies,	  though,	  had	  won	  what	  they	  needed	  most-­‐-­‐	  time.	  	  Before	  the	  next	  constitutional	  convention	  in	  2005,	  not	  only	  did	  activists	  have	  time	  to	  educate	  the	  public	  and	  lobby	  legislators	  to	  win	  votes,	  perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  couples	  began	  getting	  married.	  	  	  	  When	  the	  legislature	  had	  not	  acted	  to	  change	  marriage	  laws	  in	  the	  180	  day	  timeframe	  set	  out	  by	  the	  SJC,	  Governor	  Mitt	  Romney	  reluctantly	  ordered	  town	  clerks	  to	  issue	  marriage	  licenses	  to	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Court’s	  ruling	  on	  Goodridge	  (Lewis	  2004b).	  	  When	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  couples	  began	  getting	  married	  on	  May	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17,	  2004,	  gay	  families	  dominated	  the	  news	  cycle	  for	  the	  entire	  week.	  	  Gay	  marriage	  opponents	  held	  “scattered	  protests”	  on	  what	  some	  of	  them	  called	  “marriage	  destruction	  day”,	  but	  those	  counting	  on	  a	  “backlash	  to	  the	  legalization	  of	  same	  sex	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts	  to	  help	  them	  marshal	  public	  support”	  were	  likely	  disappointed	  (Klein	  2004b).	  	  Observers	  noted,	  “The	  positive	  public	  spirit	  that	  enveloped	  the	  entire	  state	  seemed	  immune	  to	  the	  negative	  predictions	  of	  gay	  marriage	  opponents,	  who	  forecast	  the	  end	  of	  civilization	  as	  we	  know	  it.	  	  With	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  in	  every	  community	  in	  the	  state	  publicly	  declaring	  their	  love,	  it	  was	  becoming	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  cast	  them	  in	  the	  role	  of	  enemy	  citizens”	  (Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2008:	  107).	  	  	  As	  public	  opinion	  polls	  showed	  support	  increasing	  for	  gay	  marriage,	  momentum	  continued	  to	  build	  for	  gay	  marriage	  proponents	  in	  another	  important	  way:	  elections.	  	  As	  Ganz	  (2004:	  181)	  asserts,	  “a	  critical	  strategic	  goal	  of	  those	  contesting	  power	  is	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  turn	  short-­‐term	  opportunities	  into	  long-­‐term	  gains	  by	  institutionalizing	  them”,	  and	  what	  better	  way	  to	  institutionalize	  a	  political	  opportunity	  or	  legislative	  gain	  than	  by	  ensuring	  that	  your	  political	  and	  legislative	  allies	  retain	  their	  elected	  positions?	  Knowing	  that	  legislators	  who	  voted	  for	  civil	  unions	  in	  Vermont	  had	  faced	  severe	  repercussions	  at	  the	  polls,	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts	  were	  determined	  to	  protect	  their	  legislative	  allies.	  They	  knew	  they	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  lose	  a	  single	  vote	  heading	  into	  the	  next	  constitutional	  convention.	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As	  early	  as	  June	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  gay	  marriage	  was	  “already	  fuelling	  campaign	  fireworks”	  and	  was	  likely	  to	  continue	  to	  dominate	  the	  election	  cycle	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  vote	  in	  November	  (Kocian	  2004).	  	  However,	  MassEquality	  was	  working	  with	  a	  highly	  motivated	  base	  of	  volunteers	  and	  utilized	  those	  volunteers	  in	  campaigns	  across	  the	  state	  to	  protect	  legislators	  who	  supported	  gay	  marriage.	  	  MassEquality	  Field	  Organizer	  Ryan	  Brown	  recalls,	  “We	  got	  involved	  in	  over	  350	  elections.	  	  To	  this	  day	  no	  legislator	  lost	  their	  seat	  because	  of	  their	  vote	  for	  marriage	  equality.	  	  We	  had	  200,000	  members	  across	  the	  state	  and	  we	  would	  tell	  our	  members	  to	  get	  involved	  in	  a	  race	  because	  we	  really	  needed	  to	  protect	  that	  person.”	  	  In	  fact,	  not	  only	  did	  gay	  marriage	  supporters	  in	  the	  legislature	  keep	  their	  seats,	  LGBT	  advocates	  actually	  gained	  some	  additional	  legislative	  allies.	  	  	  One	  of	  these	  new	  legislative	  allies	  was	  openly	  gay	  Carl	  Sciortino,	  who	  describes	  the	  way	  his	  incumbent	  opponent	  “went	  very	  anti-­‐gay	  [in	  his	  campaign].	  	  Going	  into	  November	  his	  whole	  campaign	  was	  focused	  on	  my	  being	  gay	  and	  my	  support	  of	  gay	  marriage	  and	  it	  backfired	  heavily	  on	  him.	  	  We	  won	  two	  to	  one.”	  	  The	  November	  elections	  ended	  in	  a	  net	  increase	  of	  two	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  supporters	  in	  the	  Massachusetts	  legislature,	  and	  not	  long	  afterward	  anti-­‐gay	  Speaker	  of	  the	  House	  Tom	  Finneran	  resigned	  and	  was	  replaced	  by	  LGBT	  ally	  Sal	  DiMasi.	  	  According	  to	  Sidney	  Tarrow	  (1998:79),	  “Challengers	  are	  encouraged	  to	  take	  action	  when	  they	  have	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allies	  who	  can	  act	  as	  friends	  in	  court,	  as	  guarantors	  against	  repression,	  or	  as	  acceptable	  negotiators	  on	  their	  behalf”.	  	  Thus	  the	  legislative	  restructuring	  that	  occurred	  gave	  LGBT	  activists	  cautious	  optimism	  heading	  into	  the	  next	  constitutional	  convention	  cycle.	  As	  time	  passed	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  next	  constitutional	  convention,	  polls	  continued	  showing	  an	  increase	  in	  support	  for	  gay	  marriage	  (Phillips	  2005).	  Reports	  indicated	  that	  in	  the	  time	  that	  passed	  since	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  couples	  had	  been	  getting	  married,	  “The	  news	  is	  how	  little	  news	  there	  really	  has	  been.	  Almost	  everyone	  calmed	  down.	  	  Couples	  got	  married	  and	  went	  on	  with	  their	  lives.	  	  It	  got	  hard	  to	  remember	  what	  all	  of	  the	  fuss	  was	  about”	  (Walker	  2005).	  	  Of	  course,	  for	  LGBT	  activists	  the	  “fuss”	  remained	  over	  the	  pressing	  need	  to	  defeat	  the	  Travaglini-­‐Lees	  amendment	  in	  the	  next	  constitutional	  convention,	  and	  after	  that	  defeating	  the	  initiative	  petition	  that	  was	  being	  circulated	  to	  put	  an	  anti-­‐gay-­‐marriage	  amendment	  on	  the	  2008	  ballot.	  	  	  During	  this	  time,	  activists	  had	  also	  been	  working	  on	  outreach	  and	  education,	  for	  example,	  explaining	  why	  civil	  unions	  relegated	  LGBT	  couples	  and	  families	  to	  second-­‐class	  status.	  	  This	  was	  particularly	  important	  because	  they	  needed	  to	  convince	  legislators	  to	  vote	  against	  the	  civil	  union	  compromise	  bill	  in	  the	  upcoming	  constitutional	  convention.	  	  Some	  activists	  conceded	  that	  this	  was	  something	  they	  had	  to	  understand	  themselves	  first.	  	  For	  example,	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Bruce	  Bell	  who	  worked	  with	  GLAD,	  said,	  “For	  a	  while	  I	  didn’t	  understand	  the	  difference.	  	  I	  was	  like,	  well,	  we’re	  going	  to	  get	  the	  same	  rights,	  who	  cares?	  But	  at	  the	  federal	  level,	  federal	  law	  only	  talks	  about	  marriage.	  	  And	  then	  there’s	  the	  whole	  separate	  but	  equal	  thing.”	  	  The	  idea	  that	  civil	  unions	  were	  separate	  from	  and	  unequal	  to	  marriage	  created	  a	  “cultural	  contradiction”	  that	  activists	  utilized	  for	  mobilization.	  	  Here	  it	  was	  themes	  of	  equal	  marriage	  rights	  for	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  couples	  coming	  up	  against	  the	  idea	  of	  creating	  a	  separate	  institution	  to	  administer	  those	  rights.	  	  	  The	  very	  phrase	  “separate	  but	  equal”	  draws	  on	  the	  history	  of	  legal	  segregation	  and	  the	  struggle	  for	  racial	  equality	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  thus	  held	  particular	  significance	  for	  African	  American	  legislators	  like	  Diane	  Wilkerson,	  who	  gave	  an	  impassioned	  speech	  early	  on	  in	  the	  debate	  over	  gay	  marriage	  invoking	  her	  family	  history	  and	  experience	  with	  segregation	  in	  the	  American	  South.	  In	  her	  emotional	  delivery	  of	  that	  speech,	  she	  concluded,	  “I	  could	  not	  in	  good	  conscience	  ever	  send	  anyone	  to	  that	  place	  from	  which	  my	  family	  fled”,	  referring	  to	  the	  second	  class	  status	  conferred	  by	  the	  establishment	  of	  separate	  institutions	  for	  white	  and	  non-­‐white	  racial	  groups	  in	  the	  Jim	  Crow	  era.	  	  Another	  African	  American	  ally	  in	  the	  State	  House,	  Byron	  Rushing,	  a	  long	  time	  supporter	  of	  LGBT	  rights,	  convinced	  his	  office	  mate	  in	  the	  House,	  Doug	  Peterson,	  to	  support	  gay	  marriage	  by	  asking	  him,	  “Doug,	  if	  we	  said	  to	  African	  Americans,	  you	  can	  have	  all	  the	  rights	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and	  benefits	  of	  marriage,	  but	  we’re	  going	  to	  call	  it	  civil	  unions,	  how	  would	  you	  vote?”	  (quoted	  in	  Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2008:	  85).	  	  	  	  Openly	  gay	  legislators	  were	  also	  important	  in	  establishing	  through	  personal	  interactions	  with	  other	  legislators	  that	  the	  separate	  but	  equal	  strategy	  was	  anything	  but	  equal.	  For	  example,	  conservative	  Republican	  Shaun	  Kelley	  emerged	  as	  a	  vocal	  ally	  to	  the	  LGBT	  community	  because	  of	  his	  friendship	  with	  openly	  gay	  Democrat	  Liz	  Malia	  (Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2008).	  Interactions	  between	  legislators	  were	  integral	  in	  winning	  the	  votes	  needed	  to	  make	  the	  yes-­‐yes-­‐no	  strategy	  work	  by	  convincing	  legislators	  to	  vote	  against	  the	  Traveglini-­‐Lees	  amendment	  in	  the	  end.	  	  While	  it	  appeared	  that	  enough	  votes	  might	  have	  been	  accumulated	  to	  vote	  down	  the	  Travaglini-­‐Lees	  civil	  union	  amendment	  in	  the	  next	  constitutional	  convention,	  the	  petition	  drive	  under	  way	  ensured	  this	  would	  not	  be	  the	  last	  battle	  in	  what	  had	  seemingly	  become	  a	  war	  of	  attrition	  over	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts.	  Activists	  pulled	  out	  all	  the	  stops.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  lobbying	  legislators,	  holding	  rallies,	  canvassing	  neighbourhoods	  door-­‐to-­‐door,	  and	  buying	  advertisements,	  activists	  Norma	  Shapiro	  of	  the	  ACLU,	  with	  Arline	  Isaacson	  and	  Bill	  Conley	  at	  MGLPC,	  went	  as	  far	  as	  seeking	  out	  “gay	  siblings	  and	  children	  of	  legislators	  to	  convince	  their	  relatives	  to	  vote	  against	  the	  amendment”	  and	  even	  spent	  the	  summer	  months	  leading	  
	  	   209	  
up	  to	  the	  convention	  driving	  these	  family	  members	  “far	  and	  wide	  to	  meet	  legislators”	  (Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2008:	  115).	  	  	  The	  relentless	  strategizing	  worked.	  	  As	  the	  constitutional	  convention	  reconvened	  on	  September	  15,	  2005,	  Senate	  minority	  leader	  Brian	  Lees,	  co-­‐sponsor	  of	  the	  civil	  union	  amendment	  about	  to	  be	  voted	  on,	  announced	  that	  he	  had	  come	  to	  oppose	  his	  own	  amendment.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  “more	  than	  7000	  letters,	  emails,	  and	  telephone	  calls”	  he	  received	  from	  constituents,	  what	  changed	  his	  mind	  was	  that,	  “Gay	  marriage	  had	  begun	  and	  life	  has	  not	  changed	  for	  the	  citizens	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  those	  can	  now	  marry	  who	  couldn’t	  before.	  	  This	  amendment	  was	  an	  appropriate	  measure	  of	  compromise	  a	  year	  ago	  but	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  today”	  (Gozemba	  and	  Kahn	  2008:	  119).	  	  The	  legislature	  voted	  157-­‐39	  to	  defeat	  the	  separate	  but	  equal	  amendment,	  leaving	  the	  SJC’s	  decision	  intact.	  	  The	  crowds	  at	  the	  State	  House	  cheered	  at	  the	  defeat	  of	  the	  convention	  on	  the	  Travaglini-­‐Lees	  amendment.	  	  However,	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  activists	  had	  little	  time	  to	  celebrate	  their	  victory	  because	  a	  citizen’s	  petition	  drive	  was	  under	  way	  to	  gather	  signatures	  to	  put	  an	  anti-­‐gay	  marriage	  amendment	  on	  the	  ballot.	  	  	  On	  December	  7,	  2005	  the	  anti-­‐gay	  marriage	  group	  Vote	  On	  Marriage	  delivered	  enough	  signatures	  to	  put	  the	  anti-­‐	  gay	  marriage	  amendment	  on	  the	  ballot	  for	  the	  next	  election	  (Helman	  2006).	  The	  referendum	  would	  appear	  on	  the	  ballot	  in	  2008	  if	  approved	  by	  just	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fifty	  legislators	  in	  a	  constitutional	  convention	  cycle.	  	  With	  the	  increase	  in	  public	  and	  legislative	  support	  for	  gay	  marriage	  coming	  to	  fruition	  with	  a	  win	  in	  the	  latest	  constitutional	  convention,	  some	  LGBT	  activists	  and	  allies	  felt	  confident	  that	  the	  upcoming	  initiative	  petition	  could	  be	  beaten	  with	  an	  up	  or	  down	  vote	  in	  the	  constitutional	  convention	  and	  preferred	  this	  to	  using	  parliamentary	  tactics	  to	  beat	  the	  petition	  in	  the	  constitutional	  convention	  cycle	  to	  follow.	  	  Others	  were	  less	  optimistic.	  In	  the	  last	  constitutional	  convention	  LGBT	  activists	  needed	  only	  51%	  of	  the	  legislature	  to	  vote	  with	  them	  on	  legislatively	  introduced	  amendments.	  	  To	  beat	  a	  citizens’	  initiative	  petition	  in	  the	  constitutional	  convention,	  they	  would	  need	  over	  75%	  of	  the	  legislature	  on	  their	  side.	  	  Field	  Organizer	  Ryan	  Brown	  explains	  what	  activists	  were	  up	  against,	  “We	  needed	  to	  convince	  151	  legislators	  to	  not	  only	  support	  marriage	  equality	  but	  to	  vote	  the	  way	  we	  needed	  them	  to	  vote	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  question	  from	  being	  put	  on	  the	  ballot,	  which	  is	  a	  whole	  other	  battle.”	  	  Brown,	  with	  MassEquality	  volunteers,	  pounded	  the	  pavement,	  knocked	  on	  doors	  in	  key	  districts,	  handed	  out	  cards	  for	  constituents	  to	  mail	  into	  their	  legislators,	  and	  even	  dialled	  legislators	  on	  his	  personal	  cell	  phone	  so	  that	  constituents	  could	  leave	  messages	  for	  their	  representatives.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time	  Arline	  Isaacson	  of	  the	  MGLPC,	  Norma	  Shapiro	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  ACLU,	  and	  others	  continued	  their	  lobbying	  efforts	  at	  the	  State	  House	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and	  strategized	  ways	  to	  beat	  the	  initiative	  petition	  at	  the	  ballot	  box,	  should	  it	  come	  to	  that.	  	  Even	  as	  this	  was	  taking	  place,	  the	  contention	  and	  vitriol	  around	  the	  issue	  had	  all	  but	  disappeared	  from	  the	  Massachusetts	  public	  sphere	  and	  instead	  tension	  emerged	  among	  activists	  themselves.	  	  Gamson	  and	  Meyer	  (1996:	  283)	  point	  out	  “justifications	  for	  strategic	  choices	  center	  on	  definitions	  of	  relative	  opportunity,	  and	  these	  are	  recurrent	  issues	  of	  contention	  in	  movements…consensus,	  then,	  is…typically	  a	  contentious	  process	  and	  the	  definition	  of	  opportunity	  is	  often	  at	  the	  center	  of	  what	  is	  most	  contentious.”	  	  In	  this	  case,	  some	  activists	  and	  allies	  wanted	  to	  strategize	  a	  way	  to	  beat	  the	  ballot	  initiative	  using	  parliamentary	  tactics,	  while	  other	  saw	  an	  opportunity	  to	  debate	  the	  issue	  and	  have	  an	  up	  or	  down	  vote	  in	  the	  legislature	  on	  its	  merits.	  	  Arline	  Isaacson	  was	  not	  optimistic,	  “We	  knew	  we	  did	  not	  have	  enough	  votes	  in	  the	  legislature	  to	  defeat	  it.	  We	  needed	  to	  delay	  the	  vote	  and	  ultimately	  not	  have	  a	  vote.	  	  We	  got	  a	  delay	  in	  May,	  and	  another	  in	  June	  or	  July.	  	  We	  were	  really	  buying	  time	  forever,	  time	  to	  get	  votes.”	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  were	  those	  allies	  that	  Arline	  referred	  to	  as	  “process	  liberals”,	  who	  supported	  gay	  marriage	  but	  were	  also	  concerned	  with	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  democratic	  process	  and	  preferred	  to	  forego	  parliamentary	  manoeuvring	  if	  there	  was	  a	  chance	  to	  win	  on	  an	  up	  or	  down	  vote	  on	  the	  issue.	  	  This	  created	  a	  tension	  within	  the	  movement	  that	  former	  MassEquality	  board	  member	  Buzz	  Harris	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describes	  as	  a	  “larger	  impediment	  than	  any	  other	  opposition	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  It	  was	  difficult	  and	  painful,	  but	  we	  did	  manage	  to	  contain	  it.”	  	  	  While	  activists	  managed	  to	  delay	  the	  constitutional	  convention	  for	  a	  time,	  eventually	  Senate	  President	  Bob	  Travaglini	  lost	  patience.	  	  In	  November	  2006,	  activists	  and	  their	  legislative	  allies,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  Speaker	  of	  the	  House	  Sal	  DiMasi,	  convinced	  legislators	  to	  vote	  to	  recess	  the	  constitutional	  convention	  until	  the	  last	  day	  of	  the	  legislative	  session.	  	  With	  a	  supportive	  Senate	  President,	  such	  a	  recess	  vote	  would	  have	  killed	  the	  initiative	  petition	  but	  rather	  than	  letting	  the	  bill	  die	  on	  that	  last	  day	  of	  the	  session	  in	  January	  2007,	  Travaglini	  immediately	  called	  for	  a	  vote,	  and	  the	  referendum	  passed.	  	  Arline	  Isaacson	  recalled,	  “We	  did	  not	  have	  to	  lose	  on	  January	  2	  even	  though	  we	  didn’t	  have	  the	  votes.	  	  It	  was	  simply,	  totally,	  because	  of	  Bob	  Travaglini	  that	  we	  lost	  because	  if	  he	  had	  been	  willing	  to	  help	  us	  even	  a	  little	  bit	  that	  day	  we	  could	  have	  prevailed	  and	  it	  would	  have	  been	  over.”	  	  The	  next	  constitutional	  convention	  on	  the	  initiative	  petition	  would	  be	  held	  in	  June	  2007.	  Activists	  had	  one	  last	  chance	  at	  the	  June	  constitutional	  convention	  to	  defend	  marriage	  in	  the	  legislature,	  rather	  than	  at	  the	  ballot	  box.	  MassEquality	  ramped	  up	  the	  pressure	  yet	  again.	  	  Ryan	  Brown	  remembered,	  	  We	  didn’t	  waste	  our	  time	  or	  resources	  generating	  contacts	  to	  legislators	  who	  were	  already	  on	  our	  side	  so	  we	  focused	  on	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those	  who	  were	  not	  with	  us.	  	  We	  focused	  on	  key	  districts	  and	  organized	  meetings	  in	  those	  districts.	  	  If	  we	  knocked	  on	  someone’s	  door	  and	  they	  were	  an	  opponent,	  we	  simply	  said,	  ‘Thank	  you	  for	  your	  time.’	  We	  needed	  to	  find	  the	  people	  that	  were	  going	  to	  convince	  their	  legislators	  to	  vote	  with	  us.	  	  That	  banning	  gay	  marriage	  would	  harm	  gay	  families	  remained	  centre	  stage	  in	  the	  campaign.	  	  MassEquality	  developed	  and	  released	  its	  “It’s	  Wrong	  to	  Vote	  on	  Rights”	  ad	  campaign	  featuring	  same	  sex	  couples,	  their	  children,	  and,	  in	  one	  case,	  their	  parents,	  speaking	  in	  support	  of	  same	  sex	  marriage	  and	  making	  the	  statement	  that	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  vote	  to	  take	  away	  their	  right	  to	  be	  married.	  	  Same	  sex	  couples	  continually	  reminded	  legislators	  what	  was	  at	  stake	  for	  their	  family	  in	  this	  vote.	  	  Inside	  the	  legislature	  allies	  worked	  with	  advocates	  to	  develop	  the	  most	  effective	  lobbying	  strategies.	  	  Representative	  Carl	  Sciortino	  recalled,	  	  We	  had	  a	  steering	  committee	  of	  5	  or	  6	  representatives	  and	  senators	  that	  met	  on	  a	  regular	  basis	  with	  the	  key	  organizations	  including	  MassEquality,	  the	  Massachusetts	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Political	  Caucus,	  the	  ACLU,	  GLAD,	  the	  Freedom	  to	  Marry	  Coalition,	  and	  the	  Religious	  Coalition	  for	  the	  Freedom	  to	  Marry.	  	  As	  colleagues	  we	  were	  able	  to	  find	  out	  from	  legislators	  what	  their	  private	  personal	  struggles	  were	  with	  the	  issues,	  what	  they	  were	  really	  thinking	  and	  not	  just	  what	  they	  were	  saying	  to	  the	  press,	  but	  what	  they	  were	  struggling	  with	  personally.	  	  That	  was	  really	  useful	  in	  how	  we	  directed	  our	  advocacy.	  	  According	  to	  Ryan	  Brown,	  activists	  were	  able	  to	  use	  this	  information	  from	  legislative	  supporters	  to	  develop	  “very	  specific	  plans	  for	  each	  of	  those	  other	  legislators”	  whose	  votes	  they	  needed	  to	  win.	  He	  continued,	  “We	  developed	  a	  multi-­‐faceted	  strategy	  that	  was	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individualized	  for	  every	  single	  legislator.”	  	  	  It	  was	  the	  interaction	  of	  political	  opportunities,	  presence	  of	  elite	  allies,	  and	  strategic	  savvy	  of	  activists	  that	  made	  winning	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts	  possible.	  Same-­‐sex	  marriage	  proponents	  were	  also	  bolstered	  by	  the	  election	  of	  gay	  marriage	  supporter	  Deval	  Patrick	  as	  Governor	  and	  the	  resignation	  of	  Senate	  President	  Bob	  Travaglini,	  who	  was	  replaced	  by	  LGBT	  ally	  Teresa	  Murray.	  	  Of	  course,	  such	  “changes	  in	  some	  aspect	  of	  a	  political	  system	  [can]	  create	  new	  possibilities	  for	  collective	  action”,	  as	  indeed	  they	  did	  in	  this	  case	  (McAdam,	  McCarthy,	  and	  Zald	  1996:17).	  	  With	  the	  most	  powerful	  politicians	  in	  Massachusetts	  now	  supporting	  gay	  marriage,	  the	  tide	  began	  to	  turn.	  For	  six	  months,	  the	  lobbying	  and	  meetings	  with	  legislators	  continued	  non-­‐stop.	  Even	  so,	  as	  the	  time	  drew	  near	  for	  the	  last	  constitutional	  convention	  on	  June	  17,	  2007	  everyone	  knew	  that	  the	  outcome	  of	  vote	  was	  too	  close	  to	  call.	  Arline	  Isaacson	  said,	  “It	  was	  the	  community	  that	  got	  us	  to	  the	  precipice”	  but	  described	  Patrick,	  DiMasi,	  and	  Murray	  as	  “the	  last	  breath	  of	  air	  that	  pushed	  it	  over	  the	  right	  way.”	  According	  to	  MassEquality,	  the	  “three	  leaders,	  along	  with	  gay	  rights	  activists,	  spent	  the	  last	  several	  days	  [prior	  to	  the	  constitutional	  convention]	  intensely	  lobbying	  a	  dozen	  or	  more	  state	  representatives	  and	  state	  senators	  who	  had	  previously	  supported	  the	  [anti-­‐gay	  marriage]	  amendment	  but	  signalled	  that	  they	  were	  open	  to	  changing	  their	  positions”	  (MassEquality	  email	  2007).	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Patrick,	  DiMasi,	  and	  Murray	  had	  decided	  the	  morning	  of	  the	  constitutional	  convention	  that	  they	  had	  enough	  legislators	  on	  their	  side	  to	  win	  and	  that	  they	  would	  beat	  the	  amendment	  in	  an	  up	  and	  down	  vote,	  rather	  than	  using	  parliamentary	  tactics	  like	  calling	  for	  an	  adjournment.	  	  	  The	  politicians	  were	  more	  confident	  than	  the	  activists,	  so	  Arline	  Isaacson	  developed	  a	  system	  to	  have	  legislators	  who	  were	  strong	  supporters	  of	  marriage	  equality	  stand	  near	  other	  legislators	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  they	  did	  not	  waver	  and/or	  vote	  against	  marriage:	  	  Their	  job	  was	  to	  not	  leave	  them	  alone	  for	  a	  minute	  where	  they	  might	  be	  overwhelmed	  by	  self-­‐doubt	  or	  accessible	  to	  pressure	  from	  our	  opponents.	  So	  some	  of	  them	  spent	  the	  entire	  morning	  in	  this	  legislator’s	  office	  or	  that	  legislator’s	  office	  talking	  to	  them	  and	  telling	  them,	  ‘You	  can	  do	  it.	  It’s	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do.’	  Euphemistically	  holding	  their	  hands	  the	  entire	  time	  and	  babysitting	  them,	  and	  it	  worked.	  	  It	  really	  worked.	  	  Ryan	  Brown	  echoed	  Arline	  when	  he	  described	  how	  activists	  	  Pulled	  out	  all	  the	  stops	  at	  the	  very	  end.	  	  Those	  allies	  we	  had	  in	  the	  State	  House,	  once	  they	  put	  their	  vote	  in	  we	  had	  sort	  of	  a	  buddy	  system	  where	  they	  would	  go	  over	  to	  somebody	  who	  had	  never	  voted	  with	  us	  before	  and	  would	  just	  stand	  over	  them.	  	  Carl	  Sciortino,	  for	  instance,	  who	  is	  a	  gay	  legislator,	  would	  stand	  there	  and	  say,	  ‘Are	  you	  really	  going	  to	  vote	  against	  my	  rights?’	  	  In	  the	  end	  it	  worked,	  all	  of	  the	  lobbying,	  door	  knocking,	  advertising,	  letter	  writing,	  and	  strategizing	  worked.	  	  In	  the	  final	  constitutional	  convention	  the	  initiative	  petition	  attempt	  was	  voted	  down	  151-­‐49,	  without	  a	  vote	  to	  spare.	  With	  the	  vote	  that	  close	  the	  legislators	  who	  had	  changed	  their	  position	  were	  the	  key	  to	  winning.	  	  Ryan	  Brown	  remembered,	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Being	  in	  the	  State	  House	  that	  day	  was	  the	  result	  of	  years	  and	  years	  of	  work	  and	  so	  much	  resources	  and	  time	  and	  energy.	  And	  that	  one	  final	  moment	  the	  State	  House	  went	  silent,	  and	  there	  were	  some	  of	  those	  key	  legislators	  that	  we	  needed	  to	  have	  and	  we	  saw	  green	  lights	  go	  up	  next	  to	  their	  names.	  We	  had	  never	  seen	  green	  lights	  next	  to	  their	  names	  before.	  It	  was	  just	  amazing.	  	  Carl	  Sciortino	  described	  the	  moment	  when	  he	  realized	  they	  won	  and	  described	  his	  interaction	  with	  another	  legislator,	  Paul	  Loscocco,	  whom	  Sciortino	  had	  been	  trying	  to	  win	  over	  prior	  to	  the	  vote,	  	  When	  I	  saw	  the	  votes	  being	  counted	  and	  I	  realized	  we	  had	  won	  I	  started	  crying,	  and	  then	  I	  turned	  to	  him	  because	  I	  realized	  how	  he	  had	  voted	  and	  that	  he	  had	  switched,	  he	  switched	  unbeknownst	  to	  any	  of	  us,	  and	  HE	  was	  crying,	  and	  I	  said,	  ‘Paul,	  what	  finally	  clicked?’	  And	  he	  was	  just	  crying	  and	  said,	  “I	  knew	  it	  was	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do	  and	  I	  couldn’t	  live	  with	  myself	  if	  I	  didn’t	  do	  the	  right	  thing.’	  	  	  	  	  Another	  important	  swing	  vote	  came	  from	  Representative	  Paul	  Kujawski	  who	  described	  his	  change	  of	  heart	  this	  way,	  	  I’ll	  never	  forget	  the	  day	  I	  was	  riding	  into	  work	  and	  a	  very	  good	  friend	  of	  mine	  called,	  a	  very	  strong	  supporter.	  	  She	  said,	  ‘Paul,	  I	  need	  you.’	  	  She	  said,	  ‘Paul,	  my	  daughter	  is	  gay	  and	  we	  didn’t	  know	  what	  was	  wrong	  with	  my	  daughter	  and	  there	  wasn’t	  anything	  wrong	  with	  her.’	  	  She	  said,	  ‘I	  know	  the	  way	  you	  have	  voted	  in	  the	  past	  and	  I	  need	  you	  to	  change	  your	  vote	  on	  this	  issue.’	  	  And	  I	  said,	  ‘Lynn,	  you	  can	  sleep	  easy	  tonight.’	  [During	  the	  vote	  at	  the	  constitutional	  convention]	  you	  could	  sense	  there	  was	  a	  ‘wow’	  to	  some	  of	  those	  green	  lights	  or	  red	  lights	  go	  up	  that	  people	  didn’t	  expect,	  and	  mine	  was	  one	  of	  those.	  (MassEquality	  video	  Thank	  You	  Massachusetts	  2008).	  	  	  	  And	  Republican	  Senate	  Minority	  Leader	  Richard	  Tisei	  summed	  up	  his	  position	  this	  way,	  	  	  
	  	   217	  
There	  are	  a	  lot	  of	  families	  out	  there	  who	  have	  children	  that	  are	  same	  sex	  couples	  and	  those	  kids	  deserve	  the	  same	  sort	  of	  rights	  and	  protections	  under	  the	  law.	  	  I’m	  glad	  I	  was	  on	  the	  right	  side	  of	  history,	  and	  I’m	  glad	  that	  our	  state	  was,	  and	  our	  legislature.”	  (MassEquality	  video	  Marriage	  Equality	  Works	  2008).	  	  Changing	  the	  votes	  of	  key	  legislators	  was	  the	  result	  of	  activists	  taking	  advantage	  of	  political	  opportunities	  and	  creating	  strategies	  that	  engaged	  the	  culture	  in	  which	  they	  were	  embedded.	  	   The	  story	  of	  the	  success	  of	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts	  revolves	  around	  the	  interaction	  of	  culture,	  structure,	  and	  agency.	  	  As	  Marshall	  Ganz	  (2004:	  182)	  puts	  forth,	  “Environmental	  change	  may	  generate	  the	  opportunities	  for	  social	  movements	  to	  emerge,	  but	  the	  outcomes	  and	  legacies	  of	  social	  movements	  have	  more	  to	  do	  with	  the	  strategies	  actors	  devise	  to	  turn	  these	  opportunities	  to	  their	  purposes,	  thus	  reshaping	  their	  environment.”	  	  The	  history	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  LGBT	  movement	  is	  one	  of	  activists	  continually	  taking	  advantage	  of	  opportunities,	  creating	  opportunities,	  and	  pushing	  forward	  in	  a	  way	  that	  sustained	  both	  political	  and	  cultural	  changes	  that,	  in	  turn,	  increased	  chances	  for	  future	  movement	  success.	  	  Activists	  in	  Massachusetts	  were	  able	  to	  win	  gay	  marriage	  because	  of	  the	  resources,	  knowledge,	  and	  expertise	  they	  had	  accumulated	  for	  thirty	  years.	  	  Utilizing	  these	  resources	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  gay	  marriage	  eventually	  created	  a	  momentum	  for	  this	  next	  milestone	  in	  LGBT	  rights;	  once	  that	  milestone	  was	  in	  sight	  activists	  began	  to	  feel	  that	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history	  was	  on	  their	  side.	  And	  once	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  history	  was	  indeed	  on	  their	  side,	  legislators	  who	  were	  once	  adversaries	  became	  allies	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  intense	  work	  by	  advocates	  to	  expand	  the	  notion	  that	  a	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  “ally”	  could	  be	  pro-­‐family,	  pro-­‐religion,	  working	  class,	  Republican,	  etc.,	  but	  also	  because,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Republican	  Representative	  Paul	  Loscocco,	  “It	  was	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do”.	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CHAPTER	  6:	  CONCLUDING	  ANALYSIS	  	  Introduction	  	  	   The	  previous	  chapters	  gave	  a	  long-­‐view	  historical	  account	  of	  the	  social,	  political,	  and	  cultural	  forces	  that	  cultivated	  one	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  regional	  LGBT	  rights	  movements	  in	  America,	  and	  how	  this	  movement	  accomplished	  what	  no	  other	  had	  done	  in	  the	  US	  before	  (and	  few	  have	  done	  after):	  establishing	  full	  and	  equal	  legal	  marriage	  rights	  for	  same	  sex	  couples.	  	  Remarkably,	  Massachusetts’	  activists	  achieved	  this	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  majority	  of	  American	  states,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  federal	  government,	  had	  already	  passed	  Defense	  of	  Marriage	  Act	  legislation	  and/or	  constitutional	  amendments	  against	  same	  sex	  marriage.	  	  This	  concluding	  analysis	  will	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  specific	  factors	  that	  fuelled	  anti-­‐gay-­‐marriage	  sentiment	  across	  the	  US	  and	  assess	  how	  Massachusetts	  became	  an	  outlier	  to	  these	  trends	  in	  three	  important	  ways	  1)	  the	  social	  and	  historical	  forces	  at	  work	  undermining	  resistance	  to	  gay	  marriage,	  2)	  the	  political	  structures,	  opportunities,	  and	  constraints	  that	  created	  an	  environment	  where	  the	  trend	  against	  gay	  marriage	  could	  be	  turned,	  and	  3)	  the	  specific	  frames	  and	  strategies	  used	  by	  activists	  to	  win	  marriage	  rights	  for	  same	  sex	  couples	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	   There	  are	  many	  social	  forces	  in	  Massachusetts	  that	  might	  insulate	  this	  state	  against	  what	  some	  have	  called	  the	  “gay	  marriage	  panic”	  in	  the	  US	  (Adam	  2003).	  	  In	  their	  analyses	  of	  United	  States	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resistance	  to	  gay	  marriage,	  both	  Barry	  Adam	  and	  David	  Rayside	  emphasize	  considerable	  regional	  variation	  in	  factors	  contributing	  to	  such	  resistance	  (Adam	  2003,	  Rayside	  2008).	  	  Rayside	  (2008:	  164)	  specifically	  states	  in	  his	  analysis,	  “the	  areas	  where	  attitudes	  are	  more	  favourably	  disposed	  to	  homosexuality	  and	  gay	  rights	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  see	  policy	  changes	  on	  relationship	  issues”	  and	  that	  this	  “favours	  activists	  in	  the	  Northeast	  particularly”.	  	  The	  characteristics	  that	  favour	  development	  of	  attitudes	  more	  conducive	  to	  LGBT	  rights	  advancement	  in	  the	  Northeast,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  US	  (especially	  the	  Midwest	  and	  Southern	  states)	  include	  several	  cultural,	  ideological,	  and	  demographic	  variables.	  	  In	  Massachusetts,	  there	  are	  trends	  in	  religious	  and	  political	  party	  affiliation,	  urbanity,	  income,	  and	  education;	  and	  an	  orientation	  towards	  civil	  rights	  and	  social	  justice.	  These	  characteristics	  stand	  apart	  from	  other	  factors	  that	  stoke	  resistance	  to	  gay	  marriage	  across	  America.	  Demographic/Cultural	  Factors	  	   In	  comparative	  analyses	  of	  international	  or	  regional	  support	  for	  or	  resistance	  to	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  several	  demographic	  characteristics	  consistently	  correlate	  with	  support	  for	  gay	  marriage.	  	  Bayliss	  Camp	  (2006)	  and	  David	  Rayside	  (2008)	  each	  emphasize	  that	  support	  for	  gay	  marriage	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  measures	  of	  income,	  education,	  and	  urbanity.	  Camp	  (2006:	  11),	  for	  example,	  in	  his	  county	  level	  analysis	  of	  voting	  patterns	  in	  anti-­‐gay	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marriage	  referenda	  in	  the	  US	  finds	  support	  for	  his	  hypothesis	  that	  “with	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  urbanization	  and	  diversity	  we	  should	  expect	  more	  socially	  tolerant,	  or	  liberal,	  views	  on	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  legal	  recognition	  of	  homosexual	  relationships.”	  	  Further,	  Rayside	  (2008:	  164-­‐165)	  points	  out	  that	  “large	  cities	  [and]	  regions	  with	  ethnically	  diverse	  populations	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  inclusive	  policies	  on	  sexual	  orientation.”	  Also,	  Camp	  (2006:	  21)	  finds	  that	  the	  “effect	  for	  income	  is	  surprisingly	  strong”	  in	  that	  the	  higher	  the	  income	  in	  a	  particular	  area	  the	  less	  support	  there	  is	  for	  anti-­‐gay	  marriage	  legislation.	  	  Given	  the	  strength	  of	  these	  associations,	  when	  we	  look	  at	  Massachusetts,	  a	  state	  that	  US	  census	  data	  consistently	  confirms	  is	  one	  of	  the	  wealthiest,	  most	  educated,	  and,	  anchored	  by	  cosmopolitan	  Boston,	  heavily	  urban	  states	  in	  the	  country,	  it	  becomes	  more	  clear	  why	  this	  state	  should	  emerge	  on	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  gay	  marriage	  movement	  (United	  States	  Census	  2000b).	  	  Additionally,	  outside	  of	  large	  urban	  centres,	  both	  scholars	  find	  that	  college	  towns	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  supportive	  of	  gay	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage	  than	  other	  areas	  (Camp	  2006,	  Rayside	  2008).	  	  There	  are	  4,431	  degree	  granting	  colleges	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  the	  small	  state	  of	  Massachusetts	  is	  home	  to	  over	  191	  of	  them	  (Boston	  Globe	  staff	  2009).	  Many	  of	  these	  institutions	  are	  located	  in	  the	  state’s	  rural,	  western	  region.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  western	  Massachusetts	  city	  of	  Amherst,	  home	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Massachusetts,	  Amherst,	  students	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comprise	  80%	  of	  the	  city’s	  population,	  and	  there	  are	  seventy	  cities	  across	  the	  state	  of	  Massachusetts	  where	  students	  are	  25%	  or	  more	  of	  the	  population	  (http://zipatlas.com/us/ma/city-­‐comparison/percentage-­‐college-­‐students.htm).	  	  This	  may	  balance	  out	  any	  loss	  of	  support	  for	  gay	  marriage	  moving	  out	  away	  from	  urban	  Boston,	  as	  students	  and	  residents	  of	  college	  towns	  across	  the	  state	  pick	  up	  the	  slack.	  	  	  	  The	  observations	  of	  MassEquality	  field	  organizer	  Ryan	  Brown	  support	  this	  connection:	  People	  who	  lived	  in	  the	  city	  were	  supportive	  right	  off	  the	  bat.	  	  Once	  we	  got	  into	  western	  Massachusetts,	  where	  it’s	  more	  rural,	  there	  wasn’t	  the	  initial	  support	  [but]	  it	  was	  easy	  to	  convince	  them	  why	  they	  needed	  to	  support	  our	  cause.	  	  Education	  came	  into	  play,	  too,	  [even]	  older	  people	  that	  had	  been	  to	  college	  were	  more	  supportive	  than	  those	  who	  had	  not	  been	  to	  college.	  	  	  	  Another	  activist,	  Lisa	  Thompson,	  born	  and	  raised	  in	  Boston	  and	  now	  living	  in	  western	  Massachusetts,	  described	  the	  cultural	  dynamic	  in	  western	  Massachusetts	  this	  way,	  “It’s	  this	  pocket	  where	  you	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  really	  highly	  educated	  people	  coming	  and	  going,	  but	  a	  lot	  of	  people	  love	  it	  out	  in	  western	  Massachusetts	  and	  they	  don’t	  want	  to	  leave.	  	  I’m	  one	  of	  those	  people.	  Overall,	  we	  have	  a	  very	  highly	  educated	  state,	  even	  in	  rural	  areas.”	  	  This	  illustrates	  not	  only	  which	  demographic	  factors	  are	  correlated	  with	  support	  for	  gay	  marriage	  are	  prominent	  in	  Massachusetts,	  but	  also	  that	  demographics	  are	  often	  overlapping	  indicators	  of	  support	  or	  opposition	  to	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage.	  	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  not	  only	  whether	  one	  lives	  in	  a	  rural	  or	  urban	  area,	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but	  there	  is	  an	  intersection	  with	  education,	  income,	  and	  potentially	  other	  factors,	  as	  well.	  	  	  	   Camp	  (2006),	  Rayside	  (2008),	  and	  Adam	  (2003)	  also	  identify	  a	  certain	  pattern	  of	  economic	  factors	  other	  than	  income	  associated	  with	  regional	  support	  for	  gay	  marriage.	  	  For	  Adam	  and	  Rayside,	  this	  is	  the	  strength	  of	  labour	  unions.	  	  Both	  of	  these	  scholars	  argue	  that	  the	  general	  weakness	  of	  labour	  in	  the	  United	  States	  is	  an	  important	  reason	  for	  the	  slow	  uptake	  of	  national	  recognition	  of	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights	  and	  same	  sex	  marriage	  in	  particular.	  	  Adam	  (2003:	  265)	  credits	  Canadian	  labour	  unions	  for	  advancing	  support	  for	  gay	  marriage	  because	  of	  labour’s	  ability	  to	  effectively	  “break	  the	  ice”	  by	  initiating	  protections	  for	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  employees	  in	  the	  workplace	  as	  well	  as	  publicly	  supporting	  gay	  rights	  initiatives	  in	  the	  political	  arena.	  	  Rayside	  (2008	  :161)	  echoes	  this	  argument	  when	  he	  asserts,	  “Canadian	  unions	  have	  been	  a	  world	  leader	  in	  taking	  up	  sexuality	  issues.	  	  Some	  U.S.	  unions	  have	  made	  important	  moves	  on	  these	  and	  other	  equity	  issues,	  but	  the	  reach	  and	  visibility	  of	  the	  activism	  has	  been	  modest.”	  	  Additionally,	  union	  membership	  is	  much	  higher	  in	  Canada	  (and	  many	  other	  industrialized	  nations)	  than	  it	  is	  in	  the	  US	  (Adam	  2003,	  Rayside	  2008).	  	  	  Regionally	  speaking	  in	  the	  US,	  however,	  union	  membership	  is	  above	  average	  in	  Massachusetts	  and	  the	  political	  power	  of	  these	  organizations	  is	  comparatively	  stronger.	  	  According	  to	  the	  US	  Bureau	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of	  Labor	  Statistics	  nearly	  16%	  of	  Massachusetts	  workers	  are	  union	  members,	  while	  the	  national	  average	  is	  12.4%	  (United	  States	  Bureau	  of	  Labour	  Statistics	  2011).	  	  All	  told,	  Massachusetts	  is	  home	  to	  525	  union	  locals,	  with	  over	  555,000	  individual	  union	  members	  (http://www.unions.org/unions/MM).	  	  Indeed,	  the	  public	  support	  of	  unions,	  including	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  and	  SEIU,	  was	  important	  for	  passage	  of	  the	  two	  most	  significant	  pieces	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  legislation	  in	  Massachusetts	  history:	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  civil	  rights	  bill	  in	  1989	  and	  gay	  marriage	  in	  2007	  (Boston	  Globe	  Staff	  1989,	  Lewis	  2004a,	  Lewis	  2004c).	  	  The	  role	  of	  labour	  in	  LGBT	  rights	  advancement	  has	  been	  overlooked	  and	  deserves	  more	  attention	  in	  social	  movement	  literature.	  	  However,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  study	  the	  historical	  record	  offers	  little	  more	  than	  a	  few	  specific	  references	  to	  labour	  union	  support	  (they	  are	  cited	  above).	  	  Additionally,	  while	  my	  informants	  considered	  public	  support	  of	  labour	  unions	  to	  be	  an	  important	  component	  of	  their	  final	  success,	  it	  was	  political	  and	  religious	  allies	  whom	  they	  described	  as	  being	  most	  closely	  involved	  in	  the	  strategizing,	  lobbying,	  and	  other	  actions	  specifically	  taken	  to	  advance	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  Taking	  a	  slightly	  different	  angle,	  Camp’s	  (2006:	  11)	  economic	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  region	  has	  moved	  into	  a	  post-­‐industrial	  economic	  base,	  and	  he	  found	  support	  for	  his	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  greater	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  region	  has	  “moved	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toward	  a	  post-­‐industrial	  economic	  base,	  the	  lower	  the	  support	  for	  marriage	  restriction	  laws”.	  	  Here	  too,	  we	  find	  Massachusetts	  to	  be	  a	  state	  where	  characteristics	  correlated	  with	  support	  for	  gay	  marriage	  continue	  to	  add	  up.	  	  Brown	  and	  Tager	  (2000:	  275)	  identify	  a	  long-­‐term	  economic	  shift	  in	  Massachusetts	  leading	  away	  from	  industrial	  labour	  towards	  education,	  health,	  and	  financial	  service	  industries	  that	  “transformed	  Massachusetts	  workers	  from	  primarily	  blue-­‐collar	  factory	  laborers	  to	  white	  collar	  professionals,	  up-­‐scale	  service	  employees,	  and	  numerous	  low	  wage	  workers.”	  	  Part	  of	  this	  trend	  may	  be	  attributed	  to	  high	  levels	  of	  education	  in	  Massachusetts;	  however,	  growth	  in	  the	  service	  industry	  also	  includes	  the	  expansion	  of	  employment	  in	  low-­‐wage	  occupations,	  like	  restaurant	  work	  or	  the	  hospitality	  industry,	  that	  do	  not	  require	  workers	  to	  have	  advanced	  levels	  of	  education.	  While	  service	  industry	  growth	  may	  seem	  at	  odds	  with	  data	  suggesting	  the	  importance	  of	  union	  strength	  in	  Massachusetts,	  given	  that	  many	  people	  associate	  union	  membership	  with	  blue-­‐collar	  workers,	  the	  Service	  Employees	  International	  Union	  Massachusetts	  State	  Council,	  for	  instance,	  lists	  its	  membership	  at	  “over	  75,000	  strong”	  (http://www.seiuma.org/about/members.cfm).	  	  	  No	  doubt,	  investing	  in	  these	  non-­‐industrial	  areas	  of	  the	  economic	  sector,	  in	  addition	  to	  having	  strong	  unions	  to	  protect	  worker	  benefits	  and	  wages,	  likely	  helps	  cultivate	  Massachusetts	  as	  one	  of	  the	  wealthiest	  states	  in	  the	  nation.	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The	  observations	  of	  Massachusetts	  activists	  who	  worked	  on	  the	  gay	  marriage	  campaign	  reflect	  the	  work	  of	  these	  scholars.	  	  For	  example,	  when	  asked	  what	  he	  thought	  made	  Massachusetts	  more	  likely	  to	  recognize	  gay	  marriage	  than	  other	  states,	  MGLPC	  Co-­‐Chair	  Gary	  Daffin	  explained,	  “We	  have	  a	  very	  well-­‐educated	  population.	  	  We	  have	  a	  high	  tech	  employer	  base,	  so	  I	  think	  we	  have	  a	  fairly	  wealthy	  community	  here.	  	  For	  some	  reason	  I	  think	  that	  contributes	  to	  people	  being	  able	  to	  see	  LGBT	  rights	  as	  something	  not	  personally	  threatening	  to	  them.”	  Similarly,	  Ryan	  Brown,	  a	  field	  organizer	  for	  MassEquality,	  remembered	  the	  importance	  of	  union	  support	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  “Labour	  unions	  rarely	  ever	  got	  involved	  in	  [relationship	  recognition]	  issues	  like	  this.	  	  This	  time,	  we	  had	  labour	  unions	  across	  the	  entire	  state	  organizing	  on	  our	  behalf.	  	  They	  would	  bring	  huge	  groups	  of	  people	  to	  come	  support	  us.”	  	  Lastly,	  former	  MassEquality	  board	  member	  Buzz	  Harris	  supported	  the	  assertion	  that	  diversity	  and	  education	  are	  important	  indicators	  of	  support	  for	  marriage	  equality.	  Originally	  from	  the	  American	  South,	  Harris	  observeed,	  “This	  state	  is	  much	  more	  heterogeneous	  than	  any	  other	  place	  I’ve	  lived.	  	  People	  are	  conscious	  of	  their	  immigrant	  past,	  and	  there	  is	  still	  a	  lot	  of	  immigration	  today.	  	  So	  I	  think	  people	  are	  used	  to	  being	  around	  people	  that	  are	  different	  than	  them	  whether	  it	  is	  culturally,	  linguistically,	  religiously;	  there	  is	  much	  more	  religious	  diversity	  here,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  huge	  academic	  community.”	  	  	  Each	  of	  these	  activists	  experienced	  first	  
	  	   227	  
hand	  the	  way	  that	  demographic	  characteristics	  can	  shape	  people’s	  attitudes	  about	  gay	  marriage,	  and	  their	  experiences	  supported	  existing	  evidence	  explaining,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  why	  Massachusetts	  was	  able	  to	  succeed	  against	  the	  US	  DOMA	  trend	  where	  other	  states	  had	  failed.	  	   In	  international	  analyses	  exploring	  why,	  when	  most	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  industrialized	  world	  has	  in	  place	  some	  legal	  recognition	  for	  same	  sex	  couples,	  the	  US	  seems	  to	  put	  up	  such	  spectacular	  resistance	  to	  gay	  marriage,	  religion,	  particularly	  the	  strength	  of	  conservative	  Protestantism	  in	  the	  US,	  is	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  many	  explanations.	  	  Citing	  the	  high	  rate	  of	  evangelical	  Protestantism	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  Seymour	  Martin	  Lipset	  (1996:	  63)	  posited,	  “Americans,	  in	  harmony	  with	  their	  sectarian	  roots,	  have	  a	  stronger	  sense	  of	  moral	  absolutism	  than	  Europeans	  and	  even	  Canadians”,	  countries	  where	  evangelical	  Protestants	  are	  fewer	  in	  number.	  	  	  Similarly,	  David	  Rayside	  (2008)	  and	  Miriam	  Smith	  (2008)	  emphasize	  the	  impact	  of	  religion	  in	  creating	  differing	  outcomes	  for	  gay	  marriage	  in	  the	  US	  and	  in	  Canada.	  	  For	  example,	  Smith	  (2008:	  92)	  points	  out	  that,	  “In	  both	  Canada	  and	  the	  US,	  Christian	  Right	  (and	  other	  conservative	  religious	  organizations)	  intervened	  as	  third	  parties…in	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  cases.	  	  In	  the	  US,	  however,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Christian	  Right	  has	  been	  much	  more	  extensive.”	  	  Similarly,	  Rayside	  (2008:	  164)	  acknowledges	  that	  while	  conservative	  religious	  groups	  did	  protest	  against	  same	  sex	  marriage	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in	  Canada,	  in	  the	  US,	  “The	  weight	  of	  religious	  conservatism	  is	  a	  potent	  force	  of	  resistance…but	  it	  does	  vary	  by	  locale.	  	  In	  those	  regions	  where	  the	  religious	  right	  is	  weaker,	  pro-­‐gay	  activism	  is	  enhanced	  by	  the	  real	  possibility	  of	  securing	  gains.”	  This	  suggests	  religion	  is	  important	  for	  regional	  analyses	  as	  well.	  	  	  	  To	  illustrate,	  in	  his	  intra-­‐US	  analysis	  Bayliss	  Camp	  (2006:	  19)	  found	  that	  religion	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  predicted	  a	  full	  one	  third	  of	  the	  variance	  in	  voting	  patterns	  on	  gay	  marriage	  referenda,	  and	  more	  specifically,	  “moving	  from	  a	  relatively	  liberal	  locale,	  one	  with	  a	  fewer	  than	  average	  number	  of	  evangelicals…to	  a	  more	  conservative	  locale…produces	  about	  a	  3%	  shift	  in	  the	  vote	  outcome	  on	  a	  marriage	  restriction	  referenda.”	  	  These	  points	  are	  central	  to	  exploring	  the	  difference	  made	  in	  Massachusetts,	  where	  a	  rather	  distinctive	  set	  of	  religious	  forces	  were	  afoot	  as	  compared	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  nation.	  	  Religion	  is	  also	  a	  complicated	  factor	  to	  explore	  because	  religion	  acts	  as	  more	  than	  a	  demographic	  variable;	  it	  is	  a	  cultural	  and	  political	  variable	  as	  well.	  	  	  Indeed	  the	  secular	  force	  of	  religion	  is	  a	  unique	  part	  of	  American	  culture	  and	  politics,	  particularly	  the	  influence	  of	  evangelical	  Christians	  (Lipset	  1996,	  Rayside	  and	  Wilcox	  2012,	  Smith	  2009).	  	  The	  advancement	  of	  women’s	  rights	  and	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  inspired	  evangelical	  Christians	  to	  get	  active	  in	  politics.	  	  This	  was	  a	  role	  that	  evangelical	  communities	  had	  previously	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shunned,	  preferring	  to	  live	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  immoral	  secular	  world	  and	  developing	  their	  own	  church	  networks,	  bible	  institutions,	  religious	  retreats,	  and	  media	  outlets	  (Fetner	  2008:	  8).	  	  Sociologist	  Tine	  Fetner	  (2008:	  8-­‐9)	  describes	  the	  evangelical	  religious	  right	  as	  being	  “pulled”	  into	  secular	  party	  politics	  in	  the	  1970s	  because	  of	  involvement	  in	  the	  “anti-­‐feminist	  movement,	  the	  pro-­‐life	  movement,	  and	  the	  anti-­‐gay	  movement”.	  	  	  Throughout	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  groups	  like	  the	  Moral	  Majority,	  the	  Heritage	  Foundation,	  and	  the	  Christian	  Coalition	  drew	  on	  previously	  established	  networks	  in	  the	  evangelical	  community	  and	  eventually	  coalesced	  into	  a	  powerful	  force	  that	  exerted	  intense	  pressure	  on	  American	  culture	  and	  politics,	  and	  made	  evangelical	  leaders	  like	  Jerry	  Falwell,	  Pat	  Robertson,	  James	  Dobson,	  and	  others	  successful	  in	  bending	  the	  ears	  of	  US	  politicians	  and	  presidents	  for	  the	  last	  thirty	  years	  (Adam	  2003,	  Fetner	  2008,	  Rayside	  and	  Wilcox	  2012).	  	  	  In	  Massachusetts,	  however,	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  evangelical	  religious	  right	  is	  diminished	  as	  it	  gets	  refracted	  through	  the	  powerful	  influence	  of	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church,	  and	  this	  has	  important	  cultural	  and	  political	  consequences	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  Across	  the	  United	  States	  about	  26%	  of	  the	  population	  identifies	  as	  evangelical	  Protestant,	  but	  Massachusetts	  has	  a	  disproportionately	  small	  number	  of	  evangelicals,	  just	  11%	  (Pew	  Forum	  on	  Religious	  and	  Public	  Life	  2008).	  	  This	  follows	  Barry	  Adam’s	  (2003:	  263)	  assertion	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that,	  “The	  particular	  strength	  of	  conservative	  Protestantism	  and	  Mormonism	  in	  the	  Rocky	  Mountain	  and	  southern	  states	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  degree	  in	  the	  Midwest	  is	  borne	  out	  in	  the	  legislative	  record”	  on	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights,	  as	  we	  see	  a	  much	  friendlier	  record	  on	  gay	  rights	  in	  Massachusetts	  than	  we	  would	  in	  most,	  if	  not	  all,	  other	  states.	  	  	  Moreover,	  Massachusetts,	  the	  long-­‐ago	  adopted	  homeland	  of	  English	  Puritans,	  was	  the	  later	  birthplace	  of	  the	  Unitarian	  Church	  and	  the	  United	  Church	  of	  Christ,	  the	  two	  denominations	  that	  developed	  out	  of	  the	  splintering	  of	  the	  early-­‐American	  Puritan	  Church.	  	  David	  Rayside	  (2008:	  154)	  maintains	  that	  the	  Unitarian	  Church	  and	  the	  United	  Church	  of	  Christ	  “had	  often	  been	  on	  the	  forefront	  of	  mainstream	  Protestant	  debates	  on	  issues	  related	  to	  homosexuality.”	  	  In	  fact,	  these	  denominations	  had	  been	  recognizing	  same	  sex	  relationships	  for	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  gay	  marriage	  “panic”,	  some	  as	  early	  as	  the	  1970’s	  (Religious	  Coalition	  for	  the	  Freedom	  to	  Marry,	  People	  of	  Faith	  Testimony:	  Rejoicing	  in	  Marriage	  Equality	  2006:	  40).	  	  Other	  mainline	  Protestant	  denominations	  like	  Presbyterians,	  Episcopalians,	  and	  Lutherans	  also	  recognize	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  unions	  and/or	  actively	  support	  some	  degree	  of	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  civil	  rights	  in	  general	  (Rayside	  2008:	  153).	  	  Mainline	  Protestant	  denominations,	  such	  as	  these,	  account	  for	  15%	  of	  Massachusetts	  religious	  believers-­‐	  just	  under	  the	  national	  average	  of	  18%	  (Pew	  Forum	  on	  Religion	  and	  Public	  Life	  2008).	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   Evangelical	  Protestants	  did,	  of	  course,	  mobilize	  against	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts	  by	  teaming	  up	  with	  the	  most	  powerful	  religious	  entity	  in	  the	  state,	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church.	  	  The	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  can	  certainly	  claim	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	  religious	  believers	  in	  Massachusetts	  at	  43%,	  which	  is	  well	  above	  the	  national	  average	  of	  24%;	  however,	  Catholics	  (somewhat	  famously)	  do	  not	  always	  adhere	  to	  Church	  doctrine.	  	  In	  2008,	  despite	  the	  Church’s	  official	  position	  against	  gay	  marriage,	  some	  42%	  of	  Catholics	  nationwide	  supported	  equal	  marriage	  rights	  for	  same	  sex	  couples	  compared	  to	  only	  17%	  of	  evangelical	  protestants	  (Lewis	  2003c,	  Pew	  Forum	  on	  Religious	  and	  Public	  Life	  2008).	  	  Church	  officials	  in	  Massachusetts,	  however,	  pulled	  out	  all	  the	  stops	  in	  fighting	  gay	  marriage	  by	  issuing	  public	  proclamations,	  writing	  letters	  to	  the	  editor,	  taking	  out	  ads,	  mailing	  anti-­‐gay-­‐marriage	  literature	  to	  parishioners	  urging	  them	  to	  act	  against	  same	  sex	  marriage,	  holding	  voter	  drives	  at	  churches,	  and	  the	  like	  (Abraham	  2004b).	  Activist	  Lisa	  Thompson	  recalled,	  “I	  have	  family	  members	  that	  are	  church-­‐going	  Catholics;	  the	  amount	  of	  horrible,	  hateful	  videos	  and	  written	  materials	  that	  were	  distributed	  by	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  to	  my	  family	  members	  was	  awful.”	  Each	  activist	  I	  spoke	  with	  identified	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  as	  the	  primary	  opponent	  to	  gay	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage	  in	  the	  state.	  Despite	  the	  intense	  mobilization	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church,	  there	  is	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  Catholics	  are	  not	  “distinctly	  conservative	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on	  questions	  of	  sexuality”	  (Rayside	  and	  Wilcox	  2012:	  11).	  	  For	  example,	  Bayliss	  Camp	  (2006:	  23)	  found	  nationwide	  evidence	  in	  his	  2006	  analysis	  of	  county	  level	  data	  on	  anti-­‐gay-­‐marriage	  voting	  patterns,	  that,	  “by	  and	  large,	  Catholic	  voters	  are	  not	  as	  antipathetic	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  gay	  marriage	  as	  they	  are	  portrayed	  to	  be	  in	  the	  press”,	  and	  the	  “effects	  of	  the	  percent	  mainline	  Protestant	  are	  comparable	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  Catholic	  coefficient”.	  	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  gay	  marriage	  struggle	  in	  Massachusetts	  reached	  its	  height	  around	  the	  time	  that	  the	  priest	  child	  sexual	  abuse	  scandal	  was	  in	  full	  swing	  and	  this	  may	  have	  dented	  the	  Church’s	  moral	  authority,	  causing	  even	  devout	  believers	  to	  question	  a	  formerly	  revered	  institution.	  	  Indeed,	  Arline	  Isaacson	  recalls	  that	  the	  Church	  scandal	  caused	  “a	  lot	  of	  legislators	  to	  question	  views	  of	  the	  Church	  to	  which	  they	  had	  previously	  strongly	  adhered.”	  	  This	  scandal,	  combined	  with	  the	  tendency	  for	  Catholics	  to	  stray	  from	  the	  admonitions	  of	  the	  Church	  hierarchy,	  gave	  activists	  some	  traction	  in	  challenging	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church’s	  antipathy	  to	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  	  An	  additional	  point	  to	  consider	  is	  the	  potential	  number	  of	  nominal	  Catholics,	  who	  may	  be	  claimed	  by	  the	  Church	  regardless	  of	  their	  adherence	  to	  its	  teachings.	  	   Massachusetts	  is	  also	  home	  to	  a	  politically	  active	  Jewish	  community.	  	  Reconstructionist	  and	  Reform	  Jewish	  communities	  have	  been	  particularly	  supportive	  of	  gay	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage.	  	  For	  example,	  “Reconstructionist	  rabbis	  in	  the	  United	  States	  voted	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overwhelmingly	  in	  2004	  to	  support	  the	  extension	  of	  civil	  marriage	  to	  include	  same	  sex	  couples	  [and]	  many	  Reform	  rabbis	  have	  also	  performed	  marriages	  in	  their	  synagogues”	  (Rayside	  2008:	  154).	  	  Nationwide,	  Jews	  account	  for	  2%	  of	  the	  US	  population,	  and	  in	  Massachusetts	  3%	  of	  the	  population	  identifies	  as	  Jewish	  (Pew	  Forum	  on	  Religious	  and	  Public	  Life,	  2008).	  	  Even	  as	  a	  relatively	  small	  proportion	  of	  the	  population,	  the	  Massachusetts	  Jewish	  community	  played	  an	  important	  part	  in	  fighting	  for	  marriage	  equality	  and	  several	  rabbis	  played	  key	  roles	  in	  the	  formation	  and	  governance	  of	  the	  Religious	  Coalition	  for	  the	  Freedom	  to	  Marry.	  In	  fact,	  Jewish	  activists	  played	  such	  a	  prominent	  part	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  marriage	  equality	  that	  one	  of	  my	  respondents	  recalled	  a	  board	  member	  of	  one	  LGBT	  organization,	  herself	  Jewish,	  who	  joked	  that	  the	  board	  was	  “over-­‐Jewed”,	  implying	  the	  board	  needed	  more	  diverse	  religious	  representation.	   	  	   Strong	  religious	  opposition	  can	  often	  mean	  the	  death	  knell	  for	  gay	  rights	  legislation	  in	  regions	  where	  numbers	  of	  conservative	  evangelical	  Protestants	  in	  particular	  are	  at	  or	  above	  average	  (Camp	  2006).	  	  Conversely,	  the	  religious	  diversity	  in	  Massachusetts	  was	  effectively	  utilized	  in	  support	  of	  gay	  marriage.	  	  The	  active	  presence	  of	  a	  number	  of	  diverse	  religious	  traditions	  supporting	  marriage	  equality	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Religious	  Coalition	  for	  the	  Freedom	  to	  Marry.	  	  Formed	  in	  1998,	  by	  the	  height	  of	  the	  marriage	  battle	  in	  2006	  the	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group	  listed	  “more	  than	  700	  clergy,	  congregations	  and	  faith-­‐based	  organizations	  from	  twenty-­‐two	  faith	  traditions	  that	  support	  marriage	  equality	  for	  same	  sex	  couples”	  (Religious	  Coalition	  for	  the	  Freedom	  to	  Marry,	  People	  of	  Faith	  Testimony:	  Rejoicing	  in	  Marriage	  Equality	  2006:	  i).	  	  	  The	  RCFM	  was	  active	  in	  lobbying	  and	  outreach	  efforts,	  and	  the	  value	  of	  their	  presence	  can	  hardly	  be	  understated.	  	  One	  of	  my	  interview	  participants,	  Amy	  Hunt,	  stated,	  “The	  Religious	  Coalition	  was	  a	  rock	  star.	  	  They	  did	  a	  lot	  of	  work	  for	  a	  lot	  of	  years	  that	  was	  incredibly	  helpful.”	  	  And	  Arline	  Isaacson	  recalled,	  By	  the	  time	  we	  got	  to	  the	  constitutional	  convention	  in	  2007	  they	  [the	  RCFM]	  had	  made	  it	  to	  1000	  [clergy	  members].	  The	  symbolism	  of	  having	  1000	  clergy	  on	  our	  side	  was	  powerful	  not	  just	  because	  of	  the	  number.	  	  The	  reason	  it’s	  so	  important	  is	  that	  it	  changes	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  debate.	  	  Previously	  it	  had	  been	  gay	  people	  versus	  religion,	  but	  with	  more	  religious	  people	  on	  our	  side	  it	  became	  religion	  versus	  religion.	  This	  changes	  the	  nature	  of	  what	  you’re	  asking	  legislators	  to	  vote	  on.	  	  You’re	  asking	  them,	  ‘Do	  you	  want	  to	  be	  in	  the	  position	  of	  choosing	  which	  religion	  prevails?’	  And	  no	  legislator	  does.	  	  Even	  the	  most	  Catholic	  legislator	  in	  the	  most	  Catholic	  district	  doesn’t	  want	  to	  be	  saying,	  ‘I’m	  choosing	  Catholics	  over	  Protestants’.	  	  So	  that	  dynamic	  shifted.	  	  And	  the	  RCFM	  folks	  were	  willing	  to	  take	  on	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  and	  write	  to	  them	  in	  a	  public	  forum	  and	  say,	  ‘We	  respect	  your	  views,	  but	  please	  don’t	  impose	  your	  views	  on	  our	  religious	  beliefs.’	  That	  changed	  the	  dynamic	  totally.	  	  While	  LGBT	  rights	  proponents	  in	  other	  regions	  had	  religious	  allies	  to	  be	  sure,	  the	  more	  conservative	  religious	  composition	  of	  those	  regions	  often	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  effectively	  mobilize	  against	  deep	  religious	  opposition	  to	  gay	  marriage.	  	  Across	  the	  United	  States,	  just	  12	  states	  have	  a	  percentage	  of	  evangelical	  Protestants	  below	  21%,	  and	  each	  of	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those	  states	  perform	  markedly	  better	  on	  gay	  rights	  measures	  than	  states	  that	  are	  greater	  than	  21%	  evangelical	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  Utah,	  which	  is	  dominated	  by	  Mormons-­‐	  another	  religious	  affiliation	  decidedly	  opposed	  to	  gay	  rights)	  (Pew	  Forum	  on	  Religion	  and	  Public	  Life	  2009,	  The	  National	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Task	  Force	  2011).	  	  Religion	  is	  by	  no	  means	  the	  only	  explanation	  for	  anti-­‐gay-­‐marriage	  sentiment,	  but	  clearly	  religion	  is	  one	  decisive	  factor.	  	  	   Among	  denominations	  where	  most	  support	  is	  found	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  there	  are	  varied	  theological	  perspectives	  on	  homosexuality	  and	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  Among	  Christian	  churches	  the	  Unitarians	  have	  long	  held	  a	  theological	  position	  in	  support	  full	  LGBT	  equality.	  	  Unitarians	  established	  the	  Office	  of	  Bisexual,	  Gay,	  Lesbian,	  and	  Transgender	  Concerns	  in	  1973	  based	  on	  the	  “First	  Principle”	  of	  the	  Unitarian	  faith:	  “to	  affirm	  and	  promote	  the	  inherent	  worth	  and	  dignity	  of	  every	  person”,	  and	  issued	  a	  statement	  specifically	  supporting	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  1996	  (Unitarian	  Universalist	  Association	  of	  Congregations	  1996).	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  mainline	  Protestant	  churches	  in	  the	  United	  States	  have	  “moved	  toward	  a	  more	  positive	  view	  of	  sexual	  diversity	  but	  often	  only	  in	  small	  steps	  and	  with	  much	  conflict”	  (Rayside	  and	  Wilcox	  2012:	  11).	  	  That	  said,	  many	  such	  denominations	  have	  developed	  somewhat	  progressive,	  if	  complicated,	  theological	  views	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  Episcopal	  Church	  does	  not	  have	  an	  official	  stance	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  per	  se,	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but	  in	  2006	  issued	  a	  statement	  in	  which	  the	  church	  declared	  its	  "support	  of	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  persons	  as	  children	  of	  God”	  and	  stated	  its	  opposition	  to	  “any	  state	  or	  federal	  constitutional	  amendment"	  prohibiting	  same-­‐sex	  marriages	  or	  civil	  unions	  (General	  Convention	  2006).	  	  Lutheran	  doctrine	  officially	  defines	  marriage	  as	  a	  covenant	  between	  a	  man	  and	  woman,	  but	  in	  2009	  there	  was	  a	  statement	  approved	  at	  the	  Lutheran	  Church	  in	  America	  Bi-­‐annual	  Churchwide	  Assembly	  to	  allow	  congregations	  “to	  recognize,	  support	  and	  hold	  publicly	  accountable	  lifelong,	  monogamous,	  same-­‐gender	  relationships"	  if	  they	  chose.	  The	  Methodists’	  official	  position	  does	  not	  recognize	  same	  sex	  marriage,	  but	  there	  is	  evidence	  of	  movements	  within	  the	  congregation	  to	  change	  the	  official	  position	  (Pew	  Forum	  on	  Religion	  and	  Public	  Life	  2010).	  	  Among	  mainline	  Protestant	  groups,	  the	  United	  Church	  of	  Christ	  offers	  the	  most	  unequivocal	  endorsement	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  on	  the	  theological	  grounds	  that,	  “the	  life	  and	  example	  of	  Jesus	  of	  Nazareth	  provides	  a	  model	  of	  radically	  inclusive	  love	  and	  abundant	  welcome	  for	  all”	  (UCC	  resolution	  2005).	  	  	   Jewish	  congregations	  were	  also	  important	  supporters	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts.	  Among	  the	  Jewish	  faith,	  positions	  on	  homosexuality	  are	  often	  implicitly	  filtered	  through	  a	  theology	  that	  emphasizes	  human	  rights,	  social	  justice,	  and	  the	  God-­‐given	  dignity	  of	  all	  human	  beings.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  Reconstructionist	  Jewish	  tradition	  cites	  human	  rights	  as	  one	  rationale	  for	  its	  support	  of	  same-­‐sex	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marriage	  (Tuttle	  2008),	  and	  takes	  pride	  in	  having	  “long	  been	  a	  leader	  in	  liberalizing	  Jewish	  approaches	  to	  homosexuality”	  (Harris	  2008).	  Similarly,	  The	  Union	  for	  Reform	  Judaism	  Central	  Conference	  of	  American	  Rabbis	  issued	  a	  resolution	  in	  which	  they	  declared	  support	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  stating,	  “the	  relationship	  of	  a	  Jewish,	  same	  gender	  couple	  is	  worthy	  of	  affirmation	  through	  appropriate	  Jewish	  ritual”,	  but	  also	  declared	  support	  for	  rabbis	  who	  choose	  not	  to	  ordain	  such	  unions,	  “We	  support	  the	  decision	  of	  those	  who	  choose	  to	  officiate	  at	  rituals	  of	  union	  for	  same-­‐gender	  couples	  [and	  for]	  those	  who	  do	  not”	  (Central	  Conference	  of	  American	  Rabbis	  2000).	  Additionally,	  citing	  the	  “God	  given	  dignity	  of	  all	  human	  beings”	  the	  Committee	  on	  Jewish	  Laws	  and	  Standards,	  the	  central	  authority	  for	  the	  Conservative	  Jewish	  tradition,	  issued	  a	  controversial	  statement	  that	  did	  not	  recognize	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  but	  offered	  explicit	  support	  for	  the	  choice	  of	  rabbis	  who	  do	  ordain	  such	  unions	  (Committee	  on	  Jewish	  Law	  and	  Standards	  2006).	  	  	  	   The	  conservative	  religious	  voices	  most	  in	  opposition	  to	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  also	  have	  several	  prominent	  rationales	  for	  their	  position.	  	  	  In	  this	  case,	  The	  Massachusetts	  Family	  Institute	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  a	  state	  affiliate	  of	  Focus	  on	  the	  Family,	  a	  national	  group	  founded	  by	  influential	  evangelical	  Christian	  author	  James	  Dobson.	  Focus	  on	  the	  Family	  describes	  itself	  as	  a	  “global	  Christian	  ministry	  dedicated	  to	  helping	  families	  thrive	  by	  providing	  resources	  that	  help	  couples	  to	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build	  healthy	  a	  marriage	  that	  reflect	  God’s	  design”	  and	  defines	  its	  core	  beliefs	  around	  the	  idea	  that	  “all	  people	  are	  of	  infinite	  value,	  regardless	  of	  age,	  development,	  appearance	  or	  ability”	  (http://www.focusonthefamily.com/about_us.aspx,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  	  While	  the	  LGBT	  affirming	  religious	  groups	  cited	  above	  use	  beliefs	  about	  the	  inherent	  worth	  and	  dignity	  in	  all	  human	  beings	  as	  a	  rationale	  to	  support	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  and	  other	  rights	  for	  the	  LGBT	  community,	  Focus	  on	  the	  Family	  and	  its	  affiliates	  use	  the	  same	  rationale	  to	  support	  conversion	  therapy	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  and	  mobilize	  against	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  	  To	  illustrate,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  inclusiveness	  and	  acceptance	  of	  Unitarian	  doctrine,	  the	  Massachusetts	  Family	  Institute	  indicates	  their	  “compassion…	  for	  those	  struggling	  with	  same-­‐sex	  attraction”	  by	  urging	  them	  “to	  change	  their	  choice	  of	  lifestyle	  through	  the	  work	  of	  Exodus	  International,	  Love	  Won	  Out	  and	  Parents	  and	  Friends	  of	  Ex-­‐Gays	  and	  Gays”	  (http://www.mafamily.org/issues/human-­‐sexuality/).	  	  Additionally,	  Focus	  on	  the	  Family	  defines	  marriage	  as	  a	  divine	  order	  from	  God	  based	  on	  the	  creation	  story	  in	  the	  Biblical	  Book	  of	  Genesis	  and	  the	  New	  Testament	  Gospel	  of	  Matthew:	  “[Marriage]	  is	  ordered	  as	  the	  union	  of	  a	  man	  and	  a	  woman	  in	  marriage—heterosexual	  and	  monogamous—an	  order	  that	  Jesus	  unambiguously	  reaffirmed	  in	  Matthew.”	  (Foster,	  cited	  at	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http://www.focusonthefamily.com/marriage/gods_design_for_marriage/marriage_gods_idea/the_divine_order_to_marriage.aspx).	  	  	  Although	  affiliated	  with	  Focus	  on	  the	  Family,	  the	  Massachusetts	  Family	  Institute	  does	  not	  specifically	  identify	  itself	  with	  a	  particular	  religious	  tradition	  or	  denomination	  but	  states	  its	  relationship	  to	  “Judeo-­‐Christian	  values”.	  	  Perhaps	  this	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  other	  prominent	  religious	  groups	  in	  Massachusetts	  that	  diminishes	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  evangelical	  Christian	  contingent	  in	  that	  state.	  	  Identifying	  with	  broad	  Judeo-­‐Christian	  values	  rather	  than	  exclusively	  evangelical	  Christian	  interpretations	  of	  Scripture	  leaves	  greater	  possibilities	  for	  coalition	  building	  with	  socially	  conservative	  Jewish	  traditions	  and	  Roman	  Catholics.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  view	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  Family	  Institute	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  reflects	  the	  position	  of	  the	  evangelical	  Focus	  on	  the	  Family	  as	  well	  the	  position	  of	  prominent	  Catholic	  groups.	  	  The	  MFI’s	  official	  statement	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage:	  Since	  the	  primary	  purpose	  of	  marriage	  is	  the	  procreation	  and	  nurturing	  of	  children,	  marriage	  can	  only	  be	  the	  union	  of	  a	  man	  and	  a	  woman.	  The	  concept	  of	  an	  alternative	  definition	  that	  includes	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  is	  fundamentally	  flawed.	  It	  is	  a	  travesty	  that	  a	  Massachusetts	  court	  decided	  to	  thrust	  a	  radical	  social	  experiment	  upon	  an	  unwilling	  populace	  by	  legalizing	  same-­‐sex	  “marriage.”	  This	  government	  endorsement	  of	  motherless	  and	  fatherless	  families	  is	  both	  reckless	  and	  dangerous.	  A	  maturing	  child	  needs	  the	  gender-­‐specific	  influences	  of	  both	  a	  mother	  and	  a	  father.	  (	  http://www.mafamily.org/issues/marriage-­‐and-­‐family/same-­‐sex-­‐marriage/)	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Similarly,	  while	  Roman	  Catholic	  groups	  voicing	  opposition	  to	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  draw	  on	  appeals	  by	  the	  Pope	  for	  Catholics	  to	  “stand	  up	  for	  marriage”,	  they	  are	  similar	  to	  evangelical	  groups	  in	  that	  they	  declare,	  “same-­‐sex	  unions	  are	  not	  marriages	  [and]	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  will	  undermine	  the	  capacity	  of	  marriage	  as	  a	  civil	  and	  social	  institution	  to	  protect	  children”	  (http://www.catholicvote.org/index.php?/site/issues_details/marriage_and_family/).	  	  	   On	  each	  factor	  identified	  with	  support	  for	  gay	  marriage-­‐	  higher	  income	  levels	  and	  education,	  strong	  labour	  unions,	  a	  post-­‐industrial	  economic	  base,	  below	  average	  numbers	  of	  evangelical	  Christians,	  a	  diverse	  population,	  largely	  urban-­‐	  Massachusetts	  scores	  higher	  than	  most	  US	  states.	  	  The	  presence	  of	  and	  interaction	  between	  these	  factors	  helps	  to	  maintain	  a	  culture	  where	  citizens	  of	  Massachusetts	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  accepting	  of	  LGBT	  people	  and,	  by	  extension,	  there	  is	  greater	  likelihood	  that	  Massachusetts	  residents	  will	  be	  supportive	  of	  LGBT	  rights	  claims,	  including	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  	  But	  demographic	  characteristics	  in	  and	  of	  themselves	  do	  not	  explain	  the	  advancement	  of	  activist	  agendas,	  policy	  decisions	  and	  legislation	  in	  favour	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  	  	  	  These	  must	  be	  explained	  by	  considering	  local	  political	  institutions	  and	  the	  strategies	  that	  activists	  use	  to	  successfully	  engage	  them.	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Politics,	  Political	  Opportunities,	  and	  Political	  Constraints	  	   In	  Camp’s	  (2006)	  analysis,	  the	  largest	  predictor	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  person	  might	  vote	  for	  anti-­‐gay	  marriage	  referenda	  is	  party	  affiliation;	  the	  higher	  the	  percentage	  of	  Republican	  voters	  in	  any	  particular	  county	  the	  more	  likely	  that	  anti-­‐gay	  marriage	  referenda	  were	  to	  pass.	  	  This	  would	  likely	  surprise	  few	  people	  with	  even	  a	  passing	  interest	  in	  American	  politics	  as	  the	  Republican	  Party	  has	  “for	  three	  decades…portrayed	  itself	  (with	  few	  exceptions)	  as	  explicitly	  anti-­‐gay”	  (Rayside	  2008:	  32).	  	  Both	  Camp	  and	  Rayside	  suggest	  party	  effects	  in	  attitudes	  reflect	  the	  polarization	  of	  American	  politics,	  especially	  around	  moral	  issues.	  Camp	  also	  finds	  that	  party	  affiliation	  interacts	  strongly	  with	  religion	  and	  this	  reflects	  Barry	  Adam’s	  (2003:	  264)	  assertion	  that	  the	  “relationship	  between	  the	  Republican	  Party	  and	  the	  Christian	  Right	  has	  helped	  consolidate	  conservative	  Protestant	  influence	  beyond	  its	  numerical	  voting	  weight”.	  	  Further,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  gay	  rights,	  religious	  “fundamentalists	  have	  built	  an	  efficient	  institutionalized	  system	  of	  cultural	  reproduction,	  propagating	  a	  cosmology	  that	  constructs	  homosexuality	  as	  one	  element	  in	  a	  semiotic	  chain	  of	  ‘moral	  decline’”	  (Adam	  2003:	  264).	  	  This	  creates	  a	  significant	  challenge	  to	  advancing	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  through	  the	  legislature	  at	  the	  federal	  level	  and	  in	  many	  states	  where	  Republicans	  compose	  a	  significant	  percentage	  of	  the	  legislature.	  	  	  
	  	   242	  
Republicans	  are	  generally	  the	  weaker	  party	  in	  Massachusetts,	  and	  there	  is	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  Massachusetts	  Republicans	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  fiscally	  conservative	  rather	  than	  socially	  conservative	  (Graff	  2001,	  Lewis	  2002).	  	  However,	  only	  a	  few	  Republicans	  have	  bucked	  the	  national	  party	  line	  to	  advance	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights	  in	  the	  Bay	  State.	  Notable	  exceptions	  include	  libertarian	  leaning	  Republican	  Governor	  Bill	  Weld	  in	  the	  1990’s,	  and,	  importantly,	  the	  handful	  of	  Republican	  legislators	  who	  came	  to	  publicly	  support	  same	  sex	  marriage	  through	  the	  long	  course	  of	  the	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  struggle	  in	  the	  2000’s.	  	  	  	   The	  Democratic	  Party	  is	  generally	  more	  likely	  to	  favour	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights,	  but	  by	  no	  means	  does	  it	  present	  a	  united	  front	  for	  such	  rights	  the	  way	  Republicans	  present	  a	  united	  front	  against	  them.	  	  Even	  in	  states	  where	  Democrats	  may	  be	  strong	  contenders	  for	  public	  office	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  that	  they	  will	  be	  socially	  conservative,	  and	  this	  is	  especially	  true	  in	  the	  South	  (Rayside	  2008:	  33).	  	  Although	  Rayside	  (2008:	  33)	  argues	  that	  “Democrats	  are	  stronger	  in	  the	  North-­‐eastern	  states	  than	  elsewhere,	  and	  these	  Democrats	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  lean	  left	  than	  their	  counterparts	  in	  most	  other	  regions”,	  the	  fact	  remains	  that	  several	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  DOMA	  bills	  and	  amendments	  were	  sponsored	  and/or	  whole-­‐heartedly	  supported	  by	  powerful	  socially	  conservative	  Democrats	  like	  Tom	  Finneran	  and	  Bob	  Travaglini.	  	  However,	  while	  Finneran	  and	  Travaglini	  proved	  to	  be	  quite	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obstructionist,	  liberal	  Democrats	  Deval	  Patrick	  and	  Sal	  DiMasi	  in	  particular	  were	  vital	  to	  the	  success	  of	  gay	  marriage	  in	  the	  end.	  This	  split	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  in	  Massachusetts	  is	  at	  least	  partly	  related	  to	  religious	  influence	  on	  politics,	  but	  in	  this	  region	  it	  is	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  rather	  than	  Protestant	  Evangelicals	  with	  whom	  LGBT	  activists	  must	  contend.	  	  Even	  so,	  the	  “prominence	  of	  conservative	  religiosity	  even	  in	  the	  most	  progressive	  of	  American	  regions	  means	  that	  victories	  [for	  LGBT	  rights]	  can	  only	  be	  won	  with	  enormous	  effort”	  (Rayside	  2008:	  34).	  	  This	  is	  certainly	  the	  case	  in	  Massachusetts	  where,	  despite	  its	  solid	  ‘blue	  state’	  status,	  the	  struggle	  for	  marriage	  equality	  lasted	  nearly	  a	  decade	  during	  which	  the	  LGBT	  movement	  was	  forced	  to	  fend	  off	  repeated	  DOMA	  attempts.	  The	  last	  of	  these	  attempts	  hinged	  on	  the	  votes	  of	  a	  handful	  of	  conservative	  legislators	  of	  both	  parties,	  several	  of	  whom	  changed	  their	  position	  at	  the	  last	  minute	  to	  narrowly	  defeat	  an	  attempted	  ballot	  initiative	  that	  would	  have	  potentially	  banned	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts	  by	  just	  one	  vote.	  	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  story	  here	  is	  not	  that	  there	  were	  DOMA	  attempts	  in	  Massachusetts,	  but	  that	  LGBT	  activists	  and	  their	  allies	  were	  actually	  able	  to	  fight	  back	  and	  win	  against	  them.	  	  This	  is	  due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  political	  structure	  of	  Massachusetts	  and	  the	  opportunities	  within	  this	  structure	  that	  activists	  were	  able	  to	  exploit,	  or	  create.	  	  Across	  the	  US,	  the	  fragmented	  structure	  of	  the	  political	  system	  creates	  a	  number	  of	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openings	  for	  political	  activism	  by	  social	  movements-­‐	  and	  counter-­‐movements	  (Rayside	  2008,	  Smith	  2009).	  	  This	  is	  one	  factor	  that	  accounts	  for	  the	  patchwork	  legislative	  record	  of	  gay	  rights	  in	  the	  US	  where	  the	  system	  of	  political	  checks	  and	  balances	  in	  place	  “gives	  legislatures	  more	  leverage	  over	  policy	  making	  than	  is	  characteristic	  of	  parliamentary	  systems	  [and]	  within	  legislatures	  individual	  legislators	  have	  much	  more	  freedom	  than	  their	  counterparts	  in	  other	  countries”	  (Rayside	  2008:	  31).	  	  The	  separation	  of	  powers	  in	  federal	  and	  state	  governmental	  structures	  means	  that	  legislatures	  may	  override	  LGBT	  friendly	  court	  decisions,	  and	  if	  that	  fails	  there	  is	  always	  the	  citizens’	  petition/ballot	  initiative.	  	  However,	  Massachusetts	  activists	  are	  well	  positioned	  to	  fight	  back	  because	  of	  the	  longevity	  and	  experience	  of	  those	  driving	  the	  movement.	  The	  ballot	  initiative	  is	  a	  particularly	  unique	  element	  of	  the	  US	  federal	  and	  state	  governmental	  structure.	  	  Reflecting	  the	  strength	  of	  American	  populism	  and	  underpinned	  by	  an	  ideology	  of	  popular	  democracy,	  “many	  state	  constitutions	  provide	  mechanisms	  for	  ballot	  initiatives	  and	  referenda	  [and]	  there	  is	  a	  long	  history	  of	  using	  ballot	  initiatives,	  recall,	  election	  of	  judges	  and	  other	  measures	  of	  popular	  democracy”	  to	  push	  back	  against	  unpopular	  court	  decisions	  (Smith	  2009:	  17-­‐19).	  	  In	  many	  other	  countries,	  “conservatives	  and	  evangelicals	  lack	  institutional	  levers	  or	  pressure	  points	  to	  counter	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  courts”	  (Smith	  2009:	  18).	  	  In	  comparison	  to	  Canada	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and	  most	  other	  liberal,	  Western	  democracies,	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  American	  political	  structures	  “translates	  into	  a	  comparatively	  permeable	  political	  system	  that	  privileges	  social	  movements	  [but]	  by	  providing	  so	  many	  veto	  points,	  the	  political	  system	  also	  advantages	  advocates	  of	  the	  status	  quo”	  (Rayside	  and	  Wilcox	  2012:	  20).	  For	  American	  LGBT	  activists,	  as	  well	  proponents	  of	  other	  types	  of	  group	  rights	  claims,	  this	  means	  that	  advances	  in	  civil	  rights	  are	  rarely	  safe	  from	  counter-­‐attack.	  	  	  These	  basic	  structural	  facts	  are	  as	  true	  in	  Massachusetts	  as	  they	  are	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country.	  However,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  ballot	  initiative	  process	  itself	  in	  Massachusetts	  gives	  activists	  greater	  odds	  of	  mobilizing	  against	  it.	  	  Referring	  to	  the	  Proposition	  8	  vote	  that	  banned	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  California,	  activist	  Lisa	  Thompson	  said,	  “I’m	  actually	  not	  surprised	  California	  changed	  the	  constitution	  because	  it’s	  really	  easy	  for	  them	  to	  do	  it,	  where	  as	  here	  it’s	  not	  so	  easy.“	  	  The	  ballot	  initiative	  process	  in	  Massachusetts	  is	  a	  multi-­‐step	  process.	  	  Enough	  signatures	  must	  first	  be	  gathered	  to	  show	  citizen	  support	  for	  the	  initiative	  and	  then	  the	  petitions	  must	  be	  certified	  by	  the	  Attorney	  General’s	  office	  before	  being	  sent	  to	  the	  legislature.	  	  Once	  in	  the	  legislature,	  a	  ballot	  initiative	  must	  be	  approved	  by	  25%	  of	  legislators	  in	  two	  constitutional	  conventions	  (joint	  meetings	  of	  the	  House	  and	  the	  Senate)	  that	  take	  place	  in	  two	  consecutive	  legislative	  sessions.	  	  That	  the	  bar	  for	  legislative	  approval	  of	  a	  ballot	  initiative	  is	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set	  quite	  low	  (25%	  of	  the	  legislature)	  is	  an	  advantage	  for	  the	  petitioners;	  that	  the	  process	  is	  quite	  lengthy	  is	  an	  advantage	  for	  opponents	  of	  the	  petition.	  	  For	  Activist	  Amy	  Hunt,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  ballot	  initiative	  petition	  process,	  “The	  magic	  thing	  here	  was	  time.”	  She,	  too,	  compared	  the	  process	  with	  that	  of	  California,	  	  [In	  California]	  you	  can	  win	  a	  valid	  court	  case	  and	  they	  [opponents]	  can	  generate	  a	  ballot	  question	  in	  two	  or	  three	  months.	  	  You	  don’t	  want	  that.	  	  That’s	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  I	  believe	  it	  started	  in	  Massachusetts,	  because	  it	  was	  hard	  to	  generate	  a	  valid	  petition	  and	  there	  was	  already	  an	  extraordinary	  structure	  in	  place	  to	  fight	  against	  it.	  	  Hunt’s	  observations	  touch	  on	  both	  the	  structural	  and	  strategic	  advantages	  of	  Massachusetts	  activists,	  i.e.,	  not	  only	  was	  the	  initiative	  petition	  process	  complicated	  for	  gay	  marriage	  opponents,	  but	  there	  was	  an	  experienced	  network	  of	  SMOs,	  activists,	  and	  legislative	  allies	  ready	  to	  fight	  an	  initiative	  petition	  when	  it	  came.	  The	  real	  advantage	  of	  LGBT	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts	  was	  their	  experience	  and	  deep	  knowledge	  of	  the	  political	  system	  and	  its	  vulnerabilities.	  This	  gave	  them	  the	  tools	  necessary	  to	  manipulate	  the	  system	  in	  their	  favour.	  	  Referring	  to	  the	  constitutional	  convention	  process,	  Arline	  Isaacson	  quipped,	  “You	  know	  that	  old	  song	  ‘There	  are	  Fifty	  Ways	  to	  Leave	  Your	  Lover’?	  Well,	  there	  are	  fifty	  ways	  to	  kill	  a	  con-­‐con.”	  	  A	  political	  opportunity	  or	  structural	  vulnerability	  may	  be	  meaningless	  if	  activists	  are	  ill-­‐prepared	  to	  capitalize	  on	  it,	  but	  Massachusetts	  activists	  had	  thirty	  years	  of	  accumulated	  knowledge,	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thirty	  years	  of	  accumulated	  experience,	  and	  thirty	  years	  of	  coalition	  building	  and	  contact-­‐making.	  	  This	  group	  was	  well	  positioned	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  any	  opportunity.	  	  	  According	  to	  Miriam	  Smith	  (2008:	  191),	  “Political	  institutions	  themselves	  produce	  different	  forms	  of	  politics	  [and]	  institutional	  structures	  play	  a	  shaping	  role	  in	  movement	  strategizing.”	  	  Gay	  marriage	  was	  made	  possible	  in	  Massachusetts	  because	  of	  activists	  like	  Arline	  Isaacson,	  Mary	  Bonauto,	  and	  others	  who	  had	  been	  engaged	  with	  Massachusetts	  political	  and	  legal	  institutions	  for	  many	  years	  and	  were	  well	  informed	  and	  well	  prepared	  to	  strategize	  for	  success	  on	  multiple	  levels	  in	  order	  to	  win	  marriage	  and	  fend	  off	  the	  anticipated	  attempts	  to	  overturn	  it.	  	  When	  the	  time	  came	  to	  develop	  a	  strategy	  to	  engage	  any	  particular	  aspect	  of	  Massachusetts	  political	  institutions,	  for	  instance	  to	  win	  in	  court,	  to	  kill	  a	  “con	  con”,	  or	  to	  change	  a	  legislator’s	  vote,	  these	  activists	  were	  equipped	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Additionally,	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts	  were	  boosted	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  marriage	  equality	  by	  existing	  policies	  that	  recognized	  and	  protected	  LGBT	  individuals	  and	  families.	  	  This	  is	  exceedingly	  important	  because	  “past	  policies	  are	  institutionalized	  in	  ways	  that	  reflect	  current	  debates”,	  and	  are	  “play[ed]	  out	  through	  legal	  doctrine	  and	  jurisprudence”,	  thereby	  shaping	  possibilities	  for	  future	  movement	  (or	  counter-­‐movement)	  success	  (Smith	  2009:	  172,175).	  	  So,	  for	  example,	  because	  many	  Americans	  believe	  that	  “queer	  sexuality	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challenges	  the	  heterosexual	  family,	  it	  is	  cast	  in	  [the	  same	  sex	  marriage	  debate]	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  family,	  social	  and	  even	  national	  stability”	  (Smith	  2009:	  171).	  	  However,	  in	  Massachusetts	  the	  courts	  and	  the	  legislature	  had	  been	  recognizing	  and	  protecting	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  families	  for	  nearly	  a	  decade,	  starting	  in	  the	  1990’s	  when	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  couples	  overturned	  a	  discriminatory	  foster	  parenting	  policy,	  again	  when	  the	  SJC	  recognized	  second	  parent	  adoption,	  and	  still	  again	  with	  the	  legal	  recognition	  of	  de	  facto	  parenting	  rights.	  	  	  In	  fact,	  when	  making	  the	  decision	  to	  go	  for	  a	  gay	  marriage	  case	  in	  Massachusetts,	  Mary	  Bonauto	  and	  GLAD	  made	  the	  decision,	  in	  part	  because,	  “Massachusetts	  is	  a	  state	  that	  is	  committed	  to	  equality	  and	  it’s	  a	  state	  where	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  families	  are	  no	  stranger	  at	  any	  branch	  of	  government,	  and	  those	  things	  matter”	  (GLAD	  Civil	  Union	  to	  Marriage	  panel:	  2009).	  Therefore,	  when	  the	  time	  came	  to	  fight	  for	  marriage,	  it	  did	  not	  work	  for	  opponents	  to	  somehow	  position	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  and	  their	  families	  as	  “the	  ‘enemy’	  of	  common	  folk”,	  as	  had	  worked	  successfully	  for	  opponents	  in	  many	  other	  DOMA	  campaigns	  (Adam	  2003:	  269),	  because	  in	  Massachusetts	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  families	  had	  already	  established,	  with	  the	  force	  of	  the	  law	  behind	  them	  in	  many	  ways,	  that	  they	  were	  common	  folk,	  a	  fact	  repeatedly	  emphasized	  by	  the	  LGBT	  movement	  throughout	  the	  struggle	  for	  marriage	  equality.	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In	  many	  cases,	  progress	  on	  same	  sex	  marriage	  in	  the	  US	  has	  been	  limited	  “by	  the	  absence	  of	  more	  elementary	  rights	  protections	  in	  much	  of	  the	  country”	  (Rayside	  2008:	  70).	  	  The	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  anti-­‐discrimination	  protection	  creates	  a	  policy	  legacy	  that	  may	  help	  or	  hinder	  advancement	  on	  relationship	  recognition;	  therefore	  in	  the	  United	  States	  “same-­‐sex	  marriage	  is	  a	  potent	  issue	  for	  the	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  communities	  in	  part,	  because,	  in	  many	  jurisdictions,	  it	  is	  legal	  to	  discriminate	  against	  lesbians	  and	  gays	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  employment	  and	  housing”	  (Smith	  2009:5).	  	  Indeed,	  less	  than	  half	  of	  US	  states	  currently	  bar	  discrimination	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  and/or	  gender	  identity,	  leaving	  LGBT	  people	  at	  risk	  in	  their	  employment,	  housing,	  and/or	  other	  ways	  should	  they	  be	  discriminated	  against	  	  (http://www.thetaskforce.org/reports_and_research/nondiscrimination_laws).	  	  Recall,	  however,	  that	  Massachusetts	  was	  out	  front	  on	  anti-­‐discrimination	  measures	  as	  well,	  passing	  a	  statewide	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  in	  1989.	  	  Many	  activists	  specifically	  mentioned	  the	  importance	  of	  having	  the	  civil	  rights	  law	  in	  place.	  	  Gary	  Daffin	  of	  MGLPC	  describes	  the	  long-­‐term	  significance	  of	  the	  bill	  this	  way,	  	  Gay	  civil	  rights	  allowed	  more	  and	  more	  people	  in	  the	  state	  to	  be	  out	  and	  to	  feel	  like	  the	  government	  was	  on	  their	  side	  a	  little	  bit,	  or	  that	  we	  were	  at	  least	  making	  progress.	  	  After	  that	  we	  passed	  the	  hate	  crimes	  law	  and	  as	  we	  worked	  on	  domestic	  partnerships,	  more	  people	  got	  engaged	  with	  LGBT	  rights	  in	  the	  broader	  community.	  	  The	  culture	  became	  more	  accepting,	  and	  politically,	  for	  elected	  officials,	  it	  became	  less	  and	  less	  okay	  to	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be	  anti-­‐gay,	  and	  it	  chiselled	  away	  at	  the	  hard	  anti-­‐gay	  folks	  in	  the	  legislature.	  	  	  Securing	  anti-­‐discrimination	  policies	  in	  housing	  and	  employment,	  and	  other	  initiatives	  in	  support	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  rights,	  are	  not	  only	  significant	  policy	  changes;	  they	  leave	  what	  Miriam	  Smith	  (2008)	  refers	  as	  “policy	  legacies”	  that	  activists	  can	  build	  on	  future	  success.	  	  Such	  initiatives	  are	  important	  in	  leading	  to	  cultural	  change	  as	  well	  by	  making	  it	  safer	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  to	  be	  out	  in	  their	  communities.	  	  For	  example,	  Pat	  Ould	  of	  North	  Shore	  MassEquality	  credits	  early	  gay	  rights	  victories	  with	  making	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  “more	  comfortable	  coming	  out	  and	  not	  being	  worried	  about	  retribution	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  job.	  	  There	  had	  been	  a	  lot	  of	  rights	  already	  won	  [before	  marriage],	  adoption,	  foster	  care,	  employment	  protection,	  there	  was	  a	  lot	  in	  place	  already…that	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  marriage.”	  	  In	  addition	  to	  policy	  legacies,	  these	  early	  victories	  that	  made	  it	  ”more	  comfortable”	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  to	  live	  openly	  contributed	  to	  important	  cultural	  changes	  as	  well.	  Moreover,	  any	  legislation	  that	  makes	  it	  easier	  for	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  couples	  to	  be	  “out”	  in	  their	  communities	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  some	  political	  and	  cultural	  impact.	  This	  is	  a	  fact	  highlighted	  by	  Camp	  (2006:	  26),	  who	  finds	  “strong	  evidence	  that	  the	  number	  of	  same	  sex	  households	  in	  a	  locale	  makes	  a	  significant	  difference…the	  more	  visible	  we	  [LGBT	  people]	  are,	  the	  more	  of	  a	  difference	  we	  make”	  in	  levels	  of	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support	  for	  gay	  marriage.	  For	  an	  example	  of	  the	  way	  that	  simply	  being	  out	  can	  make	  a	  difference,	  consider	  this	  statement	  by	  activist	  Elyse	  Cherry	  who	  recalls	  from	  her	  lobbying	  experience,	  “There	  were	  legislators	  who	  would	  say,	  ‘My	  district	  doesn’t	  really	  support	  gay	  marriage	  but	  I’m	  really	  stuck	  because	  my	  kids	  are	  now	  going	  to	  hockey	  practice	  with	  somebody	  whose	  got	  gay	  parents	  and	  I	  can’t	  figure	  out	  why	  I	  should	  treat	  them	  differently.’”	  Just	  knowing	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  couples	  forced	  legislators	  to	  grapple	  with	  this	  issue	  on	  a	  personal	  level,	  not	  only	  a	  policy	  level.	  Thus,	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  can	  increase	  the	  odds	  for	  the	  LGBT	  movement	  success	  in	  fighting	  for	  additional	  rights	  just	  by	  being	  out.	  	  In	  turn,	  fighting	  and	  winning	  incremental	  rights	  battles	  educates	  activists	  about	  the	  political	  and	  cultural	  structures	  that	  they	  must	  engage	  to	  be	  successful,	  and	  enables	  them	  to	  hone	  their	  tactics	  and	  strategies	  so	  as	  to	  maximize	  chances	  for	  future	  success.	  	  Massachusetts	  had	  legislation	  in	  place	  as	  early	  as	  1989	  that	  made	  it	  easier	  for	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  to	  be	  out	  and	  politically	  active	  and	  activists	  continued	  to	  build	  on	  this	  success.	  	  This	  is	  another	  crucial	  piece	  of	  the	  explanation	  for	  why	  gay	  marriage	  was	  made	  legal	  first	  in	  Massachusetts.	  Frames	  and	  Strategies	  	   There	  are	  two	  overlapping	  approaches	  to	  the	  strategies	  used	  by	  activists	  to	  establish	  same	  sex	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts:	  political	  and	  cultural.	  	  When	  Arline	  Isaacson	  says	  “there	  are	  fifty	  ways	  to	  kill	  a	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con	  con”	  she	  is	  referring	  to	  political	  approaches	  and	  parliamentary	  tactics	  that	  can	  be	  used	  within	  a	  political	  structure	  to	  advance	  or	  block	  legislation.	  These	  tactics	  are	  central	  to	  movement	  success,	  but	  can	  be	  risky	  and	  may	  work	  only	  in	  circumstances	  where	  political	  insiders	  are	  willing	  to	  pull	  strings	  (within	  the	  legal	  rules	  of	  legislative	  proceedings)	  to	  ensure	  things	  might	  go	  a	  certain	  way	  (for	  example,	  see	  the	  “yes-­‐yes-­‐no”	  strategy	  described	  in	  chapter	  5).	  Knowledge	  of	  what	  strings	  are	  available	  to	  be	  pulled	  and	  knowing	  which	  ally	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  pull	  them	  shapes	  political	  movement	  strategies.	  Indeed,	  “political	  institutions	  and	  policy	  legacies	  are	  the	  unseen	  structures	  behind	  the	  vociferous	  debate	  between	  same	  sex	  marriage	  advocates	  and	  defenders”,	  and	  “the	  strategies	  used	  by…social	  movement	  organizations	  [are]	  structured	  by	  the	  institutional	  openings	  available	  to	  them”	  	  (Smith	  2009:	  159,	  161).	  	  Political	  institutions	  and	  policy	  legacies	  structure	  the	  debate	  but	  the	  debate	  does	  not	  end	  in	  the	  political	  realm;	  it	  spills	  over	  into	  culture	  and	  the	  two	  spheres	  act	  (and	  react)	  upon	  each	  other.	  Because	  of	  this,	  even	  the	  cultural	  strategies	  used	  by	  activists	  were	  shaped	  by	  the	  political	  institutions	  and	  structures	  that	  activists	  must	  engage,	  as	  much	  as	  those	  same	  strategies	  were	  designed	  to	  engage	  the	  hearts	  and	  minds	  of	  legislators	  and	  their	  constituents.	  	  	  	   One	  example	  of	  the	  connections	  between	  culture,	  political	  structures,	  and	  movement	  strategy	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	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populist	  ideology	  and	  popular	  democracy,	  especially	  the	  ballot	  initiative	  process.	  	  Populism	  is	  both	  structural	  and	  cultural	  in	  the	  US	  and	  manifests	  itself	  in	  many	  of	  the	  frequently	  utilized	  frames	  and	  discourses	  against	  gay	  marriage,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  prominent	  use	  of	  ballot	  initiatives	  and	  referenda	  as	  way	  to	  bring	  the	  issue	  of	  gay	  marriage	  ‘to	  the	  people’	  (Adam	  2003,	  Rimmerman	  2002).	  	  Populist	  ideologies	  have	  long	  been	  used	  to	  mobilize	  opponents	  against	  LGBT	  rights.	  	  For	  example,	  consider	  Christian	  Coalition	  founder	  Pat	  Robertson’s	  “populist	  crusade	  to	  turn	  America	  back	  to	  its	  ‘moral	  roots’	  [and]	  ‘traditional	  family	  values’”	  (Rimmerman	  2002:	  136).	  	  In	  addition,	  Rayside	  (2008:	  31)	  identifies	  the	  American	  system	  as	  unique	  in	  its	  use	  of	  referenda	  to	  decide	  public	  policy	  and	  points	  out	  that	  “religious	  conservatives	  have	  been	  particularly	  intent	  on	  putting	  questions	  before	  state	  electorates	  to	  prevent	  or	  roll	  back	  measures	  that	  recognize	  sexual	  diversity”.	  	  Sean	  Cahill	  (2007:	  165)	  notes,	  	  “Since	  1974	  antigay	  activists	  have	  deployed	  more	  than	  one	  hundred	  ballot	  measures	  and	  initiatives	  [and]	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  were	  approved”.	  	  Cultural	  support	  for	  populist	  ideologies	  and	  populist	  political	  structures	  reinforce	  each	  other,	  and	  this	  plays	  itself	  out	  in	  both	  the	  frames	  used	  to	  argue	  against	  gay	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage	  and	  the	  political	  institutions	  and	  structures	  used	  to	  roll	  back	  advances	  made	  by	  LGBT	  activists.	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Populist	  ideology	  and	  the	  popular	  democratic	  structural	  opportunities	  in	  the	  US	  political	  system	  account	  for	  the	  viability	  of	  such	  discourses	  and	  frames	  against	  gay	  marriage,	  yet	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts	  were	  able	  to	  strategize	  against	  the	  typical	  success	  of	  this	  framing	  strategy	  of	  their	  opponents.	  Gay	  marriage	  opponents	  had	  been	  victorious	  in	  other	  states	  by	  mobilizing	  populist	  discourses	  against	  gay	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage	  in	  several	  ways.	  One	  of	  these	  is	  the	  “special	  rights”	  argument,	  where	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  individuals	  and	  couples	  are	  cast	  as	  “privileged,	  spoiled,	  and	  demanding	  ‘special	  rights’”	  for	  a	  “lifestyle”	  that	  many	  do	  not	  approve	  of,	  or	  even	  find	  dangerous	  and/or	  threatening	  to	  the	  “traditional	  family”	  (Adam	  2003:	  269).	  	  After	  constructing	  gay	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage	  this	  way,	  opponents	  then	  “mobilized	  a	  constituency	  that	  identified	  itself	  as	  the	  victims	  and	  outcasts	  of	  unfeeling	  liberal	  elites,	  including	  gay	  people	  among	  them”	  (Adam	  2003:	  269).	  	  	  Certainly	  this	  was	  a	  strategy	  tried	  by	  opponents	  of	  gay	  marriage	  in	  Massachusetts,	  but	  it	  failed	  to	  take	  off	  because	  political	  and	  cultural	  conditions	  in	  Massachusetts	  are	  different	  than	  those	  of	  other	  states.	  	  	  Casting	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  an	  entire	  way	  of	  life	  or	  culture	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  succeed	  in	  regions	  where	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  social	  anxiety	  already	  exists,	  especially	  anxiety	  over	  economic	  and	  social	  change,	  and	  where	  suspicion	  is	  already	  high	  in	  regards	  to	  racial,	  immigrant,	  and/or	  other	  “outsiders”	  (Adam	  2003,	  Smith	  2009,	  Stein	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1999,	  Rayside	  2008).	  	  Given	  Massachusetts’	  status	  as	  a	  wealthy	  state	  with	  a	  stable	  economy,	  with	  a	  history	  of	  immigration,	  and	  a	  reasonably	  large	  amount	  of	  diversity,	  these	  arguments,	  while	  put	  forth	  with	  fervour	  by	  some	  citizens	  of	  the	  state,	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  successful	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  mainstream	  Massachusetts	  residents.	  	  	  Also,	  these	  arguments	  are	  often	  floated	  with	  an	  attachment	  to	  conservative	  religious	  beliefs	  about	  the	  danger	  of	  moral	  decline,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  cultural	  orientation	  regarding	  religious	  expression	  that	  is	  unique	  in	  Massachusetts.	  According	  to	  Legislator	  Carl	  Sciortino,	  “The	  religious	  heritage	  of	  the	  [Northeast]	  region	  tends	  to	  be	  a	  very	  personal	  expression.	  	  It’s	  sort	  of	  a	  Puritanical	  tradition	  of	  [Massachusetts]	  where	  you	  might	  have	  strong	  religious	  beliefs	  but	  they’re	  yours,	  they’re	  private,	  you’re	  not	  meant	  to	  force	  them	  on	  other	  people.”	  	  	  In	  this	  case,	  such	  an	  attitude	  about	  religious	  beliefs	  could	  very	  well	  work	  against	  the	  uptake	  of	  other	  religiously	  based	  arguments	  that	  attach	  same	  sex	  marriage	  to	  an	  overall	  ‘moral	  decline’	  that	  threatens	  the	  family	  and	  society.	  	  	   The	  second	  reason	  that	  populist	  “special	  rights”	  and	  “family	  values”	  arguments	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  take	  root	  in	  Massachusetts	  is	  that	  the	  LGBT	  movement	  here	  has	  already	  successfully	  mobilized	  against,	  debunked,	  and	  neutralized	  these	  arguments	  in	  previous	  rights	  battles.	  	  The	  special	  rights	  and	  family	  values	  arguments	  had	  been	  levelled	  at	  LGBT	  rights	  campaigns	  in	  Massachusetts	  since	  the	  fight	  for	  the	  civil	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rights	  bill	  in	  the	  1980’s	  and	  throughout	  the	  struggle	  over	  domestic	  partnerships	  in	  the	  1990’s.	  	  Arline	  Isaacson	  recalls,	  	  A	  lot	  of	  the	  arguments	  used	  against	  marriage	  we	  had	  tackled	  one	  or	  two	  decades	  earlier.	  	  In	  the	  80’s	  we	  tackled	  ‘special	  rights’	  around	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill.	  	  When	  it	  came	  to	  marriage,	  that	  came	  up	  in	  a	  lot	  of	  other	  states,	  but	  it	  didn’t	  come	  up	  in	  this	  state.	  	  We	  had	  already	  beaten	  that	  one	  back.	  	  This	  and	  other	  earlier	  rights	  victories	  meant	  that	  Massachusetts	  citizens	  had	  already	  dealt	  with	  most	  anti-­‐gay	  arguments	  and	  had	  seen	  them	  defeated.	  	  Activist	  and	  GLAD	  employee	  Bruce	  Bell	  points	  out	  that	  by	  the	  time	  same	  sex	  marriage	  came	  to	  the	  fore	  in	  the	  2000’s,	  “the	  legislature	  had	  already	  conceded	  that	  gay	  people	  were	  ok	  to	  parent	  and	  so	  forth.	  So	  a	  lot	  of	  those	  [anti-­‐family]	  arguments	  didn’t	  hold	  water.”	  Because	  of	  these	  earlier	  decisions	  affirming	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  couples	  and	  their	  families,	  such	  families	  had	  been	  visibly	  embedded	  into	  the	  fabric	  of	  everyday	  life	  in	  Massachusetts	  for	  many	  years.	  	  Buzz	  Harris	  says,	  “The	  ‘protect	  our	  children’	  stuff	  they	  were	  trying	  to	  get	  in	  there,	  but	  they	  dropped	  it	  pretty	  quickly	  because	  it	  just	  wasn’t	  working	  for	  them.”	  	  	  To	  most	  residents	  of	  Massachusetts,	  lesbians	  and	  gay	  people	  are	  not	  scary	  strangers,	  or	  outsiders	  demanding	  “special	  rights”.	  	  They	  are	  the	  two	  dads	  of	  your	  daughter’s	  friend	  from	  her	  soccer	  team;	  they	  are	  the	  lesbian	  moms	  who	  drive	  their	  son	  to	  hockey	  practice	  every	  morning	  just	  like	  you	  do.	  	  They	  are	  a	  couple	  who	  want	  to	  know	  that	  they	  can	  visit	  each	  other	  in	  the	  hospital	  should	  one	  of	  them	  fall	  ill,	  a	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couple	  who	  wants	  to	  know	  that	  one	  of	  them	  will	  be	  able	  to	  keep	  the	  house	  should	  the	  other	  go	  into	  a	  nursing	  home.	  	  These	  are	  the	  ‘special	  rights’	  of	  gay	  marriage,	  and	  it	  is	  these	  rights	  that	  activists	  chose	  to	  highlight	  in	  their	  lobbying	  and	  advertising.	  	  	  Indeed,	  when	  asked	  what	  the	  most	  successful	  strategy	  was	  almost	  every	  activist	  I	  spoke	  with	  emphasized	  the	  ‘personal	  stories’	  such	  as	  these,	  that	  ‘put	  a	  human	  face’	  on	  the	  issue.	  	   The	  other	  side	  to	  the	  populist	  argument	  against	  gay	  marriage	  was	  ‘Let	  the	  people	  vote’.	  	  This	  is	  a	  frame	  that	  had	  support	  from	  prominent	  conservatives,	  and	  perhaps	  was	  popular	  because	  it	  did	  not	  outwardly	  criticize	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  or	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  but	  rather	  emphasized	  that	  ‘the	  people’	  should	  be	  able	  to	  vote	  on	  such	  an	  important	  issue.	  	  President	  George	  Bush	  led	  the	  charge	  by	  responding	  to	  the	  Goodridge	  decision	  in	  his	  2004	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  Address	  with	  this	  statement,	  “A	  strong	  America	  must	  value	  the	  institution	  of	  marriage.	  	  Activist	  judges,	  however,	  have	  begun	  redefining	  marriage	  by	  court	  order,	  without	  regard	  for	  the	  will	  of	  the	  people…	  On	  an	  issue	  of	  such	  great	  consequence,	  the	  people’s	  voice	  must	  be	  heard.”	  In	  Massachusetts,	  for	  those	  who	  did	  not	  mobilize	  around	  religious	  reasons	  to	  oppose	  the	  SJC’s	  decision	  on	  marriage,	  ‘Let	  the	  people	  vote’	  was	  the	  frame	  most	  utilized.	  	  Because	  it	  did	  not	  necessarily	  condemn	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  people	  or	  their	  families,	  this	  frame	  could	  have	  held	  more	  popular	  appeal	  with	  the	  democratically	  minded	  Massachusetts	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public.	  However,	  LGBT	  activists	  effectively	  challenged	  this	  with	  two	  counter-­‐frames:	  ‘It’s	  wrong	  to	  vote	  on	  rights’	  and	  ‘No	  discrimination	  in	  the	  constitution’.	  	  	   Massachusetts	  activists	  had	  been	  building	  the	  argument	  for	  marriage	  around	  the	  freedom	  to	  marry	  and	  asserting	  the	  equality	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  families	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  marriage	  struggle.	  This	  took	  the	  form	  of	  mobilizing	  around	  the	  idea	  that	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  people	  should	  be	  free	  to	  choose	  a	  partner	  of	  the	  same	  sex,	  that	  the	  resulting	  relationships	  and	  families	  are	  equal	  in	  worth	  to	  those	  of	  heterosexual	  couples,	  and	  that	  these	  relationships	  deserve	  the	  same	  legal	  rights	  and	  protections	  as	  any	  other.	  	  While	  some	  scholars	  have	  found	  that	  the	  “presence	  of	  the	  morality	  frame	  lessened	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  equality	  frame”	  (Tadlock	  Gordon,	  and	  Popp	  2008:	  196),	  in	  Massachusetts	  the	  morality	  frame	  was	  not	  very	  strong.	  	  While	  the	  morality	  and	  ‘family	  values’	  frames	  failed	  to	  take	  off	  for	  opponents,	  the	  ‘Let	  the	  people	  vote’	  frame	  did	  gain	  some	  traction.	  	  Especially	  later	  in	  the	  marriage	  struggle	  when	  supporters	  were	  trying	  to	  kill	  the	  initiative	  petition	  in	  the	  legislature,	  this	  became	  the	  frame	  to	  beat.	  	  At	  this	  point	  activists	  developed	  the	  ‘It’s	  wrong	  to	  vote	  on	  rights’	  campaign.	  	  	  The	  ‘It’s	  wrong	  to	  vote	  on	  rights’	  campaign	  successfully	  merged	  the	  family	  equality	  frame	  with	  democratic	  values	  in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  provide	  a	  populist	  counter-­‐punch	  to	  the	  ‘let	  the	  people	  vote’	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argument.	  	  This	  campaign	  specifically	  featured	  a	  series	  of	  ads	  that	  each	  highlighted	  a	  gay	  family	  or	  family	  members;	  one	  featured	  two	  dads	  and	  their	  daughter,	  in	  another	  parents	  of	  a	  lesbian	  spoke	  lovingly	  of	  their	  daughter,	  her	  partner	  and	  the	  child	  they	  had	  together,	  and	  the	  last	  featured	  the	  grown	  son	  of	  a	  lesbian	  couple	  who	  spoke	  of	  how	  much	  it	  meant	  to	  him	  that	  his	  moms	  were	  finally	  able	  to	  marry.	  	  In	  each	  two-­‐minute	  spot	  the	  featured	  family	  or	  family	  members	  spoke	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  family	  and	  that	  is	  was	  wrong	  to	  vote	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  these	  families.	  	  The	  point	  of	  this	  campaign	  was	  to	  link	  fundamental	  democratic	  values	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality	  to	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  families	  and	  they	  were	  successful,	  in	  part,	  because	  these	  ads	  were	  developed	  well	  after	  Goodridge	  and	  after	  gay	  marriages	  had	  been	  happening	  for	  the	  better	  part	  of	  year.	  	  These	  ads	  brought	  home	  the	  point	  that	  passing	  a	  referendum	  against	  gay	  marriage	  now	  would	  be	  voting	  to	  take	  away	  rights	  that	  already	  existed.	  	  This	  is	  exactly	  what	  Mary	  Bonauto	  and	  the	  legal	  team	  at	  GLAD	  were	  banking	  on	  when	  they	  filed	  Goodridge	  in	  April	  2001.	  	  Believing	  that	  if	  they	  could	  win	  marriage	  before	  their	  opponents	  succeeded	  in	  putting	  the	  issue	  on	  the	  ballot,	  then	  people	  would	  see	  gay	  marriage	  was	  not	  so	  scary	  or	  threatening	  after	  all.	  	  And	  they	  were	  right.	  	  Focusing	  on	  family	  matters	  and	  arguing	  that	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  families	  deserved	  the	  same	  protection	  as	  heterosexual	  families	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  very	  effective	  strategy.	  	  Long-­‐time	  activist	  and	  co-­‐author	  of	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Courting	  Equality:	  A	  Documentary	  History	  of	  America’s	  First	  Legal	  
Same-­Sex	  Marriages,	  Pat	  Gozemba	  reflected,	  	  I	  think	  for	  a	  long	  time	  LGBT	  people	  felt	  that	  having	  a	  spotlight	  shining	  on	  their	  lives	  and	  revealing	  what	  their	  lives	  were	  like	  was	  not	  going	  to	  be	  helpful,	  and	  in	  the	  end	  it	  was	  very	  helpful.	  	  The	  more	  people	  revealed	  about	  their	  day	  to	  day	  life-­‐-­‐	  their	  life	  in	  their	  neighbourhood,	  their	  life	  in	  their	  job,	  their	  kids	  in	  school,	  being	  elders	  and	  worrying	  what’s	  going	  to	  happen	  when	  one	  of	  them	  has	  to	  go	  in	  a	  nursing	  home-­‐-­‐	  that	  kind	  of	  thing.	  	  More	  of	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  personal	  really	  actually	  helped	  us	  a	  whole	  lot.	  	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  making	  the	  personal	  political	  in	  such	  a	  way	  helped	  sway	  legislators	  and	  constituents.	  	  Activist	  Lisa	  Thompson	  recalls	  a	  speech	  she	  heard	  by	  a	  legislator	  who	  had	  changed	  his	  mind	  to	  support	  gay	  marriage.	  She	  paraphrases	  the	  speech	  this	  way,	  	  ‘I	  have	  had	  person	  after	  person	  after	  person	  come	  into	  my	  office	  saying	  what	  a	  difference	  it	  would	  make	  in	  their	  lives	  if	  they	  could	  get	  married.	  	  And	  what	  a	  difference	  it	  would	  make	  in	  their	  children’s	  life	  in	  they	  could	  get	  married.	  	  And	  I’ve	  had	  people	  come	  into	  my	  office	  and	  tell	  me	  they	  are	  against	  gay	  marriage	  and	  I’ve	  asked	  ‘How	  will	  this	  decision	  affect	  you	  personally?’	  And	  they	  cannot	  say	  anything	  concrete.	  	  But	  these	  other	  people	  tell	  me	  concrete	  ways	  that	  this	  will	  improve	  their	  lives.	  So	  how	  could	  I	  possibly	  vote	  to	  harm	  a	  group	  of	  people,	  if	  it	  is	  not	  going	  to	  harm	  anyone	  else?	  	  How	  could	  I	  do	  that?’	  	  Another	  activist,	  Ellen	  Zucker,	  a	  lawyer,	  explains	  how	  she	  came	  to	  hear	  of	  an	  individual	  who	  was	  influenced	  to	  support	  gay	  marriage	  after	  seeing	  one	  of	  the	  	  “It’s	  wrong	  to	  vote	  on	  rights”	  segments,	  	  	  I	  was	  working	  on	  a	  case,	  and	  one	  of	  the	  court	  clerks	  asked	  me,	  ‘You’re	  the	  one	  who	  does	  the	  gay	  stuff,	  right?’	  And	  I	  said,	  ‘Yeah,	  yeah,	  that’s	  me.’	  And	  she	  said,	  ‘My	  husband	  is	  a	  hockey	  player,	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and	  when	  he	  grew	  up,	  every	  day	  his	  mom	  or	  dad	  would	  take	  him	  to	  hockey	  practice	  at	  5:30	  in	  the	  morning.	  	  And	  when	  my	  husband	  saw	  that	  ad	  with	  that	  young	  man	  who	  talked	  about	  his	  moms	  taking	  him	  to	  hockey	  practice,	  my	  husband	  watched	  that	  ad	  and	  said,	  ‘Fuck	  it,	  they	  should	  just	  be	  able	  to	  marry.’	  	  The	  experiences	  of	  these	  activists	  underscore	  the	  importance	  of	  ‘putting	  a	  face’	  on	  the	  issue.	  	  Making	  the	  personal	  political	  is	  a	  strategy	  that	  was	  successful	  with	  legislators	  and	  the	  public	  alike.	  	  This	  also	  relates	  to	  Camp’s	  finding	  that	  being	  out	  and	  visible	  creates	  an	  understanding	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  support	  for	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  gay	  marriage.	  	   The	  “No	  discrimination	  in	  the	  constitution”	  frame	  became	  particularly	  important	  when	  the	  fight	  against	  the	  ballot	  initiative	  was	  in	  full	  swing.	  	  According	  to	  Gary	  Daffin,	  activists	  “laid	  out	  this	  argument	  not	  as,	  ‘Are	  you	  for	  gay	  marriage?’	  per	  se,	  but	  ‘Do	  you	  want	  to	  write	  discrimination	  into	  the	  constitution?’”	  This	  frame	  is	  important	  because	  it	  helps	  legislators	  and	  individuals	  who	  might	  experience	  some	  cognitive	  dissonance	  while	  trying	  to	  sort	  out	  their	  personal	  discomfort	  around	  gay	  marriage	  with	  their	  basic	  belief	  in	  equal	  rights.	  	  Daffin	  continues,	  	  This	  helped	  tremendously	  both	  in	  the	  legislature	  and	  with	  regular	  folks.	  	  When	  they	  started	  seeing	  people	  get	  married	  this	  helped	  them	  overcome	  their	  emotional	  reaction.	  I	  think	  some	  people	  thought	  that	  this	  wasn’t	  a	  good	  argument,	  but	  in	  the	  end	  it	  was.	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This	  frame	  drew	  on	  Massachusetts’	  historical	  pride	  and	  pride	  in	  its	  constitution.	  	  Several	  activists	  reflected	  on	  why	  this	  frame	  was	  significant.	  	  Lisa	  Thompson	  cites	  “a	  sense	  of	  pride”	  that	  comes	  from	  “being	  one	  of	  the	  first	  colonies”	  and	  having	  “one	  of	  the	  oldest	  constitutions”.	  	  Mary	  Bonauto	  urged	  activists	  to	  “get	  a	  feel	  for	  the	  true	  history	  and	  narratives	  about	  the	  history	  of	  the	  state”	  and	  described	  the	  importance	  of	  history	  to	  Massachusetts	  culture	  this	  way,	  	  [Founding	  father]	  John	  Adams,	  being	  from	  Massachusetts,	  had	  a	  role	  in	  writing	  the	  Massachusetts	  constitution,	  and	  the	  Massachusetts	  constitution	  influenced	  the	  federal	  constitution.	  [Because	  of]	  John	  Adams…	  we	  have	  several	  equality	  provisions	  in	  the	  Massachusetts	  constitution	  and	  we	  can	  rely	  on	  all	  of	  them.	  (GLAD	  “From	  Civil	  Unions	  to	  Marriage	  Equality”	  panel	  2009)	  	  That	  LGBT	  activists	  in	  Massachusetts	  can	  draw	  an	  historical	  line	  back	  to	  John	  Adams	  and	  use	  his	  writing	  to	  argue	  in	  favour	  of	  equal	  rights	  is	  very	  powerful.	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  opponents	  would	  dispute	  the	  argument	  that	  Adams’	  writing	  can	  be	  used	  to	  justify	  gay	  marriage.	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  prove	  whether	  any	  founding	  father	  would	  be	  for	  or	  against	  gay	  marriage	  if	  they	  were	  writing	  in	  the	  present	  day.	  	  This	  ambiguity	  may	  actually	  help	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  frame	  sticks	  just	  enough	  to	  give	  it	  a	  degree	  of	  traction.	  Activists	  in	  Massachusetts	  were	  successful	  with	  these	  frames	  and	  strategies	  because	  they	  were	  a	  good	  cultural	  fit	  and	  not	  only	  built	  on	  the	  foundation	  of	  previous	  policy	  legacies	  and	  movement	  successes,	  but	  drew	  on	  dominant	  cultural	  ideologies	  as	  well.	  	  	  	  The	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success	  of	  the	  family	  equality	  frame	  was	  made	  possible	  in	  Massachusetts	  because	  this	  was	  not,	  in	  fact,	  the	  first	  time	  that	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  families	  had	  been	  under	  scrutiny.	  	  Certainly,	  the	  debates	  over	  foster	  care	  and	  domestic	  partnerships	  had	  brought	  attention	  to	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  families.	  But	  this	  time,	  activists	  had	  more	  control	  over	  the	  images.	  	  Also,	  the	  struggle	  for	  gay	  marriage	  occurred	  over	  a	  decade	  after	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  families	  were	  first	  thrust	  under	  the	  spotlight	  during	  the	  foster	  care	  debate	  in	  the	  1980’s.	  After	  LGBT	  activists	  (eventually)	  won	  the	  fight	  to	  overturn	  a	  discriminatory	  foster	  parenting	  policy	  and	  then	  went	  on	  to	  win	  other	  LGBT	  family	  friendly	  court	  and	  policy	  decisions,	  Massachusetts	  residents	  had	  some	  time	  to	  adjust	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  families	  in	  a	  way	  that	  facilitated	  the	  uptake	  of	  these	  family	  oriented	  frames	  during	  the	  gay	  marriage	  debate.	  Of	  course,	  the	  successful	  uptake	  of	  any	  particular	  frame	  is	  contingent	  on	  cultural	  resonance.	  	  Mayer	  Zald	  (1996:	  266)	  tells	  us,	  “Social	  movements	  occur	  in	  a	  larger	  social	  context.	  	  They	  draw	  on	  cultural	  stock	  for	  images	  of	  what	  is	  an	  injustice,	  for	  what	  is	  a	  violation	  of	  what	  ought	  to	  be.”	  	  One	  cultural	  element	  that	  helped	  LGBT	  activists	  and	  allies	  is	  what	  many	  of	  them	  described	  as	  a	  ‘libertarian’	  attitude	  in	  the	  Northeast.	  	  For	  instance,	  Pat	  Ould,	  an	  activist	  in	  Salem,	  Massachusetts	  and	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  North	  Shore	  MassEquality	  describes	  what	  she	  calls	  the	  “Yankee	  individualism”	  that	  characterizes	  
	  	   264	  
the	  Northeast,	  “That	  sort	  of	  thing	  where,	  when	  people	  can	  come	  to	  that	  level	  of	  understanding,	  that	  nobody	  should	  be	  able	  to	  tell	  anyone	  else	  how	  to	  live	  their	  life.	  	  I	  think	  that	  worked	  to	  our	  benefit.”	  	  	  Similarly,	  MGLPC	  Co-­‐Chair	  Gary	  Daffin	  says	  that,	  	  There	  are	  some	  Conservative	  Tea	  Party	  people	  I	  know	  personally	  who	  think	  the	  idea	  of	  two	  men	  sleeping	  together	  makes	  them	  sick…but	  they	  were	  staunch	  defenders	  of	  the	  notion	  that	  people	  should	  have	  equal	  rights.	  	  They	  can	  make	  a	  distinction	  where	  they	  have	  their	  own	  issues	  but	  they	  realize	  that	  they	  don’t	  have	  the	  right	  to	  prevent	  other	  people	  from	  having	  basic	  civil	  rights.	  	  	  	  This	  kind	  of	  ‘live	  and	  let	  live’	  attitude	  became	  more	  pronounced	  after	  same	  sex	  couples	  began	  getting	  married	  in	  2004.	  	  Legislator	  Carl	  Sciortino	  says	  that	  after	  2004	  gay	  marriage	  opponents	  lost	  their	  enthusiasm,	  “It	  was	  just	  not	  really	  an	  issue.	  It	  was	  like,	  ‘Yep,	  you	  go	  get	  married,	  do	  your	  thing,	  I	  don’t	  care.	  	  What	  about	  my	  job?	  What	  about	  the	  economy?	  What	  about	  my	  health	  care?’	  	  They	  moved	  on.”	  	  Gary	  Daffin	  had	  the	  same	  observation,	  “In	  the	  end,	  people	  didn’t	  see	  any	  harm	  to	  themselves.	  People	  just	  didn’t	  really	  care	  in	  the	  end.	  	  Most	  people	  were	  on	  the	  side	  of,	  ‘What	  the	  heck?	  It’s	  not	  hurting	  me.’”	  	  While	  these	  statements	  may	  reflect	  a	  cultural	  orientation	  toward	  libertarian	  tendencies,	  they	  also	  underscore	  the	  connections	  between	  culture,	  strategy,	  and	  institutions	  emphasized	  by	  Miriam	  Smith	  (2008)	  in	  that	  the	  political	  structure	  of	  the	  constitutional	  convention	  process	  gave	  people	  time	  to	  see	  that	  gay	  marriage	  would	  not,	  in	  fact,	  be	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harmful	  to	  themselves	  or	  their	  family	  despite	  the	  claims	  made	  by	  gay	  marriage	  opponents.	  	  	  Massachusetts	  has	  often	  been	  on	  the	  forefront	  of	  social	  justice	  causes,	  and	  many	  citizens	  of	  the	  state	  are	  proud	  of	  this	  history	  (Brown	  and	  Tager	  2000).	  	  This	  is	  something	  that	  MassEquality	  field	  organizer	  Ryan	  Brown	  reflected	  on	  when	  asked	  what	  makes	  people	  in	  Massachusetts	  more	  likely	  than	  those	  in	  other	  states	  to	  support	  gay	  marriage,	  “Massachusetts	  prides	  itself	  on	  being	  the	  first	  in	  many	  different	  social	  movements.	  	  Maybe	  it	  was	  an	  issue	  of	  pride.”	  For	  or	  against	  marriage,	  everyone	  had	  an	  awareness	  that	  history	  was	  being	  made	  in	  Massachusetts.	  	  At	  one	  point,	  there	  was	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  marriage	  when	  activists	  began	  to	  feel	  the	  momentum	  tip	  in	  favour	  of	  marriage	  equality.	  	  Activists	  did	  not	  know	  they	  would	  win-­‐-­‐	  they	  could	  not,	  would	  not	  know	  until	  the	  last	  vote	  was	  cast	  to	  defeat	  the	  amendment-­‐-­‐	  but,	  as	  the	  vote	  drew	  near,	  they	  began	  to	  feel	  “empowered	  by	  the	  confidence,	  however	  vague,	  that	  they	  have	  history	  
on	  their	  side”	  (Hirschman	  1991:	  158,	  emphasis	  in	  original,	  cited	  in	  Gamson	  and	  Meyer	  1996:	  286).	  	  	  	  As	  this	  momentum	  shifted,	  even	  many	  same	  sex	  marriage	  opponents	  came	  to	  feel	  that	  they	  wanted	  to	  be	  on	  the	  right	  side	  of	  history.	  	  	  	  For	  a	  state	  whose	  citizens	  take	  pride	  in	  their	  history	  and	  their	  role	  in	  progress,	  the	  idea	  that	  they	  were	  contributing	  to	  history	  was	  a	  poignant	  frame.	  	  Ellen	  Zucker	  describes	  the	  shift	  this	  way,	  “At	  some	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point	  we	  had	  the	  momentum.	  	  At	  that	  point,	  the	  final	  closing	  arguments	  were	  simply,	  ‘Do	  you	  want	  to	  be	  on	  the	  wrong	  side	  of	  history?’	  And	  none	  of	  them	  did.	  	  No	  one	  wants	  to	  be	  the	  one	  to	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  progress.	  So	  at	  that	  point,	  progress	  became	  a	  tactic.”	  	  Lisa	  Thompson’s	  take	  on	  this	  strategy	  was	  to	  tell	  legislators	  that	  voting	  for	  the	  amendment	  would	  be	  “a	  mistake”.	  	  She	  explains,	  	  There’s	  a	  legacy	  of	  making	  mistakes	  and	  having	  to	  fix	  them,	  like	  our	  part	  in	  slavery	  and	  our	  part	  in	  burning	  women	  accused	  of	  witchcraft.	  	  So	  I	  said,	  ‘Let’s	  not	  do	  anything	  we’ll	  have	  to	  apologize	  for	  later.’	  	  One	  of	  my	  strategies	  with	  the	  legislators	  was,	  ‘Don’t	  be	  on	  the	  wrong	  side	  of	  history.	  If	  you	  vote	  for	  the	  amendment,	  you’re	  going	  to	  apologize	  to	  the	  next	  generation	  for	  this.’	  	  Arline	  Isaacson	  used	  a	  similar	  strategy	  for	  legislators	  who	  were	  struggling	  with	  the	  upcoming	  vote.	  	  Isaacson’s	  strategy	  involved	  providing	  diverse	  contexts	  for	  rebuttal	  of	  the	  anti-­‐gay	  marriage	  amendment	  so	  that	  legislators	  could	  find	  one	  that	  fit	  for	  their	  constituencies:	  I	  would	  say	  to	  them,	  ‘I	  need	  you	  to	  think	  about	  twenty	  years	  from	  now	  when	  your	  kids	  are	  older	  and	  they	  ask	  you	  what	  you	  did	  about	  gay	  marriage.	  	  What	  are	  you	  going	  to	  say	  to	  them?	  	  Are	  you	  going	  to	  say	  that	  you	  didn’t	  like	  gay	  marriage	  and	  that	  it	  was	  against	  your	  religious	  beliefs	  but	  that	  you	  didn’t	  think	  discrimination	  should	  be	  added	  to	  the	  constitution?	  How	  are	  you	  going	  to	  explain	  this	  moment?’	  It	  was	  another	  crying	  thing	  for	  legislators.	  	  Easily	  a	  dozen	  legislators	  who	  had	  previously	  voted	  against	  us	  came	  back	  to	  me	  and	  said,	  ‘Thinking	  of	  it	  that	  way	  caused	  me	  to	  change	  my	  vote.’	  If	  they	  could	  view	  it	  in	  a	  historical	  context	  that	  changed	  everything	  for	  them.	  	  Being	  on	  the	  right	  of	  history	  is	  a	  frame	  that	  works	  in	  Massachusetts	  where	  there	  is	  a	  general	  sense	  of	  pride	  in	  the	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state’s	  progressive	  history	  and	  participation	  in	  social	  reform	  movements	  (Brown	  and	  Tager	  2000),	  where	  even	  conservative	  legislators	  like	  Republican	  Richard	  Tisei	  (quoted	  in	  the	  chapter	  5)	  says	  he	  is	  glad	  that	  he	  and	  the	  state	  of	  Massachusetts	  were	  on	  the	  “right	  side	  of	  history”	  in	  supporting	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  	  This	  reflects	  the	  culmination	  of	  the	  factors	  outlined	  above.	  	  Conversely,	  in	  states	  where	  opposition	  to	  gay	  marriage	  is	  rooted	  in	  religion,	  for	  example,	  many	  legislators	  would	  take	  pride	  in	  being	  that	  person	  who	  stopped	  progress	  on	  something	  that	  they	  believed	  causes	  ‘moral	  decline’	  and	  is	  genuinely	  harmful	  to	  families	  and	  the	  nation.	  	  But	  these	  conservative	  religious	  and	  moral	  arguments,	  while	  present,	  never	  took	  off	  in	  Massachusetts	  because	  they	  did	  not	  resonate	  with	  the	  many	  other	  cultural	  variables	  afoot	  in	  the	  state.	  	  Arguments	  about	  freedom,	  equality,	  and	  real	  family	  values	  were	  the	  frames	  that	  resonated	  here	  and	  these	  frames	  carried	  the	  movement	  to	  victory	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  marriage	  equality.	  In	  the	  years	  since	  Massachusetts	  became	  the	  first	  state	  to	  legally	  recognize	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  several	  other	  states	  have	  done	  the	  same.	  	  The	  total	  now	  stands	  at	  six	  states	  (Connecticut,	  Iowa,	  Massachusetts,	  New	  Hampshire,	  New	  York,	  and	  Vermont)	  in	  the	  US	  where	  marriage	  equality	  is	  the	  law	  of	  the	  land,	  and	  all	  but	  two	  of	  these	  are	  in	  the	  New	  England	  region.	  	  This	  supports	  the	  observation	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of	  Laumann,	  Gagnon,	  Michael,	  and	  Michaels	  (1994)	  that	  the	  New	  England	  states	  are	  among	  the	  most	  progressive	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  sexuality	  and	  sexual	  freedom.	  	  While	  this	  dissertation	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  case	  of	  Massachusetts	  as	  the	  first	  state	  with	  legal	  gay	  marriage,	  clearly	  there	  are	  regional	  variables	  at	  play	  across	  New	  England.	  	  For	  example,	  when	  is	  come	  to	  religious	  variables,	  many	  of	  the	  Northeastern	  states	  share	  characteristics	  that	  set	  them	  apart	  from	  other	  US	  regions	  that	  are	  most	  resistant	  to	  LGBT	  rights	  (Pew	  Forum	  on	  Religious	  Life23	  2008).	  	  Also,	  New	  England	  states	  rank	  similarly	  on	  national	  measures	  of	  education	  and	  income.	  	  	  There	  exists	  some	  regional	  variation	  within	  New	  England	  states	  in	  these	  measures,	  and	  the	  intra-­‐region	  differences	  reflect	  the	  larger	  relationship	  of	  these	  variables	  with	  support	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  	  For	  example,	  Maine	  scores	  less	  high	  on	  education	  and	  income,	  and	  Maine	  is	  the	  only	  New	  England	  state	  where	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  is	  not	  legally	  recognized	  (same-­‐sex	  marriage	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  legislature	  in	  2009	  then	  later	  repealed	  via	  a	  closely	  contested	  referendum)	  (The	  National	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Task	  Force	  2011).	  	  However,	  the	  differences	  in	  education,	  income,	  religiosity,	  and	  political	  affiliation	  within	  New	  England	  are	  nothing	  like	  the	  stark	  contrast	  between	  the	  New	  England	  region	  and	  the	  American	  South	  (where	  some	  anti-­‐gay	  marriage	  amendments	  were	  passed	  by	  margins	  of	  75%	  or	  more)	  (measureofamerica.org	  2011,	  Pew	  Forum	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on	  Religion	  and	  Public	  Life	  2008).	  	  	  That	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  was	  first	  made	  legal	  in	  Massachusetts	  certainly	  reflects	  many	  unique	  aspects	  of	  this	  state,	  but	  Massachusetts	  is	  embedded	  in	  the	  larger	  New	  England	  region,	  and	  this	  entire	  region	  is	  exceptional	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  when	  compared	  to	  other	  regions	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  particularly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  LGBT	  rights.	  It	  does	  appear	  that	  public	  opinion	  has	  tilted	  increasingly	  in	  favour	  of	  gay	  marriage	  in	  national	  surveys.	  (Pew	  Forum	  on	  Religion	  and	  Public	  Life	  2010b)	  	  As	  opinions	  shift	  across	  the	  U.S.,	  how	  will	  the	  fight	  for	  marriage	  equality	  take	  shape	  in	  other	  regions?	  	  Will	  activists	  in	  other	  states	  be	  able	  to	  seize	  the	  moment	  when	  a	  political	  opportunity	  emerges?	  	  Will	  they	  be	  able	  to	  strategize	  and	  engage	  their	  local	  cultures	  to	  marshal	  success?	  	  The	  answers	  to	  these	  questions	  are	  far	  from	  certain.	  	  	  If	  we	  are	  to	  learn	  anything	  from	  the	  successful	  Massachusetts	  movement,	  it	  is	  that	  persistence	  pays	  off.	  	  Even	  in	  other	  states	  where	  cultural	  variables	  may	  be	  formidably	  stacked	  against	  the	  advancement	  of	  LGBT	  rights,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  cultures	  are	  not	  static;	  they	  are	  permeable.	  In	  Massachusetts,	  it	  took	  over	  a	  decade	  to	  pass	  the	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  civil	  rights	  bill,	  after	  which	  activists	  wrangled	  for	  a	  decade	  fighting	  for	  domestic	  partner	  benefits,	  and	  after	  that	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spent	  nearly	  as	  long	  fighting	  off	  attempts	  to	  establish	  DOMA.	  Marriage	  equality	  was	  not	  won	  overnight.	  There	  were	  more	  than	  thirty	  long	  years	  between	  the	  time	  that	  Barney	  Frank	  and	  Elaine	  Noble	  first	  sponsored	  the	  gay	  civil	  rights	  bill	  1974	  and	  when	  the	  Massachusetts	  legislature	  defeated	  the	  anti-­‐gay	  marriage	  amendment	  in	  2007.	  	  Activists	  fought	  hard	  all	  those	  years,	  but	  no	  matter	  whether	  they	  won	  and	  lost	  each	  battle,	  they	  never	  stopped	  learning	  and	  strategizing.	  	  They	  never	  stopped	  fighting.	  	  Yes,	  Massachusetts	  is	  unique	  in	  that	  there	  were	  cultural	  conditions	  in	  place	  that	  LGBT	  activists	  could	  build	  on	  to	  gain	  support	  for	  movement	  initiatives	  over	  the	  years.	  	  However,	  there	  must	  be	  unique	  cultural	  conditions	  in	  any	  region	  that	  can	  somehow	  be	  turned	  in	  favour	  of	  LGBT	  rights	  and/or	  marriage	  equality	  given	  the	  right	  combination	  of	  political	  opportunity	  and	  movement	  creativity.	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